John Rex

The Integration of Immigrant Minorities, Social Citizenship and Cultural Differences. Radicalisation and Conflict in the Light of Frustrated Expectations

1. Recent Problems of Conflict and Control of Ethnic Minorities

There has been a significant change in the relation of ethnic minorities to their host societies in recent years as a result of the fact that they have not been able to achieve the kind of integration which was previously thought possible because the promise of equal rights in education and employment which the Welfare State appeared to offer them. As a result the ethnic minorities have become radicalised or have retreated into some form of fundamentalism asserting the superiority of their own cultures.

The existence of these radicalised and fundamentalist minorities creates a severe problem of social control in contemporary European societies both at national and local urban level. This situation of conflict contrasts with what could previously been assumed as the natural tendency of modern welfare states. In order to understand this fully it is necessary to contrast the present situation with these earlier ideal situations.

I find it useful in opening up this topic to discuss two related statements on policy, which have played their part in the political development of the United Kingdom. The first is that contained in T. H. Marshall's *Citizenship and Social Class* (1951) on the nature of social citizenship. The second is that of the British Home Secretary, Jenkins, in 1966 relating to the integration of immigrants (Jenkins 1966).[1] Starting from this base I will go on to show how the context and the content of the debate about citizenship has changed over fifty years in Europe and America and the way in which the question of the integration of immigrants has been reformulated in relation to it.

---

[1] For convenience I shall refer to this statement as "the Jenkins formula" in what follows.

2. The General Problem of Citizenship and the Welfare State

2.1 Marshall's Concept of Citizenship

What Marshall was addressing in his book was the question of whether British politics would continue to be based upon a process of class struggle. In this profoundly anti-Marxist perspective the primacy of class loyalty over any other in the British working class would be overcome by the identification of all individuals with citizenship. Citizenship was first a matter of equal legal recognition by the courts, secondly a matter of enfranchisement, and thirdly the acquisition of social rights. The process of the acquisition of social rights, although begun earlier, attained a new momentum in the creation of the Welfare State. Drawing on the ideas of Beveridge in his *Full Employment in a Free Society* (1944) and in his report to the government on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) Marshall suggested that social citizenship would come to involve a guaranteed minimum income in times of ill health, unemployment and old age, the fixing of wages by free collective bargaining, and the guarantee of minimum standards of housing, health and education for all. It did not suggest universal equality of outcome for all, nor did it simply call for equal opportunity. Rather it envisaged a guaranteed minimum for all together with recognition of the right of individuals to obtain more for themselves over and above this minimum.

The attainment of social citizenship in this sense could be contrasted with the idea of social exclusion. This is a question to which we shall have to return.

2.2 Cultural Diversity and Citizenship.

The concept of multiculturalism is now widely discussed and multiculturalism is often celebrated as an important ideal separate from that of citizenship. A good example of this kind of celebration is to be found in the work of Parekh (2000). What is striking about this work is that it does not relate the discussion of multiculturalism to questions of political conflicts and their resolution on other grounds. This is clearly brought out in a powerful critique of Parekh

and other theorists of multiculturalism such as Kymlicka (1995), and Charles Taylor (1994) by Barry (2000). Significantly too, Parekh makes no reference to the work of T. H. Marshall or to the formulation of the concept of "integration" by the British Home Secretary in 1966.

The Jenkins statement suggests that integration of minorities should not be conceived as a "flattening process of uniformity" but as the recognition of "cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance". What is perhaps most significant here is that, unlike other theories of multiculturalism, the notion of the recognition of cultural diversity is coupled with that of the necessity of equal opportunity. Though this notion is actually rather less radical than that of Marshall's social citizenship, its inclusion does nonetheless real the question of cultural diversity to that of shared citizenship.

I have suggested repeatedly that the Jenkins formula implies the existence of two institutional domains. On the one hand there is that of the public political sphere which includes the institutions of the welfare state but also of course legal and political equality; on the other there is the set of institutions which structures the life of separate ethnic minority communities. These include speaking their own language in private, practising their own religions and maintaining their own family practices. In my book *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State* (Rex 1996) I have discussed some of the difficulties which are involved in this notion of two institutional domains. They include (1) the difficult question of the role of the educational system which straddles the two domains, (2) the attempt by human rights activists to extend the ideas of the public into the separate communal domain and, vice versa, the attempts by some ethnic communities to extend their own values into the public domain and (3) the possibility of a limited intermediate domain as instanced by the arts and cuisine.

