Editorial

Annika Wellmann

In October 1924 German film director Fritz Lang left for the USA to study the methods of film production in America. Later he insisted that his first impression of New York inspired him to make *Metropolis*. This movie—today internationally renowned as a major piece of film culture—combines urban fantasies and visions of the (dismal) future: The gigantic city of Metropolis is socially segregated; while the wealthy upper class lives aboveground and rules from large tower complexes, the working class leads a miserable existence in the depths below. They spend half the day working, dominated by huge machines. Freder, the son of the city's Master, and Maria, a girl that preaches in the catacombs, try to overcome class segregation and exploitation. While contemporary critics attacked the sentimental plot, *Metropolis* was acclaimed for its high level of technical skill. Now, as before, it is considered »a laboratory of modernist cinema and architecture« (Jacobsen and Sudendorf 2000: 9). It thus features different aspects of time and space: the spatial (here: transatlantic) and highly productive transfer of concepts and ideas; the creation of spaces that can be described as arrangements of structures, proportions, and designs; the social stratification of spheres in which people are placed; an imagined future that manifests itself spatially as a city with a distinctive architecture and infrastructure. The cover image of this issue adds further dimensions to this list. It depicts carpentry workers constructing the skyscrapers that are to contribute to the eccentric and unique image of Metropolis. The photo hints at the fact that it takes time to construct spaces; spaces are generated in processes. What is more, the busy carpentry workers—however much they might be posing—remind us that the production of space is mainly carried out by ordinary people, often in minor positions and in everyday routines.

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Both history and sociology have engaged in issues like those raised by Metropolis. Time and space are pivotal concepts as well as well-established research topics in both disciplines.[1] And yet there has been a striking shift in recent years. History and sociology traditionally organize their research in terms of time. It is difficult to imagine historical research without temporal selectivity and typological chronologies, while the emergence of sociology is usually linked with ideas of modernity and the forward movement of society along linear trajectories. Central questions have been continually framed in a historical and sociological semantic of »tradition/modernity,« »r/evolution« or »stagnation/progress,« etc. These semantics still play a crucial role, but both disciplines are now also shifting towards research questions that are framed in terms of spatial concepts. As concepts such as »world society,« »entangled histories,« »transnationalism,« »multi-locality« or »histoire croisée« suggest, research is increasingly represented in topological forms and structures. Today it seems that studies on »modernization« will be almost entirely replaced by research on »globalization.« These conceptual shifts challenge central and classical approaches in both disciplines.

In 2011, the *Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology* (*BGHS*) invited PhD candidates to discuss aspects of the new approaches outlined above in the context of empirical topics or to reflect directly on the history of these shifts. From February 9 to 11, about 25 young historians, sociologists and researchers from neighboring disciplines met at the *BGHS Third Annual Seminar* to present and discuss their findings in a lively atmosphere. This issue of *InterDisciplines* presents six papers that resulted from this conference. The articles are wide-ranging both in terms of time and space: They span from 18th century France to 21st century China. The authors cover a variety of topics, including the construction, usage, and symbolic meaning of spaces; internal and transatlantic migration; entanglements; and »global thinking.« Quite strikingly, all of them focus on spatial aspects and hardly ever reflect on or empirically explore the con-

1 Thanks to Valentin Rauer: He launched the idea for the *Third Annual Seminar* of the *Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology* and wrote the call for papers on which this paragraph is based.

struction, perception, and effects of time. This mirrors the situation at the Annual Seminar. It would be worthwhile investigating why time is a blind spot, while space in its various forms has become a leading category in historical and sociological research: Do we take time for granted? Leaving this question aside, this issue presents original explorations and fruitful findings and thus contributes to a multifaceted and ever-changing research field.

By examining the ways in which cages and corresponding imaginations and practices of caretaking and domestication construed birds as »pets« in eighteenth-century Paris, Julia Breittruck combines spatial history and animal history. She analyzes bird caging as a cultural technique of domestication and cohabitation, the placement and treatment of birds as signs of the owners' social status, and the symbolic function of aviaries as aristocratic heterotopias. Breittruck thus shows that human-bird relationships were defined by both the conceptualization and practice of education as well as by their placement in real and imagined spatial proximities or distances.

Felix Schürmann offers a contribution to the debate on spatial concepts in historiography. By looking at contacts between coastal dwellers in Africa and its offshore islands and sailors from whaling vessels in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, he suggests that »beach« and »ship« are spatial images for arenas of historic entanglements. Additionally, Schürmann proposes linking the approach of »entangled histories« to a historical anthropological perspective so that actors can be taken into full view.

David Gutman's article contributes to the well established field of migration history. Gutman examines the emergence of migrant smuggling networks that facilitated migration to North America from communities in eastern Anatolia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He focuses on how the migration industry incorporated pre-existing social relationships and networks while creating many new ones in order to maintain the flow of migrants in the face of state prohibitions. By doing so, he argues for an examination of the roles played by »periph-

eral« social actors and dynamics in shaping the new spatio-temporal regime.

Gleb Albert analyses expectations of an imminent world revolution in early Soviet Russia. He shows that the belief in world revolution was not limited to the intellectual leadership, but that regional party activists placed themselves and their revolutionary activity within a global context. Albert strives to elucidate activists' ideas about the process of world revolution and how they imagined the communist world that would come into existence after the worldwide »proletarian« victory. This »world society« in the making is compared to Niklas Luhmann's concept of world society. Finally, Albert evaluates the role of communist »global thinking« in the context of the ascension of Stalinism in the mid- to late-1920s.

Rumin Luo's focus is on internal migration in China. She analyzes the Hukou system—a system that regulates mobility and distributes social services between rural and urban areas—as an institutional passage that combines the perspectives of time and space: Although migrants experience a shift in identity as they cross this passage, they remain bound to a rural past based on where they were originally registered. Luo thus argues that this system implies an internal passage for the status transition of migrants.

Based in the field of urban sociology, Anna-Lisa Müller explores three essential aspects of cities and urban spaces in an experimental manner: the way people shape urban spaces, the impact of local history on urban design, and graffiti as a means of communication in urban spaces. Müller analytically connects these aspects to Henri Lefèbvre's conception of space as a social product and presents findings of her empirical studies in the European cities of Dublin and Gothenburg in a photo essay.

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Jacobsen, Wolfgang and Werner Sudendorf (eds.) 2000: Metropolis. Ein filmisches Laboratorium der modernen Architektur / Metropolis. A Cinematic Laboratory for Modern Architecture. Stuttgart, London

Pet Birds. Cages and Practices of Domestication in Eighteenth-Century Paris

Julia Breittruck

Both animal history and the dimensions of spatiality have been gaining attention in the cultural and social sciences in recent years. Unsurprisingly, in the historical sciences it is urban history that has been among the first to postulate a connection between both. When looking for proof that nature is not just a construct, but also influences culture and social life, Dorothee Brantz, for example, focuses on urban transformations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She epitomizes space in order to overcome a presumably conceptual and discursive dichotomy between nature and culture (Brantz 2008). This rather abstract concept, put into practice by Brantz in her research on the use of animals for slaughter and for work in urban areas, leads to a more far-reaching question in social and cultural history that includes the relationships between humans and animals: In what ways did common spaces and spatial partitioning produce the differences between humans and animals?

This paper focuses on the particular phenomenon of »pet making« in early modern times. I argue that in Paris, which was a trading place of exotic and local species of birds throughout the eighteenth century (Robbins 2002), the construction of particular cages and the corresponding imagination and practice of domestication were a way of construing birds as »pets.« My guiding question is: To what extent did historical practices of caretaking constitute domestication by means of architectural design? Caging was embedded in a principal belief in the feasibility and pleasure of taming nature. As Ingensiep demonstrated looking at natural historians' descriptions of apes (Ingensiep 2006), there was a particular interest in teaching animals human-like behavior in the second half of the eighteenth century. In what way did this apply to birds?

By looking at different kinds of eighteenth-century birdcages, the status of these animals—their difference from or similarity to »the human« and their social and financial value—will be discussed.

While there has been research on animal architecture in art-historical accounts of zoos and horse stables, cages used for companion animals have strangely been ignored.[1] Despite this, cages seem to self-evidently reside at the core of a supposedly ahistorical human-animal division. This brief discussion of interpretive possibilities analyzes, in the main, eighteenth-century bird-keeping manuals. Written by noblemen with an interest in ornithology or with official bird caretaking tasks, they were among the first to explicitly explain and popularize practices of keeping birds for pleasure in the home, and are also the main historical source of eighteenth century cage construction advice available to us today.

1. Pet-making and cultural techniques of cohabitation

Recent conceptual history investigations have stated that »pets« found their way into dictionaries as well as into English and Dutch middle-class homes during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Boehrer 2007: 20–24). In principle, all animals deemed tameable, small, curious, rare, esthetic, or precious—such as horses, dogs, birds, cats, and sometimes even monkeys, ferrets, turtles, squirrels, otters, and rabbits, as well as later also hares, mice, hedgehogs, bats, and toads—could be kept as animals »for pleasure,« notably in well-to-do-households (Thomas 1983: 110). In 1789, the *Journal des Luxus und der Moden* gave »pet-status«[2] to

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1 For a review of the literature on animal architecture in French historiography see Baratay 2003. Robbins also touches upon the topic (Robbins 2002: 32–33).

2 For one of the first historiographical uses of the term »pet-status« see Raber 2007: 87.

dogs, cats, monkeys, snakes, lizards, cicadas, and birds; amongst the latter nightingales, canary birds, and several species of parrots as »lap animals« (*Schoßtiere*) (Reichardt 1789). The 1723 reference book *Dictionnaire universel de commerce* denominated aviary or cage birds as »singing birds,« »birds for pleasure,« or »companion birds« (Savary 1723: 892).

According to Georg Wacha, burghers of cities such as Vienna had been keeping domesticated livestock as well as songbirds since the fourteenth century (Wacha 1997: 250). Tamed ringdoves and canary birds had been popular in Spain and England since the sixteenth century (Wacha 1997). However, bird keeping has not been an anthropological constant, but differed according to the owners' social status and the bird species. Particular practices of keeping birds as pets emerged in Paris when the bird trade increased due to the import of canary birds and different kinds of parrots toward the end of the seventeenth century (Robbins 2002), and many members of the bourgeoisie tried to breed birds in their own homes and sell them (Hervieux 1709). Whereas housekeeping treatises and hunting manuals had been explaining techniques of catching and feeding birds throughout the seventeenth century, the genre of companion bird manuals emerged only at the end of the century and promulgated specific cultural domestication techniques.

Caging birds can be regarded as a cultural technique of human-animal cohabitation. Symbolic work on living with animals, that is to say its cultural meaning and densification, requires specific cultural techniques. According to a definition posited by Thomas Macho, cultural techniques differ from other survival techniques insofar as they can potentially be self-referential: one can read about reading, a portrait refers to the image of a potentially absent or dead person which is already an effigy of the living person, while hunting cannot refer to itself (Macho 2008). Accordingly, caging birds refers to traditional techniques of fencing farm animals, but becomes a »technique of second order« (i.e. self-referential; Macho 2008: 100) as a practice of enclosure by referring to spatial partitioning and enclosing as tools of domestication and cohabitation.

Margot Schindler et al. (Schindler 2006) claim that cages often tended to become »an ornament and object of prestige whereas the ›inhabitants‹

took a back seat« and were hence just subject to whims of fashion. This assumption may be the reason that research thus far has not acknowledged cages' historical relevance. However, various birdcage forms offer a projection surface for historical imaginations of emerging bourgeois values. As one example, one of the most-read novels of the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse,* published in 1761, suggests that bird aviaries had high symbolic value as regards the imagery of women and gardens (Rousseau 1761). On the practical level, different cage constructions created both a human-animal division and pet status.

Early modern bird cages were usually constructed by bird merchants or by specialized craftsmen. They were sold at markets and in shops, and can roughly be categorized according to their functions: decoy, transport, domestic and/or garden use. In Paris, many bird sellers were located around the *quai de la mégisserie* (Robbins 2002: 109). Several authors of eighteenth-century manuals describe the design, equipment, and placement of cages used for keeping birds for pleasure. Jean-Claude Hervieux de Chanteloup, who published a wide-spreading manual for the keeping of canary birds at the beginning of the century, re-edited at least eleven times in French and translated into several European languages, lists cages, aviaries (*volières*), and bird houses (*cabanes*). Aviaries, traditionally used by the nobility, were often located in gardens, whereas cages were smaller and placed on tables or hung indoors next to a window. It seems that people often kept a larger number of birds in one single cage so that Hervieux advised his readers not to place more than five or six couples together (Hervieux 1709).

At the end of the seventeenth century, keeping falcons, doves, and poultry in proper aviaries continued to be regarded as a prestigious noble privilege. At that time, however, »birds for pleasure« progressively increased in rank to a level similar to these »status birds«. Manuals started propagating and thus increasingly standardized the practices of keeping birds. While household literature for landlords concentrated on instructions for hunting, farming, and cookery, starting in the late seventeenth century, bird-keeping manuals emphasized »amusement.« This up-and-

coming genre of bird-keeping manuals, which in part included knowledge from ancient natural-history tomes and sixteenth-century ornithological texts, provided instructions concerning acquisition, breeding, feeding, training, nursing, and caging. These were addressed to the so-called »*curieux*«—usually erudite collectors of rare, ancient, or foreign »*naturalia*«, artifacts, and artworks; a category mainly comprising noblemen as well as members of a well-to-do bourgeoisie.

While the species and the modes of keeping birds still fulfilled functions of status representation, they became further socially encoded and gendered. According to Emma Spary, the writings by the famous natural historians and ornithologists Réaumur and Buffon connoted bird keeping and modes of collecting either to »manly« science or a »womanly« foible for luxury (Spary 2002). Likewise, Hervieux de Chanteloup's 1709 publication *Nouveuau Traité des Serins de Canarie* tried to balance these tendencies. While Hervieux mainly refers to the usually male *Curieux* in the text, his opening dedication to Louise Françoise de Bourbon, *princesse de Condé* states that bird keeping was an »innocent pleasure« which inherently relates it to female and possibly childlike pastimes (Hervieux 1709: epistle).

In his treatise, Hervieux de Chanteloup, royal »supervisor of the woods« (*commissaire ou inspecteur des bois à bâtir*) (Michaud 1840: 152) as well as »guardian of the princess's canary birds« (*gouverneurs des serins*), issued several cage and aviary instructions. First, he recommended overall visibility of the birds be provided by open bars instead of boards, as it offered a pleasure »quite exhilarating & very much pleasing to the eye« (Hervieux 1709: 110). Hervieux, whose intention was to train healthy birds, also provided advice about cage size and measurements for a bird's well-being, as well as the position of perches, feeding, and drinking dishes for both healthy and sick birds. He specifically drew attention to new birds that tended to hit their head against the bars when people approached them: he preferred bars to a screen of boards within the cage or bird house for the domestication process of an initially feral bird: »It is these same birds, uncovered in this manner, that become so familiar with the world by looking out in all directions, that nothing can alarm

them any more« (Hervieux 1709: 10).[3] Hence, transparent construction was declared as the driver of the face-to-face familiarization of bird and keeper.



Plate 1: Hervieux 1709: 16–17.

This technique of caging can also be found in the principles and ideas of spatial delimitation and enclosure of the king's animals in the late seventeenth-century royal menagerie of Versailles: Hervieux's cage promotes

3 Original: »C'est que ces mêmes Oiseaux qui sont ainsi à découvert, deviennent si familiers en voyant de tous côtez & si souvent le monde, que rien ne peut les effaroucher.«

the mechanism of permanent visibility. It is also a sort of theater that refers to the practice of exhibiting the domestication and taming process of the bird itself. Is it far-fetched to move on to Michel Foucault's idea of a cultural model of the perfect prison? In his analysis of the architecture of the »Panopticon,« Foucault raised the question of whether Jeremy Bentham had Louis XIV's menagerie in mind when he designed his ideal human jail.[4] Indeed, in Hervieux's description one can see the inherent idea of the bird »tamer« who disciplines the animal—while not taking into account the bird's awareness of an omnipresent observer, but at any rate its allegedly voluntary surrender to its human companionship.[5]

4 See Foucault 1995, 201: »The panoptic mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize immediately. In short, it reverses the principle of the dungeon; or rather of its three functions—to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide—it preserves only the first and eliminates the other two. Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap.«

5 Foucault wonders whether Bentham based his ideal type on the concept of the Versailles menagerie (Foucault 1995: 204): »The Panopticon is a royal menagerie; the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping and the king by the machinery of a furtive power. With this exception, the Panopticon also does the work of a naturalist. It makes it possible to draw up differences: among patients, to observe the symptoms of each individual, without the proximity of beds, the circulation of miasmas, the effects of contagion confusing the clinical tables; among school-children, it makes it possible to observe performances (without there being any imitation or copying), to map aptitudes, to assess characters, to draw up rigorous classifications and, in relation to normal development, to distinguish ›laziness and stubbornness‹ from ›incurable imbecility‹; among workers, it makes it possible to note the aptitudes of each worker, compare the time he takes to perform a task, and if they are paid by the day, to calculate their wages.« In this case, why should Hervieux's birdcage not be a precursor, a way to unintentionally test different types of imprisonment (such as that proposed by Nobleville and analyzed in the following)?

Comparison with another manual shows that these popular books focused on aspects of domestication whereby the animal had to adapt to human needs and aims via education. The cage served as a technical space for the control of the initially wild, untamed being. Arnault de Nobleville, a physician whose *Aëdonologie, ou Traité du Rossignol franc et chanteur* was published in 1773, described the taming of nightingales as an eminent problem. The nightingale, which had been a popular domestic bird for centuries, was also labeled by Georges Louis Leclerc, *comte de Buffon*, author of the widely read *Histoire naturelle des oiseaux* (1779), as having the opposite temperament of a canary bird (Rothfels 2007). Buffon separated the »wild« and »natural« spheres from the »tame« and »artificial«: »If the Nightingale be the songster of the grove, the Canary Finch is the musician of the chamber. The melody of the former is derived from Nature alone, that of the latter is directed and improved by our instructions [*nos arts*]« (Buffon 1793c: 1).[6] That is why Nobleville recommended calming the not-yet companion nightingale through the use of strong measures for the first season after capture, that is to say through use of a rather small cage closed with boards on all sides excepting the foreside measuring sixteen inches long, fourteen inches high, and fourteen inches deep (Nobleville 1773: 48–62). In contrast to Hervieux, Nobleville placed less emphasis on the bird's sanity and mood. The interaction between human and animal was limited to a hatch at the bottom of the cage. Furthermore, he advised a second cage with bars for permanent use and a third one for blinding. Blinding birds with a red-hot wire was an early modern practice applied in order to calm the songbird after capture and to increase its educability by reducing distraction.

The question of the distinction between animals and humans was imminent, since both were subject to education. Whereas Buffon continuously anthropomorphized animals—both in his use of vocabulary as well as in his comparisons of animal behavior and social human actions—he still attempted to draw clear-cut boundaries when reflecting on parrots'

6 Leclerc 1793c: 1. Original: Leclerc 1779a, 1: »Si le rossignol est le chantre des bois, le serin est le musicien de la chambre; le premier tient tout de la Nature, le second participe à nos arts.«

ability to speak: »There are two kinds of perfectibility, one is sterile and is limited to the education of the individual. The other is fertile as it is diffused through a whole species and cultivated by the institutions of society. No animal is susceptible to this perfectibility of the species« (Buffon 1779b: 67).[7] Thus following the »Anciens,« the naturalist distinguished between supposedly similar conditions of human and animal capacities by attributing refinement and socializing practices to humans. In doing so, by underscoring the role of the mother in particular in an education both continual and tender, Buffon advanced late-eighteenth-century bourgeois family values. Consequently, he found that animals were merely lacking in constant affection:

> These birds [*perroquets*/parrots; JB] […] lack this expression of intelligence which is the high faculty of language. They are deprived of it like all other animals […] due to their short association with their parents whose care is limited to physical instruction [*éducation*], and it is not repeated and not continued long enough to produce durable and reciprocal impressions, it does not even suffice to establish a constant family union which is the first degree of all society and unique source of all intelligence (Buffon 1779b: 69).[8]

7 Original: »Car il faut distinguer deux genres de perfectibilité, l'un stérile, et qui se borne à l'éducation de l'individu, et l'autre fécond, qui se répand sur toute l'espèce, et qui s'étend autant qu'on le cultive par les institutions de la société. Aucun des animaux n'est susceptible de cette perfectibilité d'espèce […].«

8 Since the English translation of 1793 considerably changed the meaning of Buffon's text, the author of the present study translated this excerpt. I tried to make the historical semantics of the original French as clear as possible. Original: »Or ces oiseaux, auxquels rien ne manque pour la facilité de la parole, manquent de cette expression de l'intelligence, qui seule fait la haute faculté du langage: ils en sont privés comme tous les autres animaux, et par les mêmes causes, c'est-à-dire, par leur prompt accroissement dans le premier âge, par la courte durée de leur société avec leurs parens, dont les soins se bornent à l'éducation corporelle, et ne se répètent ni ne se continuent assez de temps pour faire des impressions durables et réciproques, ni même assez pour établir l'union d'une famille

What, then, if continuous education were applied to birds? Hervieux explained precisely how to instruct birds by singing repetitively and over a long time span. As opposed to Nobleville, Hervieux did not mention the practice of blinding, but instead suggested a rather gentle way of teaching melodies to the canary bird: he recommended covering the cage with cloth while training the bird with a flageolet, a bird flute. Hervieux meticulously described how the bird, separated from other animals, should remain like this for ten days before starting training with the flageolet, after which the bird could be taught one or two melodies by playing them to the bird a maximum of five times a day. This instruction, articulated in manuals distributed as of the early eighteenth century, appears to make birdsong into a historical phenomenon (Hervieux 1709: 90–110). Hervieux's books described and endorsed this particular instructional practice for a larger public in several editions throughout the century (1705, 1707, 1709, 1712, 1713, 1734, 1740, 1745, 1766, 1785, 1802) and thus became a potential way of »doing pet birds« (analogous to the concept of »doing gender«).[9]

2. The bird's place

The relations of keepers to their birds differed according to profession, gender, and social status, and were connected to the spatial proximity between humans and animals and to the cage's placement.

