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Transformed Anti-Semitism — A  
Report on Anti-Semitism in Ger-  
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## Abstract

It is argued that anti-Semitism has to be understood as a myth which legitimizes the devaluation and inequality of Jews. Two core facets of anti-Semitism are differentiated: traditional and transformed anti-Semitism. Traditional anti-Semitism is an overt devaluation and discrimination which is more or less outlawed in Germany. However, many traditional myths on Jews and Judaism are transformed and adjusted to prejudices against Jews and Judaism which seem to be accepted by the majority. E. g., this transformed anti-Semitism is expressed by an anti-Semitic criticism on Israeli policies. Several other facets of transformed anti-Semitism are differentiated.

On the background of this differentiation of facets several surveys and polls on anti-Semitism in Germany since the 1990th are reviewed. Additionally results of the German survey on „Group-Focused Enmity“ are presented. It is shown that traditional and transformed anti-Semitism are widespread in Germany. Especially male, uneducated and elder respondents seem to be prone to anti-Semitism, but it has to be observed that anti-Semitism is widely share in the political center. Although there are hints to an increasing transformed anti-Semitism it is questioned whether this is a new anti-Semitism. It is argued that modern forms of a transformed anti-Semitism have to be analyzed in the context of populism and propaganda.

## Lizenz

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## **Transformed Anti-Semitism— A Report on Anti-Semitism in Germany**

### **1. Modern stories and old history**

Anti-Semitism in Germany has a long and ongoing history, and since the Holocaust it is a disastrous part of German culture. Although it is a persistent German problem, it has gained new interest due to three phenomena. *Firstly*, during the violent attacks of right-wing extremists in the early 1990s Jews, Jewish symbols and Jewish institutions have been the main targets of racist attacks. In most cases these offences were committed by right-wing extremist groups, because anti-Semitism is a central dimension of right-wing extremism (see Kumanoff 1994; Merkl/Weinberg 2004). Lately, young Muslims are also among the perpetrators displaying anti-Semitic agitation in Islamic circles. However, most offences still stem from right-wing extremist groups (see e. g., Bergmann/Wetzel 2003). *Secondly*, polls showed that a lot of Germans demand a final closure (Schlussstrich) concerning the history of the Holocaust and Germans' responsibility and feelings of guilt. Since the Holocaust this demand has been widespread, but it was tabooed in East-Germany and outlawed in Germany. *Thirdly*, the criticism of Israeli violence against Palestinians following the 2nd Intifada increased and it was mixed with hostile sentiments against Jews in general.

Today, members of the cultural and political elite propagate to engage in an open debate about the responsibility of Jews for the torture of Palestinians and in a debate about feelings of guilt, anti-Semitic stereotypes and prejudice. Notably, two prominent affairs influenced this discourse. During the 2002 election campaign for the parliament of North-Rhine Westphalia Jürgen Möllemann, a prominent member of the Liberal German Party (FDP), publicly complained that criticizing Israeli policy is banned because it is regarded as displaying Anti-Semitism. The affair started, when Jamal Karsli, a Muslim and a former member of the Green Party, who applied for admission in the FDP, gave an interview to the weekly right-

wing newspaper Junge Freiheit. He argued that the 'Zionistic lobby' controls the media entirely. Michel Friedman, the former vice president of the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland (Central Council of Jews in Germany), accused Karsli of being anti-Semitic. Having supported Karsli's application, Möllemann started a public campaign advocating an end to the taboo to speak about, discuss and criticize Israel. Anti-Semitic undertones were shimmering through the whole argumentation, and Möllemann described Israeli policies in Palestine, which he recognized as Jewish, in terms to describe the crimes of the Nazis. Möllemann ignored public proclamations by the Zentralrat stating that criticizing Israel is possible and welcome, as long as it is not anti-Semitic. He accused Friedman of representing Israeli interests. Möllemann's characterization of Friedman as arrogant and aggressive was combined with an accusation of taking political sides (that is, supporting Sharon's politics). Möllemann also held Friedman responsible for an outbreak of anti-Semitism. The whole affair reached its climax when Möllemann sent leaflets to households in North-Rhine Westphalia during the election campaign. The leaflets displayed a picture of Friedman next to Sharon. Even though the FDP excluded Möllemann, because the public pressure increased, Möllemann received a lot of support and a lot of people approved of the anti-Jewish criticism of Israeli policy. At the end, Möllemann tried to present himself both as a victim and a hero. By arguing against a taboo on criticism of Israel he broke the norm against anti-Semitism.

One year later on the 3rd of October 2003, the Day of German Reunification, Martin Hohmann, a member of the Bundestag (Parliament) for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), gave a public speech on "Justice for Germany". He referred to Jews as „Tätervolk" (offenders), e. g., in reference to the Russian revolution. Benz (2004) argued that this talk was unique not because of its underlying anti-Semitic sentiment but because it involved a well prepared anti-Semitic public argumentation. Hohmann argued against the German *Kollektivschuld* (collective guilt/responsibility) and he argued for a closure on this topic. Eleven days after his talk Hohmann was excluded from the CDU fraction, but, similar to Möllemann, he received notable public support.

Both cases became prominent in the media and initiated public debates. The problem was not the anti-Semitic attitude but the fact

that the dialogue was initiated and held in the political center and that it incorporated anti-Semitic myths about conspiracy, Jews as offenders, the exploitation of the Holocaust, the attribution of responsibility for persecution to Jews, a reversal of feelings of guilt from victims to perpetrators, vice versa etc. Additionally, such cases emerged during a period of success for right-wing populist parties in federal elections, during attacks on Jews and Jewish institutions and while changes occurred in public opinions about Jews including criticism of Israel. Several surveys and polls were conducted during this period which seemed to portray a new wave of anti-Semitism. They offer clues about the intensity of anti-Semitism, but several questions can not be answered, e. g.: Is a new form of anti-Semitism emerging? Do we have to consider different facets of anti-Semitism? Is anti-Semitism increasing and who is susceptible to it? The answers to such questions are not only relevant for this discourse, but for providing a starting point for combating anti-Semitism. That is why the main aim of the current paper is to work out facets of anti-Semitism, to give a report on surveys referring to such facets, and to gain insight into the common structure and dynamics of German anti-Semitism. To elaborate on patterns of anti-Semitism we will *firstly* provide definitions of different facets of anti-Semitism. *Secondly*, we will review studies and polls to determine the distribution and intensity of these facets. In particular, we will present results of our project on group-focused enmity. *Thirdly*, we will discuss anti-Semitism in regard to tradition and change, the social margin and center, political orientations, prejudiced sentiments and personality and propaganda. To facilitate the rather complex results we will highlight observations and conclusions in the form of short summaries.

## **2. Traditional Devaluation and Transformed myths**

Our main argument is that expressions of anti-Semitism are legitimizing societal myths reinforcing discrimination against Jews. We define legitimizing myths as ideological systems which comprise sets of opinions about the nature of ingroups and outgroup. The core of myths about outgroups like Jews is devaluation and inequality. The core functions are to explain the truth, e. g., about the nature of

outgroups, the difference between 'us' and 'them', and the truth about the relations between the groups, and to offer knowledge and linkages for the ingroup. This is comparable to other forms of prejudice, although there are myths specific to Jews and Judaism with different prejudicial expressions (see Fein 1987, for a comparable definition; see e. g., Wodak 1997, for discourse studies on anti-Semitism which give a good picture about anti-Semitic myths and their function).

To determine such expressions we refer to research on prejudice and racism. Basically, research has differentiated between traditional and modern prejudice. We propose that the core of *traditional anti-Semitism* is a categorical separation of Jews and Judaism expressed by negative attitudes and images representing an antipathy towards Jews based on a generalization which is directed toward Jews as a group or toward Jewish people because they are members of that group (Allport 1954). This devaluation and discrimination is partly linked to the myth about responsibility and the reversal of feelings of guilt. Guilt is a central dimension of anti-Semitism. Additionally, traditional anti-Semitism is based on generalized stereotypes and an over-estimation of Jewish threat. It is represented by manifest behavioural intentions, social distance, and the myth about power and influence.

Old and conventional myths that are passed on through generations are the bases of modern or *transformed anti-Semitism*. Traditional myths are transformed and adjusted to current topics like the 9/11 attacks, the Israel-Palestine conflict or debates about a final closure on the history of the Holocaust. In this sense anti-Semitism is 'chameleon-like': It adjusts to time. Anti-Semitism takes on a new form, while still comprising old anti-Semitic myths and stereotypes, such as Jewish conspiracy, Jewish power, and the notion of Jews as murderers. It also involves attempts to stop feeling guilty through the use of arguments concerning a reversal of guilt. Several themes can be used for transferring anti-Semitism into a new transformed form—as long as the themes are emotionally loaded and easily functionalized. One example is the current debate on German victimization during the 2nd World War bombardments of Dresden and the suffering of Germans. This debate has emerged now, 60 years after the end of the war, while nearly all eye-witnesses have died. Within this debate the role of perpetrators and victims is

fused. Other topics seem to be of ongoing importance, e. g., solidarity, fear of infiltration and economic power. Anti-Semitic stereotypes are not used any time. E. g., racial stereotypes of Jews seem to be out(lawed) at the moment. However it is probable that they are reactivated one day again if they fit to the *Zeitgeist*, or they are transformed into a modern expression. Stereotypes like those about 'Jewish appearance' survive by being embedded in traditional myths and they can be reactivated easily. Contrary to traditional anti-Semitism, most transformed anti-Semitic myths are not normatively banned, as they do not appear to portray anti-Semitism at first glance. All expressions of anti-Semitism that make use of unspecific terms (such as the global and persistent claim concerning Jewish power) can be considered transformed forms. That is, its configuration changes throughout time and under specific circumstances, but the substance underlying the myths and stereotypes persists representing the core of the antipathy.