Apart from these difficulties there is the fact that insistence on separateness may mean exclusion from the rights of the public institutional sphere. Just as there is a special problem relating to the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the public domain, so there is a special problem of their exclusion. In their case exclusion takes the

form of racial and ethnic discrimination.[2]

2.3 Gellner and the Theory of the Modernising Nation State

Along with Marshall, Gellner (1983) has developed a highly influential theory of citizenship in the modernising nation state. Like Marshall Gellner rejects the idea that class is or should be a main focus of identification in modern conditions. The modernising nation state, as represented above all by the French state after the Revolution, replace the notion of class loyalty with the notion of a common citizenship fostered by a universal education system. Equally there is in principle in this nation state no room for any ethnic ties. Thus, in contrast with Anthony Smith, who has written extensively about the continuing importance of ethnicity and, indeed, the ethnic origins of nations (Smith 1981 and 1986), Gellner has little place for ethnicity. Citizenship for him is the only important structuring principle in the modern nation state.

2.4 Social Citizenship, Class Struggle and Social Policy.

My own reaction to Marshall's thesis about social citizenship was to agree that it did give a useful account of the kind of society which was coming into being after the 1939-45 World War in Europe. It seemed to me however that this was only possible if there was a balance of power between the major classes (Rex 1961). It occurred in fact when the bourgeoisie and proletariat recognised that they could not achieve a victory and that they had to accept some kind of consensus or middle way. Also involved was a limited acceptance of the market mechanism as a way of distributing goods, but allowing for governmental intervention to guarantee a social minimum for all.

 The notion that social citizenship taking precedence over class loyalty was dependent upon an historic class compromise implied that, if the balance of class forces was disturbed, that compromise

---

[2] I do not wish to raise at this point the problem of the use of the term race. I fully understand the objections which are made to the use of the very term "race", but this does not mean that there may not be forms of exclusion based upon racist beliefs. It is in this sense that I refer to exclusion on racial and ethnic grounds.

would not be maintained and there would be a reversion to class struggle. These question were at the heart of British politics between the end of the sixties and the eighties. First the Labour Party agreed that the assertion of trade union power through strikes and similar actions was no longer necessary and that a new system of industrial relations could now operate. This led to the publication of the White Paper entitled *In Place of Strife* (Department of Employment and Productivity, 1969). As Barbara Castle, the Minister concerned, put it this was not intended to replace collective bargaining by state intervention. Rather it was a way of getting unions to face up to their responsibilities "to ensure that workers do not down tools before they have used the procedure for examining disputes which their own unions have negotiated" (Tribune Archive 1969). This recognised that there were differences of interest but suggested that they could be resolved in negotiation rather than through disruptive industrial action. Given such a system of industrial relations, the creation of a social citizenship which would replace class struggle was possible. Political sociologists in the Scandinavian countries were pursuing similar ideas. Thus Korpi in Sweden argued that the class struggle could be pursued by peaceful and democratic means (Korpi 1978) and that working class mobilisation had a part to play in the Welfare State (Korpi 1983). Esping-Anderson, on the other hand, saw the Welfare State as taking different forms in different times and places. His is a complex argument about different ways in which the market mechanism and the "commodification of labour" might be modified. There are thus three types of Welfare capitalism. The first is one in which income is seen as related to need rather than being a reward for performance and is given after a means test. The second one is that which was developed in Bismarck's Germany in which there was compulsory social insurance and benefits given at different levels according to contributions. The third which is represented by the Beveridge Report is that which offers "a basic equal benefit to all irrespective of prior earnings, contributions or performance".[3]

Whatever the form of the welfare state, however, it seemed to be challenged in Britain with the revolution in social policy brought

---

[3] This is slightly misleading in that in the first place benefits as of right followed from contributions which had been paid, though there was also a supplementary system of social assistance which covered others regardless of contributions.

about by the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher between 1979 and 1992. Crucially she broke the power of the trades unions and no longer needed the consensus looked for in *In Place of Strife*. Oddly she did claim that she would "defend the Welfare State", but, in saying this, she limited the notion simply to social insurance against unemployment, ill health and old age rather than as involving all the wider issues which Marshall had had in mind. Her successor, John Major in some ways went further in saying that he believed in a classless society, meaning by this one in which there would be equality of opportunity for all individuals without any kind of class mobilisation.

2.5 The Consequences of the Breakdown of Welfare Capitalism

In the previous section I have assumed that the Welfare State was the result of class mobilisation, class struggle and class compromise. A rather more cynical view is taken by Crowley (1994). For him welfare payments were offered to the working classes because they were a necessary cost for the preservation of capitalism. The problem which he then poses is what will happen when these payments cannot any longer be met. It is in these circumstances, he believes, that nationalism and xenophobia will be appealed to rather than a sense of social citizenship.