In early modern times, fostering enclosure of certain animals partly relied on religious divisions of wild and domestic species or individuals. In ecclesiastical definitions in early modern times, »mankind« was said to dominate all animals, justified by the well-known verses of Genesis (1:26 and 1:28). As Éric Baratay puts it, domestic animals were conceived of as

constante, premier degré de toute société, et source unique de toute intelligence.«

9 Some teaching practices to consciously direct the training of singing birds for the home were known to breeders beforehand. Tyrolean canary breeders and merchants, whose exportation activities in Europe reached their peak in the eighteenth century, had been training birds by whistling melodies to them, exploiting their ability to imitate.

being not only subjected to, but also naturally and originally attributed to humans for use (Baratay 1993: 87). The concept of human dominion was all-encompassing: in clerical treatises of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, both domestic and wild animals contributed to humanity's pleasure either through their agricultural and work utility, their company, or the distraction and satisfaction of curiosity (*curiosité*) they offered when hunted (Baratay 1993: 89). While this seems quite cynically anthropocentric today, abbot Pluche, in his 1732 *Spectacle de la nature*, even confirmed a God-given, human-centered topography of animals' natural habitats: while »monsters« and dangerous animals were said to be far away, in the oceans for instance, wild animals lived in proximity to humans—for hunting—and domesticated animals lived in towns (Baratay 1993: 91).

A very famous 1751 painting by Jean Siméon Chardin, *La Serinette*, has as its subject an interior scene with a woman teaching a canary bird.[10] This lady—in a living room that evokes wealth and a foible for exoticism, with green tapestries, chairs covered with a white-green Chinese silk, and underscored by the dress she is wearing, white embroidered with roses—is apparently playing a melody to the canary on a barrel organ, the »*Serinette*.« The existence of many such *serinettes* for the musical instruction of birds, artefacts from the second half of the eighteenth century in France, support the view that this setting is quite close to the »reality« of the scenery.[11] Considering that the room in which the bird is placed served the dwellers' outward representation to guests, the decorative and at times quite expensive canary bird contributed to the room's (semi)public presentation. Birds certainly functioned as meaningful social capital, and prices for cages and for birds produced and reproduced social status in two ways: according to Hervieux, prices in 1745 ranged between three to

10 Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin, Jean-Baptiste-Siméon 1751: La Serinette, or Dame variant ses amusements; oil on canvas, 50 cm x 43 cm, Frick Collection and Musée du Louvre. See www.louvre.fr.

11 Although mid-eighteenth-century genre paintings tended to be fairly similar to the actual interiors they presented, an iconographic influence of traditional representations of women with birds is likely, too.

forty-five livres for different canary breeds depending on their popularity and rarity of coloring.[12] Louise Robbins found that prices for cages ranged from »a low of 72 livres for a wheeled aviary with canaries, goldfinches, and other small birds, to a high of 4,000 livres for a seven-foot-high parrot cage with gold-plated brass ornamentation« (Robbins 2002: 32). Furthermore, the well-being of one or more canary birds could inherently represent the intellectuality of its owner: if tulip bulbs, shells, fossils, and further natural items were usually at the core of collectors' interests in study and social representation, then the ornithological knowledge a versed bird keeper acquired through specialized books and popular scientific manuals such as those by Hervieux, Nobleville, or Buc'hoz might well have been part of identifying a person as a »*curieux*.«[13]

Bird keeping in town dwellers' homes was discussed controversially during the eighteenth century. On the one hand, it is likely that canary birds grew in popularity in middle-class households during the eighteenth century because they were easy to both deal with and clean. As depicted by Hervieux, drawers of cage floors that could slide in and out facilitated cleaning (table 1). Nobleville added that they should be filled with dry moss where the bird droppings would dry »promptly.«[14] While they could be considered a sign of wealth, birds could also be classified as a lower-class phenomenon if they were kept in bad conditions. Pet keeping was subject to criticism regarding a lack of knowledge concerning hygiene, as pronounced by Louis-Sébastien Mercier in his *Tableau de Paris* in 1783. He wrote that poverty, pet keeping, and unclean living conditions were widespread phenomena at the time: »The poorer people are in Paris, the more often they keep dogs, cats, birds, & co. pell-mell in

12 Prices were unstable. According to Hervieux, a male »*serin blond doré*« cost four livres ten francs in 1709, while in 1745 it cost four livres, and twelve livres in 1785. In 1745, a »*serin plein & parfait*« was priced at forty-five livres.

13 For the profiling of an early modern »curieux« by collecting »naturalia« also see Goldgar on tulip collecting in seventeenth-century Netherlands: Goldgar 2007.

14 Nobleville 1773: 59.

a small room« (Mercier 1783: 196).[15] Similar to some of his contemporaries' opinions on bad habits among the lower classes of society, Mercier assigned a lack of hygiene practices to the working class. Mercier noted that in spite of police prohibitions, these people kept domestic animals for food in a presumably unsanitary manner: »Despite the police's proscriptions, most people breed rabbits in their hovel […]. They live with smelling races […]« (Mercier 1783: 196). Parrots in their cages hanging in windows completed the picture of noise pollution and dirtiness on Parisian streets: »Another keeps a parrot in the window; with the result that the neighbor studying history, medicine, or music hears the annoying and repetitive babbling of this animal all the time« (Mercier 1783: 197).

Bird-caging as a cultural technique reflected not only its own function, but was also referred to in other practices: journals and poems produced iconic and written discourses on liberty in contrast to enclosure which often included cages and thereby evoked new meanings. According to Louise Robbins, they »reflect[ed] the tensions of a culture that was based on chains of authority, but in which freedom was becoming a popular refrain.« For example, the integrity of young women was discussed using images of confinement which described cages as »providing a refuge, protecting the creature from a harsh world.« In contrast, some people envisioned only free animals as beautiful animals (Robbins 2002: 134). Of course, this interpretation of cages as anti-freedom imagery drew upon older, but often differently connoted images. During the eighteenth century, spatial relations and enclosure became topics not only of pet-making but of further identification with human living conditions. Mercier transferred bird-caging to a topical reflection of the domestic condition of the »sedentary working« craftsmen of Paris:

> The tailors, the cobblers, the stonemasons, the embroiderers, the needlewomen, all the sedentary crafts always keep an animal confined in a cage, as though to make them share the tedium [*ennui*] of their own slavery. There is a magpie in a small cage, and the poor

15 Translation by the author: »Plus les gens sont pauvres à Paris, plus ils ont de chiens, de chats, d'oiseaux, & c. pêle-mêle dans une petite chambre.«

> beast passes its entire life from morning to evening leaping, moving, searching for deliverance. The tailor looks at the captive magpie, and wishes it could keep him company forever. (Mercier 1783: 196)[16]

This description of the spatial proximity of humans and animals served the critical observer as a metaphor to denounce the conditions of society's working classes just a few years before the beginning of the French Revolution.

3. Symbolic function

Images of very popular aristocratic aviaries tended to evoke paradisiac gardens. Naturalist Pierre-Joseph Buc'hoz described them in his manual *Amusements des Dames dans les Oiseaux de Volière* in 1782. Biological interest mixed with baroque imaginings of arcadia seems to have influenced his concept of the aviaries »almost every Sir has built.« Facing the morning sun the aviary should incorporate some areas to which the birds can retreat on hot days. Furthermore, it should mimic natural habitats and be beautiful by means of murals on the interior colored in »sky blue & with a landscape, or, at least, in violet, green or Cremnitz white« as well as plants to which (artificial) nests could be attached: »in this aviary you will put […] five or six evergreen trees or, if unavailable, you will put […] plants you will have cut for this purpose« (Buc'hoz 1782: 324). Thus, natural and remote locations, such as breeding sites, were brought into a happy, human-made proximity. They could be called »heterotopias« in allusion to Michel Foucault's *Des espaces autres, Hétérotopies;* »another real space« in which the societal »other« is actually and materially encompassed. In addition to providing a location for many social happenings,

16 »Les tailleurs, les cordonniers, les cizeleurs, les brodeurs, les couturieres, tous les métiers sédentaires, tiennent toujours quelque animal enfermé dans une cage, comme pour lui faire partager l'ennui de leur propre esclavage. C'est une pie resserée dans une petite cage; & la pauvre bête passe toute sa vie du matin au soir à sauter, à se remuer pour chercher sa délivrance. Le tailleur regarde la pie captive, & veut qu'elle lui tienne éternellement compagnie.«

heterotopias contribute to stabilizing or renewing social structures by taking on several functions. While indoor cages have been shown to not only have been perceived as unjust prisons at times and indeed, on an architectural level, alternated between disciplining »Panopticon,« solitary cell, and species-appropriate confinement, they also evoked paradisiac imaginings of a protected artificial enclave. Seemingly authentic but controlled gardens that imitated nature became increasingly popular during the eighteenth century. Rousseau's protagonist Julie cultivates her aviary in this manner with several birds she calls her »guests» or even »masters« of their own domain instead of »prisoners« (Rousseau 1761: 121–122). The lady's aviary turns out to be a metaphor of her own decision to embrace bourgeois moral values: Julie was originally an aristocratic young lady who progressively becomes more bourgeois. Having first been in love with a man her age, she is forced into marriage with the much older M. Wolmar. Reaching a turning point, she decides to »prefer« the quiet and orderly life of a married couple over her former passion.

While this illusionary Arcadian imagery favors metaphors of voluntarily tamed or virtuous behavior—be it human or animal—practices such as those described by Nobleville conquered nature in a much more direct way. Here, the spatial conquest directly enters the wilderness: Nobleville proposed appropriating nature by actually transplanting trees used for breeding in his book's chapter entitled »How to establish nightingales in places where there are none.«[17] If a person missed the varied and untiring song of the nightingale in the own garden, what he described as »the most beautiful bouquet a tree can yield,« he suggested searching out a breeding pair in the woods, capturing it, cutting the branches with the birds' nest on it (or the entire tree), and then placing it in front of one's home (Nobleville 1783: 103).

17 Original: »De la maniere d'etablir des rossignols dans les endroits ou il n y en a point.«

Similar to the functions of a »heterotopia,« Buc'hoz and Nobleville transported nature that was unavailable in the immediate spatial vicinity to the human living sphere in a concentrated form.

Conclusion

In this brief overview on caging, three main issues which emerged, were negotiated, and changed during the eighteenth century have been raised: first, the educability and, hence the ontological status of certain birds; second, the positioning of the bird in the proximity of human living spheres and its consequences for the pet-owner's status; and, third, the aristocratic ideas of a paradisiacal garden aviary and its poetic transformation into a bourgeois ideal. Distinctions between humans and birds and hereby between wild animals and pets were established through the practical conceptualization of education, spatial relations, and the placement of birds and cages. In summary, the practical appropriation of birds, demonstrated using the cases of the canary and the nightingale, took place by means of the animals' integration into human spaces. Hence, the pet bird began to exist as soon as it was attributed to a proper place. Buc'hoz's manual and Rousseau's novel depicted an Arcadian, world-bettering, and bourgeois image of cages and caging, whereas »everyday« manuals on keeping and breeding birds tended to be either more brutal or drew attention to the birds' needs as well. Over the eighteenth century, cages functioned as imaginative spaces as well as spaces for interaction by creating avenues of communication for birds and keepers. A future discussion of approaches to cage settings analyzed using actor-network theory could add to the understanding of how certain birds entered into an interactive role with their owners.

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Ships and Beaches as Arenas of Entanglements from Below: Whalemen in Coastal Africa, c. 1760–1900

Felix Schürmann

Remembering the moment he arrived at his first whaling ground on a New Bedford whaler in the mid-nineteenth century, sailor Charles Nordhoff remarked: »I was looking for some peculiarity in the color of the water, the strength of the breeze, or the quality of the atmosphere, to distinguish this from the other parts of the ocean.« Although »so much had been said of ›good whaling ground‹«, the sea of the Mozambique Channel turned out to be »as deeply blue, the breezes as gentle, and the air as hazy as it generally is in those portions of the tropics« (Nordhoff 1855: 90f.). The ocean with its inscrutable surface conceals its mysterious inhabitants from the whaleman as it conceals its mysterious pasts from the historian. However, when explored in the right way, the ocean reveals its secrets and regorges its whales and its pasts. »The Sea Is History,« Derek Walcott entitled his famous poem. It is not only a history of linking together ›larger‹ processes on the land, but a history in its own right, shaped by its own actors, following its own logic. »Where are your monuments?« Walcott asks and gives the answer: »The sea has locked them up.« Seeking material artifacts on the sea makes a historian look like the young Charles Nordhoff awaiting the color of the water to change when reaching a whaling ground. Notwithstanding the absence of visible tracks, the ocean is »a tracked-on space« as Greg Dening has put it:

> The wakes of ships and canoes that have crossed it have left no permanent mark on its waters. But if we voyaged in a *New 20,000 Leagues under the Sea*, looking up to the canopy of the sea's surface above us and had a sort of time-exposure vision, we would find

> the tracks a closely woven tapestry of lines. Very few of these lines would be random. They are all directed in some way by systems of knowledge: of stars, of time, of distance—and of purpose: of trade, of empire, of science, of way-finding. There are many other tracks, too, of whales in seasonal migration, of tuna, of birds. These too, more mysteriously, are directed by systems of knowledge. (Dening 2002: 2f.)

The tapestry of invisible but purposely drawn lines constituting the evidence of the sea's history turns out to be a valuable point of reference when entering current debates on how to conceptualize the spaces of history. Ships have been the essential means of linking remote spaces with each other for the greatest part of history, and focusing on maritime actors is of crucial relevance for understanding the spatial entanglements of the past (Heidbrink 2007). In this sense, Kären Wigen has stated: »Approaching human society from the water is prompting scholars to think afresh about such basic elements of geography as distance, scale, and boundaries. (…) [M]aritime social-cultural history as an analytical project requires an expansive spatial vision, extending not only from the ships to the docks but bridging multiple regions of the ocean and including littorals and their hinterlands as well.« (Wigen 2008: 12).

For several years now, historiography is renewing its spatial visions and its instruments for conceptualizing historical processes that exceed common spatial frameworks. My current dissertation research is conceived as a contribution to the debate on how to operationalize recent approaches in this field, confronting them with a phenomenon of interaction from the maritime sphere. The project focuses on contacts between coastal dwellers in Africa and its offshore islands (referred to as coastal Africa in the following) and sailors from whaling vessels (whalemen) who frequented African coastal waters in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Directing our view to the movements of the actual actors of transoceanic entanglements, the field of observation cannot be specified as confined, as is usually the case in comparative or transfer-oriented studies, which often focus on two delimited spatial entities. The attention follows the ships' routes, which were determined by the

movements of the whales and other factors, and illuminates contact situations at various places, asking about their impacts on broader historical processes. How can this undertaking contribute to the renewal of spatial visions in historiography?

The goal of this article is to step into the conceptual discussion on historical space from the perspective of my research and introduce the ›beach‹ and the ›ship‹ as analytical figures. It begins by giving a short outline of the dissertation project and then portrays ›beach‹ and ›ship‹ as its central spatial images. Subsequently, it presents two empirical examples of entanglements initiated by interactions between coastal dwellers and whalemen and, in conclusion, suggests describing them as entanglements from below. Since the project is a work in progress, these considerations have a preliminary character.

Whalemen and coastal dwellers in the African context

People act intentionally, but history, as Wolfgang Reinhard reminds us, hardly follows the purposes of its actors—it »instead results dialectically from unintended side effects.« (Reinhard 2010: 87, translated from German by the author). An initial idea informing my dissertation project is to put such unintended consequences on center stage, namely: to interpret the American-style pelagic whaling of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a mobile practice that entailed far-reaching side effects of a global range. When whaling vessels from North America and Europe extended their voyages to all oceans from the 1760s onward, they spanned a net of hunting grounds, maritime routes, transport chains, and supply posts across the world.[1] About a hundred years later, when this

1 On the dynamics of exploration in particular, see Davis & Gallman 1993: 56–59, 62; Dolin 2007: 227–229; Francis 1990: 78f., 125–135; Jackson 1978: 92, 98–106, 117–130, 136–142; Jones 1981: 23–25, Mc Devitt 1978: 113f., 207–212; Macy 1835: 54; Spence 1980: 83f., 93, 96, 99, 107, 113, 117–119, 123; Stackpole 1952: 33–35, 51–55, 68; Starbuck 1878: 56, 95f., 176. I borrowed the term »American-style pelagic whaling« from Randall R. Reeves and Tim D. Smith, who developed a periodization model for the global history of whaling (Reeves & Smith 2006: 90f.).

whaling era reached its peak, around nine hundred vessels were being navigated simultaneously by more than twenty-thousand whalemen across the globe (Hohman 1928: 5f., 41f.). Since most voyages took several years and supplies continuously had to be obtained en route, contacts between sailors and coastal dwellers emerged wherever the ships opened up new whaling grounds. Viewed in this way, the legacy of whaling—spatially, probably the farthest reaching practice of exploiting natural resources in history—is not only a legacy of depleted species. In manifold and sometimes unforeseen ways, the hunt for whales shaped the everyday experiences and actions of those who came in contact with it—on sea and on land, in huge harbors and on small islands, in the Sea of Okhotsk as well as in the Great Australian Bight.

The encounters, exchanges, and communication between whalemen and coastal dwellers left traces on the beaches as well as on the ships. In my dissertation, I investigate the depth of these traces, or rather the shaping powers of such contacts, by examining a seascape topography that involves places on the eastern and western coast of Africa and its offshore islands. The field of observation includes places where, at times, whalers made up the largest and most influential segment of ships, such as in Annobón (today a part of Equatorial Guinea), Walvis Bay (Namibia), and Mutsamudu (Comoros). It also includes places where merchantmen, dhows, and naval ships commonly dropped their anchors as well, such as Delagoa Bay (Moçambique), Port Louis (Mauritius) and Saint Augustin (Madagascar). I am not examining all the places whalemen frequented in the African context, but all those where they appeared as a distinct group of actors.[2] The sites under consideration were not only distant from each other, but also different in terms of their social, political, economic, and cultural settings. However, the encounter with the whalemen and their consistent interests was a shared experience: the sailors sought provisions and water, wood to fire up the on-board tryworks, trading opportunities, recreation, time and space for ship repairs, sexual activity, and,

2 In the world harbors Cape Town and Zanzibar, whalers apparently made up only a minor portion of the shipping traffic, and whalemen hardly made an appearance as a distinctive group.

from time to time, opportunities to escape from the vessel. The basic question of the project is what impacts these practices had on coastal communities, particularly with regard to social and political dynamics as well as changes in economic structures and trade networks.

Why is ›Africa‹ a valid spatial reference for this kind of research? There are two reasons; the first is a pragmatic one: from the perspective of social and cultural history, there are hardly any studies on whalers' activities in the seas surrounding the African continent. Unlike the Pacific or the North Atlantic, there is a gap in the empirical research.[3] Secondly, this subject has the potential to widen and to delineate the common understanding of Africa's connections with the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds. Most studies in this field are located in the broader framework of colonialism and the Atlantic Slavery. It is doubtlessly justified and necessary to pay particular attention to this domain of maritime connections, not least because it contributed to Africa's long-lasting marginalization. At the same time, however, centering on colonialism and slavery has created powerful paradigms which sometimes mislead scholars to pre-structure their analytical frameworks by assuming a ubiquitous asymmetry in every relationship. Viewed against this background, studies of coastal contacts are particularly prone to »teleological fallacy,« as Ian C. Campbell terms it, namely that: »knowledge of the later outcome of contact influences perception of the nature of early contact.« (Campbell 2003: 63). In such a framework, scholars tend to confine historical actors from Africa to the role of victims and, as Monica Juneja criticizes, lose sight of ambiguous, unexpected, and disparate phenomena (Juneja 2003).

3 Haywood (1967) is the only separate study on whalers' activities in the African context. It is largely a survey of sailors' records and only superficially outlines the conditions and dynamics of coastal societies. Aside from Haywood, there are a few articles touching upon the issue of coastal interaction with whalemen, see in particular Booth 1964; Richards & Du Pasquier 1989; and Wray & Martin 1983. For the Pacific context, see Gray 1999; Kenny 1952; Kugler 1971; Martin 1979; Mrantz 1976; Ralston 1977; and Webb 1988.

The contacts between coastal dwellers and whalemen in the African context bear such a disparate character. Whalers were among the first ships that came from North America and Europe to coastal Africa on a regular basis without any interest in obtaining slaves (Duignan & Gann 1984: 58f.). Unlike many other actors who arrived on African beaches in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, whalemen had no intention of intervening in the societies they encountered. They were neither affected by the sense of vocation that distinguished missionaries, nor did they necessarily think of themselves as bearers of a superior civilization, as explorers or agents of colonial powers did. Their routes followed the movements of their prey, and, in a way, coastal contacts came along as an incidental side effect of the pursuit and capture of whales. For a whaler, roaming the oceans was not merely an intermezzo between departure and arrival, but the principal purpose of a voyage. A considerable portion of their itineraries was unpredictable. Coastal contacts which occurred over the course of these movements cannot be understood when acting on the a priori assumption that the actors involved encountered each other on a predetermined basis with unequal agencies. Accordingly, the investigation of this comparatively ambiguous context of interaction can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of Africa's maritime pasts.

Ships and beaches

The history of whalemen's activities in coastal Africa is a history of exchange and communication that transcends boundaries—foremost in the spatial, but also in the social, cultural, political, economic, and normative sense. In this regard, it touches upon recent debates in historiography on how to conceptualize the spaces of history: influenced by globalization discourse, postcolonial criticism, and other stimuli, historians have developed, revitalized, and borrowed a number of instruments from other disciplines that aim to overcome the conventional understanding of spaces as holistic containers. Approaches such as *transnational history*, *histoire croisée*, or *entangled histories,* and concepts such as cultural transfer, hybridization, or *Black Atlantic* emphasize inherent and reciprocal dy-

namics of interactions beyond the borders of nation-states or other spatial entities imagined as fixed by restrictive boundaries.[4]

Some research in this field has been criticized for not applying its criticism of narrowing prefigurations to itself. Which constrictions, exclusions, and normative determinations do popular images from the digital age such as *network*, *flow*, or the *global* involve? And how does this conceptual equipment affect not only the potential findings, but also the constructions of the objects of empirical research? To this effect, Frederick Cooper has indicated the danger of projecting present experiences (or rather expectations) of global connectivity onto the past: in doing so, scholars create totalizing and therefore misleading paradigms that lose sight of important nuances (Cooper 2007: 159; see also Luutz 2007).