Transformed anti-Semitism is similar, but not identical, to *secondary anti-Semitism*. Secondary anti-Semitism represents one facet of transformed anti-Semitism. It is a specific German form that plays anti-Semitism down and dismisses it as trivial—even partly denying Auschwitz. This form also calls for a final closure on this chapter of German history (Bergmann/Erb 1996). Again, prosecutors and victims are readily interchanged and anti-Semitic stereotypes are frequently employed, such as Jewish power, greediness and slyness resulting in presumed attempts to take advantages of the NS-past. The underlying motive appears to be to free oneself of any feelings of guilt by blaming the victims and to maintain a constant, positive identity (Haudry 2004). Anti-Semitism is communicated via a 'detour', e. g., via the argument that Jews separate themselves from others or take advantage of the Holocaust and/or the NS-past. Further, expressions of transformed anti-Semitism refer to the attempt to free oneself of any feelings of guilt and shame by accusing Jews of taking advantage of the Holocaust or of allegedly demolishing Palestine, and the comparison of Israeli policy in Palestine with Jewish policy or even Nazi policy (that is, they behaved in the same horrible way). An ostensible weaker facet of anti-Semitism is represented by a criticism of Israeli policy which is regarded as Jewish policy. Heyder/ Iser/Schmidt (2005) proposed that at least one of four criteria has to be met before a criticism of Israel can be

considered anti-Semitic: 1. The denial of the right of Israel to exist and the right of self-defense; 2. A historical comparisons between Israeli policy concerning Palestine and the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich; 3. Evaluating Israeli policy with double standards, that is, particular political measures are criticized in Israel but not in other countries; 4. The transferring of anti-Semitic stereotypes to Israel and, in turn, the transformation of Israel to the myth of 'the collective Jew' (der kollektive Jude). If the criticism of Israel does not meet any of these criteria it is not considered anti-Semitic.

Another facet of transformed anti-Semitism can be *modern racism*, although both concepts are not identical (for the concept of modern racism, see Dovidio/Gaertner 1998). Transformed anti-Semitism is a subtle form of prejudice that is expressed whenever it seems safe and acceptable to do so and when antipathy and inequality can be disguised. Similar to modern racism, transformed anti-Semitism is perceived as acceptable. However, we propose that contrary to the assumptions of theories on modern racism its kernel of antipathy and inequality is not specifically hidden. People are not motivated to be perceived as tolerant or friendly, because they perceive that some anti-Semitic opinions and stereotypes do not contradict norms; they seem to be accepted by the majority. E. g., it is represented by the relativization, extenuation and (partly) by a neglect of the crimes of the Nazis and the demand for a final closure concerning the feelings of guilt for the Holocaust. The power of transformed anti-Semitism lies in evoking sentiments and relying on threats, e. g., by right-wing populists who make use of the freedom of speech and rely on the assumption that the majority feels and thinks the same way. This is what happened in the cases of Möllemann and Hohmann. Based on such a differentiation between traditional and transformed anti-Semitism, we can review and evaluate surveys and polls on anti-Semitism in Germany.

### **3. Frequency of anti-Semitic myths in Germany**

Regular polls and surveys do not differentiate between facets of anti-Semitism. They report frequencies in order to obtain an overview of the problem. That is, they report expressions on an item-level. However, we will argue that we can deduce the facets of anti-



Semitism. We reviewed empirical studies on anti-Semitism from the mid 1990s, because during that time a renewed political and scientific interest developed. This review is presented firstly, followed by results of our own study.

### 3.1 Observations by polls and surveys

Several surveys and polls have been conducted since the beginning of the 2nd Intifada. We categorized findings according to single items for the facets based on our definitions. Table 1 gives an overview of these facets and their measures and the frequency of agreement.

**Table 1:** Surveys and polls on anti-Semitism in Germany

Facet of anti-Semitism	Item/Question	Outcome/agreement in %	Source/Author	Sample
<b>Traditional</b>				
<i>Stereotyping</i>	One can detect Jews by their appearance.	18%	Stern <sup>1</sup> 2003	1.301 adults
	Money plays a bigger role for Jews than for other people.	9%	IDA <sup>2</sup> 2003	1.075 teenagers
	More than others, the Jews use dirty tricks to achieve what they want.	23%	NB 2002; DNB 2003 <sup>3</sup>	5.051 teenagers
	Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want.	21% (2002) 22% (2004)	ADL <sup>4</sup>	
	Answers to the question: "Why Germans find Jews disturbing". - economic power - societal influence - Jewish faith	32% 32% 19%	BM/ZfA <sup>5</sup> 2003	1.006
<i>over-estimation of group size</i>	Estimation of numbers of Jews in Germany > 5 Million 1-5 Million	31% 26%	Stern 2003	1.301 adults

<i>Manifest</i>	It would be better for Germany not to have Jews in the country.	5,7%	Frindte/ Funke/Jacob 1997;	2.133 teenager <sup>a</sup>
	Jews should not have any higher positions in the state.	8,8%	Frindte 1999	
	Would you say it would be better (for Germany) to have no Jews in the country?	10% East- and 8% West- Germans	Allens- bach <sup>6</sup> 1998	Re- presenta- tive
	I belong to those who do not like Jews.	5,3%	Frindte et al. 1997; Frindte 1999	2.133 teenagers
<i>Antipathy</i>	Which groups in society are perceived as negative? People with Jewish descent	15% East- and 17% West- Germans	Focus <sup>1</sup> 2003	1.800 adults
	'a great amount of Germans dislikes Jews'	12%	BM/ZfA 2003	1.006
<i>Guilt exploitation and attribu- tion</i>	Jews are partly responsible for being hated and persecuted.	29%	Der Spiegel <sup>1</sup> 2002	re- presenta- tive poll
	Jews are guilty accomplices if they are hated and persecuted.	5,3%	Frindte et al. 1997; Frindte 1999	2.133 teenagers
	Jews are to be blamed for the death of Christ.	5%	IDA 2003	1.075 teenagers
	Because of their behavior Jews are not at all blameless for their persecution.	6%		
	Jews have so many problems because god punishes them for crucifying Jesus Christ.	9%	Stern 2003	1.301 adults
	Because of their behavior Jews are not at all blameless for their prosecution.	19%		
Complicity of Jews for their prosecution	19%			

<i>social distance</i>	'do not want a Jew as neighbor'	13%	BM/ZfA 2003	1.006
	... it would be unpleasant if a Jew married into their family.	28%	ALLBUS <sup>7</sup> 2002	2.820 representative
<i>Influence and power</i>	In Germany Jews have too much influence. Jews have too much influence in the world.	4,2%  3,9%	Frindte/ Funke/Jacob 1997; Frindte 1999	2.133 teenagers
	Even today the influence of Jews is big.	8% East- and 9% West- Germans	Brähler/ Angermeyer (BA) 2001 (2002)	5.051 representative
	Jews have too much influence in the world.	  13,20%	Wittenberg 2000	6.671 representative
	Even today Jews have too much influence.	28%	NB 2002; DNB 2003	5.051
	Jews have too much influence in the world.	29%	Der Spiegel 2002	representative
	Jews have too much influence in our society.	20%	BM/ZfA 2003	1.006
	Today, like in the past, Jews have to much influence on world events.	25%		
	Power and influence of Jews in the business world is incommensurate with the amount of Jews in the total population.	33%	Stern 2003	1.301 adults
	Jews have too much influence in the world.	28%		
	Even today the influence of Jews is big.	10%	IDA 2003	1.075 teenagers
	Jews have too much power in the business world.	32% (2002) 24% (2004)	ADL 2002, 2004	adults

<i>Separation</i>	There is simply something particular and peculiar about Jews and they are not particularly suited to us.	20%	NB 2002 DN 2003	5.051
	There is simply something special and peculiar about Jews and they do not fit with us.	20%		
	There is simply something special and peculiar about Jews and they do not fit with us.	6%	IDA 2003	1.075 teenagers
	There is something special and peculiar about Jews and that's why they do not fit with us.	17%	Stern 2003	1.301 adults
	Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind.	24% (2002) 30% (2004)	ADL 2002, 2004	adults
	Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country.	55% (2002) 50% (2004)		
	Jews primarily feel close to Israel; they are only marginally interested in the affairs of the country they are living in.	35%	Stern 2003	1.301 adults
<b>Transformed</b>				
<i>Modern separation</i>	Jews are more loyal to Israel than to this country.	55% (2002) 50% (2004)	ADL 2002, 2004	
	Jews primarily feel close to Israel; they are only marginally interested in the affairs of the country they are living in.	35%	Stern 2003	1.301 adults