Delanty takes a rather different perspective (1996). When I argued that there was likely to be tension between the sense of national identity of the European nations and the threat posed by new immigrant identities, he argued that this was a secondary factor and that the real problem was precisely that posed by Crowley, namely the breakdown of social citizenship deriving from a secure system of social welfare.

Finally in this section I should like to draw attention to an important recent article by Schierup (Gundara and Jacobs, 2000). In this article Schierup draws attention to the fact that, whereas Marshall envisaged a society in which nearly all people could enjoy social citizenship and relatively few were excluded, in the present situation in most advanced capitalist countries there is a large proportion of the population living in relative poverty and relative deprivation. The concept of social citizenship would seem to need

redrawing in these circumstances, as would any conception of the Welfare State based upon the assumptions which Beveridge was able to make.

3. The Rights and Duties of Citizenship

For Marshall the notion of citizenship was based upon the idea of social rights. Quite obviously the guarantee of such rights is the performance by others, especially the state, of social duties. It is a striking fact, however, that there had also been another theme in many policy discussions which has emphasised duties to the exclusion of rights. In my earliest research in Birmingham I recorded the claim by the City Council's so-called *Liaison Officer for Coloured People* that immigrants had now got their rights and must now be compelled to perform their duties (Rex and Moore 1967). A similar conception of citizenship guided Conservatives during the period of the Thatcher government. Inter alia, education in citizenship was seen as a way of combating crime and hooliganism. The work of Bernard Crick (Crick 1998) who was called upon to advise the government on education for citizenship left open the question of whether rights or duties should be emphasised, but by the beginning of the 21st century all the emphasis was laid upon duties. In other versions the notion of education for citizenship was applied particularly to ethnic minorities. This had been true in much French discussion of the matter. The aim of citizenship education according to a proposal for joint research put to the *Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations* by French colleagues saw the main object of citizenship education as being the education of immigrant minorities as being the displacement of the traditional non-secular cultures of immigrants rather than that of White children whose colonialist and racist assumptions had to be challenged. This view was reinforced in Britain after 2001 by two factors. One was the fear of immigrants after the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. The other was the fear felt in government circles after racial disturbances between Asian and White communities in North British cities. The major policy response was to suggest the introduction of identity cards and tests of language which would apply especially to Asians who, it was thought, needed to be integrated. Another research proposal put to

the *Centre* was a comparative one designed to study the integration of Turkish citizens in London. The fact that many of these Turks were in fact Kurdish asylum seekers struggling to become citizens seemed to have escaped the authors of this research proposal.[4]

All in all what this discussion shows is that the notion of citizenship in the Marshallian sense is far from universally shared. There is a conservative alternative which strongly affects government policy and the funding of social research. This is true both of discussions of citizenship in general but even more true when what is being discussed is the citizenship of immigrants and minorities. It is to the place of these minorities that we must now turn.

4. Minorities and Citizenship

The question of the citizenship of minorities and the manner of their integration into national societies breaks down into two. On the one hand there is the degree to which territorially concentrated groups share in a common citizenship or claim a separate one. On the other hand there is the question of the immigrants who are dispersed in the general population. This latter question has to be discussed both in relation to economic migrants and in relation to political migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.

4.1 National Minorities within Nations

The problems involved in the citizenship of territorial groups may be illustrated by considering the cases of Catalonia and Scotland on the one hand[5] and the Basque country and Ireland on the other. In the

---

[4] It was a permanent problem in the shaping of research plans that many social scientists adopted research strategies which were concerned with imposing duties of citizenship on immigrants and minorities. Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, a French academic principally concerned with legal questions put the proposal to the Centre for a comparative study of citizenship in Britain and France. Steven Vertovec suggested the study of the education in citizenship of Turkish students as part of an Anglo-German study sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation.

[5] We may leave out here cases like that of Wales in Great Britain or some of the relatively autonomous regions in Spain which may be seen simply as having less powers than the devolved governments of Catalonia and Scotland.

case of Catalonia and Scotland the claim that is made for special rights is not made on behalf of all those who are linguistically or ethnically Catalonian or Scots but rather for all those living in Catalonia or Scotland. Only a minority of Catalonians or Scots seeks independence. The majority seeks devolved rights within a national state whose citizenship they would retain. From the point of view of the Spanish or British state, this is a problem which must be solved by the devolution of some governmental powers.