I meet this challenge by focusing on the actual practices and experiences of mobile actors who created spaces through their movements. The point of observation is not centered on a fixed spatial entity, but lays out a polylocal field and thus escapes the embedding of history in territorial space.[5] Utilizing a concept by Mary Louise Pratt, the places and spaces of interaction between whalemen and coastal dwellers can be described as ›contact zones‹: where persons of different cultural and social backgrounds came into contact, the reciprocal exchange was able to create its own dynamics and thus partially or fully detach lifestyles and normative systems in such spaces from those of their neighboring social environments (Pratt 1992: 4, 6f.). In coastal areas, however, such processes were subject to the dual character of the shoreline: separating the land from the sea, the shore only opened up to a contact zone when ships dropped anchor. Being ›in-between‹ spaces *and* boundaries, and at the same time limiting *and* expanding ranges of mobility, coastal areas were a specific type of ›contact zone‹, which Greg Dening has described as the ›beach‹. In Dening's understanding, a beach is not—or not only—a cer-

4 Regarding the objectives of these approaches, see in particular Randeria 1999, Subrahmanyam 1997, and Werner & Zimmermann 2002.

5 The idea of operating with polylocal fields of study came up in cultural anthropology; see in particular Marcus 1995 and Clifford 1999: 31.

tain type of the earth's surface in the geological sense, but an arena of interaction where the dynamic of becoming never leads to a static being. Unlike ›frontiers‹ in the history of settler colonialism, beaches did not necessarily become sites of a permanent overpowering, since, in the words of Dening, they »have to be crossed both by those who came first and those who come after.« Accordingly, a beach must be understood as a permanent »double-edged space, in-between; an exit space that is also an entry space; a space where edginess rules.« (Dening 2004: 13, 16). Consequently, a characteristic feature of beaches as ambivalent spaces of crossings and the ›in-between‹ was the prominent role of intermediaries: translators and pilots, beachcombers and middlemen, and many other border-crossers and negotiators had significant impact on the dynamics of interaction (Dening 1978: 31–34; Dening 2004: 18).

Whalemen and coastal dwellers not only faced each other on beaches, but also on the vessels, when, for example, traders, pilots, or messengers came aboard. Above all, however, newly hired sailors crossed the beaches towards the ships. American whalers normally recruited parts of their crew en route. During the second half of the eighteenth century, these cases were still sporadic. They occurred, for example, when captains had to replace men that had deserted, had suffered accidents, or were not fit for service for other reasons. Over the course of nineteenth century however, picking up shipping labor along the way became a widespread practice: the spatial and temporal expansion of the voyages opened up manifold opportunities to hire unskilled men who would work for little pay and could be taught most onboard jobs in little time. Especially on overcrowded Atlantic islands such as the Cape Verdes or the Azores, willing young men could be found in abundance (as I will discuss in more detail below) (Gillis 2007: 31).

The ranks and rules that structured life on a whaler hierarchically relativize the shaping power of the sociocultural diversity on board. By linking everyday experiences and practices with sharply defined status positions, the ship tended to de-individualize its occupants, comparable, for example, to a military barrack or a prison (Dening 1978: 159). Nevertheless, the ship was a space of cultural exchange. Since sailors

continuously had to deal with the diverse cultural and social practices within the frequently changing crews, David A. Chappell refers to ships as travelling border zones, or *periplean frontiers* (Chappell 1991: 1–9).

Understanding whaling vessels in this sense, as dynamic sociocultural arrangements, the resemblance between ships and beaches becomes apparent. Every sailor was shaped by the society in which he experienced his socialization and learned his categorical assumptions, but a ships' crew was no miniature model of these societies. Rather, it was a specific community formed at sea that followed its own logic. In the same way, a coastal place was not necessarily representative of the hinterland. In the Atlantic world for example, from the sixteenth century on, some coastal communities shared more similarities with coastal societies on different continents than with neighboring societies. It would be misleading to understand cultures in coastal Africa as homogenous entities which could be defined in an absolute sense (Gillis 2007: 30). Culture in the contact zone was no culture of place, as Michael Pesek has stated, but a culture of situations in which people configured and negotiated their encounters again and again (Pesek 2005: 67, 98). According to Marshall Sahlins, this practice of configuring and negotiating unfolds its own dynamic »which meaningfully defines the persons and the objects that are parties to it.« In fact, as Sahlins states, it is not the case »that the situations encountered in practice will stereotypically follow from the cultural categories by which the circumstances are interpreted and acted upon.« (Sahlins 1981: 35). In the words of Campbell, forms of behavior in the contact zone were not necessarily »part of the normal cultural expressions of the parties involved. They belonged, in other words, to the culture of contact only, not to the culture of daily life or the culture of normal experience.« (Campbell 2003: 64).

In this sense, beaches as well as ships—each in their own manner—were arenas of situational dynamics of transculturation which »lay beyond a confrontation of holistic cultures clearly distinguishable from each other.« (Pesek 2005: 99, translated from German by the author). In view of this, I am skeptical about reading the history of maritime interaction in coastal Africa as an interruption of something ›authentic‹ through out-

side intruders. Individuals who related their everyday life practices to the sea in a connected manner encountered each other at the beaches and on the ships, not representatives of ›Africa‹ on the one hand and of ›the West‹ on the other. Therefore, ›beaches‹ and ›ships‹ as arenas of this history as well as ›whalemen‹ and ›coastal dwellers‹ as its actors should be understood as categorical models which are necessary to make empirical processes describable, but not as holistic categories.

Entanglements from below

In an oral history interview in 1983, Joseph Andrade recalled: »My oldest brother had shipped out from New Bedford on a whaling boat.« Following his brother, Andrade signed onto an American whaler at São Nicolau in 1914 with the intent to migrate to the United States: »When I heard he was coming to the Cape Verde Islands, I was on the lookout for him. I was eighteen years old. When he arrived I asked him to ask the captain to give me a chance and he did.«[6] Joseph Andrade's story indicates how interactions between coastal dwellers and whalemen could initiate structural relationships that outlasted temporary contact situations. The chain migrations from the Cape Verdes to New England in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are but one example of the historical entanglements that emerged from whaling operations in coastal Africa. They originated in the practice of young men from the islands attempting to escape unemployment, the notorious famines, and the threat of Portuguese military service by joining American whalers. For these men, working on a whaler was firstly a strategy for survival. It meant having a regular supply of food and drink available, and it provided an opportunity to find better prospects in life in the United States. Ship owners took advantage of the availability of cheap labor at the Cape Verdes by sending out whalers with only a skeleton crew and instructing captains to man the rest of the crew with islanders recruited en route for low wages (Almeida 1978: 16–27; Creighton 1995: 9; Haywood 1967: 13–15, 59–62; Whitecar 40–42). Most captains who pursued this strategy

6 Joseph Andrade cited in Halter 1993: 69.

hired less than five men—in particular on São Nicolau, Santo Antão, Maio and, above all others, on Brava (Almeida 1978: 29)—, but in some cases it was considerably more. (When the schooner *Arthur V. S. Woodruff* from New Bedford visited São Vicente in December 1917, captain John T. Edwards shipped as many as 18 men, see Logbook ARTHUR V. S. WOODRUFF, 26 December 1917.) Over the years the hiring added up to substantial numbers. In 1868, the American consul at Brava, Benjamin Tripp, estimated that about four-thousand men had left the island temporarily or permanently with American whalers—or *Americanos*, as they were known on the Cape Verdes (Haywood 1967: 60f.).

Towards the end of the century, Cape Verdean-American entrepreneurs began operating passenger and cargo vessels, so-called packet ships, that transported migrants, mail, goods, and seasonal workers between New England and the islands on a regular basis. This traffic, often described as ›Brava Packet Trade‹, contained many old whaling schooners, brigs, and barks that had been taken out of service, and involved up to twenty-two voyages a year at its peak in the early 1900s. Via the Brava Packet Trade, Cape Verdeans followed their relatives, friends, and ancestors in large numbers and thus initiated a process of chain migration to New England, especially to the port cities and to the labor-intensive textile and cranberry industries in southeastern Massachusetts. In the period from 1900 to 1920, more than eighteen-thousand migrants from Cape Verde entered the United States, creating Luso-American *Crioulo* communities that still shape coastal New England today, New Bedford and Providence in particular. The exact number of migrants who crossed the Atlantic from the Cape Verdes to the United States is not known, but it is estimated to add up to between thirty-five thousand and forty thousand for the period from 1820 to 1976. The money these migrants and their descendants sent back to their relatives became an important source of income for many islanders and substantially stimulated the Cape Verdean economy (Almeida 1978: 30f.; Brooks 2006: 134; Halter 1993: 37, 41, 92f.; Lobban & Lopes 1995: 46–49).

A second example for an entanglement effect of whalemen's activities in coastal Africa can be found in the history of Walvis Bay. The ǂAonin (a

small community who speak a Nama dialect[7]) at this barren place on the desert coast of today's Namibia were no seafaring people, and for a long time vessels from Europe avoided the desolate Namib shore because of its dangerous seas and winds, the scarcity of protected bays, and the notorious fog. From the late fifteenth until the late eighteenth centuries, only a handful of vessels passed along Walvis Bay, not making any (documented) contact with the inhabitants of the bay (Dekker & De Jong 1998: 51–56; Gewald 1995: 419f.; Hartmann 2006: 11–13; Kienetz 1977: 555f.; Kinahan 2000: 14f.). However, when whalers from Nantucket, Dunkirk, and London extended their operations in the South Atlantic after the end of the American Revolutionary War, Walvis Bay evolved into one of their most important hunting grounds within a few years. Between 1788 and 1795, up to forty vessels came to the bay every year between June and September in order to hunt southern right whales, which migrate each winter from their Antarctic feeding grounds toward their breeding and calving grounds in the sheltered bays along the coasts of southern Africa. The few sources that provide information on whaling operations in the bay during these years indicate that they involved frequent trade and communication between whalemen and the ≠Aonin. (Booth 1964: 278f., 281 n. 27.; Jackson 1978: 108f.; Richards & Du Pasquier 1989: 232–234; Smith 1971: 210–217; Stackpole 1953: 164f.; Wray & Martin 1983: 215f.). Sailor James Choyce, who was in Walvis Bay from June to September 1793 on the British whaler *London*, reports in his memoirs: »While we stayed here we often went on shore to trade with the Hottentots for goats and small bullocks, for which we gave them iron, buttons, knives, and tobacco, of which they seemed very fond.« (Choyce 1891: 4).

7 ≠Aonin is etymologically derived from the Nama word »≠áob,« which means »top.« There are different explanations of what top refers to in this particular case. ≠Aonin could basically mean »people of the point,« or »people from the margins of the Nama area,« or »people standing on the top of the Nama people,« or something similar. The name was translated into Dutch as »Topnaar« (top = top, peak, above…; naar = to, as, according, aside…). See Lau 1985: 1243; Van den Eynden et al. 1992: 3.

Other sources support the view that contacts between whalemen and the ≠Aonin basically involved barter in particular (but not exclusively) of livestock and water in exchange for tobacco and beads (Alexander 1838 II: 87–93, 96, 106; Andersson 1861: 18; Booth 1964: 281; Galton 1891: 10; Kinahan 2000: 15, 17, 93; Wallace 2011: 37f.). Since there was neither a colonial government nor a class of professional middlemen interfering with trade, whalers could obtain provisions directly from the producers for lower prices than, for example, in Cape Town or St. Helena. The outbreak of the Anglo-French War in 1793, the Quasi-War between the United States and France (1798–1800), and the Anglo-American War of 1812 turned whaling into a high-risk business and reduced the number of vessels in the bay. After the peace agreements of Ghent and Paris in 1814, the route to Walvis Bay generally was open again to whalers, but since by that time their main interest had shifted to the sperm whales of the Pacific, and the southern right whale population was already decimated, the bay did not become a major whaling ground again (Haywood 1967: 82f.). Regular visits by whalers continued at a lower frequency until about 1840, and even thereafter some few vessels called on the bay until the American Civil War (Andersson 1861: 338; Booth 1964: 281; Griffiths et al. 2004: 309; Hopkins 1938: 165; Whitecar 1860: 362).

By 1840, the trade at the bay had attracted the attention of Oorlam and Nama groups[8] from the hinterland. Beginning in the 1790s, these soci-

8 Oorlam is a collective term for five groups, each involving several hundred to several thousand persons, which migrated into the southern and central areas of today's Namibia from the northern Cape frontier between the 1790s and the 1850s. The Oorlam groups were comprised of clans who had merged with social outsiders such as impoverished Khoisan herders and hunters, farm workers, fled slaves, and outlaws. The Nama lived in the southern area of today's Namibia and, around 1800, were divided into eight independent chiefdoms. In face of the scarce pasture and water resources, Nama lived in relatively small communities numbering between a few dozen and about fifteen hundred persons. Their total number was estimated between nine thousand one hundred and thirty-three thousand by the mid-nineteenth century (Dedering 1997: 25–29, 30, 34, 80; Lau 1982: 33–35, 43f., 75–77, 88f., 146).

eties had established a raid economy in the sparsely populated area of what is today southern and central Namibia. It was chiefly based upon mounted groups (*komandos*) carrying out hit-and-collect attacks on cattle posts. This practice must be regarded as an element of the cumulative incorporation of southern African regional trade systems into the expanding capitalist world economy: in order to barter guns, ammunition, horses, and ox-wagons from traders based in the Cape Colony, a growing number of Oorlam and Nama groups aimed at looting cattle herds as trade goods from each other as well from other pastoral societies; from the Herero in particular. This process involved far-reaching socioeconomic transformations and reached Walvis Bay in about 1840, when the most powerful Oorlam group from the interior, the Afrikaner Oorlam, connected the bay with regional centers in the interior by building a road for ox-wagons. Although the Afrikaner Oorlam leaders did not leave written records explaining their motives, it seems quite obvious that their aim was to gain access to maritime trade networks.[9] At the beginning of the 1840s and again in 1844, *komandos* allied with the Afrikaner Oorlam raided the ≠Aonin, killing many people, taking captives, and carrying away the cattle. It seems that the raids left the ≠Aonin as impoverished herders for the cattle of the Afrikaner Oorlam, who, for their part, brought Walvis Bay under their control (Hahn 1844; Kinahan 2000: 18; Scheppmann 1916: 238; Tindall 1959: 32, 40, 71, 74).

In 1843, the Afrikaner Oorlam invited two traders from the Cape, James Morris and Sidney Dixon, to set up a permanent trading post near Walvis Bay. Morris and Dixon sold beef to vessels passing by and contracted to provide the island of St. Helena with cattle and sheep (Henrichsen 2011: 21, 83f.; Kinahan 2000: 18, 70; Tabler 1973: 29f., 78f.; Tindall 1959: 71, 73). The more regular shipping traffic resulting from their activities, and the road connection to the interior, made the bay an attractive place for the Christian missionary societies, which had extended their activities in southern Africa by this time. In 1846 the German

9 Missionary Johannes Rath reported in 1845 that any trade at the bay had to be authorized by the Afrikaner Oorlam (Rath 1845: 228).

Rhenish Missionary Society established a station in the vicinity of the bay, seeing it as a suitable starting point for expanding into ›heathenish‹ areas (Tabler 1973: 95). The trade at the bay increased remarkably from the 1850s onward when hunters began to ship ivory and ostrich feathers from the interior via Walvis Bay to the Cape markets. De Pass & Co., a company from Cape Town, hunted for sharks in Walvis Bay and erected a fishing establishment in its vicinity in 1852. Some storehouses were to follow, and the first regular ship connection between the bay and Cape Town was set up (Andersson 1861: 340; Hahn 1984/1985: 897; Henrichsen 2011: 89; Kinahan 2000: 18). The number of cargo vessels frequenting Walvis Bay on a regular basis increased from eight in 1857 to twenty-eight in 1890, and notable amounts of ivory tusks, animal skins, and ostrich feathers were exported through the bay (Henrichsen 2011: 21f., 131–7, 327–9). Reciprocally, firearms were dispersed across southwestern Africa via Walvis Bay, even reaching Ngamiland in the northwest of today's Botswana (Tlou 1985: 66). During these decades, Walvis Bay emerged as the major trading port between Cape Town and Luanda and eventually came under the sphere of colonial politics. For the arguments of this article, it is important to realize that the barter between whalemen and the ≠Aonin marked the beginning of a process that transformed the beach of Walvis Bay from a boundary into an arena of interaction and crossings, and initiated far-reaching and long-lasting connections with larger trade networks.

The briefly outlined examples of the Cape Verdean-American migration and the emergence of Walvis Bay as a trading port show that in the case of whaling, ordinary people initiated entanglements through their everyday (mobile) practices that could span large spatial and temporal distances. However, ›entangled histories‹ as conceptualized by Shalini Randeria and others are often thought of in rather macrohistorical terms as an historical intertwining between big structures (such as epistemological systems or legal orders), large processes (such as globalization or modernization), and huge entities (such as society or nation-states). Such perspectives on entangled histories tend to involve a dualistic configura-

tion of the entities and spaces of study.[10] I am using the expression ›entanglements from below‹ to emphasize that the interconnections I am investigating were created from the bottom up, through the actions and experiences of ordinary, underprivileged actors. Entanglements from below were not necessarily structural processes, but a more multifaceted array of interconnections which evolved from an intertwining of everyday practices and meanings across long distances. For me, ›from below‹ firstly refers to a height of observation where the »little peope,« as Dening calls them, stand in the center, those »on whom the forces of the world press most hardly« (Dening 2004: 12). As Gayatri Spivak might put it, the actors of such entanglements from below often cannot speak for themselves, as they may have passed down comparatively few texts. However, as Alf Lüdtke reminds us, »to experience and to act is more than a text« (Lüdtke 1991: 17). Most of the migrants who crossed the Atlantic from the Cape Verde Islands to the United States and most of those who established the trade at Walvis Bay could not inscribe their voices in the predominant written discourses. However, they could act and they could travel, and through their mobile practices create what Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker have described as »new and unexpected connections, which variously appeared to be accidental, contingent, transient, even miraculous« (Linebaugh & Rediker 2000: 6).

The case of the interactions between whalemen and coastal dwellers in the African context shows the potential of a maritime and polylocal field of study to challenge methodological territorialism in historiography. In order to unfold this potential, the concept of ›entangled histories‹ needs to be linked to a historical anthropological perspective that does not conceal the diversity of individual appropriation strategies behind a macrohistorical height of observation. Understood as analytical figures, the images of the ›beach‹ and the ›ship‹ can establish this link and illumi-

10 In a programmatic article, Randeria described »entangled histories« as a project aiming to »conceptually reformulate the past and present relations between western and non-western societies« (Randeria 1999: 87, translated from German by the author).

nate the ways in which the history of global entanglements was created from below.

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Agents of Mobility: Migrant Smuggling Networks, Transhemispheric Migration, and Time-Space Compression in Ottoman Anatolia, 1888–1908[1]

David Gutman

Introduction[2]

This article has as its backdrop a little known chapter of the great transhemispheric migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 1885 and 1915, more than seventy-five thousand mostly (though not exclusively) Armenian migrants departed the eastern provinces of Ottoman Anatolia for North America (Mirak 1983: 290; Willcox 1969: 432–436).[3] Of these, nearly half left in the face of strict Ottoman state prohibitions on this migration, lifted only after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. For the most part, these migrants were young men seeking work in a number of small factory towns that dotted the eastern United States and Canada. Similar to their contemporaries from migrant-

1 I would like to thank the Institute of Advanced Studies in Humanities for »providing critical support in allowing me to complete this article and my fellow IASH colleagues for providing helpful comments on an earlier presentation of this research.«

2 This article is based on a chapter from my dissertation project, »Sojourners, Smugglers, and the State: Transhemispheric Migration Flows and the Politics of Mobility in Eastern Anatolia, 1888-1908.«

3 These sources provide definitive information only about rates of Armenian migration during this period (numbering about 28,000). Quantifying non-Armenian migration from the region is much more difficult, but it numbered at least over 2,000 persons.

sending regions throughout the globe, migration to North America was often intended to be temporary.

Map 1: Ottoman Empire: Anatolia and Northern Arabia, 1907[4]

Despite numerous challenges, many of these migrants did return home before the Armenian genocide that resulted in the destruction of most migrant-sending communities in the region. Areas within the provinces of Mamuretülaziz, Diyarbakir, and Erzurum, located in the rocky foothills and fertile alluvial plains within a 100-kilometer radius of the eastern Anatolian city of Harput (modern-day Elaziğ, Turkey), served as the epicenter of this migration, especially in the period before 1908 (see Map 1).[5] The manifold and interrelated forces that drove this migration are

4 William Patten and JE Homens: *New Encyclopedic Atlas and Gazetteer*, New York: 94 (Date of publication unknown.).

5 The city of Harput was part of a broader conurbation that included the lowland city of Mezra'a. Mezra'a was made the provincial center of Mamuretülaziz province in the mid-1860s while the older, elevated neighborhoods comprising the city of Harput remained a prominent cultural, educational, and trade center for the region's population. To minimize

too difficult to list within the confines of this short article. The presence of American missionaries, increased economic and political pressures on settled agricultural populations, and outbreaks of violence against Armenians in the mid-1890s, however, were among the chief factors.[6]



Map 2: Migrant-Sending Region-Harput (Kharput) at center right

Shortly following the advent of large-scale migration to North America in the late 1880s, the Ottoman state began aggressive attempts at interdiction. Unlike more lightly enforced prohibitions against overseas migration from the Levant and the Balkans, other major sources of Ottoman migration to the New World, bans against migration from eastern Anatolia were motivated by the Ottoman state's firm belief in the existence of a close relationship between migration to North America and

confusion, this article refers to the entire Mezra'a/Harput conurbation as Harput.

6 For a more detailed discussion of the historical context that gave rise to this migration, as well as the question of return migration, see my forthcoming doctoral dissertation (Gutman 2012).

the budding transnational Armenian revolutionary movement.[7] In addition, whereas restrictions against Levantine migration were for the most part lifted after 1898, prohibitions targeting especially Armenian migration to North America would remain in place until the toppling of the regime of Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909) in 1908 (Akarlı 1992: 124).[8] In response to these prohibitions, dense networks of intermediaries emerged to smuggle migrants seeking passage to North America from sending communities in the Anatolian interior on to foreign steamers leaving out of Ottoman port cities on the Black and Mediterranean Sea coasts.