<i>Advantage from the past and exploitation</i>	Many Jews today try to take advantage of the past.	17,00%	IDA 2003	1.075 teenagers
	Many Jews try to exploit history for their own purpose and take advantage of the past (the Third Reich) and let Germans pay for it.	13%	Alheim/Heger 2002	2.167 students
	Jews are intelligent in terms of taking advantage of the guilty conscience of Germans.	20%		
<i>Secondary with Criticism on Israeli policy mixed with NS-comparisons</i>	Israel practices a war of extermination against the Palestinians.	25%	IDA	1.075 teenagers
	The Nazi past is used by Jews to maintain the current Israeli politics.	19%		
	Answers to the question: Why Germans find Jews disturbing. - "enrichment of individual Jews through reparations"	39%	BM/ZfA 2003	1.006
	Answers to the question: Why Germans find Jews disturbing. - "Israeli politics in occupied areas"	65%	BM/ZfA 2003	1.006
<i>final stroke</i>	It is time for a final closure regarding the National Socialist past.	36%	Alheim/Heger (2002)	2.167 students
	I get angry when Germans are still today accused of the crimes towards Jews.	70%		
	It is time for a final closure regarding the national-socialist past.	49%	IDA 2003	1.075 teenagers
	As a youngster today one does not have to think about feelings of guilt experienced by Germans towards Jews.	16,1%	Frindte et al. 1997; Frindte 1999	2.133 teenagers
	Centuries after the end of the war we should not speak so much about the persecution of Jews, as we should reach closure with the past.	25,1%		
	Closure on the topic 'Holocaust'	61%	Stern 2003	1.301 adults
	Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.	58% (2002) 56% (2004)	ADL	

<i>Neglect of responsibility</i>	The German population has no particular responsibility towards Jews.	20,1%	Frindte et al. 1997; Frindte 1999	2.133 teenagers
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*Annotation:*

1 weekly magazine; see see [www.hagalil.org/hagalil/or/2004/01/antisemitismstudien.htm](http://www.hagalil.org/hagalil/or/2004/01/antisemitismstudien.htm)

2 Documentation Center for Work on Anti-Racism; see Rheims/Schmidt 2004

3 Niedermayer/Brähler (NB) 2002; Decker/Niedermayer/Brähler (DNB) 2003

4 Anti-Defamation League

5 Berliner Morgenpost (Newspaper) and Centre for Research on Anti-Semitism

6 Surveyinstitut on Anti-Semitism

7 General German Social Survey; analyses done by the authors

It is not possible to summarize the responses via statistical analyses of the structure and their relations. We believe that the categorization by facets is convincing because of face validity. Overall, the studies showed that any anti-Semitic myth is less frequent in samples of teenagers and young adults. *Traditional anti-Semitism* is firstly represented by *stereotyping* Jews, advocated by about 20-30% of the respondents. Further, any myths are accompanied by an *overestimation* of group size: The study by the weekly magazine Der Stern (2003) showed that more than 50% of Germans completely overestimate the number of Jews, which actually are about 100.000. An open rejection of Jews by *manifest anti-Semitism* was well below 10%, whereas *antipathy* was expressed by about 16% of Germans. However, the Center for Research on Anti-Semitism (BM/ZfA 2003) showed that only 12% believe that a lot of Germans dislike Jews. Interestingly, about 20% of Germans share the *myths concerning Jews' guilt/responsibility* for being persecuted and hated. *Social distance* varies between 13% and 28%. The conspiracy and threatening myth about Jewish *influence* is supported by nearly 25%. *Separatist* anti-Semitism concerning the myth that there is something peculiar about Jews is supported by about 20%, whereas the accusation that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to Germany ranges between 30-50%. Unfortunately, only the Anti-Defamation League conducted a *cross-national* survey throughout selected European countries and the USA in 2002 (see also ADL 2002a/b/c; see table 1). Results indicated a decline in traditional anti-Semitism, except in the UK. In 2002, German (36%) and Belgian (35%) re-

spondents seemed to be more traditionally anti-Semitic than French (25%), British (24%) or Danish (16%) respondents.

*Transformed anti-Semitism* is nearly represented by homogeneity of Jews and Judaism with Israel and a legitimization of anti-Semitic sentiments referring to 'misbehavior' of Israel. It is represented by a *modernized myth of separation*, which is advocated by 35-55%. The myth that Jews try to take *advantage of the past and the Holocaust* is adopted by 17-20% of Germans. *Secondary anti-Semitism* which refers to a criticism of Israeli policy with reference to Nazi crimes) ranges from 19% (comparing Israeli policy with Nazi crimes) to 65% (perceiving Israeli policy as Jewish). A *final closure* to the history of the Holocaust is demanded by 36% of students, and by up to 70% of Germans. Only Frindte et al. (1997) measured the neglect of responsibility for Jews, which 20,1% of teenagers disagreed with.

To sum up, the selected results show a high agreement with the myths about Jewish conspiracy, classical stereotyping, devaluation, and social distancing from Jews. These traditional anti-Semitic myths can be reinforced by putting Jews in a separate category that is distinct from the ingroup. Traditional anti-Semitism and the exclusion of Jews are normatively outlawed, partly because of German's historical responsibility. How can people express anti-Semitism based on feelings of guilt and shame? One way is to refer to the *Zeitgeist*—that is, reversing feelings of guilt by pointing out Jews' "bad" behavior. Another possibility is to maintain anti-Semitic attitudes and to free oneself of any dissonance with negative feelings, guilt or shame. Yet another way is to demand a final closure of this part of history.

Agreement with anti-Semitic statements is still substantial in Germany. Traditional anti-Semitism is just as common as transformed anti-Semitism. We assume that every myth about anti-Semitism is aiming at *devaluation*. Devaluation is attained via traditional anti-Semitic myths expressing antipathy, stereotypes, and social distancing and via myths referring to Jews in Israel. Secondly, we observed exclusion and separation which aims at *inequality*. In particular, we can observe a reversal of feelings of guilt and an attempt to forget this particular part of history—thus, protecting one's identity and *legitimizing* devaluation and inequality. However, this rhetoric and its facets are only deduced from single observations,

and we do not know whether these facets can be differentiated statistically and to which extent they are interrelated.

### 3.2 Observations by the survey on „Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit“

Since 2002, prejudice and discrimination in Germany have been observed in the representative survey on Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit (Group-focused Enmity/GFE). The project is headed by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (University of Bielefeld) and funded by a consortium of the Volkswagen, Freudenberg and Möllgaard Foundations. It is the most comprehensive German study on prejudice since the Second World War. Each year about 3.000 German citizens are interviewed by telephone. Patterns of prejudice and discrimination, general social and political attitudes, and individual background variables are measured. Additionally, between 2002 and 2004, a panel-survey was conducted with 900 respondents in the last wave.

The GFE-surveys, conducted in 2002 and 2003, and the panel concentrated on traditional anti-Semitism. In 2004, anti-Semitism was assessed in more detail. After several pre-tests five facets of anti-Semitism emerged, which were supported through confirmatory factor analyses. Heyder/Iser/Schmidt (2005) presented a first report on the different facets. Due to the particular item content and in order to compare the results with other surveys in the current report we differentiate between seven facets of anti-Semitism: There were two facets of traditional anti-Semitism: *Old myths about Jewish influence and attribution of responsibility* (representing classical anti-Semitism by Heyder/Iser/Schmidt). Additionally, five facets of transformed anti-Semitism were observed: *Secondary anti-Semitism* with reference to the NS-past—taking *advantage of the past* and *demanding closure*—and with reference to Israel—*separatist anti-Semitism*, *anti-Semitic criticism of Israel* and *criticism of Israel via NS-comparisons*. Although Heyder/Iser/Schmidt (2005) did not differentiate between traditional and transformed anti-Semitism we assumed that the last five facets are close to our definition of transformed anti-Semitism.



Linked to transformed anti-Semitism, we assessed the *reversal of feelings of guilt for being discriminated against* representing an ideological immunization of prejudice (Zick/Küpper 2005). Additionally, non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel was measured representing a general criticism of aggressive actions, particularly against Palestinians. All items were answered on a 4-point rating scale (1 = not agree at all, 2 = rather not agree, 3 = rather agree, 4 = fully agree). Table 2 shows item wordings in German and English, frequency of agreement and the internal consistency of the scales (in case a facet was assessed with more than one item).

Similar to other studies, the GFE-survey revealed an alarming number of Germans agreeing to anti-Semitic myths. However, there are striking differences between traditional and transformed anti-Semitism: (1) 65% demand a final closure of the history of the Holocaust; (2) 57% express criticism regarding Israel containing comparisons or associations with Nazi crimes; (3) 52% presume that Jews separate themselves from others; (4) 45% consider that Jews try to take advantage of the past; (5) 38% draw comparisons between Israeli policy and all Jews; (6) 21% agree with the myth about Jewish influence; (7) 17% blame Jews themselves for being persecuted. Only 11% of all respondents did rather not or not at all agree with none of the facets and 4% agreed with all of them. Table 2 shows all distributions for every single item.