A different set of problems arises in the cases of the Basques in Spain and Irish Republicans in Northern Ireland. In these cases Basque and Irish nationalists do not seek citizenship rights within the Spanish and British state. Rather they claim a right to secede from a citizenship which has been imposed on them, an ethnic affiliation to a nation which transcends national boundaries, and in the case of the Northern Irish Republicans citizenship in another state. In both of these cases those concerned have resorted to armed struggle or terrorism rather than pursuing their aims through the ballot box. As against them the state has used its military and police powers, while at the same time promoting a so-called peace process, which would bring relations with the minority nationalists within the framework of a national state with some devolution to regional assemblies. Clearly these situations are unstable but the discourse of national governments of Spain and Britain seeks to treat them as though they were comparable with the cases of Catalonia and Scotland.

The Catlonian/Scottish and Basque/Irish cases are used here as examples. They are reproduced in most other European countries in some degree and have to be dealt with either by devolution or through armed struggle and consequent peace processes. Problems are, however, more acute where previous central states have broken up, and states of ethnically based civil wars occur as in the former Yugoslavia.

4.2 The Integration of Immigrant Minorities

Western European countries during the nineteenth century were countries of emigration. Millions of their citizens migrated to North America or as settlers in colonial territories. After 1945, however, Europe began to import immigrants on a large scale until the im-

migration stop for new immigrants in the late sixties and early seventies. Thereafter it faced the problem of dealing with increasing numbers of refugees.[6]

5. Economic Immigration

The major population movement involving migrants in search of work in the nineteenth century was from Europe to the United States. In the world after 1945, however, the largest movement was of economic migrants into Europe. From a situation in which European countries were sending societies, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, economic migrants targeted Switzerland and the Benelux and Scandinavian countries, and, in the period between 1945 and 1970 this was the major movement of economic migrants. The former imperial countries actively encouraged migration from their former colonies in the fifties and sixties when there were large numbers of job vacancies in jobs which native born citizens of the European countries were unlikely to fill. In Germany, which had no former colonies to which it could turn, resort was had to Turkey and the southern European countries. By the late sixties in the United Kingdom and by the early seventies in other countries such immigration was feared and, apart from family completion and small numbers of highly skilled immigrants, immigration came to a stop. In the eighties and most of the nineties there were actually more people leaving the United Kingdom than there were economic immigrants coming in. This situation, however, changed at the end of the nineties. It was recognised amongst policy makers, both in the separate countries and at a European level, that there would be a need for considerably increased immigration during the first twenty years of the new Millennium. This was partly to cope with a demographic deficit produced by the small family size in European families and partly to fill jobs particularly those requiring high skill. There was, however, a new and influential organisation of right wing politicians and academics called Migrationwatch UK in Britain

---

[6] Calculation of the numbers of immigrants settling is a difficult matter and the different countries have different methods of counting them. A good source giving an indication of what happens country by country is Migrant Information Source, Website: http://www.migrationinformation.org/

which warned of the dangers to European identity of any further increase in the proportion of residents born overseas.[7]

There were different ways of counting these immigrants. Some countries simply counted those born abroad, and some those of foreign nationality, while in the United Kingdom an attempt was made to classify the population according to their own perception of the ethnic group to which they belonged. But, whatever the method of counting, there was now a problem in the societies of West Europe of how these immigrants were to be integrated. The Swedish political scientist Tomas Hammar (1990) drew attention to the fact that the population of Europe included some who were "denizens" rather than citizens. He had in mind here especially the German guestworkers, who were not accorded the rights of citizens. There was, however, a problem even in those of the former imperial metropolitan countries like Britain and France that the majority of their immigrants were legally and politically citizens. In these cases there was a question of whether they were in some sense excluded even though they were formally citizens.

In France policy was informed by the idea of assimilation. Immigrants from the French overseas territories were entitled to equal legal treatment and could vote. They also had many social rights. There was, however, in practice a considerable amount of discrimination against these immigrants and they were also the target of racial abuse and attack, even though this was hard to document in a country which rejected the very idea of counting these immigrants separately.

The crucial German idea was that Germany was not an immigration country and this idea was reproduced in Austria. Immigrants could, if they won the support of German churches or trades unions, enjoy social rights. Even these rights, however were paternally dispensed and, without a political voice of their own, the immigrants were wholly dependent on such paternalism. A new report to the German Parliament in 2001 called for the recognition that Germany was now, indeed an immigration country and for a

---

[7] This organisation was chaired by Sir Andrew Green former United Kingdom ambassador to Saudi Arabia and had as its honorary consultant Professor David Coleman Professor of Demography who had been a long-term supporter of the Conservative Party and who had maintained his opposition to immigration especially of Muslim immigrants throughout the seventies and eighties.

consideration of the policy implications of this change. Such a change, however, was weakly defended by the Social Democratic Party in the subsequent election and very dependent upon the government's Green partners in any practical situation. The whole situation was made more difficult for the government by the fact that the Chancellor's principal opponent had made immigration a major election issue.