Using a diverse set of sources ranging from heretofore unexamined Ottoman archival documents, United States consular reports, and the memoirs of migrants, this article unpacks and analyzes the various factors that gave rise to these networks and transformed them over both space and time. Furthermore, because of their intricate coordination and profitability, I argue that these networks together comprised an industry dedicated to facilitating migration in the face of Ottoman state prohibitions.

The acceleration and geographic expansion of large-scale transhemispheric migrations during the second half of the nineteenth century was part of a radical transformation in the temporal and spatial horizons of

7 Order of the Imperial Palace: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA).I.DH 1075 84332 (18 Recep 1305/30 March 1888).

8 Although migration to the Balkans was also proscribed by Ottoman law throughout the period under review, in stark contrast to attempts at rigid enforcement of migration prohibitions in the eastern Anatolian case, as late as 1907 various provincial officials in the Balkans appear to have lacked any clear strategy to prevent outlawed travel to North America. (See for example: BOA DH.MKT 2595 70, Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Police (20 Zilkade 1319/05 March 1902); BOA.DH.MKT 1178 28 (27 Mayis 1323/09 June 1907)). The Ottoman state's very different responses regarding overseas migration from eastern Anatolia, Lebanon, and the Balkans suggests the extent to which its policies were based on the political and social situation prevailing in each region (for more on this issue, see my dissertation).

the global capitalist economy. As noted geographer David Harvey characterized it, »...(Capitalism) became embroiled in an incredible phase of massive long-term investment in the conquest of space. The expansion of the railway network, accompanied by the advent of the telegraph, the growth of steam shipping, and the building of the Suez Canal…all changed the sense of time and space in radical ways.« (Harvey 1991: 263). The »time-space compression« facilitated by these developments radically transformed the pace at which both capital and labor circulated on a global scale (Hobsbawm 1975: 48–68). Yet even with these innovations, transcending the vast barriers of time and space separating migrants from their final destinations half a world away would have been impossible without the many networks of job recruiters, shipping agents, and human smugglers embedded in the migration process that helped to facilitate their mobility. Depending on the context, these intermediaries arranged transportation and employment, aided migrants in skirting state restrictions, and served as important (if often exploitative) links between sending communities and migrant colonies abroad.

Historians and sociologists of migration have long been aware of the importance of these networks of intermediaries in the migration process. Only recently, however, have they begun to emerge as a serious focus of historical inquiry (Peck 2000; McKeown 2001; Lee 2003: 189–222). Despite this recent interest, we are only beginning to understand how these networks emerged and operated in specific historical contexts and the factors that drove their transformation over both space and time. By placing the eastern Anatolian migration industry at the center of analysis, this article demonstrates the key role played by various local (and regional) socioeconomic and political dynamics and actors in facilitating transhemispheric migration, a quintessentially *global* phenomenon. In doing so, it argues that our understanding of the forces that brought about the emergence of a new regime of time-space in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can no longer exclude dynamics and agents operating in historically and geographically »peripheral« contexts.

Migration Agents in the Eastern Anatolian Interior

In late June 1893, shipping company officials in Liverpool, England brought six North America-bound Anatolian Armenian migrants who had recently arrived in the city to the local Ottoman consulate. Unable to speak English, the six migrants, all natives of the Harput region, could not resolve problems regarding their tickets for their upcoming transatlantic passage. Incapable of communicating with the migrants, shipping officials decided to seek the assistance of the Ottoman consul. In his report on the encounter for the Ottoman Foreign Minister in Istanbul, the consul averred that the six were but the latest group of Anatolian migrants on their way to North America to be brought before him under similar circumstances. His inquiries into how the six managed, in the face of strict prohibitions against migration to North America, to get from their hometown in the Anatolian interior to the grimy seaport on the west coast of England elicited a familiar response. Like other migrants the consul had encountered, they had contracted with one of the many »merchants« located in and around Harput who, for a price, aided those seeking to migrate to North America in defiance of these restrictions. After enduring the long overland trip to the Mediterranean port city of Mersin, the six were met by contacts of their Harput-based migration agent, who proceeded to arrange their passage to Liverpool and on to North America. Finally, one night, under the cover of darkness, the six were shuttled by boatmen to a Liverpool-bound ship where their transhemispheric journey began hidden deep in the ship's bowels to avoid detection by Ottoman port authorities.[9]

The Liverpool consul's report hints at the rapidity with which the networks comprising the eastern Anatolian migration industry emerged. Written in 1893, it shows that within a mere half-decade following the advent of large-scale migrations from this region to North America, these intricate, geographically expansive networks of intermediaries were

9 Copy of the Liverpool Consul's report to the Foreign Ministry: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA).DH.MKT 99 40 (26 Haziran 1309/09 July 1893).

already heavily involved in the business of smuggling migrants from sending communities in the Anatolian interior to Ottoman port cities. Migration agents, such as the »merchant« with whom the six Liverpool migrants contracted, served as the gateway to these networks. Migration agents operating in communities in eastern Anatolia likely did not actively seek out potential migrants as did, for example, labor recruiters and contractors in Italy, China, Mexico, and elsewhere during the same period (Gabaccia 1988: 84–97; Peck 2000: 91–96; McKeown 2001: 67–69). As labor migration, whether to Istanbul or elsewhere in the empire, was already an important component of the household economy long before the emergence of migration to North America, the decision regarding when to go, and who would undertake the long transatlantic journey was likely made within the household (Kaprielian 1984; 122–124). Thus, the potential migrant sought after the services of the migration agent, rather than the other way around.

Because the migration agent waited for clients to come to him, he necessarily possessed a degree of visibility within the community in which he operated. Providing a composite profile of the average migration agent based in communities on the Harput plain and elsewhere in eastern Anatolia is a difficult task owing to significant gaps in the historical record. Their relative absence in the documentation for this project testifies to their ability to conceal their migrant smuggling activities from the gaze of the central state. The two migration agents who receive the most significant attention were probably exceptions in terms of the scale of their respective operations. Yet their experiences provide useful hints to the types of economic means and social and political connections necessary to smuggle migrants from the interior to the coast.

As early as 1891, a migration agent named Gaspar Nahikiyan ran a sophisticated migration network out of the village of Hüseynig, located eight kilometers outside of the city of Harput.[10] Little information is

10 Report of the Ottoman Ambassador in Washington, Mavroyeni Bey to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: BEO.HR.SYS 2735 29 (06 February 1891).

given regarding how Nahikiyan conveyed his clients from the interior to Ottoman port cities and on to the New World. Nevertheless, a July 1892 report by officials in the province of Mamuretülaziz identified Gaspar Nahikiyan as a known merchant and moneylender who lent money at high interest rates for use of his services.[11] A report from the Ottoman Embassy in Washington, DC claimed a »son« of Nahikiyan's, Mardiros, based in Worcester, Massachusetts, collected on the debts of Gaspar's migrant clients after their arrival in the United States.[12] In the early 1890s, the eastern Anatolian migrant community in the United States numbered no more than a couple of thousand people. Nearly all of these migrants hailed from a handful of communities near Harput, and clustered in small colonies located in Worcester and other small factory towns in the northeastern United States. Thus, it may not have been difficult for a well-organized migration agent to collect from debtors living half a world away, especially if he had a reliable contact—such as a close relative—embedded in these small colonies to ensure that his clients paid up. After collecting the money owed, Mardiros would forward a check to a contact in Istanbul, who subsequently had it processed. The money was then sent to Gaspar in Hüseynig through an associate based in Harput, a banker identified only by his family name, Harputliyan.[13]

Nahikiyan's migrant smuggling operations are visible in the documentation as late as December 1894, when a report from the Ottoman Consulate in New York suggested that Nahikiyan's operation was a primary method by which both Armenians and Muslims (*Müslimanlar*) from the Harput region avoided prohibitions on migration to North America. The date of the consul's report suggests that Gaspar Nahikiyan's network continued smuggling migrants from the Harput region nearly four years

11 Office of the Grand Vizier to Ministry of Police: BOA.BEO 45 3317 (6 Muharrem 1310/31 July 1892).

12 Office of the Grand Vizier to Mamuretülaziz Province: BOA.BEO 83 6197 (10 Rabiulevvel 1310/01 October 1892).

13 Office of the Grand Vizier to Mamuretülaziz Province: BOA.BEO 83 6197 (10 Rabiulevvel 1310/01 October 1892).

after initially raising the attention of the Ottoman state.[14] In addition, a January 1895 spy report from the infamous Pinkerton Detective Agency, which had been hired by Ottoman diplomatic officials to keep watch on the political activities of Armenians residing in the northeastern United States, cited a lawyer with close ties to the Armenian community in Worcester who accused Mardiros Nahikiyan of exploiting members of the local Armenian migrant colony.[15] Nahikiyan's sophisticated operation, in addition to providing his clients the means to migrate to North America, readily made use of the same technologies that made large-scale transhemispheric migration from the Anatolian interior possible to reproduce local relationships of inequality in migrant colonies located half a world away.

By the first decade of the twentieth century, Gaspar Nahikiyan's banker contact in Harput, whose full name and title was Harputliyan Artin Efendi,[16] was deeply involved in the business of smuggling migrants. In September 1905, between twenty and thirty North America-bound migrants from Harput were arrested along with a guide, identified as an »agent« (*simsar*), accompanying the group to the coast. According to a report from the governor of Mamuretülaziz province to the Grand Vizier, the agent was a well-known human smuggler with a string of arrests related to his illicit work. In addition to the migrant caravan he was accompanying at the time of his arrest, the guide was found to be in pos-

14 Copy of report sent to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: BOA.HR.SYS 54 1 (16 December 1894). The consul's report also raised concerns that Muslims from eastern Anatolia who worked alongside their Armenian compatriots while in the United States could be susceptible to falling under the influence of »Armenian anti-Ottoman agitation.« (»Amerika'ya giderek Ermenilerle birlikte fabrikalarda çalışmakta olan Müslimanların Ermeniler tarafından Hükümet-i Seniyye'ye aleyhine iğfal olunabilmeleri.«)

15 Cornish to Iasigi: BOA.HR.SYS 2739 22 (24 January 1895). See also: Karents 2004: 31.

16 Ottoman documents and United States consular records both refer to him with his family name (Harputliyan) at the beginning, a practice not uncommon in an era where the use of family names was rare.

session of numerous promissory notes from migrants that he had already helped smuggle to the coast. The notes amounted to a value of over four hundred lira for which some payment had already been received.[17] The report identified the guide as a probable associate of Harputliyan Artin, who by 1905 was not only one of Mamuretülaziz Province's most prominent bankers, but also a leading member of the Provincial Executive Council.[18] It claims, furthermore, that Harputliyan Artin's migrant smuggling operations involved the close cooperation of several high-ranking provincial officials. Finally, the report charges that some of the money earned from the ring was being funneled into the construction of a hospital (*hastane*) in the region, along with other unspecified projects. Artin's operations are described in greater detail below. This 1905 report, however, hints at the extent to which the migration industry in the eastern Anatolian interior involved some of the region's most economically and politically powerful people.[19]

The level of visibility of these two cases suggests that they were to some degree exceptional. The sophistication of Gaspar Nahikiyan's operation may have been unrivaled in its complexity at a time when migration from eastern Anatolia to North America was in its relative infancy. Artin Efendi's prominence in the region as a powerful banker and member of the Provincial Administrative Council, with close connections to high-ranking members within the local officialdom, suggests he had access to resources beyond those of an average migration agent.[20] As suggested by the report describing the arrest of the smuggler cited above, however, it

17 Office of the Grand Vizier to the Ministry of Interior: BOA.MKT.MHM 659 52 (11 Şaban 323/10 October 1905).

18 Ibid., Young to Smith-Lyle Esquire, American Vice Consul in Constantinople. Harput (June 14, 1907).

19 Letter of the Governor of Mamuretülaziz Province to Ministry of Police: BOA.ZB 108 29 (Recep 325/16 August 1907).

20 Interestingly, Harputliyan Artin was not the only member of the Mamuretülaziz Provincial Administrative Council suspected of engaging in human smuggling. See: Anonymous informant to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.MKT 1075 19 (24 Mart 1322/14 April 1906).

is likely that both Gaspar Nahikiyan and Harputliyan Artin operated in conjunction with other less prominent migration agents and intermediaries in the region. In addition, both cases provide useful insight into the types of connections, resources, and background a successful migration agent operating in the interior likely possessed. For one, smuggling people from the interior to the coast and then onto ships heading abroad probably required that a migration agent have access to a wide range of powerful local contacts—not unlike those possessed by Harputliyan Artin. For example, connections to local state officials could facilitate the procurement of critical documents that could ease the migration process. More importantly, these officials could also help to ensure that a migration agent's operations remained free from interference by the Ottoman state. If a migration agent lacked such contacts, then he was probably connected to someone such as Harputliyan Artin who did possess them.

Like Gaspar Nahikiyan, however, migration agents necessarily held connections that extended far beyond the confines of the eastern Anatolian interior. In the consul's report on his encounter with the six migrants in Liverpool, he noted that migration agents in the interior possessed contacts in at least one Ottoman port city. As will become clearer below, access to port-city networks was key to ensuring that a migration agent's clients would be able to continue their transhemispheric journeys after arriving at the Ottoman coast. Despite the distances that separated migrant-sending communities in the Anatolian interior from cities on the Black and Mediterranean Sea coasts, developing such connections may not have been particularly difficult. Many migration agents no doubt spent at least some time as labor migrants or merchants in one of the burgeoning Ottoman port cities that drew heavily from labor pools in the Anatolian interior. If not, they certainly had close relatives or friends who had. The level of mobility between communities in eastern Anatolia and port cities on both the Black Sea and Mediterranean coasts meant that migration agents and others involved in the migration industry could build upon already firmly established connections that linked their communities with social and economic networks in these port cities. As Gaspar Nahikiyan's operation suggests, however, the reach of successful

migrant smuggling operations extended beyond the borders of the Ottoman Empire connecting—across vast stretches of space—sending communities in the Anatolian interior to migrant colonies sprouting up throughout North America.

Finally, migration agents, especially those running the largest operations, were men of means. Both Gaspar Nahikiyan and Artin Efendi clearly possessed a high social status in their respective communities and in the broader region. Another prominent migration agent, one Agaviyan Kivork, a native of Harput operating out of the interior metropolis of Aleppo, was identifiable by the sumptuous and conspicuous blue-gemmed gold ring he wore on his finger, hinting not only at his wealth, but his desire to flaunt it.[21] Considering the wealth and connections that these individuals possessed, it is likely that most prominent agents were merchants, a point reinforced by the Ottoman consul in Liverpool's use of the term to describe the migration intermediaries that operated in the vicinity of Harput. Certainly, merchants would have possessed the status and visibility to forge the local, regional, and even global connections needed to engage in smuggling migrants. Furthermore, successful merchants would have been among the few people in these communities with access to the economic capital necessary for this type of enterprise. Indeed, as will become clearer below, many of those affiliated with port-city migration networks were themselves merchants and artisans native to sending communities in the Anatolian interior. However, smuggling migrants was certainly not solely the domain of merchants. For example, an investigation conducted by local officials in Mamuretülaziz Province in December 1902 revealed that wealthy Muslim landlords working in conjunction with skilled muleteers guides were also in the business of smuggling North America-bound migrants from the interior to the coast.[22] Like their merchant counterparts, wealthy landlords and highly

21 Copy of telegram from the Pier Commission of Iskenderun: BOA.ZB 709 29 (12 Mayis 1323/25 May 1907).

22 Copy of telegram from the governor of Mamuretülaziz: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 134 13 (29 Teşrinievvel 1318/19 December 1902).

mobile muleteer guides doubtless also possessed the necessary connections and access to port-city networks to facilitate unlawful migration.

Regardless of the social and class status of an interior migration agent, the business of migrant smuggling allowed these actors to convert their accumulated social and political capital into economic capital. According to several sources, a migration agent's services did not come cheaply, and the monetary returns were indeed significant. In January 1901, the United States consul in Harput reported that North America-bound migrants were paying local migration agents on average eighteen American dollars to travel from the Harput region to the coast, a price he claimed did not include the cost of an internal passport or food along the way.[23] Meanwhile, separate Ottoman documents written within months of one another mention prices of nineteen and twenty liras respectively for travel from the interior to the coast. Considering that the Ottoman gold lira was worth approximately four to five times the value of the United States dollar (Pamuk 2000: 209), these prices are much higher than those given by the American consul. The Ottoman sources, however, give no indication of what »services« were provided at these rates, or the reasons for the significant discrepancies in price between the American and Ottoman sources.[24] Twenty liras, if this was indeed representative of what most migrants could expect to pay, would have been a steep price for most prospective migrants.[25] Furthermore, sums paid to interior migration agents covered expenses for a portion of a migrant's journey

23 United States Department of State Diplomatic Despatches (USDSDD): United States Consul in Harput Thomas H. Norten to Department of State (January 22, 1901).

24 Copy of Telegram from Governor of Mamuretülaziz Province: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 134 13 (16 Tesrinievvel 1318/29 October 1902); Port Commission of Iskenderun to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH. TMIK.M 121 23 (02 Nisan 1318/13 April 1902).

25 According to Donald Quataert, maximum daily wages of little more than one piaster per day (100 piastre = 1 Ottoman lira) were common throughout the empire in its final decades (İnalcık and Quataert 1994: 916).

to North America—namely travel from the Anatolian interior to the coast—and thus did not represent the entire cost of migration.

Payment of such seemingly prohibitive sums in order to migrate abroad was not unique to this region or to this period in migration history. Indeed, contemporary transnational migrants from throughout the Global South continue to pay exorbitant fees for the services of middlemen and human smugglers, the cost of which continues to grow in price as states implement harsher legal and physical barriers to stem the flow (Andreas 2001: 116). The documents consulted for this project only provide incomplete clues as to the ways payment was rendered to migration agents. Money lending and debt played a major role from the early years of migration, as evidenced by Gaspar Nahikiyan's operations. The 1905 case cited above in which a migrant agent/guide was discovered to be in possession of 400 lira worth of promissory notes suggests that many of these migrants continued to borrow from these agents. As increasing numbers of migrants laboring in North America remitted wages back to their families, however, it is probable that at least some migrants paid these sums upfront from the remittances they received from family members or even close friends (Mirak 1983: 116).

The relationship between interior migration agents and their migrant clients, though certainly unequal, was not purely exploitative. At least some degree of mutual understanding frequently existed between agents and clients. For example, according to the American consul at Harput, agents guaranteed full refunds when migrants were not successfully smuggled out of the Empire.[26] In a similar vein, officials in Mamuretülaziz Province also noted that agreements between migration agents and their clients explicitly stipulated that payment was tied to the successful boarding of migrants onto a ship headed for a foreign port.[27] Despite the unequal power relationships existing between migration agents and their

26 USDSDD United States Consul in Harput Thomas Norten to Department of State (January 22, 1901).

27 Copy of telegram from Mamuretülaziz Province to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 134 13 (16 Teşrinievvel 1318/29 October 1902).

clients, it was likely in the best interests of most migration agents to honor such guarantees. Information about flagrantly abusive practices could easily spread within the relatively small communities in which most migration agents operated, thus threatening a migration agent's reputation and, in turn, a very lucrative source of income (Kaprielian 1987: 34–35). Thus, unlike elsewhere on the long journey to North America, it seems a certain »moral economy« may have provided some degree of protection to migrants from the worst forms of exploitation at the hands of these migration agents.

From the Interior to the Coast: The Shifting Geography of the Migration Industry

After contracting with a local migration agent, migrants were confronted with a long, often arduous, overland journey to a port city. The journey from the interior to the coast was a process more complicated than simply heading for whichever port city happened to be the closest. Rather, factors ranging from the port-city connections of interior migrant agents to shifting state regulations on mobility and improved surveillance measures in port cities meant that throughout the period under investigation the geography of migration remained in constant flux. When migration from eastern Anatolia to North America began to catch the eye of Ottoman officials in the late 1880s, the most common method of exit involved acquiring an internal passport—required for anyone seeking to travel within the empire[28]—that allowed the prospective migration passage to the imperial capital of Istanbul. After arriving in Istanbul (usually accessed by sea from a port city on the Black Sea), local boatmen helped migrants to clandestinely board foreign steamers bound for Marseilles or other ports of transit.[29] Often, those possessing internal passports for

28 The document's Ottoman Turkish name is *mürur tezkeresi* the more direct translation of which is »document of passage.«

29 See for example: Copy of telegram from the Province of Mamuretülaziz to the Ministry of Interior, BOA.Y.PRK.DH 2 86 (14 Temmuz 304/27 July 1888); Ministry of Police to Coastal Provinces, BOA ZB 588 1 (5 Rabiulahir 1310/27 October 1892).

Istanbul left Black Sea ports such as Samsun or Trabzon aboard foreign ships headed for the imperial capital. Rather than disembarking when the ship reached Istanbul, they instead stowed away on the ship until it landed at its homeport.[30]

In the late 1880s and early 1890s, travelling through Istanbul was probably the most convenient route to begin the prohibited journey to North America. Generations of young men from communities throughout the eastern provinces of Anatolia had migrated to Istanbul for work in order to provide needed economic support for their families back home. As a result, it was not difficult for a North America-bound migrant to procure an internal passport for Istanbul under the auspices of going for trade or work.[31] Beginning in the early 1890s, growing political and labor unrest among Armenians in Istanbul, coupled with the growing visibility of Armenian revolutionary movements both within and outside the empire, led the Ottoman state to begin curtailing Armenian migration to the imperial capital (Riedler 2011: 163–166). Finally in 1896, after the storming of the Ottoman Bank by associates of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnaktsutiun*) and the subsequent outbreak of deadly riots targeting Armenian workers in Istanbul, the Ottoman state reacted by expelling most Armenian migrant laborers from the city. This action was followed by an order calling for the nearly complete interdiction of future Armenian migration to the city (Quataert 1993: 69–69). With travel becoming increasingly difficult by the early 1890s, Istanbul relatively quickly ceased to be an important exit point for North America-bound migrants.