**Table 2:** Agreement to each item of the facets of anti-Semitism in percentages (n = 2.660)

Facets of anti-Semitism	English	Original German items	not agree at all	rather not agree	rather agree	fully agree	Total Agreement <sup>5</sup>
<b>Traditional</b>							
Influence <sup>1</sup>	Jews have too much influence in Germany.	Juden haben in Deutschland zuviel Einfluß.	43,6	34,9	10,9	10,6	21,5
Attribution of guilt <sup>1</sup>	Because of their behavior Jews are partly to blame for their persecution.	Durch ihr Verhalten sind die Juden an ihren Verfolgungen mitschuldig.	50,4	32,2	11,1	6,3	17,4

Advantage from past	Many Jews today try to take advantage of the "Third Reich" past.	Viele Juden versuchen, aus der Vergangenheit des Dritten Reiches heute ihren Vorteil zu ziehen.	21,6	33,3	25,2	20,0	45,2
Secondary anti-Semitism (Final stroke and relativization of Holocaust) (alpha .80)	I get angry when Germans still today are accused of the crimes against Jews.	Ich ärgere mich darüber, daß den Deutschen auch heute noch die Verbrechen an den Juden vorgehalten werden.	11,9	19,8	23,8	44,5	65,3
	I do not like hearing again and again about the German crimes against Jews.	Ich bin es leid, immer wieder von den deutschen Verbrechen an den Juden zu hören.	14,6	23,2	20,9	41,3	
Separatist anti-Semitism <sup>2</sup> (alpha .78)	German Jews feel more related to Israel than to Germany.	Die deutschen Juden fühlen sich stärker mit Israel als mit Deutschland verbunden.	7,9	36,6	33,7	21,9	52
	Jews in this country are more interested in Israeli than in German affairs.	Die Juden hierzulande interessieren sich mehr für israelische als für deutsche Angelegenheiten.	10,7	41,5	29,2	18,6	
Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel <sup>3</sup> (alpha .75)	Because of their politics I start to dislike Jews more and more.	Durch die israelische Politik werden mir die Juden immer unsympathischer.	23,1	45,2	19,1	12,6	38,1
	Considering Israel's politics I can understand that people do not like Jews.	Bei der Politik, die Israel macht, kann ich gut verstehen, daß man etwas gegen Juden hat.	18,9	36,8	28,9	15,5	

NS-comparing criticism of Israel (alpha .59)	Israel is fighting a war of extermination against Palestinians.	Israel führt einen Vernichtungskrieg gegen die Palästinenser.	7,6	24,0	33,2	35,1	57,3
	What Israel is doing today to Palestinians is basically not that different from what the Nazis did to Jews.	Was der Staat Israel heute mit den Palästinensern macht, ist im Prinzip auch nichts anderes als das, was die Nazis im Dritten Reich mit den Juden gemacht haben.	18,8	30,0	23,9	27,3	
<b>Non-anti-Semitic Israel-criticism<sup>4</sup></b> (alpha .75)	I get angry if I think of Israel's behavior towards Palestinians.	Ich werde wütend, wenn ich daran denke, wie Israel die Palästinenser behandelt.	4,0	14,2	37,5	44,4	84
	It is not fair that Israel is taking land from the Palestinians.	Es ist ungerecht, daß Israel den Palästinensern Land wegnimmt.	3,9	10,0	34,5	51,5	

*Annotation:*

- 1 Labeled as classical anti-Semitism by Heyder/Iser/Schmidt (2005)
- 2 Labeled as anti-Semitic separation by Heyder/Iser/Schmidt (2005)
- 3 Labeled as Israel-referring anti-Semitism by Heyder/Iser/Schmidt (2005)
- 4 Labeled as Israel-critical attitude by Heyder/Iser/Schmidt (2005)
- 5 (Mean) Percentage of those who agree to the item or facet.

Results support the observations of other studies. Traditional anti-Semitism was weaker than the facets of transformed anti-Semitism, maybe because traditional ways are blocked by public banishing and individuals mix anti-Semitism with sentiments of the time, e. g., to bypass being blamed to be anti-Semitic in a sophisticated way. There was a clear tendency for people to free themselves of feelings of guilt: 2/3 of respondents agreed with the statement that they get angry over accusations and do not want to be confronted with the Holocaust any more. We can only speculate as to whether this shows that these people have already reached closure, while refu-

sing to be obstructed and therefore getting angry. Additionally, we noticed that anti-Semitic criticism of Israeli policy is widely shared, especially criticism which compares Israeli policy to the crimes of the Nazis. To estimate whether the frequency of anti-Semitic myths is problematic, we have to examine the extent to which the facets of anti-Semitism are related to each other.

#### 4. Between old and new—Links between facets of anti-Semitism

The reports of the polls and surveys do not contain information about any relations between items and constructs. Therefore, we will concentrate on data of the GFE-survey (see table 3).

**Table 3:** Inter-correlations between facets of anti-Semitism and non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel

Myth of ...	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1 Influence	-	.56	.35	.34	.55	.20	.46	.48	.07
2 Attribution of responsibility		-	.35	.32	.52	.23	.45	.47	.04
3 Modern Separatist anti-Semitism			-	.32	.38	.32	.42	.33	.13
4 Final closure				-	.48	.32	.31	.33	.04
5 Advantage of past					-	.29	.45	.47	.09
6 Israel criticism via NS-comparison						-	.39	.25	.37
7 Anti-Semitic Israel criticism							-	.50	.19
8 <i>Reversal of feelings of guilt: Own fault being not liked</i>								-	.06
9 <i>Non anti-Semitic Israel criticism</i>									-

Correlations with  $r > .07$  are significant with  $p < .001$ ;  $r < = .07$  at least marginal significant with  $p < .1$ .

All facets of anti-Semitism were significantly correlated with each other. There were high correlations between the myth about influence, the attribution of responsibility (that Jews are responsible for their persecution) and the accusation of taking advantage of the Holocaust. Obviously, old myths about influence, blame and reversal of

feelings of guilt were closely interlinked. Interestingly, anti-Semitic criticism of Israel criticism, which might justify disliking Jews, correlated substantially with these facets. Moderate correlations were detected between separatist anti-Semitism and demands for a final closure of this chapter of German history, while only a modest correlation was detected with criticism of Israel via NS-comparisons. Additionally, some facets remarkably correlated with the reversal of feelings of guilt which is a measure of the immunization of anti-Semitism by blaming Jews for not being liked: anti-Semitic Israel criticism, the myth about Jewish influence, the attribution of responsibility and the accusation of taking advantage of the past. Interestingly, there were hardly any relations between traditional facets and those referring to the NS-past and non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel. However, moderate and modest correlations could be observed with a transformed anti-Semitism referring to Israel, especially with criticism with reference to NS-crimes. Thus, these results raise the question of whether the relations indicate some kind of new anti-Semitism or a subtle prejudice against Jews and Judaism?

Throughout the debate on anti-Semitism one side argues that new anti-Semitism is expressed by criticizing Israeli policy in Palestine, which even spreads into the political left-wing spectrum. We could not observe any correlations between non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel and traditional anti-Semitism. However, there were modest relations with separatist anti-Semitism ( $r = .13$ ) and anti-Semitic criticism of Israel ( $r = .19$ ), and an impressive relation to criticism of Israel via NS-comparisons ( $r = .37$ ). Results indicated that people are able to criticize Israel without employing facets of anti-Semitism mentioning Israel—correlations were substantial but only moderate, indicating that it is not just a mix-up because of the use of the word "Israel"—but people are not very sensitive to Israel criticism that contains NS-comparisons. We assume that even though people are able to draw clear and sensitive distinctions between non anti-Semitic Israel criticism and Israel criticism that contains anti-Semitic components, some are doing this not very carefully. It seems as if Israel criticism is used as a bypass for anti-Semitism even though it does not have to be the case and is not always the case.

Is it possible to criticize Israel without anti-Semitic undertones? For a detailed analysis we differentiated respondents who agreed more or less to each single facet of anti-Semitism from respondents

who criticized Israel in a non anti-Semitic way. For those criticizing Israel in non anti-Semitic way, 23% still agreed with the myth about influence, 19% attributed responsibility to Jews, 47% assumed that Jews try to take advantage of the past, 49% agreed with separatist anti-Semitism, 62% became angry for being blame for the Holocaust, 58% drew parallels between NS-crimes and Israel's behavior toward Palestinians, 34% agreed with anti-Semitic Israel criticism. Only 10% of the respondents who criticized Israel did not agree with any facet of anti-Semitism! These people were especially better educated and (rather) left-wing respondents from West-Germany (and young, educated East-German men; details below). Results are not in line with hypotheses about left-wing anti-Semitism; at least it does not seem to be widespread.

Is criticism of Israel a hidden form of anti-Semitism? Analyses showed that criticism of Israel via comparisons to the NS correlated with criticism of Palestinian attacks on Israel (measured by two items: "Palestinian attacks against Israel can not be justified at all"; "I think it is horrible how the Palestinians try to destroy the state of Israel"). More than 60% rather or fully agreed. Nevertheless, criticism of the Palestinians correlated only modestly with criticism of Israel ( $r = .21$ ). There is also a slight positive correlation with Israel criticism that contains NS-comparisons ( $r = .10$ ). Correlations with more traditional facets of anti-Semitism are very weak but negative. These findings indicate that in some cases criticism of Israel via NS-comparisons might "only" be an expression of very harsh criticism of aggressive Israeli attacks in general, without hidden anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, correlations between non anti-Semitic Israel criticisms and criticism of aggressive Palestinian acts were only modest. We conclude that criticism of Israel via NS-comparison can be, in some cases, just a harsh, not very sensible and conscious reaction to aggressive conflicts in general.

To summarize, there are few people criticizing Israel harshly because of its politics toward the Palestinians without displaying anti-Semitism. However, 90% agree to one or the other facet of anti-Semitism. Again, we have to state that criticism of Israel does not have to be anti-Semitic, but in most cases it goes along with an agreement with clear anti-Semitic statements.