The alternative to French assimilationist policy and the guest-worker policy of the German speaking countries was some form of multiculturalism and this it was generally thought was exemplified by policy in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Multicultural, however, is a very loosely used term. It may often be used interchangeably with the terms multiethnic and multiracial and mean no more than recognising that the population includes many who are visibly different in their physical appearance and their culture. This may not involve according these minorities significant rights and may indeed be coupled with the notion that some cultures are superior to others. (See for instance the writings of the working class Conservative headmaster and publicist, Ray Honeyford, who both advocated an inegalitarian version of multiculturalism (Honeyford 1988) and accused the State bureaucracy of seeking to impose it (Honeyford 1998). In this context what I have called the Jenkins formula which combines the recognition of cultural diversity with equality of opportunity and mutual tolerance.[8] This represents a stronger and more political form of multiculturalism which, as I have suggested, is not defended in Parekh's influential work any more than it is in popular discussion. Because the term multiculturalism is loosely used it has been rejected as an ideal by a number of important European sociologists.[9] Wieviorka in France has suggested that the very term ethnicity is used only to refer to inferiors (Wieviorka 1994). Jan Rath in the Netherlands suggests that in the much-vaunted Dutch form of multiculturalism ethnic mi-

---

[8] The word tolerance unfortunately seems to some to imply a paternalistic attitude to those who lack power. Probably "mutual respect" would be a better term.

[9] This was the topic of a conference organised by the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations in Warwick University whose findings were reported in a book edited by myself and Beatrice Drury (Rex and Drury 1994). Wieviorka, Rath, Radtke and Schierup and Alund were amongst the most important contributors to the discussion which followed.

norities are recognised but actually marked for unequal treatment (Rath 1994).

Two other significant interventions in this debate are those of Radtke in Germany and Schierup and Alund in Sweden. Radtke places great emphasis upon what he calls the Social Democratic Welfare State. In this Welfare State the conflicting interest of difference classes have led to a series of compromises. Turkish immigrants who are exploited or oppressed by their marital partners, employers or landlords should have their interests defended within this system. The mistake of multicultural policy as represented by the Multicultural Bureau in Frankfurt seems to him to be misguided in setting up a separate organisation for immigrants. Radtke, however, does not consider the possibilities raised by the Jenkins formula of recognising cultural diversity without denying the minorities rights to protection within the institutions of the Welfare State (Radtke 1994).

Schierup and Alund (1990) are suspicious of Swedish multiculturalism which they see as directing attention away from other forms of struggle. Multicultural consultation too often suggests that minorities can best be dealt with through representatives chosen for them by the government. Rank and file members of the minority communities, particularly amongst the young may form alliances across ethnic boundaries not merely with other minority groups but with disadvantaged and disaffected Swedes.

All of these criticisms of actual forms of multiculturalism by serious social scientists should be accepted. What they do, however, is to make even more necessary the insistence upon the strong political form of multiculturalism implicit in the Jenkins formula rather than the abandonment of the very ideal. True citizenship can be multicultural.

5.1 The Culture of Minority Groups

Many of the critics of multiculturalism imagine that to speak of minority cultures at all is to be guilty of what is called essentialism. Essentialism is the doctrine which sees minority cultures as fixed traditionally and unchanging. It is important therefore to emphasise in the discussion of the cultures of minority groups that they are

subject to change. What I have suggested in my writing (Rex 1996a; 1996b) is that minority cultures must be thought of as involving not simply a body of ideas but all the forms of mobilisation and all the goals and aspirations of minority groups. The changing culture of these groups, I argue, has three points of reference, namely the changing structure of homeland society, the struggle for survival and equality in the land of first settlement and the aim of possible migration to another society. Crucially, in the land of first settlement, which is what we are discussing when we talk of integration of immigrant minorities in Europe, they have an interest in obtaining equality of treatment and in fighting racist exclusion. For this reason they tend to be very supportive of the idea of social citizenship in the Welfare State. The fact that lands of possible onward migration are another point of reference draws our attention to the fact that immigrant minorities are part of transnational communities. This is an important aspect of globalisation which we shall discuss in a later section.

5.2 Refugees and Political Migrants

In the previous section we have looked first at the concept of citizenship in general terms and then at its applicability to sub-national territorially concentrated groups on the one hand and economic migrants on the other. We must now turn, however, to the group whose rights to citizenship result from their status as asylum seekers and refugees or who might be called more generally political migrants.