These developments in the early 1890s laid the ground for a significant shift in the geography of the migration industry. Black Sea port cities, such as Samsun, that had long served as transit points for Istanbul-bound migrants would remain important points of embarkation

30 Circular report from Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.MKT 1554 16 (8 Safer 1306/14 October 1888).

31 Ministry of Police to Coastal Provinces: BOA ZB 588 1 (5 Rabiulahir 1310/27 October 1892).

throughout the period in question. In addition to having been popular transit points for eastern Anatolian migrants bound for Istanbul, these cities possessed close economic and trade ties with communities throughout the Anatolian interior. As a result, they had the requisite socioeconomic networks needed to facilitate clandestine migration. By the early 1890s, however, migrants increasingly travelled south to the burgeoning port city of Mersin. The emergence of Mersin as an exit point paralleled the city's meteoric rise as the major seaport serving the nearby inland metropolis of Adana and its cotton-rich hinterlands (Toksöz 2000). Beginning in the early 1890s, several major European shipping lines such as the French Messageries Maritimes and the Austrian Lloyd offered regular service out of the new port (ibid. 169). In addition, Adana's rapidly growing population of migrant laborers and merchants with ties to communities in the Anatolian interior provided the requisite social infrastructure for the emergence of local networks aiding incoming North America-bound migrants. As early as 1892, a report from officials in Mamuretülaziz complained of the large numbers of migrants from the Harput region travelling to the city of Adana under the pretense of searching for work but leaving instead for North America on ships departing out of Mersin.[32] The port city of Iskenderun—also located on the Mediterranean coast roughly two hundred kilometers south and east of Mersin—emerged during this time as an important exit point for North America-bound migrants. Like Mersin, Iskenderun was the primary port for a major inland metropolis, Aleppo, with long-standing economic ties to eastern Anatolia.

Evidence suggests that by the late 1890s, these two Mediterranean port cities supplanted Black Sea ports as departure points for North America-bound migrants. For example, in January 1901, the American consul in Harput reported that the large volume of America-bound migrants covertly leaving through Samsun had strained the ability of Samsun-based middlemen to safely and discreetly convey their clients to foreign ships.

32 Ministry of Interior to Governor of Adana Province: BOA.DH.MKT 1931 29 (10 Şaban 1309/10 March 1892).

As a result, local migration agents in the vicinity of Harput were increasingly sending their migrant clients through Iskenderun.[33] In addition to the reason given by the consul, coastal geography may have also played a major role in the increasing prominence of the Mediterranean in the geography of the eastern Anatolian migration industry. The expansive, relatively protected and shallow coastline flanking both Iskenderun and Mersin provided ideal conditions for boatmen/smugglers to establish informal »piers« (*iskeleler)* well outside of the two cities. From these improvised launch sites, boatmen/smugglers could ferry migrant passengers to waiting foreign ships, avoiding surveillance in the central ports.[34] Similar methods of bypassing port-city surveillance would have been impossible in Black Sea ports like Samsun and Trabzon, as both cities are hemmed in on three sides by steep rises in elevation, and on the fourth by the choppy and storm-prone waters of the Black Sea. Unlike those leaving through Mersin or Iskenderun, most North America-bound migrants travelling via Samsun or Trabzon would have been forced to take their chances leaving through the central port.

Beginning in the first years of the twentieth century, the geography of the eastern Anatolian migration industry expanded further down the Mediterranean coast as migrants began increasingly to travel through Levantine port cities such as Latakia, Tripoli, and Beirut.[35] This development is surprising at first glance considering the vast geographical distances separating the Anatolian interior from these port cities. Furthermore, unlike other ports on the Black and Mediterranean Sea coasts, Levantine cities historically did not have significant social and economic ties with migrant-sending communities in eastern Anatolia. Thus, Levantine ports lacked the same social infrastructure that had given rise to networks involved in smuggling migrants through other port cities.

33 Norten (Harput) to Department of State (January 22, 1901).

34 Mersin Pier Commission to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.MKT 139 19 (13 Şevval 1320/12 January 1903). For more on the operations of boatmen, see below.

35 BOA.Y.PRK.AZN 24 35 (2 Cemazeyilahir 1323/04 October 1905).

Several important developments, however, help shed light on the emergence of the Levant as a critical part of the geography of the eastern Anatolian migration industry. Beginning in the first years of the twentieth century, a marked increase in reports regarding the arrest of groups of North America-bound migrants in the vicinities of Mersin and Iskenderun suggests that local officials in these two cities were at least partially successful in implementing measures to prevent migrant smuggling.[36] The increase in migrant traffic through Levantine ports may have been in part a response to greater challenges facing migrants leaving through Mersin and Iskenderun.[37] The completion of railway networks linking Beirut to Aleppo and Adana in 1906 certainly added further to the volume of eastern Anatolian migrants leaving through Levantine ports, as these migrants could now travel to ports as distant as Beirut without adding significantly more time to the long journey from the eastern Anatolian interior (İnalcık and Quataert 1994: 802–815).

36 See for example: Governor of Adana Province to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 89 55 (7 Rabiulahir 1318/04 July 1900); Copy of telegram from District Governor of Mersin to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 126 20 (14 Haziran 1318/27 June 1902).

37 Copy of telegram from Mamuretülaziz Province to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 134 13 (17 Şubat 1319/01 March 1903).

Map 3: Mediterranean Coast: Mersin/Adana, Iskenderun, Latakia, Beirut

The fact that these cities were sites of a parallel migration industry that similarly emerged in the late-1880s to facilitate the migration of thousands of Levantine migrants to the New World, however, is perhaps the most important factor explaining their incorporation into the geography of eastern Anatolian migration (Akarlı 1992: 113–114; Khater 2001: 54–55). With the lifting of most prohibitions on Levantine migration abroad in December 1898, those from the region seeking to migrate to the New World no longer had to rely as heavily upon smugglers and other intermediaries (Akarlı 1993: 123–124). A November 1901 report from the Ministry of Interior described how migrant smugglers in the Levant had, as a result of the lifting of these prohibitions, lost a significant and stable stream of revenue. The report went on to surmise that these smugglers were devising strategies to continue luring migrants to their services.[38]

38 Ministry of Interior to District Governor of Mount Lebanon: BOA.DH.MKT 2562 38 (17 Şevval 1319/28 November 1901).

Indeed, for some of these now struggling smugglers, the continued prohibition on migration from eastern Anatolia to North America provided an opportunity to regain at least some of their lost business. This conclusion is bolstered by a 1907 report out of Beirut that claimed that the clientele of most Beirut-based migrant smugglers consisted either of local military deserters or Anatolian Armenians.[39] Although those involved in the Levantine migration industry may not have possessed the same historical connections to migrant-sending communities in eastern Anatolia as did Mersin or Iskenderun, the economic and transportation linkages that connected these Mediterranean port cities probably helped facilitate some degree of coordination between smugglers in the different locations.

Paralleling the growing importance of the Levant in the geography of migration, the Russian Black Sea port of Batumi also emerged as a major exit point in the first years of the twentieth century.[40] Migrants from the district of Kiğı in northeastern Anatolia, an important source of North America-bound migration, were among those most likely to depart via Batumi. This port city, located at the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains, was perhaps the most difficult to reach of all those ports of exit used by migrants. Migrant caravans travelled there on foot over rough terrain and were required to cross the notoriously dangerous Russian-Ottoman frontier. Yet the city had the benefit of being under Russian control, affording North America-bound migrants the chance to avoid the challenges of migrating clandestinely through an Ottoman port city. In addition, Batumi, like many Ottoman port cities, was also connected to various eastern Anatolian communities through labor migration and trade, allowing for the emergence of an infrastructure catering to North America bound-migrants.[41]

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39 Copy of report of Beirut Pier Commission: BOA ZB 709 29 (21 Mayıs 1323/03 June 1907).

40 See the documents in BOA.ZB 607 & 608 focusing mainly on the departures of North America-bound migrants from Batumii.

41 See below.

This constantly shifting and expanding geography of migration testifies to the ease with which the underground networks that facilitated migration from eastern Anatolia to North America could be reworked or even formed anew across vast distances. Considering the many difficulties involved in smuggling migrants from the eastern Anatolian interior, this spatial flexibility was essential to maintaining high levels of migration to North America in the face of strict prohibitions by the Ottoman state. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction to this article, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed developments (technological and otherwise) that facilitated the rapid compression of time and space, allowing the transhemispheric migrants of that era to travel great distances at heretofore unthinkable speed. As this section has shown, however, the space migrants traversed was neither inert nor neutral. In addition, their journeys were not merely determined by factors such as the availability or roads, railroads, or steam travel. Rather, the geography of migration was in constant flux and susceptible to change as the result of a variety of less tangible and easily overlooked political, social, and economic dynamics.

Migration Networks in the Port City

After difficult overland journeys that could easily exceed two weeks, migrants arrived at one of the bustling ports on the Black or Mediterranean Sea coasts. These cities were the endpoint of both the domestic smuggling networks that comprised the migration industry, and it was here where, through whatever means necessary, arrangements were made for the continuation of these road-weary migrants' long transhemispheric voyages. The available documentation reveals only partial glimpses of these port-city migrant smuggling networks. Yet these snippets of information hint at the existence of impressively coordinated systems linking numerous actors across diverse ethno-religious, national, and class lines.

Israel Safarian, who in 1907 migrated from his home village in the northeastern Anatolian district of Kiğı to the city of Brantford, Ontario, wrote decades later of his travel to and subsequent experiences awaiting

departure in the port city of Batumi. After a harrowing journey over mountainous terrain that involved crossing the ever-dangerous Russian-Ottoman frontier, Safarian along with the others in his migrant caravan arrived at a boarding house in Batumi owned by fellow natives of Kiğı. His account details the long wait, poor conditions, and the financial exploitation he and his fellow migrants suffered at the hands of their boardinghouse proprietor compatriots. Safarian's experiences in Batumi did not end the moment he boarded a steamer to begin his transhemispheric voyage (Safarian 2002: 2–17). Over a year following his arrival in Canada, Safarian received a letter from his father stating that an associate of the innkeepers had presented the family with a bill for debts he had accumulated while in Batumi, further demonstrating the degree of power those involved in the migration industry could wield over both space and time.[42]

In the absence of similarly detailed accounts, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which Safarian's experiences are representative of the many thousands of migrants that travelled from eastern Anatolia to North America through similar migration networks. Furthermore, his account, penned decades after the events it describes and exposed to the additional filter of translation, is a compelling but problematic source. Yet much of what Safarian discussed regarding the inner workings of the migration industry is echoed in the Ottoman source material consulted for this project. For example, these documents reinforce the important role played by port-city innkeepers, such as the two described by Safarian, in the functioning of the eastern Anatolian migration industry. In January 1898, an innkeeper, Agop, based in Iskenderun, was accused of paying bribes to local police officials and a prominent member of the Iskenderun Pier Commission to allow migrants bound for North America to pass through the port.[43] Nearly three years later, in November 1900, authorities in Iskenderun expelled another local innkeeper,

42 Garabed Safarian to Israel Safarian (April 4, 1909). In: Safarian 2002: 32.

43 Letter of Informant to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 49 75 (7 Kanunisani 1313/20 January 1898).

Osep, a native of Arapkir in Mamuretülaziz Province, after local officials intercepted documents revealing his involvement in smuggling migrants.[44] In a January 1904 report to the Ministry of Interior, officials in the Black Sea port of Trabzon complained that local »Armenian innkeepers« were illegally procuring internal passports and steamer tickets for North America-bound migrants, and proposed a series of measures be enacted to prevent such activities.[45] A year later, in July 1905, the Ministry of Police reported that migrants headed for the New World were illegally procuring internal passports with the help an innkeeper based in Samsun.[46]

As both Safarian's account and these documents demonstrate, boarding houses and inns were convenient locations to house migrants as they waited for further travel arrangements to be made. Yet innkeepers and boarding house owners did not act alone in aiding migrants upon their arrival in the port city. Rather, they were components of broader networks of intermediaries involved in the business of migrant smuggling. Not surprisingly, among those who played vital roles in the operation of these networks were port-city merchants and tradesmen, who, like many of the innkeepers mentioned above, were natives of migrant-sending communities in the Anatolian interior. Merchants, especially those deeply rooted in the daily social and economic life of the city in which they operated, were well situated to access the social and political connections necessary to the continued discrete functioning of port-city migration networks.[47]

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44 Monthly Report of Iskenderun Pier Commission Teşrinisani 1316: BOA. DH.TMIK.M 99 17 (23 Ramazan 1318/14 January 1901).

45 Province of Trabzon to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 123 26 (11 Zilkade 1321/29 January 1904).

46 Ministry of Police to the Province of Aydin and District of Canık: BOA.ZB401 102 (6 Temmuz 1321/19 July 1905).

47 Governor of Adana Province to Ministry of Interior: BOA.TMIK.M 120 37 (9 Zilhicce 1319/19 March 1902).

This article has so far demonstrated the vitally important role played by the ties of compatriotism in defining the inner workings and shifting spatial contours of the eastern Anatolian migration industry. The Batumi-based innkeepers discussed in Safarian's account, both natives of his home district in Kiğı, or the various tradesmen and merchants from migrant-sending communities such as Harput, Malatya, or Diyarbakir who served as critical components to the operation of port-city migration networks, vividly illustrate the importance of these compatriot (*hemşehri*) networks. Their connections to migration agents in the interior provided the conduit for smuggling North America-bound migrants from their communities in the interior to these port cities. Such networks had long allowed merchants and migrant laborers from eastern Anatolia and throughout the Ottoman Empire to sustain close social and economic ties to their home communities despite the distances separating them. Certainly, their presence and rootedness in these communities helps to explain the emergence of such coordinated methods of migrant smuggling so quickly and over such vast distances after the emergence of large-scale migrations from eastern Anatolia to North America in the late 1880s.

In the face of Ottoman prohibitions against migration to North America, successfully and discreetly smuggling migrants through these port cities and eventually out of the Empire meant that port-city migration networks extended well beyond the bounds of compatriotism and incorporated other elements of port-city society. In his 1901 report on migration to North America, the United States consul in Harput discussed the important role of foreign consular employees in port-city migration networks.[48] Foreign missions linked to the trade concerns of numerous countries figured prominently in the political and economic life of Ottoman port cities. Foreign consulates regularly hired Ottoman subjects—most often Christians—to serve as intermediaries, translators, and guards. As a result, these consular employees possessed close ties to

48 United States Department of State Diplomatic Despatches (USDSDD): United States Consul in Harput Thomas H Norten to Department of State (January 22, 1901).

both the local and foreign populations in these port cities. The unique connections possessed by these individuals were, in turn, invaluable to those involved in migrant smuggling. Indeed, the Harput consul's report suggested that consular employees played critical roles in arranging migrants' passage on foreign ships. The consul's assertion is hardly surprising considering that consular employees, as a result of their positions, likely had easy access to the representatives of foreign shipping lines based in these port cities.

Ottoman documents also provide insight into the role played by foreign consular employees in port city-based migration networks. As early as April 1892, officials in Adana complained that the consular representative of Iran was involved in aiding the migration of Armenians bound for North America.[49] In September 1900, officials in Mersin uncovered the involvement of several employees of foreign consulates in human smuggling. Their investigation showed that employees of the city's Russian and German consulates had led migrants to a waterfront villa located outside of the central city that belonged to an American doctor working in Mersin. From there, migrants were rowed out to waiting foreign ships late at night under the cover of darkness. Three years later in June 1903, an employee of the Russian consulate in Mersin, a certain Anton, who was one of those implicated in the document cited above for his involvement in human smuggling, was again accused of facilitating the migration of North America-bound Armenians in participation with an employee of the city's British consulate. The two consular employees were paid handsomely for their work assisting migrants seeking to go abroad, commanding fees of upwards of seven lira per migrant for their services.[50] In November 1903, Anton's long-running involvement in human smuggling—along with concerns that the unlimited access to foreign ships granted him by his position was also providing him the

49 Interior Ministry to the Province of Adana: BOA.DH.MKT 1958 51 (25 Mayıs 1308/7 June 1892).

50 Mersin Pier Commission to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 139 19 (14 Şevval 1320/12 January 1903).

ability to smuggle weapons into the empire—motivated Ottoman authorities to seek his removal from the employ of the Russian Consulate, a request tersely rebuffed by the Russian ambassador.[51]

The involvement of foreign consular staff in human smuggling was not unique to Mersin. For example, in December 1903, Ottoman officials in Iskenderun accused two translators and a guard employed with the American consulate of aiding North America-bound migrants in gaining access to foreign ships docked in the port with the help of local boatmen.[52] Indeed, boatmen, like consular employees, were also components of the port-city urban milieu that played a critical role in the migration industry. After migrants had been conveyed from the interior to the coast and preparations for their transhemispheric journey made, boatmen often served as the final link in port-city migration networks. As early as July 1890, the governor of Trabzon province reported that North America-bound migrants leaving through Samsun were being shuttled late at night to waiting foreign ships by local boatmen. Because the burgeoning port still lacked a proper pier for the loading and unloading of passengers, boatmen stationed at various locations along the city's waterfront remained the primary means of accessing ships. This situation made it difficult for local officials to monitor passenger traffic and prevent the further escalation of migrant smuggling. As a result, the governor called both for the construction of a passenger pier in Samsun and the enacting of much stricter regulations targeting the operations of the city's boatmen.[53]

It was in port cities of the Mediterranean, however, where boatmen assumed an especially important role in migration networks during the period. As mentioned above, boatmen in both Mersin and Iskenderun

51 Copy of report from Adana Province to Ottoman Foreign Ministry: BOA.HR.SYS 2795 64 (22 Teşrinievvel 1319/04 November 1903).

52 Office of the Grand Vizier to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry: BOA.BEO 2234 167477 (20 Ramazan 1321/12 December 1903).

53 Governor of Trabzon Province to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.MKT 1743 81 (30 Zilkade 1307/17 July 1890).

readily exploited favorable coastal geography and placid waters to construct informal »piers« (*iskeleler*) from which migrants could be smuggled onto foreign ships. Such piers were generally set up in the vicinity of small villages usually located no more than twenty kilometers from the central port of either city. At this distance they were close enough to be readily accessible from the center of town but far enough away to avoid the reach of lighthouses monitoring the main harbor. Under the cover of darkness, migrants in groups of up to forty were rowed to ships waiting far enough offshore to also avoid detection from coastal lighthouses.[54] Testimony given by three Ottoman officials who witnessed such an event outside of Iskenderun in June 1899 provides a detailed picture of one of these late night rendezvous. The three men, identified as two military scribes and a Jerusalem-based police official, were passengers aboard the French steamer *Congo* as it sailed between Iskenderun and Mersin on the night of June 9, 1899. The district governor of Mersin summarized their statements as follows:

> The night before last around 3:30 in the morning, the Messageries ship *Congo*, on its way from Iskenderun with scheduled arrival in Mersin early yesterday morning (here meaning daybreak, a few hours after 3:30), stopped about five or six miles outside of central Iskenderun. Thirty Armenians, each about twenty to twenty-five years in age, were loaded one by one onto the backside of the ship from two white rowboats. They were quickly spirited away to some place reserved for them in the ship without being given any opportunity to mix with or speak to the other passengers on board.[55]

54 See: Report of the Ministry of Interior Reform Commission: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 93 32 (13 Cemaziyelevvel 1318/08 September 1900); BOA.DH.TMIK.M 121 23, Iskenderun Pier Commission to Ministry of Interior (02 Nisan 1318/13 April 1902); BOA.Y.PRK.AZN 24 35.

55 Ministry of Police to Province of Mamuretülaziz: BOA.MKT.MHM 545 7 (10 Haziran 1315/23 June 1899).

The details provided in the testimony of these three men hint at the impressive degree of coordination that existed between local migration intermediaries, agents of foreign shipping lines, boatmen, and the crews of these ships. The regularity with which carefully orchestrated late-night rendezvous took place reinforces the extent to which the port-city migration networks relied on the involvement of a diverse cross section of local and non-local actors. The relative visibility of these events in the documentary evidence, however, suggests the parties involved were not always successful in evading the authorities, and arrests of boatmen involved in smuggling migrants were not infrequent.[56] Despite the risks involved, participation in the migration industry was a lucrative business for boatmen. In a report from June 1900, officials at Iskenderun estimated that some local boatmen were making up to fifty lira a day conveying migrants bound for North America to waiting foreign ships. The report went on to raise concerns that the legally mandated two lira fine and short prison sentence meted out to boatmen arrested on suspicion of human smuggling was not proving an effective disincentive against such operations.[57]

Boatmen in Mersin and Iskenderun clearly ran impressive operations, evidenced by their high degree of coordination and their ability to smuggle large numbers of migrants at a time. Their counterparts based in Levantine port cities, however, appear to have operated on an even larger scale. Whereas boatmen operating in Mersin and Iskenderun appear generally to have ferried their clients to ships waiting just offshore, boatmen in the Levant regularly smuggled migrants as far as Cyprus, located nearly two hundred kilometers off the coast of the Ottoman mainland.[58]

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56 See for example: Iskenderun Pier Commission to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 90 26 (30 Mayıs 1316/12 June 1900); Governor of Halep Province to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M (4 Rabiulevvel 1320/10 June 1902).

57 Copy of response from Iskenderun Pier Commission to Halep Province: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 92 41 (6 Safer 1318/12 June 1900).

58 Ministry of Interior to Beirut Province: BOA.DH.MKT 277 47, pg. 1 (24 Safer 1312/26 August 1894).

Because Cyprus was under de facto British rule, migrants smuggled there could easily gain access to foreign ships without fear of detection by Ottoman authorities. The two hundred kilometer trip from the Levantine coast to Cyprus, however, required large vessels capable of travel on the open water. The vessel of one Latakia-based boatman, for example, was reported to have a carrying capacity of over twenty tons, suggesting the capital-intensive nature of these enterprises.[59] Some of these boatmen appear to have operated out of more than one port city.[60] Although not explicitly mentioned in the documentation, it is not unlikely that he planned to pick up more North America-bound migrant passengers from Iskenderun or even Mersin before travelling back to his home port.

The available information regarding the ethnic and social origins of these boatmen is spotty but hints at a great degree of diversity. One notable boatman/smuggler, Kiryako, who smuggled migrants from an informal port just north of Iskenderun, was a Greek Orthodox fisherman originally from the Aegean port town of Çeşme, located over one thousand kilometers from Iskenderun.[61] Kiryako was the owner of numerous small boats and his human smuggling operation was apparently large enough for him to employ other local boatmen.[62] Meanwhile, the aforementioned Trablus-based boatman, Mustafa Vaki, appears to have been a native of that city and, judging from his name, a Muslim. As shown above, his involvement in smuggling migrants may have complemented his work importing goods from Cyprus for sale in various towns along the Mediterranean coast.[63] Finally Muhammad Çek, who ran a notorious

59 BOA.Y.PRK.AZN 24 35 (12 Mart 1320/25 March 1904).

60 Iskenderun Pier Commission to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 121 23 (02 Nisan 1318/13 April 1902).