## 5. Between tradition and change—Is something new emerging?

It is almost impossible to obtain sufficient information from polls and surveys on trends of anti-Semitism because the studies provide only selective evidence. The Institute for Demoskopie Allensbach observed *traditional manifest anti-Semitism* in the last 50 years by asking representative German samples: "Would you say it would be better (for Germany) to have no Jews in the country?" In 1952, 37% of a representative sample answered it would be "better", whereas in 1998 merely 10% of East-Germans and 8% of West-Germans indicated it would be "better". Wittenberg (2000) observed a decrease of anti-Semites since 1994: In 1994, 19,1% were categorized as anti-Semitic, in 1996 12,1% and in 1998 10,6%. In contrast, Niedermayer/Brähler (2002) showed that more respondents in 2002, compared to 1999, considered it "understandable" (1999: 20%/2002: 36%) that "for some Jewish people are unpleasant" (undecided: 1999: 25%/2002: 26%; "incomprehensible": 1999: 56%/2002: 38%). The Stern-study showed a rather stable level of *stereotyping* with respect to Jewish peculiarity: 17% in 2003, 18% in 1998. Furthermore, our own analyses (Allbus) revealed an increase in *social distance*: Compared to 1996, more respondents considered it unpleasant if a Jew married into their family (2002: 28,1%; 1996: 26%). Compared to 1991 (32%), less respondents agreed in 2002 (29%) to the *attribution of responsibility* to Jews themselves for being hated and persecuted (Der Spiegel 2002). The Stern-study in 2003 revealed an unclear trend: Regarding attribution of responsibility via identifying Jews as the murderers of Christ (9% agreed in 2002, 8% in 1998) and for their persecution (in 2003 19%, in 1998 14% agreed; respectively regarding complicity because of their behavior 19% in 2003 and 17% in 1998). Referring to the myth of Jewish *influence* Niedermayer/Brähler (2002) stated an increase between 1994 (7%), 1997 (12%) and 2002 (14%) in East-Germany and even more dramatically in West-Germany (1994: 17%; 1998: 14%; 2002: 31%). In contrast, in 2002, Der Spiegel reported that 29% agreed with myths about influence compared to 36% in 1991. In 1996, 25,8% of the respondents of the General German Social Survey (Allbus) agreed with it. The Stern-study displayed an unclear trend: in 2003 33%, and in 1998 36% agreed that "Power and influence of the Jews in the business world is incommensurate with

the amount of Jews in the total population"; in 2003 28%, and in 1998 28% agreed with myths about influence, while agreement with *stereotypes* about Jewish appearances did not change (18% agreed in 2003 and 1998). Unfortunately, trends in *transformed anti-Semitism* are more difficult to detect. Concerning *modern separatist* anti-Semitism data of the Stern (2003), an unclear picture emerged: in 2003 35% and in 1998 25% perceived a stronger commitment of Jews to Israel than to Germany. While the agreement with a *final closure* of the Holocaust (2003: 61%, 1998: 63%) stayed nearly stable, the accusation of taking *advantage of the past* seemed to decrease (in 2003 36%, in 1998 41% agreed).

Data of the German GFE-study is more informative because three facets of Jewish influence, attribution of responsibility for persecution and taking advantage of the NS-past were assessed in every survey. We observed significant differences between 2002 and 2004, but we could not detect a clear trend ( $F(6,13782) = 10.183, p < .001$ ): In 2003, there was an increase in all three facets, but in 2004 there was a decrease back to the level reported in 2002. The peak in 2003 can neither be explained by a specific group regarding demographic variables nor by political attitudes or party preference. However, a clear peak in all three facets indicates not only an increase by chance. It can be assumed that contextual factors like the change in public opinion after the "Möller-mann-affair" and public debates on the 2nd Intifada triggered anti-Semitic attitudes in 2003.

To sum up, even though studies indicate a decrease in traditional anti-Semitism, this trend can not be shown in short-term comparisons. The hypothesis that traditional anti-Semitism decreases while transformed anti-Semitism increases is not sustained at all. In contrast, the observations indicate that anti-Semitism can fall and rise. We assume that different myths about anti-Semitism can be picked up by incident and charged with political, social and cultural sentiments of the time. A closer link between topics of the time and anti-Semitic sentiments might have already changed the climate and it can be assumed that anti-Semitism has reached groups representing the societal center.



## 6. Between the margin and the center: Which social groups are prone to anti-Semitism?

Results of polls and surveys indicate an alarming level of anti-Semitism in Germany, which can be interpreted as an indicator of a weak social norm not to be anti-Semitic. To get a clearer picture we tried to get information about societal groups, especially those representing the subjective vertical status position. Most reports concentrate on demographic groups (for a comparable report see Bergmann 2004b). Using data of the GFE-survey we can analyze interactions of such factors and we can analyze the impact of the perceived social status.

*East-West-differences* in traditional anti-Semitism could not be detected by Brähler/Angermeyer (2002) (8% agreed in the East, 9% in the West). Niedermayer/Brähler (2002) reported only small differences between East- and West-German respondents according to anti-Semitic stereotypes and a lower support for the myth of influence by East-Germans. In contrast, Frindte/Funke/Jacob (1997) found that East-German teenagers, especially males, are more prone to anti-Semitism than West-German teenagers. Wittenberg (2000) reported that in East-Germany an increase of anti-Semitism is observable, whereas anti-Semitism is decreasing in the West (Wittenberg 2000). With respect to the myth of influence there is a discontinuous trend between 1994, 1998 and 2002 in East- (1994: 9%, 1998: 12%, 2002: 8%) and West-Germany (1994: 13%, 1998: 9%, 2002: 20%). The GFE-survey in 2004 showed a significant multivariate East-West effect on all facets of anti-Semitism ( $F(7,2029) = 3.811, p < .001$ ). The only univariate effects occur regarding demands for a final closure and criticism of Israel via NS-comparisons. More so than East-Germans, West-Germans want to distance themselves from the Holocaust. East-Germans agree more with the criticism of Israel in regards to NS-comparisons. Even if not significant, East-Germans also tend to agree more with anti-Semitic criticism of Israel and separatist statements containing "Israel", while West-Germans are more likely to claim that Jews try to take advantages of the past.

*Gender:* Male respondents are more anti-Semitic (e. g., Niedermayer/Brähler 2002; Frindte/Funke/Jacob 1997). The poll run by the Focus showed that male respondents, between 21 and 30 years

of age, are particularly likely to be prone to anti-Semitism. Wittenberg (2000) reported that gender displayed the reported influence only in West-Germany. The GFE-survey in 2004 showed a significant impact of gender on all facets ( $F(7,2029) = 13.137, p < .001$ ). This became (univariate) apparent in terms of men believing more in the traditional myth of Jewish influence, attribute more responsibility for the persecution of Jews, and accusing Jews more than women of taking advantage of the past. Thus, men agree more than women with traditional elements of anti-Semitism. In contrast, women rely more on NS-comparisons when criticizing Israel than men, although they do not support Israel-related facets of anti-Semitism to a stronger extent than men. Further analyses showed that women tend to criticize Palestinian attacks more than men. We suggest interpreting this result with caution, as mentioned above.

*Age:* Elder people seem to be more prone to anti-Semitism. Respondents aged above 60 years agreed more (17%) than those aged between 31 and 60 (11%) or younger respondents aged between 18 and 30 (9%) on traditional anti-Semitism (Brähler/Angermeyer 2002). Young respondents aged between 14 and 24 (13% in 2003; 10% in 1998) expressed less traditional anti-Semitism than the elderly aged above 60 (10% in 2003; 38% in 1998). These differences are reported by Wittenberg (2000), too. The GFE-survey in 2004 showed age (split into those younger than or equal to 45 years and those older than 45 years) differences ( $F(7,2029) = 8.581, p < .001$ ). The univariate effect of age is significant in all facets despite criticism of Israel via NS-comparison. Older respondents agree to all facets more so than teenagers and young adults, despite stating getting angry when being held responsible for the Holocaust.

*Formal education* decreases anti-Semitism. This is true for younger respondents (Frindte/Funke/Jacob 1997; Niedermayer/Brähler 2002) and for adults regarding traditional anti-Semitism, especially stereotyping (Brähler/Angermeyer 2002). Furthermore, respondents without general qualification for university entrance (9%) agreed more than those with a certificate (3%) and respondents in job or school training (4%) (Brähler/Angermeyer 2002). Alheim/Heger (2002) found differences between students of different subjects regarding demands for closure: 23% of students studying pedagogy and social work, 32% of medical students, 34% of tea-

chers, 47% of students studying economic sciences and 58% of students studying civil engineer agreed. In the GFE-survey in 2004, education has a significant effect on all facets ( $F(7,2029) = 13.476$ ,  $p < .001$ ): Lower educated participants are more prone to anti-Semitism.

*Religious beliefs* affect anti-Semitism substantially. Analyses of the GFE-survey in 2004 showed that respondents with a Christian confession agreed significantly more to anti-Semitic statements than those without any confession (multivariate  $F(14, 3800) = 3.835$ ,  $p < .001$ , all univariate  $p$  at least  $< .05$ ). Because of small sample sizes, other religious beliefs could not be included in the analyses. In order to obtain a decent number of 136 Muslim respondents, we averaged across all GFE-surveys. Analyses of variance with confession as the independent factor and three facets of anti-Semitism (myths about influence, attribution of responsibility and taking advantage of the past) showed that Muslims are more prone to all three statements of anti-Semitism compared to all other religious groups ( $F(9,18168) = 7.261$ ,  $p < .001$ ; all three univariate  $p < .001$ ).