5.3 The Numbers of Refugees

A refugee is, according to the United Nations Convention of 1951, a person who has a genuinely held fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group or political opinion and who cannot return safely to their country of origin. According to the Guardian of 18th August 2000 there were in the world some 25 million "internally displaced persons, many of them victims of civil wars now asking the U. N. refugee Agency for

help." Not all of these would qualify as refugees in terms of the 1951 convention but they might nonetheless seek asylum. In 2000 the 38 industrialised countries received 551,000 new applications for asylum and in 2001, 595,700. The United Kingdom received the largest number of asylum seekers (92,000), followed by Germany (88,300) and the United States (83,200). The leading countries of origin for asylum seekers was Afghanistan accounting for 10% of all applications followed by Iraq (9%), Turkey (6%), Former Yugoslavia (5%), China (4%), Republic of Iran 4%, Russian Federation 3%, Sri Lanka (3%), India (3%) and Somalia (3%).

5.4 The Treatment of Asylum Applicants in the Country of Application

These figures refer to applicants for asylum making their application at the borders of or in the country in which they have refugee status. While they await decisions on their cases there are a number of ways in which they are excluded from any of the rights of citizenship. They may be kept in camps or detention centres in which their rights are not unlike those of prisoners. They may be allocated to local Councils who are expected to house them and provide education for them and their children. So far as housing is concerned they are likely to be allocated houses not wanted by the host population. Some children were allowed to attend ordinary schools, but where the asylum seekers lived in segregated circumstances they might be offered schools of their own apart from native children, they are not permitted to work, but, in any case, the houses in which they lived were vacant mainly because there was no work in the vicinity. Finally they received minimal financial assistance, and, for a while at least, were given vouchers instead of money. These vouchers were not accepted in all shops so that the asylum seekers were partially excluded from the role of consumer at the same time that they were denied the rights of citizens.

The fortunate minority would be given refugee status and go on to attain the full rights of citizenship. Some, however, would be given only "temporary protection" on the understanding that they might at any time be returned to their own countries if circumstances there change. In other cases, although the applicant was denied refugee status, the circumstances in his or her home country would

be so dangerous that the applicant was given "exceptional leave to remain".

5.5 The Treatment of Asylum Seekers Before their Migration

The number of applicants for asylum in the country where they sought it was made smaller by the fact that a number of measures had been adopted to prevent their presenting themselves in the country itself. The receiving society would declare some countries safe and thereby prevent anyone from such a country applying for asylum. In some cases, "safe havens" were established in which although there was great danger in their home societies there would be limited regions under the protection of the armed forces of the society of application and its allies. Applicants might be required in the first place to present themselves at the embassies of the society of application to obtain visas. Those who came through a third country en route to application might be returned to that country and carriers would be subject to heavy fines for carrying them. Many potential applicants therefore entered the country of application illegally and were aided in doing this by traffickers who provided their services for payment which might be paid after the illegal migrant had settled and obtained employment. There was also the possibility that traffickers would place immigrant women as prostitutes or ill paid and even slave domestic employment.

5.6 The Exclusion of Asylum Seekers from Citizenship

In all of the suffering and deprivation which asylum seekers suffered they would, of course, not be without allies. At all points there would be NGOs offering advice and assistance, including that provided by specialist lawyers.

What all this amounts to is that those awaiting asylum decisions and those who were able to stay openly or clandestinely could hardly be said to be citizens. They were the most excluded section of the population lacking the rights of the poorest economic migrants. On the other hand they would themselves be accused of really being economic migrants posing as asylum seekers. The term

"bogus asylum seekers" was frequently heard in anti-immigrant discourse in the media.

5.7 The Numbers of Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Illegals in European Cities

It is very hard to obtain any kind of reliable statistics of the numbers either of asylum seekers or various types of illegals. There is, however, a great deal of anecdotal evidence and there is hardly a town in some of major European countries in which there are not such clandestine communities of illegal political migrants.

5.8 EU Policy Towards Asylum Seekers

The fact that different European Union countries have different policies and that several different countries are involved in any asylum case has led to demands that there should be some co-ordination of policy at the European level. Unfortunately what is often suggested is harmonisation at the level of the lowest common denominator of the harshest policy towards immigrants. Some politicians moreover have used the present crisis to call for the scrapping of the 1951 Convention. The matter was taken up at the meetings of the EU under the Finnish presidency at Tampere and under the Belgian Presidency at Laeken. A Directive on *Minimum Standards on Reception of Asylum Seekers in Member States* was reconsidered at the end of April 2002 (EU Directive April 2002). This, however, was subject as had been previous drafts of the Directive to criticisms by a number of NGOs particularly the European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and Caritas. A paper signed by Martina Liebsch of Freiburg, then Vice President of ECRE and a member of Caritas entitled "Migration and Integration in Europe - The Role of Citizenship Education" was submitted to a conference in Kirscheen, Germany by ECRE on *Demands on a New Refugee Policy in Europe* in July 2001. This sets out very well some of the major criticisms of present asylum procedures which many liberal minded critics of refugee policy accept (Liebsch 2001).