61 Monthly Report of the Iskenderun Pier Commission Ağustos 1315: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 76 43 (10 Cemaziyelahir 1317/16 September 1899).

62 Iskenderun Pier Commission to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 90 26 (13 Rabiulahir 1316/11 August 1900).

63 Iskenderun Pier Commission to Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 121 23 (02 Nisan 1318/13 April 1902).

operation out of Beirut involving the smuggling of both migrants and weapons from the mid-1890s until well into the first years of the twentieth century, was of Algerian origin and received consular protection from the French government.[64] The profiles provided above are insufficient to provide a composite picture of the average boatman involved in the migration industry. However, they further demonstrate the ways in which migration networks in port cities went beyond links of compatriotism to include actors of various social, regional, ethnic, and national backgrounds. Without these networks and the specific knowledge and connections those involved in them possessed, travel from the interior to the coast, navigating the largely foreign world of the port city, avoiding detection by local authorities, and attempting to arrange passage aboard a foreign steamer would have been impossible for even the savviest of migrants.

Involvement of State Officials in the Migration Industry

The strict prohibitions in place against migration to North America motivated many state officials in the interior and in port cities to take advantage of their positions in order to benefit from the often lucrative business of facilitating unlawful migration. As a result, throughout the migration industry's geography and the time period in question, these officials were essential to the ability of these networks to operate smoothly and largely without interference.

For example, civil registrars, officials responsible for granting internal passports, sought early on to exploit the value of these documents in the migration process. There are numerous cases of registrars in communities throughout the Anatolian interior who regularly granted internal passports to North America-bound migrants or migration agents, often in return for substantial bribes.[65] Indeed, by the late 1890s, these officials

64 Ministry of Police to the Ministry of Interior: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 42 55 (26 Cemazeyilevvel 1315/23 October 1897).

65 Ministry of Interior to Province of Sivas: BOA.DH.MKT 1859 60 (10 Muharrem 1309/16 August 1891).

could expect to receive payments worth hundreds of times the legally stipulated price of an internal passport.[66] Although lower ranking civil registrars were frequently implicated in selling these documents, they were not the only ones involved in the business. In 1898, a petition written by a local merchant in Harput accused the province's chief civil registrar of charging North America-bound migrants between five and ten gold lira for internal passports.[67] In fact, the practice of selling internal passports was apparently so widespread that its importance to the migration process elicited comment by the United States consul in Harput. In a report to his superiors in Istanbul, the consul mentioned that for migrants seeking to travel to North America, the payment of bribes in order to obtain these documents was »requisite to lubricate the official machinery.«[68]

Like civil registrars based in communities in the Anatolian interior, the involvement of port city-based police officials also played key roles in facilitating migration. In July 1892, and in the face of increased efforts on the part of the Ottoman state to interdict migration to North America, the Ministry of Interior issued a stern warning threatening to hold responsible police officials in coastal provinces found either turning a blind eye to or actively facilitating the departure of undocumented migrants.[69] The ministry's concerns about the involvement of these officials in port city migration networks were well founded. Port city police officials were implicated in activities ranging from aiding innkeepers in illegally procuring travel documents for their North America-bound cli-

66 Ministry of Interior to Province of Mamuretülaziz: BOA.DH.TMIK.M 50 21 (24 Şevval 1315/17 March 1898); Ministry of Police to Province of Mamuretülaziz: BOA.ZB 446 101 (08 Ağustos 1323/21 August 1907).

67 Ministry of Interior to Mamuretülaziz province: BOA.DH.MKT 2094 46 (4 Rabiulahir 1316/22 August 1898).

68 USDSDD United States Consul Harput to Thomas Leishman, US Plenipotentiary, Constantinople (05 November 1903).

69 Ministry of Interior to Coastal Provinces and the Ministry of Police: BOA.DH.MKT 1976 17 (27 Zilhicce 1309/22 July 1892).

ents, to serving as intermediaries between North America-bound migrants and those networks of agents making arrangements for their transhemispheric travel.[70] In a particularly noteworthy example, police officers in Beirut used their authority to collaborate with local migrant smugglers in shaking down North America-bound migrants passing through the port. The ability of police in Beirut to coordinate with local migration smugglers provided them with a cut of the lucrative migrant smuggling business while ensuring it remained free from state interference.

Given problems with chronic underpayment, the fact that rank-and-file civil registrars or port city police officials sought to benefit from involvement in the migration industry is not surprising. However, the participation of state officials in the migration industry was not limited to underpaid bureaucrats or those with prior existing connections to migrant-sending communities. In March 1907, Harputliyan Artin, the powerful migration agent mentioned earlier in this article, along with the police chief of Mamuretülaziz Province, a local gendarmerie commander, and several lesser ranking police officers were arrested in connection with their alleged role in an elaborate scheme to smuggle migrants.[71] The plot, spearheaded by Harputliyan Artin and involving some of the most powerful officials in the province, occurred in plain sight and largely within the confines of the provincial government building. When the plot unraveled after a group of North America-bound migrants involved in it were arrested, the resulting arrests of prominent state officials shook the provincial bureaucracy to the core.

That high-ranking local officials in Mamuretülaziz were involved in the migration industry is not surprising in and of itself. As mentioned earlier in this article, the Ottoman state knew of Artin Efendi's connections to

70 BOA.Y.PRK.AZN 24 35 (30 Ağustos 1316/12 September 1900); Ministry of Police Council of Investigation to Vilayet of Trabzon: BOA.ZB 459 66 (30 Temmuz 1320/11 August 1904).

71 Province of Mamuretülaziz to Ministry of Police: BOA.ZB 108 29 (2 Ağustos 1323/15 August 1907).

high-ranking provincial officials since as early as 1905.[72] Indeed, Artin Efendi was himself a member of the provincial executive council and thus also a part of the regional governing apparatus. The fact that the plot's architects, one of whom was the highest-ranking police official in the province, were so flagrant about their involvement suggests just how deep the ties ran between members of the provincial administration and the migration industry. In the face of strict migration prohibitions, however, the migrant smuggling networks that emerged during this period could not have operated for two decades and at high capacity without the direct involvement of powerful and well-connected state officials. Their participation in the migration industry should not be read as an indication of rampant corruption within Ottoman provincial administration. Rather, the actions of both high- and low-ranking officials further demonstrates the powerful but often ambiguous role that state power played in shaping the migration process.

Conclusion

Henri Lefebvre argues that social spaces—networks of communication and exchange embodied in local, regional, national, and international markets of capital, labor, signs etc.—necessarily incorporate and build on top of those of previous eras (Lefebvre 1991: 86). In the same vein, the new regimes of time and space that helped to facilitate the great trans-hemispheric migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were built upon and shaped by existing social relationships and regional networks that linked people across (often great) distances and facilitated the circulation of people, labor power, and goods. In addition, they were mediated through a variety of historically specific local and regional political, social, and economic dynamics.

By investigating and analyzing the emergence of the migration industry in eastern Anatolia, this article has strived to put these actors at the center of analysis. Because of the prohibitions on migration to North

72 Office of the Grand Vizier to Ministry of Interior: BOA.MKT.MHM 659 52 (11 Şaban 323/10 October 1905).

America, coupled with the difficult nature of the trip between the Anatolian interior and the coast, the volume of migration witnessed during this period would have been impossible without the involvement of the many underground networks that comprised this migration industry. Many of these were grafted onto preexisting compatriot networks that connected migrant laborers and merchants in various Ottoman port cities with their home communities in eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman state's prohibition of migration to North America coupled with the unique challenges of transoceanic migration, however, necessitated that those involved in the migration industry go well beyond such familiar linkages. As this article demonstrates, they built connections among a larger and more diverse set of social actors, creating a pastiche of new and old social relationships reminiscent of Lefebvre's description of social space.

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From »World Soviet« to »Fatherland of All Proletarians.« Anticipated World Society and Global Thinking in Early Soviet Russia*

Gleb J. Albert

World society is considered an »all-embracing social system [...] that transcends national states and stretches itself over them as its own coordinate system« (Wobbe 2000: 6). Niklas Luhmann, whose name is connected with this perspective in the first place, concluded back in 1975 that the new »state of the world« would require a new analytic framework. This state of the world includes aspects such as the growing and all-encompassing knowledge about human life and human interaction (and the availability of this knowledge on demand), the universal spread of scientifically secured knowledge, a »global public opinion,« and global financial entanglements. Practically speaking, it is in fact a unified global worldview« that is »new and in a phase of irreversible consolidation« (Luhmann 1975: 53–54; also see Luhmann 1997b).

Luhmann's theory is less concerned with contemporary historical events and processes. However, the early history of communism in particular might serve to illustrate his model of world society—not world society as an existing global sphere of communication,[1] but world society in the making, oriented towards a final stage of a globally liberated proletariat

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1 For empirical studies of world society, see e.g. Albert & Hilkermeier 2004; Stetter 2007.

as anticipated by the communist movement. This final stage, in the eyes of the Russian Bolsheviks (and other communist activists in the wake of World War I), would have to manifest itself on a global level in order not to become prey to the contradictions between socialism and capitalism (cf. Armstrong 1993: 120). It could be secured only through world revolution, an eruptive social and political transformation on a global scale (Drabkin 1996; Agosti 1997). »Revolutionary internationalism,« the idea and practice of global class solidarity, served as cohesion for this path (Halliday 1988; van Holthoon & van der Linden 1988; Forman 1998). This essay attempts to trace the »taking place of the world within communication, which Luhmann identified with world society (Luhmann 1997a: 150), in early Soviet political discourses and practices. It will show that global thought and action was an integral part of the early Soviet communist movement and was used to create the idea of a »revolutionary global« in and through political communication.

This essay does not attempt to explore either the Bolshevik and Comintern leaders' concrete stands on world revolution, or the real (im)possibilities of such a process. Instead it aims to demonstrate how the idea of building a new society on a worldwide scale acted as a powerful element of mobilization for the Russian Communist movement, and was a distinctive feature of the ideological framework of the party's lower ranks. It aims to explore facets of global thinking, global self-placement, and anticipated world society within communist rank and file activists, more specifically within »functionary-enthusiasts« (Kolonitskii 1993: 219), during the first decade of Soviet power. Ideology is to be understood here as a »living tissue of meaning« (Hellbeck 2009: 56) and not just something that is delegated »top down« via coercion and authority. Ideological practices include the (re)production of language (Welskopp 2005: 25–26), thus ideology is embedded in the everyday lives of individual agents and recreated within their practices. My main sources are therefore not documents by top-level decision-makers, but the writings of the movement's protagonists beneath the leadership levels—private correspondence as well as public »ceremonial« products (such as greeting messages and telegrams).

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Early classic socialist texts already strove for global social transformation —first and foremost, and perhaps most consistently, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848). While the proletariat is the agent of change, it is not the first to make the step into global dimensions: for Marx and Engels the bourgeoisie was the first historical agent to widen its radius of action to the global because »[t]he need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe« (Marx & Engels 1908: 12). The bourgeoisie set the preconditions for a globalization *avant la lettre*; the introduction of free trade and a world market increasingly caused national differences to vanish. However, only »[t]he supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.« Its »[u]nited action […] is one of the first conditions for [its] emancipation« (Marx & Engels 1908: 31). For Marx and Engels, the proletariat is the predestined successor of the bourgeoisie's worldwide structures of action and communication because »modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character« (Marx & Engels 1908: 21). The final appeal of the manifesto, that there is a »world to win« (Marx & Engels 1908: 48), should be understood not only as a call to take over and expand into the bourgeoisie's globalized operating range, but also (and perhaps foremost) to achieve a global horizon of perception, a global thinking. And even though early social democracy mostly acted along a national horizon (Welskopp 2000: 534–541), increasingly it defined itself as a global movement with global aims—in its symbolism as well as in its international associations.[2]

The onset of World War I and the alignment of the European social-democratic parties to their respective national governments' policies

2 For the global pretenses of the early social-democratic symbolic universe, see e.g. Troch 1990: 62, 77. For the international organizational structures of the early labor movement, see the classic work by Julius Braunthal (Braunthal 1961).

despite previous declarations about preventing a European war at any cost struck a serious blow against socialist internationalism. Russian social democracy was the only section of the Second International (apart from the Serbian party) that opposed supporting their government's war efforts from the very beginning (Fainsod 1973: 35–36)—even though the course of the war increasingly drove the »defeatist« and pro-war camps within Russian social democracy apart. For the Bolsheviks, as the radical anti-war faction within Russian social democracy, internationalism had an even more prominent place in party politics (Nation 1989; Kenez 2006: 31). For them, however, the idea of global struggle was more than just social-democratic heritage. As stated above, the Bolshevik leadership's discourse about internationalism, as well as their concrete international policies, shifting between world revolution and international diplomacy, deserve their own treatment and shall not be discussed in detail here.[3] However, two specifics should be mentioned that may contribute to explaining Bolshevik world-revolutionary thinking.

Firstly, as Immanuel Wallerstein proposes, the development of a capitalist economy by the nineteenth century led to a global modern world system that knew no »outside« (not unlike Luhmann's world society), but only a center and (semi)peripheries. Fully developed, this system is subject to structural crises (Wallerstein 1974–2011). »Antisystemic movements,« such as social democracy, strove to break through the continuum of crisis (Arrighi et al. 1989). Whether or not one agrees with Wallerstein's approach: the Bolsheviks, as one of the »antisystemic movements,« saw themselves precisely at the highest point of a world system crisis; Lenin's conceptualization of imperialism as »the highest stage of capitalism,« written just one year before the revolution, testifies to this. For Lenin, under the impression of World War I—a global manifestation of a global crisis and thus an end stage of capitalism—revolution also had to become global, involving not only the industrial proletariat of the advanced countries, but also those »thousand million peo-

3 For further reading, see Page 1959; Flechtheim 1967; Geyer 1976a; Geyer 1976b; Vatlin 2008a; Vatlin 2008b; Drabkin 1996; Drabkin 1998; and others.

ple« on the periphery affected by global oppression (Lenin 1964a: 185–304). Thus, on the one hand, to the Bolsheviks the Russian revolution was just one inevitable part of a wider global uprising. On the other hand, since Russia itself was located at the semi-periphery of the world system, according to Wallerstein it was also a »national liberation uprising« even though it was led by a party with a »universalist ideology« (Wallerstein 2000: 378). This contradiction shapes the fluctuations of Bolshevik thought between internationalist revolutionary aspirations and Russo-centric views, a problem that will follow us throughout the essay.

Secondly, if we are to place world revolution within the history of ideas beyond socialism, it should be in the context of other »global« ideas of the time. Just as a homogenous concept of time and common vernacular print languages resulted in »imagined communities« of nations at an earlier time (Anderson 2006), a furthering of this process can be observed in the late nineteenth century. The world was now made conceivable as a global entity with the globalization of communication (telegraph, etc.) and the standardization of time zones. This led to a variety of spectacular world-encompassing scientific and economic projects (Krajewski 2006)—some of them failed and forgotten (just like world revolution), but some that also indirectly left their marks on further developments (just like world revolution once again).[4] To evaluate the messianic qualities of the idea of world revolution, however, one might also consider the biopolitical utopias that flourished particularly in Russia's left-wing circles from the beginning of the twentieth century well into the 1920s. They envisioned such extravagant undertakings as conquering space, overcoming death, and enhancing the human being, ideas that were, to a certain extent, shared and supported by parts of the Bolshevik leadership (Groys & Hagemeister 2005).

Therefore, the grandeur and megalomania of the idea that an uprising in Russia would ignite a revolutionary fire throughout the world should not

4 Interestingly, Werner Sombart points out that the »revolutionary spirit« of socialism was being fuelled by general technical progress as early as 1896 (Sombart 1909: 13).

be surprising. It was even part of the Bolshevik's internal decision making on the eve of their revolution. Discussions around the seizure of power in November 1917 had an international perspective: while Grigorii Zinov'ev and Lev Kamenev, senior members of the Central Committee, found that world revolution was not yet ripe enough, and hence feared the isolation of communists in Russia in case of a premature takeover, Lenin, in contrast, considered it a treason against world revolution not to strike now—and prevailed with his opinion (Rauch 1977: 68). After the Bolsheviks ascended to power, the new revolutionary state, which chose the *Internationale* as its national anthem and the call for proletarians of all countries to unite as its national motto, was in this sense a highly paradoxical state—more of an incarnation of the negation of the state. Fittingly, Lev Trotskii, after accepting the post of Commissar of Foreign Affairs, stated his sole aim was to »issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world, and then shut up shop« (Trotsky 1970: 341). After all, considering the anticipated world revolution and the communist world society that would follow thereafter, international relations in the form of traditional diplomacy seemed to have no future. It remains to be shown, however, that it was not just the privilege of the party leadership to see the October Revolution »not as an incident of domestic gravity, but an ignition of the worldwide reconstruction of humanity« (Ikeda 2005: 123).

The ceremonial and everyday practices of the ruling party, and concurrently public life, in the first years after the October Revolution were imbued with the notion of a worldwide struggle. International revolution was everywhere: from newspapers reporting about strikes and uprisings all over the world, to schools and streets being named after foreign revolutionaries (Albert 2010: 18). The »international situation« was a recurrent topic of every political manifestation and public gathering—even when these were not related to international events at all. The American anarchist Alexander Berkman, who visited Soviet Russia in 1920, captured in his diary his impressions of a commemorative event honoring Aleksandr Gertsen, the famous Russian proto-socialist intellectual of the nineteenth century. The hall was decorated for the pur-

pose, yet the event's program had little to do with the person being honored. After the military band played the *Internationale*, Grigorii Zinov'ev, now head of the Communist International, ascended the podium to talk about international revolution:

> Soon the Social Revolution will break out in Europe and America—it cannot be far off now, for capitalism is crumbling to earth everywhere. Then there will be an end to war and fratricidal bloodshed, and Russia will receive help from the workers of other countries.

He was followed by Karl Radek, the Bolshevik emissary who had just returned from Germany, promising that »the workers of Germany will come to the aid of their brothers in Russia, and the world will learn what the revolutionary proletariat can accomplish.« The event was concluded by Bolshevik diplomat Adol'f Ioffe, who explained the conditions of a treaty just concluded with Latvia to the audience (Berkman 1925: 38–39). The fact that the content of the memorial gathering had nothing to do with the person being commemorated seemed to disturb neither the Bolshevik organizers and participants nor the observer Berkman. It appeared completely natural that the state of global affairs should be manifest at every possible occasion. Moreover, by »internationalizing« an originally »national« event, a symbolical connection could be created between pre-Marxist national revolutionary traditions and the world-revolutionary present and future.

The picture of political and social life in Soviet Russia represented by historiography is dominated by want and violence, while the Bolshevik movement, particularly its rank and file, is portrayed as being motivated by greed and/or blind fanaticism. However, this research leaves open the question of the »positive« idea that kept the communist movement going and also reached beyond the movement into wider society. It was not so much Marxist theory.[5] One can hardly expect that global Marxian-type

5 A survey of three hundred party activists in Ulyanovsk in 1926 revealed that over the half of the respondents had never read Marx, twenty per-

thinking would automatically trickle down to the party rank and file. One element of this thinking however—namely the belief in global revolution—was not just immanent among the Bolshevik leadership, but was far more widespread and unanimously accepted than usually assumed.

A central reason for this was the world's political constellation following the year 1914. For Russia and its inhabitants, just as for the rest of Europe, World War I was an epochal and traumatic turning point. The Bolsheviks' consistent anti-war stance and their promise of a just peace swelled their ranks in 1917 and ultimately brought them to power. But since the October Revolution not only did not end war for Russia, but instead threw it into civil war, the idea of raising the October scenario to a global level to bring salvation to the suffering Russian workers was quite attractive. It helped make sense of the world and also proved to be a potent »collective frame« for the communist movement.[6] Moreover, as Michael Geyer puts it, the struggle for world revolution

> was, from the hindsight of future generations, a phantasmagorical, megalomaniac project detached from reality, but the […] revolutionary contemporaries thought differently (Geyer 2010: 196–197).[7]

Indeed, in the unstable situation following World War I a whole series of revolts, unrests, and revolutions were taking place in Europe and around the world (Konrad & Schmidlechner 1991; Wrigley 1993; Schulze Wessel 2005; Kenez 2006: 31). The fact that this cascade of turmoil remained fragmented and confined within national borders should not be taken for granted as a logical development, but rather critically questioned in

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cent had »tried« to read his works, and only eleven percent had read Lenin (Kenez 1985: 133).

6 For »framing« in social movements, see Snow 2004.

7 In fact, in the first years after World War I, world revolution was not just a vision of its adherents, but also a specter that haunted the conservative public (Schulze Wessel 2005: 378; Hanebrink 2008) and appeared as a possibility even to anti-Bolshevik observers within Russia (Kniazev 1993: 107, 111, 127).

the sense of a »blocked transnationality« (Geyer 2010). However the Soviet activists believed the blocked transnationality of the Russian Revolution was purely temporary. The contentious situation in Europe appeared to them as a collective departure, and where connections between the single points of world revolution could not be made, they were to be constructed.

A communist from Omsk wrote in mid-1918 in a letter to the party's Central Committee (CC) that she and her comrades were expecting news of revolution in the West any day now, since it was impossible that the class brothers abroad would turn their backs on their Russian comrades.[8] When we read this now, we are not just witnessing an attempt at »speaking Bolshevik« (Kotkin 1995) in order to curry favor with the leaders. I would argue instead that this is a genuine belief fuelled not by the mere impact of state/party ideology, but by the wish to make sense of present hardship.[9] The hope for worldwide revolutionary transformation was not necessarily decoupled from everyday life. Through their »panoptical worldview,«[10] communist activists were able to make such seemingly distant connections. The rank-and-file party activist Ivan Golubev, frustrated by the fact that his family was being held in German-occupied Minsk as much as by thankless party work, wrote in his diary on 8 October 1918, after hearing news about the beginning upheaval in Germany:

8 Letter from the Omsk Committee of the Russian Communist Party (RCP) to the CC of the RCP, May 1918. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii, Moscow (in the following: RGASPI), 17/4/23, 81. Cited in Anikeev 1967: 213–214.

9 Sergei Iarov comes to similar conclusions concerning the belief in international solidarity in the early Soviet Union (Iarov 2006: 504). However he focuses on the »manipulation techniques« the Bolsheviks applied to the »general populace« and thus does not take the inner processes of the Communist rank and file seriously.