*Migration background*: Alheim/Heger (2002) reported differences between students with German and foreign descent: 15% of foreign students agreed with the stereotype "More so than others, the Jews rely on sinister tricks to get what they want" (3% of German students), 19% agreed that "The Jews only have business on their mind" (4% German students), 30% agreed that "The Jews have too much influence in the world" (7% Germans) and 17% agreed with the statement that "For Germans it would be best if all Jews go to Israel" (3% of Germans). The IDA-study supported the observation that anti-Semitism circulates within Muslim communities and other migrant groups. Migrants agreed more often than others to the question "In your circle of friends, are there people who confess to disliking Jews?" However, in the representative GFE-survey we could not find differences between respondents with and without migration background.

*Interactions*: To analyze the impact of demographic factors more carefully we analyzed the interaction effects of the demographics on anti-Semitism using the data of the 2004 GFE-survey. Results showed a multivariate significant two-way interaction of age and education ( $F(7,2029) = 2.180$ ,  $p < .05$ ) on the facets of anti-Semitism:

Only better educated young respondents demand closure more so than the elderly. On the other hand, only lower educated respondents portray an age effect concerning separatist statements. There are also two-way interactions between East-West heritage and gender ( $F(7,2029) = 2.823, p < .01$ ): In East-Germany women express more anti-Semitic criticism of Israel than men, whereas this trend is reversed in West-Germany. There is also a multivariate significant two-way interaction between gender and age ( $F(7,2029) = 2.656, p < .05$ ) that becomes univariately evident in regards to the accusation of taking advantage of the past: While the age effect is clear for women—older women agree more than younger women—it disappears for men with regard to this facet. None of the three-way interactions or the four-way interactions were significant.

To get a clearer picture about which demographic group displays anti-Semitism we categorized respondents into 16 groups with respect to East-West heritage, age, gender, and education. There were highly significant differences across the groups ( $F(105,12996) = 4.405, p < .01$ ) which became univariately significant for all facets. Post hoc tests (Student-Newman-Keuls) indicated that traditional myths about Jewish influence are mainly supported by older, less educated West-German respondents. The same group scored highest on the attribution of responsibility for persecution among Jews themselves, which appeared to be an issue for less educated men in general. This group also expressed more anti-Semitic Israel criticism than others. Older, less educated respondents were most likely to agree to separatist anti-Semitism, especially in East-Germany. They were also most likely to agree with blaming Jews of taking advantage of the past, which is a relevant issue for less educated respondents in general—except for younger, less educated women, who do not agree with this facet very much. Demands for closure was mainly found among less educated West-Germans, but also among young men and older women. Less educated, East-German women were also most likely to agree with Israel criticism via NS-comparisons.

*Subjective social status:* In the GFE-Survey we asked half the participants to categorize themselves along a 10-point-scale regarding social status, after having informed them that some groups in society belong to a higher social class, while others belong to a

lower one. Most subjects categorized themselves just in the middle of the scale (5), only a few on the lowest ranks (1, 2 or 3). We categorized participants into 6 fairly large groups and conducted multivariate analyses of variance across all seven facets of anti-Semitism. Due to missing cases, each group's sample size was reduced: level 1-3 (n = 57), level 4 (n = 60), level 5 (n = 362), level 6 (n = 203), level 7 (n = 183), level 8-10 (n = 50). Results showed a strong significant effect of self-categorized social status ( $F(35,3801) = 3.549, p < .001$ ) which was univariate, at least marginally significant, for all facets despite final closure and anti-Semitic Israel criticism. However, means indicated that it is not easy to interpret non-linear patterns: Traditional myths about Jewish influence ( $p < .01$ ) and attribution of responsibility ( $p < .001$ ) are less supported by participants who categorized themselves on level 4 (just below the average) but mostly by those categorizing themselves on as the average status level. Through additional analyzes of the 2002 Allbus-data we observed that respondents who perceived their status as being rather high (operationalized by a measure asking respondents to indicate their status on a 10-point rating scale ('below' or 'above' the societal ranking) expressed more social distance to Jews (30,1% rejected an inter-marriage) than those who perceived their status as being rather low (24,7%).

However, while the myth about influence was at a mean level for all other groups, attribution of responsibility decreased with higher status. A similar pattern occurred concerning the myth about taking advantage of the past ( $p < .001$ ) and Israel-criticism via NS-comparison ( $p < .1$ ), with respondents on the lowest status rankings mostly agreeing. Separatist anti-Semitism was highest among the lowest social rank and decreased with status ( $p < .05$ ); the same was observed for anti-Semitic criticism of Israel ( $p = ns.$ ). Final closure was demanded by all status groups, except for the highest levels ( $p = ns.$ ). The higher status groups agreed less with most of the facets compared to others, except for criticism of Israel via NS-comparisons. However, respondents who categorized themselves just below the average status rank (level 4) scored relatively low, for some facets even displaying the lowest scores compared to other groups, except for final closure, separatist anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic criticism of Israel.

We observed that respondents of subjectively lower social status and of quite high social status were less anti-Semitic, while respondents who categorized themselves along the social center scored highest! Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel did not increase with social status that was higher than 5 (univariate  $p = ns.$ ), while criticisms on Palestinians decreased, displaying a peak among respondents who categorized themselves along level 4. Additionally, very low agreement was portrayed by respondents in the lowest ranks (univariate  $p = ns.$ ; multivariate  $F(10, 2238) = 1.969, p < .05$ ).

To summarize, men are more prone to anti-Semitism than women, the elderly are more prone than the young, and the lower educated respondents are also more prone to anti-Semitism than the higher educated ones. However, analyses of the GFE-survey showed that anti-Semitism is not a problem for less educated young East-German men. This group is more vulnerable to hating crimes, but regarding anti-Semitic attitudes the young, less educated men from East-Germany scored just around the mean or even lower than that. Nevertheless, if members of this critical group show a tendency for aggressive, prejudiced behavior they can refer to widely shared sentiments. These findings have implications for the evaluation of training programs to combat anti-Semitism. We have to consider whether the existing programs focus on the most crucial group: older, lower educated people, and those with a non-German background.

Additionally, results indicate that belonging to a religious group that preaches charity does not seem inhibit anti-Semitism: Respondents belonging to Christian confessions are more anti-Semitic than respondents without any confession. Maybe they activate old myths about Jews as the assassins of Christ and Christians. Muslim anti-Semitism is only minimally observable. A small sub-sample of Muslims in the GFE-survey particularly agreed with traditional anti-Semitic statements, and another survey reported that among foreign students traditional and separatist anti-Semitism is quite strong. However, a precise survey on Muslim anti-Semitism is missing.

Again, we observe that anti-Semitism is collectively shared in the societal center, especially defined by social status. The center should have the normative power to outlaw anti-Semitism, but it expresses the highest scores in traditional anti-Semitism and the second highest scores in transformed anti-Semitism. If we concep-

tualize anti-Semitism as a political opinion we have to prove whether this is true for the political center.

## **7. Between the Left and the Right—Anti-Semitism in the political sphere**

Anti-Semitism is part of the political debate and, especially, transformed anti-Semitism is considered a political opinion, e. g., there is a debate whether new anti-Semitism which includes both criticism of Israel and anti-Semitic sentiments is a phenomenon of the political left-wing. Surveys provide some information about anti-Semitism in the political sphere. The study by Niedermayer/Brähler (2002) showed clear differences according to party preference: Above all, voters for the conservative parties claiming to represent the political center (CDU: Christian Democratic Union, CSU: Christian Social Union) (40,1%) and the extreme right-wing parties of the German Peoples Union (DVU) and The Republicans (Republikaner) (61,1%) argue that it is understandable that "to some people Jews are unpleasant". The same differences appeared for the support of the following item: "The Jews are to blame for having such big world conflicts." Again, party differences are salient: 20,9% of non voters, 21,1% of FDP-voters; 21,6% of CDU/CSU-voters, 22,3% of voters for the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and 55,5% of DVU/Republikaner-voters agreed. Our reanalyses of the 2002 Allbus showed that 45% of Republican-voters, 37,3% of CDU/CSU-voters, 34,6% of FDP-voters, 24% of SPD-voters, 23,3% of voters for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS; constituted from the East-German Socialist Union Party) and only 6,2% of voters for the Green Party (Bündnis90/Die Grünen) agreed that it would be unpleasant if a Jew married into their family. Several other studies mentioned in table 1 show similar differences.

Subjects in the GFE-survey were asked for a self-categorization concerning their general political opinion on a scale ranging from "left-wing", "slightly left-wing", "just in the center", "slightly right-wing" to "right-wing". Political self-categorization correlated modestly with all facets of anti-Semitism ( $r = .18-.29$ ). There was just a weak correlation with criticism of Israel via NS-comparisons ( $r = .07$ ) and a weak but negative correlation with non anti-Semitic

criticism of Israel ( $r = -.05$ ): the more right-wing, the more anti-Semitic. However, results also revealed anti-Semitism in the political center. Nearly or at least half of the respondents categorizing their political opinion "just in center" (58,9% of the sample), demanded final closure (64%), agreed with Israel criticism via NS-comparisons (53%), agree with separatist statements (48%), accused Jews of taking advantage of the past (47%), expressed anti-Semitic criticism of Israel (32%), agreed with there being too much Jewish power (22%), and attributed responsibility for the persecution to Jews themselves (17%). In terms of separatist anti-Semitism and demands for a final closure the political center is distinct from more left-wing respondents, but not from respondents who consider their view to be "slightly right-wing" or "right-wing" (post hoc tests following a multivariate analyses of variance show). The political center agreed more with Israel criticism via NS-comparisons than others. On the other hand, the center agreed less with non anti-Semitic Israel criticism ( $p < .01$ ) than did the other groups, while respondents identifying their view as "slightly left-wing" or "left-wing" criticized Israel the most (multivariate  $F(4, 4372) = 5.001, p < .01$ ).