5.9 The Rise of Far Right Parties and Their Effect on Immigration Policy

As early as the late sixties anti-immigrant political parties were beginning to have electoral success. This was true of the National Front of Le Pen in France, of far right parties in Germany and of the Vlaamse Blok in Belgium. By the turn of the century, however, it seemed that such parties were achieving more and more success in a number of countries. The emergence of Jorg Haider's Peoples Party as one which had to be included in any government coalition provided a shock to the whole of Europe and the European Union sought to break off relations with the new Austrian government. This exclusion of Austria, however, was not sustained and right wing anti-immigrant parties gained more success in several countries. Le Pen's party in France merged as the largest party, a right wing anti-immigrant party with extreme anti-immigrant proposals became a part of the government in Denmark and, finally, in the Netherlands, though to be the stronghold of social democracy and multiculturalism the strange new figure of Pim Fortuyn, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim, emerged as the leader of the electorally most successful party.

The new parties of the right did not actually take power but the mainstream parties modified their own policies in immigration and refugees in order to win back the vote. In Austria where Haider's party eventually collapsed in the election of 2002, the success of the conservative parties was due to the fact that they had modified their policies to make them more hostile to immigrants and refugees. In the United Kingdom there were riots involving the Far Right and British Asians with the Far Right gaining some seats in local elections. The Labour government made a curious adaptation of Blair's formula "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime" speaking of being tough on anti-immigrant racism, but understanding of the causes of White racism. Multiculturalism was now seen as implying segregation and policy was directed towards not merely integration but rapid assimilation of the Asians. Such policies involving a fear of Asians and of Islam were even more single-mindedly pursued after the attacks of the World Trade Centre in New York.

At a European level the idea of Fortress Europe gained ground. There was to be free movement of capital and labour at least in the

Schengen countries but at the borders immigrants from the South and the East were to be kept out as much as possible. The fact that there were many such potential immigrants and refugees because of civil wars going on in the Balkans and Africa meant that these migrants would be treated as part of a temporary emergency which, it was thought, would end with their return to their countries. The other side of this coin was that the immigrant and refugee populations began to mobilise of resistance. Various forms of fundamentalism or Islamicism gained ground amongst Muslims and other immigrant groups began to organise for resistance. This was as true in Belgium as it was in the Northern British cities.

In 2004 a further set of problems came to the fore. This was the widespread use of illegal immigrants provided by so-called gang-masters to employers in agriculture, construction and other industries. These workers were paid below the national minimum wage, worked in highly unsafe conditions, lived in overcrowded dormitories and were lacking in all social rights. The Trades Union Congress called for such workers to be given social benefits but neither the employers nor the illegal workers responded, since, they were brought into public view, they were likely to be deported

Against this background the notion of a shared social citizenship amongst natives, legal and illegal immigrants and refugees could hardly be discussed as main point of policy.

Apart from the rise of right wing parties it should also be noticed that the failure of European societies to ensure that immigrant and other ethnic minorities achieve a minimum of equality in such matters as employment, education, health and housing means that their organisations will become radicalised. If this is the case they will not provide the basis for peaceful integration in their societies of settlement. From the point of view of those societies they will present a problem of social control.

This is of course the situation in most European societies today. The national societies are faced with rebellion and will inevitably pass from the stage of seeking to promote social cohesion to one in which they confront this rebellion. How well they deal with this situation is largely undecided. They may negotiate with the rebellious groups and reach a new compromise. Or they may simply seek to punish them or destroy them. These issues are at stake in the Northern British cities where disturbances occurred amongst the

Asian populations in the years after 2001 and of course the conflict is a three-sided one between an increasing strength of right wing parties, radical minority groups and the police.

The British case may serve as an example of the way in which the simple assumptions about the integration of minorities in the Welfare State did not appear to be holding and new policies seemed to be necessary to deal with new and severe conflicts.

References

Barry, Brian (2001): Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Baubock, Rainer (1991): Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship. Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations. University of Warwick Coventry, Monograph No 4.

Baubock, Rainer (1994): Transnational Citizenship. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Beveridge, William (1944): Full Employment in a Free Society. London: Allen and Unwin.

Beveridge, William (1942): Social Insurance and Allied Services. HMSO. London: Cmnd 6404.

Crick, Bernard (1998): The Crick report: Final Report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship. Qualifications and Curriculum Authority.