10 On the »panoptical worldview« of early social democracy, see Welskopp 2000: 530.

> Only one thing pleases me—that a real revolution is taking place in Germany. This means that we soon will have no frontline, I can go to Minsk, fix my affairs a bit. I will be able to calm down my children and stay at one place. That would be quite good. The German proletariat begins to gain consciousness—well, it is about time, to restore order [sic], throw down the bourgeoisie, and to liberate the common people from ages of slavery. This is necessary. (Klyshka 2002: 171)

The cut and dry, superficially Marxist rhetoric in the second half of the diary entry should not distract from the fact that rank-and-file activists were apparently able to connect their »international faith« (Collette 1999) with their daily lives. This connection could also be extend to violence. There was no contradiction in the last line of a provincial trade union organization's message of greeting: »Long live Red Terror, long live the worldwide unity of the proletariat.«[11] Internationalism and violence did not necessarily have to be at opposite ends of an argument, and the one could even justify the other—since a worldwide revolution would require even more drastic means than a national one.[12]

What did the world that the Communists thought would come into existence look like? The tendency propagated by the central media during the first years of the Soviet state, in accordance with the »classics«, was toward a Communist world state (cf. Goodman 1960) or at least a »European Republic of Councils«, as a *Pravda* headline read in 1918.[13] The party's rank-and-file and mid-level activists did not have any clear-

11 Telegram from the Restaurant Workers' Trade Union in Griazi (Tambov *guberniia*) to the Council of Peoples' Commissars, 20 September 1918. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (in the following: GARF), R-1235/93/2, 153–154.

12 Likewise, counterrevolutionary violence and revolutionary defeat abroad could be used for domestic political deterrence, as in »Look what happens when a revolution fails!« For this kind of Soviet usage of the communist defeat in Finland, see Vihavainen 2008.

13 Evropeiskaia Respublika Sovetov. *Pravda* (26/13th January 1918).

cut viewpoints about what the final result of a world revolution would ultimately look like.[14] World revolution appeared before them as a global process which would make uprisings, revolutions, and finally revolutionary states mushroom up from the ground. In 1921, the organization committee of the Third World Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) came up with an ambitious plan to celebrate the event's opening with a spotlight projection of a world map onto Moscow's night sky using fireworks to highlight the worldwide unrests and revolutions—a plan which was never carried out due to financial and technical limitations.[15] However, this imagined scenario perfectly illustrates how contemporaries perceived (and experienced) the world revolutionary process: a fascinating spectacle of a revolutionary world ablaze, fused together by smaller and local fires happening simultaneously that fed off each other and expanded.

This impression was substantiated by the proclamation of many, albeit short-lived, Republics of Councils in Europe—the most prominent in Bavaria (April–May 1919) and Hungary (March–April 1919). The creation of a German Republic in November 1918 reinforced this perception. Likewise, the fact that a »Council of the People's Representatives« (*Rat der Volksbeauftragten)* was bestowed with the highest governmental powers within the new Germany fired the Russian activists' imagination of parallel revolutionary development. Even though communist propaganda imagined the revolutionary process splitting the world into two camps—»proletarian/revolutionary« and »bourgeois/capitalist/imperialist«—activists saw this as merely a temporary state. This fissure along class lines would be overcome by an indispensable victory in class struggle, thus creating a classless world society. These temporary class factions were also imagined to be territorial. A mid-1918 message of greet-

14 Which is not surprising, however, considering that the classics also »offer glimpses rather than visions of a unified world« (Stites 1989: 179).

15 Plan of the Artistic Subdivision of the Organisational Department of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) and the Artistic Section of the Organisational Commission of the 3rd Congress, [April 1920]. RGASPI, 490/1/7, 18–20.

ing from a party organization shows how this abstract notion of an international final class struggle took visual shape in the minds of activists:

> Our revolution had separated Europe into two camps—one socialist and one imperialist. Into the socialist camp the proletariat of all nations will have safe passage, and after having unified soon, we will hoist the red flags of the International and in one common uprising sweep away the parasites and oppressors of all countries from the face of the earth. Then we will proclaim: ›The time of world revolution has come! There are no more exploiters! We will conduct our lives the way we want!‹[16]

In his classic essay on world society, Luhmann outlines the existence of two different »styles of expectation« that can coexist in every social system: cognitive expectation, which is adaptable and willing to learn, and normative expectation, which claims and prescribes morality. These styles of expectation define themselves by how they cope with disappointment: the style of

> [n]ormative expectation proves itself determined to hold to its expectations even in case of disappointment, drawing upon resources such as inner conviction, means of sanction, consensus.

Cognitive expectation, on the other hand, is adaptive and can align itself anew after disappointments. Luhmann notes that »world society constitutes itself foremost in spheres of interactions in which cognitive expectation […] can be stabilized« (Luhmann 1975: 55–56; cf. Luhmann 1995: 320–325). If we apply Luhmann's theory of expectations to the imagined world society anticipated by communist activists, we end up with an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, from the activists' perspective, the expectation of a world revolution was cognitive because it was scientifically cognoscible and predictable. Yet the activists' talk of coming world society was unmistakably normative: a worldwide socialist future simply

16 Resolution of the RCP-Committee of the 1st Revolutionary Battalion of Orel, 19 May 1918. RGASPI, 17/4/112, 8.

had to set in because it was diagnosed by socialist theory (perceived as the scholarly method par excellence) as the logical consequence of the past and present. Political realities of any kind had to adjust to this fact, and not the other way around.

Wishful thinking often got ahead of actual events in this area. The expectation of international revolution accelerating without boundaries turned desires into facts—especially when world-revolutionary fervor was fuelled from above. Aleksandr Vatlin describes the international strategy of the Bolshevik leadership in 1918 as oscillating between sober analysis of and even some pessimism as regards a possible German revolution in the first two-thirds of the year, and fervent enthusiasm in autumn—both sentiments being reflected by the central party press (Vatlin 2008a; Vatlin 2008b). However, enthusiasm and expectations of the outbreak of revolutions in the West were alive in the rank and file throughout the whole year, as the letter from Omsk and countless other documents »from below« illustrate. Thus when the central press finally declared revolution in Germany as the order of the day in early October, the expectations that now skyrocketed had already been present. Vatlin most certainly had high-ranking party members in mind when he wrote about the propagandists who must have emitted a »sigh of relief« for now being able to speak freely of world revolution (Vatlin 2008a: 78), but this feeling most likely had also permeated a larger strata of the active party membership.

In November 1918, an employee of the Red Army's military inspection sent a telegram to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK), congratulating on the »victory of world revolution« as if it was a fact that had come to pass.[17] A few months later, an assembly of communist activists near Arkhangelsk passed a resolution asserting that the workers of the whole world would come to the aid of proletarian Russia,

17 Telegram from Iren'ev to the VCIK, 15 November 1918. GARF, R-1235/93/2, 318.

as the Bavarian and Hungarian proletariat had already done.[18] This occurred just one week before the Bavarian Republic of Councils was crushed by the counter-revolutionary Free Corps; and even though communists in Budapest were able to hold their positions until August, neither Bavarian nor Hungarian communists appeared at the borders of Soviet Russia to help revolutionary activists in the provinces. The looming decay of the Hungarian Republic of Councils did not diminish the world-revolutionary optimism of Russian activists—quite the contrary. A party conference in the central Russian town of Viatka, which took place on 3 June 1919, interpreted the conflicts of Hungary with its non-socialist neighbors as follows: »They [the Entente] want to suffocate Hungary through the Czechoslovaks, but instead they get the Slovak Republic of Councils!«[19] This republic of councils, however, lasted less than a week. And even directly after the fall of communist Budapest, when Trotskii declared in a letter to his fellow party leaders that revolution in the West was put on hold and it was now time for a re-orientation towards revolutionizing Asia (Meijer 1971: 182–184), local party activists were not fazed by the defeat. A speaker at a party meeting in Kazan was still able to proclaim that world revolution would not perish, but instead would grow constantly. Ignoring the crushing of the Spartacist Uprising in Berlin earlier in January and the subsequent murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the speaker proclaimed Berlin—now that Munich and Budapest were no longer at disposal anymore—as the global epicenter of revolution.[20]

However, it did not even require the founding of a revolutionary state to make further communist fireworks appear on the revolutionary world map in the imagination of provincial activists. For the editors of a pro-

18 Resolution of a citizens' assembly in Spassko-Maretskii *raion*, 21 April 1919. RGASPI, 17/6/1, 149–150.

19 Minutes of the 5th Party Conference in Vyatka, 3 June 1919. RGASPI, 17/6/53, 2ob.

20 Minutes of a plenary meeting of communists and sympathizers, [Kazan], 28 August 1919. RGASPI, 17/6/100, 1–2ob.

vincial party paper in Cherepovets in northwest Russia, a short news item about the founding of a communist party in Constantinople resulted in the flamboyant headline *»I tam kommunizm«* (»There too, there is communism«).[21] The founding of a political splinter group in far-away Turkey was equated semantically with the imagined existence of communism in many places all over the world (»too«).

»Too« could likewise be read as »just as we are building it here in Soviet Russia.« Not only the Bolshevik leaders, but also the revolutionary activists of lower rank could see their revolutionary activity as part of a world-revolutionary process. The speaker at the fourteenth Party conference of the Moscow branch of the RCP (April 1919) began his report on the advances of the communists in Bavaria and Hungary with the statement that »our position« was strengthening day by day. Now was the time »to send the revolutionaries in the Western republics of councils our greetings, and to tell them that we are ready to team up with them for joint struggle.«[22] This feeling of taking part in a worldwide struggle also prevailed in 1923, when, in connection with the revolutionary situation in Germany, genuine world-revolutionary hopes among the rank and file would flare up for perhaps the last time (Albert 2011; Bayerlein 1999; Bayerlein et al. 2003). At a solidarity meeting for the workers of the Ruhr, the party organization of Saratov proclaimed it felt itself to be »part of the world proletariat.«[23] John Boli's and George M. Thomas' conclusion about actors within international NGOs who »have found it ›natural‹ to view the whole world as their arena of action and discourse« (Boli & Thomas 1999: 14) can also be applied to early Soviet communist activists.

Even though, as previously mentioned, the activists' conceptions of the final stage of world revolution were rather vague and it is worthwhile

21 Kommunist (Cherepovets), N° 240, 26 October 1920. RGASPI, 17/60/9, 52.

22 Minutes of the Fourteenth Party Conference of Moscow *gubernii*a, 12–13 April 1919. RGASPI, 17/6/151, 10.

23 Krasnaia pechat', N° 6 (27), 25 February 1923, 6.

elaborating on them further. The events of 1918–1919 confronted the communist movement in Russia with the (albeit short) simultaneous existence of multiple communist states, and thus must have provoked reflection about the nature of a communist world order. The position of the party leadership, particularly Lenin, during the first years of the October Revolution was unmistakably one of denying the possibility of a single revolutionary state being able to »build socialism« on its own. Lenin's opinion in late 1918 was that »the complete victory of the socialist revolution in one country alone is inconceivable and demands the most active co-operation of at least several advanced countries, which do not include Russia« (Lenin 1965a: 151). Obviously, such a categorical and consistent position cannot be observed within the movement as a whole. As a tendency, though, it can be noted that world revolution was in no way equated with »Sovietization« (in the sense of a domination of Soviet Russia or an »export« of the Soviet model). In view of the November Revolution in Germany, the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee publicly promoted the notion of a »Federated German-Austro-Russian Republic« (in that order) (Ikeda 2005: 125), while a message of greeting from party members in the Red Army to the Council of Peoples' Commissar in view of the November Revolution in Germany hailed the »brotherhood of two free Soviet Republics.«[24] A similar argumentation (shifts in the party leadership's international policies notwithstanding) can still be found five years later when, in a private report by the party organization in Arkhangelsk, a non-party worker is quoted as having said during the revolutionary situation in Germany in late 1923 that there will be »two Soviet Republics« that would make life easier for each other.[25]

24 Message of greeting from communists within the staff of the 6th Red Army to the Council of Peoples' Commissars and the German Council of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies, 15 November 1918. GARF, R-130/2/468, 111.

25 Closed letter of the Arkhangel'sk *guberniia* organisation of the RCP to the Secretariat of the CC of the RCP, [March 1924]. RGASPI, 17/33/177, 14.

Even though the idea of a revolutionary Germany as an ally of Soviet Russia is most prominent in early Soviet internationalist thought, it was about more than an alliance between two states: the vision was the creation of global unity between »revolutionary proletarians« of all countries. A cartoon published in the party newspaper *Bednota* on the occasion of the 1918 revolution in Germany visualized this idea memorably: under the disapproving gaze of Entente, a sturdy worker embodying the »German proletariat«—recognizable as such by the flag he is carrying—marches towards his revolutionary comrades: the »Russian Soviet Republic,« the »Bulgarian proletariat,« and the »Austrian proletariat« (see fig. 1).



Fig 1: »Long live Soviet Germany.« The »German proletariat« (inscription of the flag on the left) joins the revolutionary camp, welcomed by the »Bulgarian proletariat,« the »Russian Soviet Republic,« and the »Austrian proletariat.« Source: Bednota, 12 November 1918.

The vision was not just one of a union of national states. As the organizers of a train workers' congress in Moscow in August 1918 proclaimed in a message of greeting to striking Ukrainian railway men, the day was near »when all national borders will fall and we will join together under the

flag of the Third International into one worldwide family of labor.«[26] The immense symbolic power of a »Third international« in the Soviet communist movement, even before the foundation of the Comintern (the »real« Third International), remains nearly unexplored by research to date (Albert 2012: 29–30). As Gerd Koenen noted, »a space of resonance whose political-psychological effects were at first more important than its real successes« (Koenen 2010: 44) took shape for the international communist movement in the form of the foundation of the Comintern in March 1919. This, however, is even truer concerning the impact of the International on the communist movement in Russia itself. As the prospects of world revolution began to dwindle even in the early 1920s, the Comintern—its institutional embodiment and symbolic projection screen—remained. The Comintern fulfilled a function for communist activists inside and outside of Soviet Russia that can be described, as Theresa Wobbe has done, as the premise for the assumption of a world society—namely a »global level of social organization […] that formed a horizon of expectation for individual and collective agents« (Wobbe 2000: 7). Communist media portrayed the foundation of the Comintern as a counter-project to the League of Nations[27]—hence it was perceived as something much bigger than what it ultimately turned out to be: a union of (mostly) small parties. Besides being a concrete global network of communist activities and organizations, at the same time it remained a space of resonance for the dreams of international brotherhood that moved early Soviet activists.

In 1919, due to the foundation of several republics of councils, a short-lived international communist landscape appeared. How did activists imagine »most active cooperation« (Lenin 1965a: 151) within this landscape? Due to the Civil War in Russia, rank-and-file activists, particularly

26 Message of greeting from the Sixth Congress of Railway Workers' Deputies in Moscow to striking Ukrainian railway workers, 18 August 1918. GARF, R-1235/93/2, 138.

27 See e.g.: N. Baturin, »Liga narodov ili 3-j internatsional?« *Pravda* (19 October 1918). For the historical parallels between the Comintern and the League of Nations, see Koenen 2010: 40 and Schlögel 1998: 152.

on the frontlines, mostly envisioned and hoped for military cooperation from the newly acquired German and Hungarian comrades. This can be seen for example in the following telegram from a party meeting at the Civil War's southern front, sent to the VTsIK on 28 November 1918 (the heyday of the German revolution) to be forwarded to German communist leader Karl Liebknecht:

> Soon will come the hour when, together with the revolutionary army of the German Socialist Republic, we will purge the hydra of the Russian counter-revolution from the face of the earth. After we will have strengthened our brotherly proletarian republics, we will fight together for international communism. Long live the International of socialist republics![28]

Now that the Russian Civil War was turning international (due to intervention by several foreign powers on the side of the »Whites«), Russian rank and file communists hoped to employ international help themselves. These hopes were fueled by the presence of numerous World War I prisoners of war (mostly German and Austro-Hungarian) within Soviet territory,[29] because many of these foreign nationals had become radicalized in revolutionary Russia and participated in communist propaganda activities or even joined »international« units of the Red Army (Badcock 2007: 162–164; Grigorov 2005: 104–105; Vorobtsova 1975: 83ff.; Iakovlev 1964). Furthermore, Red Army commanders tried to build a bridge to Hungary during communist rule in Budapest in order to join forces with the Hungarian communist army—these attempts, however, were not successful (Bak 1971: 190; Solov'ev et al. 1972: 174–239).

It is not surprising that, due to the Civil War, the form of cooperation most frequently envisioned was military cooperation. However, visions of civilian cooperation existed as well. The Soviet journal *Eko-*

28 Telegram from the ceremonial meeting [of the party cell] in Annenskii *uezd* to Karl Liebknecht, 28 November 1918. GARF, R-1235/93/8, 8–9.

29 In 1917, 2,100,000 prisoners of war were being held in Russia (Vorobtsova 1975: 83). For an overview of this topic see Pardon 1994; Leidinger & Moritz 2003.

nomicheskaia zhizn' printed an enthusiastic report on the Hungarian communist government proposal to help Soviet Russia with coal mining in the Donbas (Mel'nik 1974: 26–27)—a plan that was completely illusory in the present situation, but still able to generate enthusiasm, because it represented a beginning for communist normality in a transnational framework. While it is easy to say in hindsight that »Russia had no chance whatsoever to build an antisystemic economy in the midst of an overpowering world capitalist system« (Brucan 2000: 444), communists in the first years after the revolution did not see it that way. They saw not only Russia, but also the other communist republics which, for a short while, seemed to grow and multiply.

The visit of Tibor Szamuely to Soviet Russia, the Hungarian People's Commissar who flew to Kiev in a spectacular plane flight, must have been perceived in a similar light. While Szamuely proceeded directly to Moscow to promote solidarity with his government and to meet with Lenin, the Hungarian pilot who flew him was given an enthusiastic welcome by Soviet military personnel in Kiev. The official statement said that »aviation, as we now have seen, is not necessarily a weapon against mankind, but also serves cultural purposes.« Furthermore the document expresses

> hope that there will be soon an international family of pilots that will serve the proletariat just as it used to serve the kings, tsars, and capitalists. Long live Soviet Hungary and the international union of pilots! (Solov'ev et al. 1972: 213)

The visit of a pilot from the communist ally was thus perceived as an entry into a civilian communist society on the one hand, where aviation, in contrast to World War I, did not only serve destruction. On the other hand, this communist society was to be a transnational one, causing the local aviators to think about international unions.[30]

30 It is worth noting that the short existence of several Soviet republics besides Soviet Russia fuelled the dreams of activists outside of Russia as well. The German Communist Party envisioned financial support from Soviet Hungary (Müller 2010: 180), while the latter disseminated updates

The motif of a symbiotic exchange between communist Soviet Republics did not disappear immediately after the capitalist stabilization of Europe after Versailles. During the German crisis of 1923, when the corresponding campaign in support of a »German October« was launched in the Soviet Union, the image of mutual support of a highly industrialized Soviet Germany and an agrarian Soviet Russia played a central role in the leaders' arguments as well as those of the rank and file (Albert 2011). Zinov'ev, speaking in September 1923 in front of local party functionaries about the coming German revolution, emphasized these prospects: »What we do not have, we will get from the Germans, and vice versa. […] [W]e will have a coalition at sight of which everything will crumble.« (Zinov'ev 1923: 21). The rank and file also had high hopes for these anticipated international events: An anonymous respondent to a survey conducted by the party organization in Perm amongst its members stated that he expected an advancement of his personal situation from »a social revolution, at least in Europe.«[31]

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Alongside global visions in which revolutionary states are an equal and symbiotic part of a coming world system, a different, opposing topos can be observed in Soviet communists' global thought: a topos of »Russian dominance« of international revolution. This idea, which became hegemonic under Stalin, was already present in the early years of Soviet rule, albeit in a subliminal way. In particular, it was based on the indisputable fact that the chain of revolutionary unrest in the wake of World War I began in Russia with the February Revolution of 1917. This fact

about the Soviet Republic in Munich and vice versa (Schulze Wessel 2005: 378). A part of the Ukrainian Communist Party even strove toward a Ukrainian Soviet Republic independent from Moscow by mobilizing Béla Kun, the leader of Soviet Hungary, to bring their cause before Lenin (Ford 2010: 594–595).

31 Completed questionnaire, late September 1923. Permskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, Perm', 557/4/383, 3. I would like to thank Aleksandr Reznik, St. Petersburg, for providing information about this document.

motivated Lenin in his famous »Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers« (March 1917) to speak of »the great honour of *beginning* the series of revolutions« that had fallen to the »Russian proletariat«—however:

> the idea that the Russian proletariat is the chosen revolutionary proletariat among the workers of the world is absolutely alien to us. […] It is not its special qualities, but rather the special conjuncture of historical circumstances that *for a certain, perhaps very short, time* has made the proletariat of Russia the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world (Lenin 1964b: 371).

As a convinced internationalist and someone who felt he was an expert on the Western labor movement through personal experience, Lenin was sure that the Russian revolution would simply clear the way for the more »advanced« Western industrial proletariat to make their own revolution. For the broad masses of party activists, however, such a perspective was less alluring since it could imply the devaluation of their own revolutionary achievements. On one hand, it was flattering to see »their« revolution in an international context; on the other hand, the role of the »vanguard« was key to their self-confidence. As a result, activist discourse on »Russian« vs. »global« as regarded the Russian revolution leaned toward the first from the beginning. This was without doubt also part of a populist strategy: Yoshiro Ikeda observed that while the Moscow party committee had already stressed the vanguard role of the Russian proletariat in public manifestos in late 1917, it was still much more »internationalist« in its internal language (Ikeda 2005: 123). However, it would be another five years before Otto Kuusinen, a leading Bolshevik and Comintern functionary, could claim in an article that foreign workers had done next to nothing to support revolutionary Russia and thus the international communist movement should be put, as the article's title stated, »Under Russian Leadership« (Kuusinen 1966: 64–81).