One might assume that people move towards the right end of spectrum and therefore adopt anti-Semitism. Alternatively, the political centre might have become more anti-Semitic over time. We analyzed the panel-data of the GFE-project which measured traditional anti-Semitism (Jewish influence, attribution of responsibility and taking advantage of the past). A sample of  $n = 900$  respondents were interviewed in 2002, 2003 and in 2004. Analyses showed a significant increase of traditional anti-Semitism ( $F(6,696) = 3.580, p < .01$ ). Especially myths about Jewish influence and attribution of responsibility rised, whereas no trend is observable for the myth that Jews take advantage of the past. Respondents did not change their political opinion significantly. That means, even if respondents generally have not changed their political view they become more anti-Semitic! Compared to all respondents, the subsample of those subjects who were interviewed on all three occasions is slightly further right-wing, already in 2002. This could explain discrepant findings of the longitudinal data, which only indicated an increase of anti-Semitism in 2003. Additionally, we compared respondents categorizing their view always as "just in the centre" with those who changed from left-wing or right-wing to the



center. While there was no significant difference between both groups, there is a significant interaction of group and time (multivariate  $F(6, 700) = 7.136, p < .001$ ) that was evident when considering the attribution of responsibility and taking advantage of the past (both  $p < .001$ ). Those in the stable political center were more anti-Semitic than other subjects in 2002 but less anti-Semitic in 2003 while displaying an increase again in 2004.

To sum up, anti-Semitism is spread all over the democratic spectrum, especially in the political center. Not only voters of right-wing parties agree to anti-Semitic statements, but also a substantial amount of others; in particular, voters of the Christian parties who claim to be the party of the center and whose voters categorize themselves "just in the centre". About half of the respondents of the GFE-survey who categorize their political view as "just the centre" particularly express transformed anti-Semitism, especially an anti-Semitic criticism of Israel comparing Israeli policies with the crimes of the Nazis.

## **8. Between prejudices—anti-Semitism as an element of group-focused enmity**

Anti-Semitism has been defined as a legitimizing myth working like other prejudices towards devaluation and inequality. To which extent is anti-Semitism similar or different from prejudices against other groups? This is a theoretical as well as an empirical question. Unfortunately, most studies on anti-Semitism do not precisely analyze relations to prejudices against other groups. Frindte/Funke/Jacob (1997) showed that manifest and latent anti-Semitism are highly influenced by a general xenophobia against strangers. We analyzed data of the 2002 Allbus and observed that social distance toward Jews (measured via the rejection of Jews as family members) correlated significantly with social distance to Muslims ( $r = .61; n = 2.795$ ) and it is significantly correlated with xenophobia towards foreigners (measured by a 4-item scale;  $r = .37; n = 2.629$ ).

We argue that anti-Semitism is one element of a syndrome of group-focused enmity (GFE/Heitmeyer 2002). Enmity (*Menschenfeindlichkeit*) is defined as an anti-humanist political attitude mani-

festing itself especially in a rejection of social groups when their behavior and lifestyle is defined as deviant. GFE is defined as a syndrome of racism, xenophobia, heterophobia (against homeless people, homosexuals, and disabled people), sexism, rights of precedence, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. That means prejudices against different groups are related to each other, have similar functions, causes and predictors, and underlying mechanisms. It is group-focused, i.e., it emerges when others are considered unequal and hostile and are discriminated against because they are identified as members of specific groups. Inequality, in the sense of unequal worth, is the core of the GFE-syndrome and anti-Semitism is one element of it.

**Table 4:** Correlations of anti-Semitism and non-anti-Semitic criticism of Israel with other elements of GFE

		Ra- cism	Xeno- phobia	Islamo- phobia	Sexism	Homo- phobia	Disab- led	Home- less	Rights of Pre- ceded
1	Old myth about Jewish influence	.265	.336	.306	.254	.292	.028	.199	.303
2	Attribution of guilt for persecution	.267	.299	.300	.262	.259	.050	.180	.277
3	Advantage of NS-past	.203	.357	.335	.216	.283	.039	.187	.312
4	Demands for closure	.187	.417	.359	.183	.228	.029	.216	.300
5	Separatist anti-Semitism	.211	.289	.289	.229	.213	-.013	.152	.260
6	Anti-Semitic Israel criticism	.243	.308	.303	.246	.256	.082	.229	.284
7	Israel criticism via NS-comparisons	.069	.218	.217	.091	.068	-.050	.120	.152
8	Reversal of guilt: Own fault for not being liked	.278	.376	.357	.268	.281	.062	.288	.331
9	Non anti-Semitic Israel criticism	-.098	-.051	-.051	-.067	-.027	-.047	-.046	-.010

All correlations with  $r > .05$  are significant at least with  $p < .05$

Confirmatory factor analyses (not presented in detail here) of the GFE-survey showed that anti-Semitism is a separate element of a syndrome. The facets of anti-Semitism correlate significantly with other elements (see Table 4, which includes non-anti-Semitic criticism of Israel).

There are moderate correlations between all seven facets of anti-Semitism and all other elements of the GFE-syndrome ( $r = .15-.42$ ), except for prejudice against disabled. Whereas the correlates of Israel criticism via NS-comparisons are low, the correlations between traditional anti-Semitism (myths about Jewish influence, attribution of responsibility) and transformed anti-Semitism (line 3 to 8) and xenophobia and Islamophobia are substantial. Correlations also supported that non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel is different to anti-Semitism: there are hardly any other correlations between other prejudices summarized in the syndrome of GFE.

To sum up, anti-Semitism generally is embedded within a network of prejudices against weak societal groups. In particular, it is linked to Islamophobia and xenophobia. We can not observe specific relations between particular facets of anti-Semitism and other prejudices, except for a general expression of rejection and devaluation across diverse facets.

## **9. Between personality and propaganda—triggers and rhetoric of anti-Semitism**

So far, the reports concentrate on an observation of facets, and on links and frequencies of anti-Semitism in different groups. We can observe that to some extent people bypass traditional anti-Semitism by updating it, and we observe that a majority of Germans demand closure for this chapter of German history. Bergmann/Heitmeyer (2005) argued that the taboo on anti-Semitism is losing its power, especially in the societal center. One might assume that any anti-Semitism within different social groups is influenced by two core factors: internal individual dispositions and external social influence. Social psychological theories stress the impact of individual dispositions on anti-Semitism. Adorno/Frankel-Brunswick/Levinson/Sanford (1950) argued that *authoritarian* personalities are prone to anti-Semitism, especially during times of societal crises. Several studies

confirmed the assumption that authoritarians are traditionally anti-Semitic (e. g., Heyder/Schmidt 2002); others found only weak or no correlations (e. g., Raden 1999; for Germany: Sturzbecher/Freytag 2000). Additionally, studies showed that right-wing authoritarianism is significantly correlated with traditional anti-Semitism (c. f., McFarland/Ageyev/Abalakina 1990; Melloen/Van der Linden/de Witte 1992). In the 2004 GFE-survey we found moderate, but substantial correlations between the single facets of anti-Semitism and authoritarianism ( $r = .28-.43$ ). In particular, there is a correlation between demanding closure and authoritarianism ( $r = .43$ ).

Social Dominance Theory (SDT), proposed by Sidanius/Pratto (1999), stresses the other side of the coin. SDT argues that prejudice and other ideologies are legitimizing myths to stabilize social hierarchies. Individuals develop a *social dominance orientation* (SDO) which is defined as an individual preference for social hierarchies. Results of several studies support the assumption that anti-Semitism is related to attitudes towards power and dominance (e. g., Brähler/Angermeyer 2002; Niedermayer/Brähler 2002). In the 2004 GFE-survey we observed moderate, but substantial correlations between SDO and the facets of anti-Semitism ( $r = .21-.33$ ); in particular, with attribution of responsibility for persecution and the reversal of guilt ( $r = .30$ ).

Whereas such approaches concentrate on dispositions, intergroup theories argue that prejudice is an expression of ingroup favoritism and outgroup devaluation. Social Identity Theory (SIT) by Tajfel/Turner (1986), which is often used to explain anti-Semitism (see Bergmann 1987; Trzebinska 1995), assumes that prejudice is a phenomenon of differentiation 'used' to bolster or increase *social identity*. Analyzing the Allbus data, Blank/Schmidt (1993) showed that traditional anti-Semitism increases the self-esteem which is derived from belonging to the German nation. Other studies showed that traditional anti-Semitism is linked to religious membership (Eisinga/Konig/Scheepers 1995; Hoge/Carroll 1975; Lukaszewski 1995). Data of the 2004 GFE-survey showed that national identification, assessed in terms of being "proud to be a German" and "proud of German history", is significantly related to anti-Semitism ( $r = .11-.26$ ). Again, national identification correlates the lowest with Israel criticism mixed with NS-comparisons (not included in the range noted) and not with non anti-Semitic criticism of Israel.