Crowley, John (1994): Social Complexity and Strong Democracy. Innovation—The European Journal of Social Sciences, 7, 3, pp. 309-320.

Delanty, Gerard (1996): Beyond the Nation State: National Identity and Citizenship in a Multicultural Society-a Response to Rex. Sociological Research Online, 1, 3. (URL: http://www.socresonline.org.uk?1/3/1.html, 08-23-2004)

Department of Employment and Productivity (1969): In Place of Strife: A policy for Industrial Relations. HMSO. London: Cmnd 3888.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990): The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

EU Directive on Minimum Standards on Reception of Asylum Seekers in Member States. April 29th 2002.

Gellner, Ernest (1983): Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwells.

Hammar, Tomas (1990): Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and citizens in a World of International Migration. Aldershot: Avebury.

Honeyford, Ray (1988): Integration or Disintegration: Towards a Non-Racist Society. London: Claridge Press.

Honeyford, Ray (1998): The Commission for Racial Equality: British Bureaucracy in a Multiethnic Society. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books.

Jenkins,Roy (1966): Address to a conference of voluntary organisations organised by the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants.

Korpi, Walter (1978): The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Korpi, Walter (1983): The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Kymlicka, Will (1995): Multicultural Citizenship. London: Oxford University Press.

Liebsch, Martina (2001) "Migration and Integration in Europe—The Role of Citizenship Education" Paper presented in Kirchsee on, Germany on behalf of the European Council for Refugees and Exiles to a round table at a conference on Demands on a New Refugee Policy in Europe, organised by the Bundeszentrale fur Politische Bildung in the Framework.of the politeia network for Citizenship and democracy in Europe.

Marshall, Thomas Humphrey (1951): Citizenship and social class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Migration Information Source Newsletter. (URL: http://www.migrationinformation.org, 23-08-2004)

Parekh, Bhiku (2000): Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Radtke, Frank-Olaf (1994): The Formation of Ethnic Minorities: The Transformation of Social into Ethnic Conflicts in the so-called Multicultural Society—The German Case, in: John Rex/Beatrice Drudy (Eds.): Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-cultural Europe. Avebury: Aldershot and Brookfield, pp. 30-38.

Rath, Jan (1991): Minosering: De social Constructe van Ethnische Minderheden, Ph. D. Thesis. University of Utrecht.

Rex, John (1961): Key Problems of Sociological Theory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Rex, John (1996a): National identity in the Democratic Multicultural State. Sociological Research Online, 1, 2. (URL: http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/1/2/1.html, 23-08-2004)

Rex, John (1996b): Ethnic minorities in the Modern Nation State. Basingstoke: MacMillan.

Rex, John (2001): Basic Elements in a Systematic Theory of Ethnic Relations. Sociological research Online, 6, 1. (URL: http:www.socresonline.org.uk/6/1/rex.html, 23-08-2004)

Rex, John (2002): The Fundamentals of the Theory of Ethnicity, in: Sinisa Malesevic/Mark Haugaard (eds.): Making Sense of Collectivity: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Globalisation. London: Pluto Press, pp. 88-121.

Rex, John/Drudy, Beatrice (eds.) (1994): Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-cultural Europe. Avebury: Aldershot and Brookfield.

Rex, John/Tomlinson, Sally (1979): Colonial Immigrants in a British City. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Schierup, Carl-Ulrik (2000): Multi-Poverty Europe, Reflections on Migration, Citizenship and Social Exclusion in the European Union, in: Jagdish Gundara/Sidney Jacobs (eds.): Intercultural Europe, Diversity and Social Policy. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Schierup, Carl-Ulrik/Alund, Aleksandra (1990): Paradoxes of Multiculturalism: Aldershot: Avebury.

Smith, Anthony D. (1981): The Ethnic Revival in the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Anthony D. (1986): The Ethnic Origins of Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwells.

Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu (1994): Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Taylor, Charles (1994): Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, in: Amy Guttman (ed.): Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 25-74.

Tribune Archive, 24th January 1969. (URL http://www.tribune,at freeweb.com/archive/240169.htm, 23-08-2004)

Wieviorka, Michel (1994): Ethnicity in Action, in: John Rex/Beatrice Drudy (eds.): Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-cultural Europe. Avebury: Aldershot and Brookfield.

The author:

Prof. em. PhD John Rex, University of Warwick, Coventry CVA 7 AL, United Kingdom, j.rex@warwick.ac.uk

Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung (JKG), 6. Jg., Heft 2/2004

Journal of Conflict and Violence Research, Vol. 6, 2/2004

Themenschwerpunkt: Wie gefährlich ist Segregation in Städten?

Analysen

Replik