National identification is related the strongest with demanding closure.

But when do individuals and groups with such motivations become prone to anti-Semitic myths? We assume that individual dispositions to authoritarian, dominance and nationalistic orientations are linked to anti-Semitism, when they are stressed and supported by social influence like propaganda and populism. Again, we can refer to the cases of Möllemann and Hohmann which tell us how the *circular rhetoric of populism* works: stressing threats and crises of the time (everything is getting worse), lowering self-esteem (we are the victims), designating the scapegoat (the Jews are bad and responsible), attacking taboos by pleading for defense, offering a solution (devaluation, inequality, exclusion) which is acceptable (because everything is deteriorating, Jews are bad etc.) and not problematic (they are to be blamed for being discriminated against). It seems as if in Germany anti-Semitism is an effective populist strategy, because anti-Semitism comprises a lot of myths about responsibility, shame, conspiracy, power, separation, which can be adopted easily because anti-Semitism thrives on these topics which dominate the present, i. e., today in Germany fear of social change, disintegration and the influence of economic rules is dominating everyday life and the inclusive forces of society.

This can work only in a certain historical and social context which supports such influential strategies and is open for a displacement of norms. It has been shown that the political and societal center already absorbed anti-Semitic sentiments, especially those referring to the *Zeitgeist*. Several empirical analyses of discourses and the media have also shown that populism works. Rensmann (2004) analyzed the discourse of the extreme Right and Left concerning public and political controversies between 1990 and 2002. He concluded that the argumentation of the political Right and extreme Left became more similar, particularly after September 11th. Both sides expressed a modernized anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, as well as an anti-Jewish hostility against globalization. Not the quantity of the discourse is decisive, but the quality. Repulsing political symbols and gestures regarding the past ('Auschwitz'), the mobilization of conventional national pride and the eroding borders concerning the legitimacy of anti-Jewish utterances within the democratic society have problematic consequences. Jäger/Jäger

(2003) analyzed print-media reporting incidents in the Middle East during the 2nd Intifada. The media presented negative reports on Israel, Israelis and Palestinians. Reports of the Right and Left press were negatively charged by anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist stereotypes and prejudices. Many reports supported a transformed separatist anti-Semitism by presenting Jews as representatives of Israel and holding them collectively responsible for Israeli politics. Similar results have been presented by the Medien Tenor (2003) which analyzed 47.098 TV-reports on Israel, 328 reports on anti-Semitism in 19 media; 4.048 passages about religious communities in 19 media and all reports on the NS-past in 27 media. The report states that the media expressed sensationalism and exploitation concerning future relations with Jews. Stereotypes seemed to influence the choice of topics, like lawsuits, criminality and drug criminality. Generally, there were more negative than positive reports on Jews, especially in comparison to reports on the Christian churches.

There are also hints that propaganda is working and producing anti-Semitism. Benz (2004) reported an analysis of letters sent in 2000-2003 to the Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland. He detected several motives of anti-Semitism, like broken national pride, defense of guilt, social envy, fear of foreign infiltration, legitimization of anti-Semitism, neglect of anti-Semitism, complains about Jewish privileges. In particular, two facets of anti-Semitism seemed to motivate writers: Separatist anti-Semitism and a myth about guilt, holding Jews responsible for being hated. Benz argued that anti-Semitism is closely linked to a generalized xenophobia—or syndrome of group-focused enmity, we would argue. A simpler indicator of the impact of populism is the success of right-wing extremist parties. In 2004, the National Democratic Party (NPD) of Germany obtained 9,2% of the votes in Saxony (East-Germany). In February 2005, a parliamentarian of the NPD gave a talk on the bombardment of Dresden in 1945 and spoke about the „Bombenholocaust“ (bombardment holocaust). During the following debate on the causes of right-wing extremism, Edmund Stoiber, leader of the CSU, argued that unemployment causes right-wing extremism. According to our opinion, these are examples of a climate which has reached a populist level which attaches the susceptibility of people.

Again, we can at least refer to the reported results of our GFE-study showing that an anti-Semitic and prejudiced populism is

present. Propaganda can attract susceptible groups (e. g., authoritarian, socially disintegrated etc.) by presenting collectivity creating myths stressing misery, pointing out scapegoats and simple solutions. A factor analyses (PCA with varimax rotation) of the 2004 survey showed that anti-Semitism is loading on one single factor together with xenophobia, threat by foreigners, nationalism and authoritarianism (51% total explanation of variance; all factor loadings a > .5). This factor represented right-wing populism. Even when the seven facets of anti-Semitism were included in the analyses separately, all loaded on one single factor together with the other aspects of right-wing populism (all factor loadings a > .4). So, empirically, we can conclude that anti-Semitism is part of populism which, in turn, causes prejudice. This is in line with studies of Hentges et al. (2003) who presented a synthesis report of qualitative studies on socio-economic change and right-wing populism. They found that outgroup rejection, ingroup favoritism, authoritarianism and rejection of institutions of representative democracy are dimensions of right-wing extremism and populism.

## **10. Modern outlooks and old myths—a Summary**

The last observation offers a first explanation, but there are plenty of big and small theories on anti-Semitism and plenty of theories can be derived from research on prejudice, discrimination and intergroup conflicts (e. g., see Bergmann 1987; Bergmann/Körte 2004). A critical test of competing theories is missing—maybe because the German debate is dominated by the question “Why the Jews?” Several authors refer to ideologies of elites concerning Jews which were always influential because the Jews have been perceived as a high status elitist subgroup of society, i. e., Jews are a relevant outgroup for elites and the middle class (Benz 2004; Elias 2001). In this sense, anti-Semitism is functional regarding the struggle for status, power and integration. By devaluing Jews as a group with high-status attributes, such as power, money and intelligence, group-based hierarchies in favor of the in-group (non Jewish Germans) are manifested. The reported results on anti-Semitism in the societal center support this assumption. Transformed anti-Semitism is a sophisticated form of devaluation because it refers to cur-

rent political, social and ideological questions of general interest and links them to traditional myths and stereotypes.

Traditional anti-Semitism partly fulfills this function, too. Although after the 2nd World War traditional anti-Semitism in Germany was outlawed and tabooed results indicate that it is still shared by about 25-30 percent of the population. Transformed anti-Semitism seems to increase with the loss of the past or struggles to disjoin the present from the past and to distance oneself from any responsibility. The rhetoric of guilt influences sentiments and attempts to reverse the guilt for prejudices, persecution, and the effacement of Jews, which goes back to the Middle Ages. In this sense, current anti-Semitic criticism of Israel is not a detour but an apologetic communication. It has developed into a process of politicization and exploitation which makes the outlawing and scandalizing difficult.

However, anti-Semitism is represented by different myths about Jews and Judaism which are connected and which partly reflect open or hidden traditional mythical images and stories about Jews. Even modern patterns of anti-Semitism rest on a kernel of traditional myths of conspiracy, particularity, racial difference etc. Several authors stress that anti-Semitism is still charged with traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes (e. g., Chesler 2003; Klug 2003; Schoenfeld 2004). Anti-Semitism, like any other form of prejudice, has always been carpeted by historically new patterns when old-fashioned and direct expressions have been tabooed as non-normative by society. As shown by prejudice against Jews, we have observed new facets of anti-Semitism since the middle of the 19th century (Haury 2004) and at least since the founding and establishment of the state of Israel. Since then the homogeneity of Israel and Jewish Zionism is lasting. In this sense, the criticism of 'Jewish crimes against Palestine' rests on the traditional assumption that every Israeli policy is equated with Jewish policy. And even if Israel and Palestine will solve the conflict peacefully any Israeli misbehavior can be attributed to 'Jewishness'. The myths about a particular Jewish character and about conspiracy are hard to overcome. So to say: As long as 'they' belong to the category of Jews and myths about the differences and peculiarities of Jews persist, Jews will be perceived as a homogeneous outgroup. In this sense, new facets of anti-Semitism are



thriving by the ongoing antipathy towards Jews in a circular fashion. This is true of many other forms of prejudice and racism.

This does not mean that there is nothing new. Transformed expressions of anti-Semitism are constrained by the *Zeitgeist*. Today, anti-Semitism is much more expressed via criticism of Israel than ever before. Additionally criticism of Israel is often expressed through judging the crimes of the Israeli government like the crimes of the Nazis. This is a new change which has to be taking into account in order to receive attention and to lead to normative efforts. Aiming at an update, we also have to consider that anti-Semitism is part of a syndrome of enmity and populism. Thus, the predictors, expressions, dimensions and outcomes of anti-Semitism can be analyzed and discussed separately, but they also need to be discussed in the context of social devaluation and propaganda. Jews and Muslims have become the subject of displacement of traditional forms of devaluation and inequality. Our review indicates that the boundaries of normality and the norm of anti-racism have recently begun to be displaced and that this process is no longer limited to extremist groups. It still needs to be explored whether this phenomenon is a new development or whether it has always been present.

We do not know exactly if we are discussing a special German case. Anti-Semitism in Germany has a ghastly history, but anti-Semitism is widespread across all nations and continents, even in Israel. It is now time to carefully analyze cross-cultural similarities and differences regarding anti-Semitism. This will also provide an answer to the question of whether it is appropriate to engage into a discourse on anti-Semitism on a cross-European level and, hence, justify the attempt to free oneself of responsibility ('We are not the only ones to blame') or whether Germany does indeed have to put more effort into combating anti-Semitism.

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