Initially, however, the idea of Russian/Soviet domination over international revolution was spoken only subliminally. The party's Central Committee issued a circular letter to local party organizations in May 1918 stating that even though world revolution would come inescapably, »for now we are alone, for now we only can serve as a bright example for

the proletarians of other countries« (Fedoseev & Chernenko 1970: 31). Organizations at lower levels, however, did not make such precise distinctions and assumed that their role as »bright examples« gave them the right to give advice to revolutionaries abroad. For example, a message of greeting from the Moscow metal workers' union directed to Karl Liebknecht in November 1918 had a pronouncedly instructive character and »recommended« the usage of certain slogans to the German communist leader (Kondrat'ev 1960: 451–452). The message of greeting from a local congress to »foreign proletarians who are as yet only languidly picking up our flag«[32] sounded like harsh criticism from the start. The longer world revolution kept Soviet activists waiting, the more such criticism seemed justified. Meanwhile, the party fostered its image as a »leader« of international revolution more and more pronouncedly. As early as 1920, a provincial newspaper's headline read »For three years the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviki has been leading the international proletariat,«[33] and a provincial party school curriculum from the same year included a whole lesson unit on »The RCP as leader of the world proletariat.«[34]

Such tendencies were possibly not the decisive factor for Stalin's turn, beginning in 1925, from the early Bolshevik primacy of world revolution towards the »building of socialism in one country,« but they helped pave the way. The abandonment of internationalism by Soviet propaganda can be explained in part, as David Brandenberger has suggested, by the idea being too abstract and inaccessible for the majority of the population (Brandenberger 2000). On the other hand, we know only little about the reception of internationalist motifs by the different social and political strata of Soviet society, as well as about their participation in interna-

32 Message of greeting from the Soviet Congress of the Sovetskii *uezd,* Viatka *gubernüa,* to the SNK, 29 December 1918. GARF, R-1235/93/2, 125.

33 Svobodnyi pakhar' (spezial edition), 7 November 1920. RGASPI, 17/60/12, 71.

34 Report on agitprop work in Perm' *gubernüa*, 24 December 1920. RGASPI, 17/60/8, 40.

tionalist practices. Furthermore, communism in the Soviet Union through the second half of the 1920s was not yet structured in such a top-down fashion as to be able to implement such an immediate paradigm change without friction. Moreover, during the phase of social stabilization and the New Economy Policy (NEP), Soviet activists continued to think in global categories. For example, the readers' correspondence column of a Soviet distance-learning journal from 1925 printed a question from a provincial party member as to whether there would also be a NEP phase in »advanced« countries like the United States when revolution succeeded there. The journal editors answered in the positive, and went even further in their public response:

> When the proletariat will prevail in all capitalist countries, it will stand before the difficult task of coupling [*smychka*] with the agrarian countries of the East. The question of a NEP on a global scale will arise.[35]

On the one hand, international revolution is being measured using Soviet dimensions: they assume the universal validity of the NEP model of development, and transpose the concept of *smychka*, the USSR model of collaboration between workers and peasants (Malle 2002: 396), to relations between industrial and agrarian nations. It is striking, on the other hand, that activists in the center as well as at the periphery were still talking in all seriousness about the inevitable coming of a communist world society.

The Stalinist paradigm change regarding internationalism went hand in hand with factional struggle in the party leadership. Back in 1923–1924, the Left Opposition led by Trotskii made a stand against Stalin's group, and the struggle flared up again in 1926–1927, when Zinov'ev and Kamenev joining Trotskii for a »United Opposition« against Stalin. These struggles were not only struggles for leadership, but also over the definition of world revolution and over how the Soviet Union should

35 *Kommunisticheskii universitet na domu* (1925, 2): 224–225.

position itself in an international context.[36] The global dimension of this conflict manifested itself very prominently in the economic debates between the opposition and the Stalinists in autumn 1926, which were held publicly and the minutes of which were even published. The debate in the Communist Academy on 26–27 September 1926, may serve as an illustration. Even though the topics were initially about industrial planning and peasant taxes, the question of a world revolutionary perspective hovered over the debate. Economist Evgenii Preobrazhenskii in particular, an adherent of the opposition, spoke out drastically against giving up the demonstrative hope for world revolution: if a General were to say to his soldiers that they might win the battle, but also lose it, then, as Preobrazhenskii argued, he would need to be replaced or even shot. Preobrazhenskii believed a world revolutionary perspective must be upheld and building socialism in the USSR should only be thought of as a breathing space between two battles (Miliutin 1926: 236). Karl Radek, veteran Comintern functionary and in some respects the embodiment of international communism in Bolshevik circles, also rose to speak and castigated »building socialism in one country« as a betrayal of world revolution (Miliutin 1926: 249). The oppositionists however were not only concerned about sticking to a formula of revolutionary fervor—for them it was also about their vision of communism, which they believed could only function as a world-embracing phenomenon. In his contribution, Bolshevik oppositionist Grigorii Sokol'nikov postulated: »Socialism is a system of world economy, and everyone who claims that we can build socialism in one country falls prey to a blatant contradiction« (Miliutin 1926: 205).

As is widely known, Stalin's interpretation of socialism gained the upper hand—a fact that of course led to modifications of the Soviet discourse on internationalism. However, this does not mean that world revolution and international solidarity completely disappeared from the Soviet propaganda arsenal—on the contrary, they survived well into the post-

36 The standard monograph on intra-party opposition is still Daniels 1969. For the »international« aspects of intra-party struggle, see esp. pp. 209–235 and 253–272.

war era. What changed, however, was the content behind these formulas. Internationalism now meant the export of the Soviet-Russian model. As has been demonstrated, what already existed in the first years of Soviet rule as a tendency now became the sole intent. This trend can be traced not only in politics, but also in cultural production. For example, a common motif in Soviet children's literature was pioneers travelling/flying around the world to convince proletarians of other countries to follow the Soviet example (Steiner 1999: 99–110). In the party journal *Krasnaia pechat'* (*The Red Press*), one of these children's books was reviewed and severely criticized—not however for its chauvinistic implications, but for a lack of literary quality.[37] This image is exemplary for how internationalism was drained of its egalitarian content and replaced with a formula for international Soviet domination. In this context, it makes sense to remember the sharp-sighted conclusion Walter Benjamin drew while visiting Moscow. On the one hand, he noted in his diary, the Soviet government was

> trying to bring about the suspension of militant communism, […] to de-politicize the life of its citizens as much as possible. On the other hand, the youth is being put through ›revolutionary‹ education in pioneer organizations, in the Komsomol, which means that they do not come to revolution as an experience but only as a discourse. (Benjamin 1986: 53)

The point Benjamin made concerning revolution is even more valid when it comes to world revolution. With the Stalinist turn, the new generation of activists could no longer experience the anticipation of a worldwide communist society within reach, but encountered it solely as discourse, or rather as a »slogan« (»*Parole*,« as in Benjamin's original German text, Benjamin 1980: 79–80) that can be filled with any content (or remain empty).

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37 *Krasnaia pechat'* (Nr. 22/November 1926): 64–65.

What conclusions can we draw for the history of the Soviet Union and the communist world from the study of early Soviet global thought? First and foremost, certain »theses of continuity« should be challenged. A number of recent publications still hold to the opinion that Stalin consistently followed and carried out the Bolshevik dream of world revolution by extending the Soviet sphere of influence over the course of World War II (Raack 1995; Musial 2008). However, to assume that Stalin strived for world revolution means utilizing a notion of world revolution that is de-historicized and hollowed out to an extent that minimizes its explanatory value. Even Stalin's declaration of the invasion of Finland by the Red Army as an act of world revolution (Bayerlein 2008: 201) should not hide the fact that this »world revolution« had little to do with the way it was conceptualized in early Soviet political discourse. To assume differently would mean falling prey to Stalin's notions.

On the other hand, an intense exanimation of early Soviet global concepts as shared by leaders and grass-roots activists independent from Bolshevik *realpolitik* might assist in a consistent historicization of the notion of world revolution. The world revolution that they expected (and were ready to push forward), was nevertheless not a completely voluntaristic act, but was rooted in assumptions of global politics that resulted from the social and political situation in the wake of World War I. Following this concept, revolutionary Russia was not, or rather was just temporarily, the center of attention, and as a revolutionary state it was not an end in itself but just one step toward a global communist structure. Of course communism was also about expansion, but not of the *one* state however »revolutionary« it might be. Rather the revolution itself, which seemed to flare up in different places, was to connect to form a global whole.

The revolutionary territorial entities generated during this process were not supposed to simply mirror the Soviet model. To understand this, Lenin's reactions to the foundation of the Hungarian Republic of Councils are an insightful and surprising read. The fact that Soviet power was initially installed in Hungary not through a communist coup, but through a socialist alliance did not cause Lenin to denounce it as a deviation. In-

stead he praised the Hungarian revolution as »extraordinarily original« (Lenin 1960: 260). At another occasion he characterized the Hungarian revolution as having been »incomparably easier and more peaceful« (Lenin 1965b: 387), a characteristic unmistakably meant as a compliment, since he also attested the Hungarian »comrades« had »set the world an even better example than Soviet Russia« (Lenin 1965b: 390). Lenin did not eschew violence as a means of a successful revolution, in Russia as well as in Hungary (ibid.), however other communist states were not expected to slavishly emulate the model of October 1917. The envisioned communist world was a world of contingency, with an open end and not preconfigured to be Russo-centric. As has been shown, rank-and-file activists were able to share this vision, no matter its hopelessness in hindsight.

This excursion into the global thought of early Soviet activists may hopefully contribute to the history of communicating the global, and extend the focus of studies on world society to the time before 1945 (cf. Wobbe 2000: 18). It is questionable whether Luhmann would have agreed with either the global vision of early Soviet activists or with this author's attempt to connect it to his theoretical framework, but it is beyond doubt that Soviet activists engaged in communication transcending national borders and made the global »take place« within it (cf. Luhmann 1997a: 150).

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Across the Institutional Passage of Migration: The Hukou System in China[1]

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Introduction

In February 2011, China overtook Japan as the world's second largest economy (following the United States) both nominally and in terms of PPP (Purchasing Power Parity). It is the world's fastest growing major economy, with average growth rates of 10 percent annually over the past 30 years. However, the country's per capita GDP is only $4,382, ranking 94th in the world in 2010 (IMF 2011), approximately 9.27 percent of that for the United States.

In the meantime, China has experienced more than two decades of rapid urbanization. The level of urbanization[3] increased from 21 percent in

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3 Urbanization is the physical growth of urban areas primarily due to modernization and global change. The term urbanization can refer to the number of urban dwellers relative to the overall population, or it can refer to the rate at which the proportion of the urban population is increasing. Urbanization may indicate a change of employment structure from agriculture and cottage industries to mass production and service industries. See Mayhew 2010.

1982 to 40 percent in 2003 and is expected to exceed 50 percent by 2015 (Duan 2003). Migration from the countryside into cities has been the main driver of urban growth. Rural-urban migration is thus playing an increasingly important role in shaping the economic and demographic landscape of Chinese cities.

The massive population movement to urban areas in China has been an inevitable trend of its market economy and is caused by social transformation. Although it is a normal phenomenon in the modern world, it still represents the largest peacetime population movement in human history. The National Bureau of Statistics of China found that the number of migrants in 2010 had already exceeded 19.51 percent of the country's population of 1.37 billion (NBS 2011a). These 261.39 million internal migrants represent the largest proportion of such in the world as compared to other countries. Even going back to 2008, internal migrants in China amounted to 15 percent of the world's 740 million internal migrants (UNDP 2009). Another calculation and definition of migrant puts the total number of »migrant workers« at 230 million by the end of 2009, which is 29.5 percent of employed population in China (NBS 2010b).

In the Chinese context, »migrants« are also defined by the Hukou (户口 Household Registration) system. According to the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, individuals who have lived in one location (for example, a city) other than the location of their permanent residence (Hukou) for more than six months each year are called »Non-Hukou migrants« (流动人口 Liudong Renkou). Those who migrated and re-registered at the new location are called »Hukou migrants« (迁移人口 Qianyi Renkou), while »migrant workers« (农民工 Nongmin Gong) are persons who have rural Hukou status[4] and are employed in secondary and tertiary industries.

The Hukou System in China is a household registration system that functions as a domestic passport system to regulate the migration of people, especially from rural to urban areas, and from small cities to large

4 This term is explained in part 1.2.

cities. Few other institutions have played a more important role than the Hukou system in defining and prescribing the conditions of social life, politics, and economic development in China.

Parts 1 and 2 of this article describe the Hukou system as an institutionalized procedure that divides internal migrants who move from the countryside or small cities to industrialized urban centers, or, to put it differently, move from the periphery to the center—this is its spatial aspect. It is also significant that many migrants remain bound to their (rural or peripheral) origins because of the Hukou system, which is the temporal aspect—the attachment to the past. In short, the simultaneous combination of time and space provides an interesting perspective on the Hukou system: while people are migrating to start a new life and to seek the benefits that the system provides in urban centers, they are still bound to their past—their original registration location.

Most prior research (Wang 2005; Chan & Zhang 1999; Cheng & Selden 1994) treats the Hukou system solely as a mechanism of exclusion and segregation that leads to the construction of a dual society. The main argument in this article, however, is that the Hukou system can also be seen as an internal passage for the status transition of migrants, consisting of three main types: the »Apartment-Hukou Strategy,« the »Green Card Strategy,« and the »Institutional Strategy,« all described in part 3. In certain respects, the Hukou system can be seen as an institutionalized passage for people that migrate and settle in urban centers, one that is strict and that transforms migrants' status from villagers (or small city inhabitants) to that of big city dwellers.

The first person to formally conceptualize the rite of passage as a general theory of socialization was Arnold van Gennep. His book, *The Rites of Passage*, elaborates the rituals marking the transitional phase between childhood and full inclusion into a tribe or social group (Garces-Foley 2006: 230). Rites of passage have three phases: separation (*séparation*), transition (*marge*), and incorporation (*agrégation*). For example, in the first phase, people withdraw from their current status and prepare to move from one place or status to another:

> The first phase (of separation) comprises symbolic behavior signifying the detachment of the individual or group...from an earlier fixed point in the social structure. (Turner 1969: 80)

The Hukou system as an institutional passage also affects migrants' transition in status. It is a territorial passage from one social space to another, it involves passing through a transitional area which is visible as a social marker in the Chinese case. For example, migrants are allowed to enter urban areas, but have only minimal protection in the labor market, and substandard access to the educational system, housing, and other social services. The passage from rural to urban, from small cities to big cities, from one »manorial« domain to another is accompanied by various political, legal, and economic formalities (Van Gennep 1972: 15). Legal rights in territories already settled are reserved for the original inhabitants. Accordingly, migrants might never be completely »integrated« in urban areas.

Although it is similar to territorial passage, it is necessary to understand how the Hukou system enables people to move across or prevents them from transition between statuses that are normally thought of as based either at the periphery or at the center. First, however, we must look at how the Hukou system is constructed as an institution.

1. Hukou: China's domestic passport

Few institutions have played a more important role than the Hukou (household registration) system in defining and setting the conditions of social life, politics, and economic development in China; or in influencing internal mobility and the disparity between urban and rural areas. The power of the Hukou system, which was created through state intervention, allows us to clearly understand the institutional setup and how it creates spatial delimitations.

1.1. Construction of the Hukou system

The Hukou system has been a fundamental institutional arrangement in Chinese society for at least twenty-five centuries.

> Almost all imperial dynasties since the Qin (third century B.C.) and the Republic of China (ROC) adopted and utilized variations of the Hukou system, with differing degrees of thoroughness and effectiveness. (Wang 2005: 33)

After the establishment of the new People's Republic of China, the present Hukou System was introduced in cities in 1951 and extended to rural areas in 1955. It was institutionalized as a permanent system in 1958 (MPS 1958).

Researchers have three common understandings of the reasons behind the emergence of the Hukou system. Firstly, it was constructed to promote urban development; secondly, it was constructed for resource allocation; and thirdly, it was constructed to facilitate administrative management, to control internal migration for instance.

The newly founded China was under pressure to develop the entire country after wars and unrest lasting nearly a century.[5] In order to develop capital-intensive heavy industry, the government attempted to distort the price of certain products to decrease the costs of such development. One way of doing so was to force the prices of agricultural products below market prices to ensure a supply of such products to industries and cities, which eventually led to the establishment of the Hukou system (Lin et.al 1999). In time, this institutional arrangement also functioned as a system for managing the rural–urban divide.

5 The Opium Wars in China (1839–1860) were followed by various rebellions and revolutions, including the Taiping Uprising, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Chinese Revolution in 1911. The Post-Revolutionary period, from 1911–21, was followed by the Communist Movement of 1921–49, which has also been called The Chinese Civil War, fought between the Kuomintang (KMT or Chinese Nationalist Party), the governing party of the Republic of China, and the Communist Party of China (CPC), for control of China. This movement eventually led to China's division into two nation states: the Republic of China (now commonly known as Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China (Mainland China).

The Hukou system started mainly as an entitlement device that people used to establish their identities in order to receive benefits. Between 1953 and 1955, the state took control over urban food rations, which was called »unified purchase and marketing of grain« (统购统销 Tong Gou Tong Xiao) and which had established compulsory sales to the state of specified amounts of grain at low state-dictated prices. The dual purpose of this »was to assure ample low-priced food for urban residents and to channel the agricultural surplus from the countryside towards industry and the cities« (Cheng & Selden 1994: 657).

»Unified purchase and marketing« was quickly extended from grain to cotton cloth, oil crops, and even bicycles, and within two to three years to all major foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials. Partially it was because all of these goods were in short supply before 1978 and they were therefore rationed for local residents on a per-capita basis (Han 1999; Cheng & Selden 1994).

Rationing made a sharp distinction between urban and rural residents. While the urban Hukou population was entitled to a state-subsidized but rationed grain supply, rural residents were responsible for feeding themselves except in times of especially severe famine when the state provided emergency relief (Cheng & Selden 1994). Consequently, consumer goods were distributed more in urban areas than in rural areas, a fact that is reflected in China's current social services system, ranging from insurance systems, retirement benefits, health care, education, and subsidized housing. In this, as in many other ways, the state took over responsibility for the livelihood of urban workers, particularly state-sector employees, while enjoining rural people to practice collective self-reliance (Han 1999).

China's urban population distribution and labor mobility and its unique Hukou system are closely intertwined. In the long run, the system functions to keep grain prices as low as possible in order to support rapid industrialization in cities (particularly in heavy industry) by confining the majority of the population to rural areas. But the Hukou system was also set up in order to prevent spontaneous rural-urban migration; people

born in rural areas cannot move to the city and obtain urban Hukou status unless mandated to do so by the state (Xiang & Tan 2005).

Throughout the first three decades of the People's Republic, growing urban-rural inequality of income, subsidies, and welfare benefits co-existed with the Hukou system, which became the institutional guardian of the urban-rural divide. Cheng & Selden (1994) argued that the state was able to prevent rapid urban migration as seen in many industrializing countries in recent decades because of its population registration and control mechanisms and the attendant food rationing, housing, and educational controls. In the end, this may be the reason why the extent of slums in China is not as pronounced as in, for example, India.

Economic reform later relaxed this administrative control. The abolition of the commune system, starting in 1978, freed peasants to seek work in the industrial and service sectors (Liang & White 1997). At the same time, both push and pull factors increased possibilities for migrating from the countryside into the cities. Since the implementation of the »Reform and Opening Up« policy in the 1980s, population movement between the countryside and the city has accelerated. Even though a more flexible Hukou policy has been adopted, Cheng & Selden (1994) argue, the system nevertheless continues to differentiate opportunity structures for the entire population based on a person's position within a clearly defined, if once again partially permeable, spatial hierarchy.

Many academics and policymakers in China believe that economic motivation may play a role in effecting partial reform of the Hukou system. The national economy's heavy dependence on exports over the last 20 years may push policymakers to adjust the country's economic structure and pay more attention to insufficient domestic demand for consumer goods, which could be boosted to foster future economic gains (Chan 2010; Cui 2011). At the »Central Economic Work« meeting in December 2009, which set the economic agenda for the country in 2010, an initiative was suggested to institute reform in small- and medium-sized cities (with populations of less than 500,000) to boost domestic consumption (Tao 2010).

Another concern is the avoidance of the long-term polarization and inequality that comes from China's dual economic and social structure,[6] caused by the way in which the Hukou system functions. The United Nations Development Program's 2006 report showed only 30 countries out of 177 with greater income inequality than China (Yong 2007). More seriously, the income ratio between the urban and rural populace was reported to be 3.33:1 in 2009, which might be the highest rural–urban disparity in the world if health insurance, education, and unemployment insurance are taken into consideration (CASS 2010). Inequality within urban areas has risen, especially among members of the country's large migrant population. They have been key contributors to economic growth and urbanization, but are vulnerable in part because they do not receive the same social services and social security benefits as official urban residents (UNDP China 2010).

What is considered to be the most significant policy shift regarding migration came in late 2002, when the transition in leadership was »finalized« at the Chinese Communist Party's Sixteenth National Congress (Xiang & Tan 2005). The new President Hu Jingtao and Premier Wen Jiabao, as one of several moves distancing themselves from the previous administration, called public attention to disadvantaged groups (弱势群体 Ruoshi Qunti), of whom migrants are a major segment. These concerns appeared in the Report on the Work of the Government for the first time in 2002, and later were also frequently present in public discourse.

6 The concept of a »dual economy« was first proposed by W. Arthur Lewis (winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1979) and is commonly known as the Lewis model. This developmental economics model explains the growth of a developing economy in terms of a labor transition between two sectors: the capitalist sector and the subsistence sector. Lewis asserted that there is a certain connection between the theories of a dual sector economy and dual social structure because both touch on the relationship between agriculture and industry and on the relocation of the rural labor force. A dual economy exists to varying degrees in many developing countries like China. For more see Mendes 2009.

A similar initiative was proposed in the Communist Party's Central Committee Document Number 1, issued at the end of January 2010:

> Rural Migrant Workers should be allowed to settle permanently in small- and medium-sized cities and enjoy the same public facilities and services as those with local urban Hukou. (State Council 2010)

Premier Wen Jiabao again pushed forward the proposal in some widely viewed webcasts in February of the same year (Chan 2010).

Since 1997, and especially since 2000, the public has expected so-called »deep reform« of the Hukou system. Nevertheless, although the political environment in contemporary China is more liberal than in the 1980s, it has remained difficult to actualize reform because the country relies on the system across so many social aspects. Therefore, the system demonstrates remarkable continuity; and its regulation and application remains fundamentally unchanged.

Chen and Buckingham (2008) point out that the cumulative effect of these reforms is not the abolition of the Hukou system, but devolution of responsibility for Hukou policies to local governments, which in many cases actually makes permanent migration of peasants to cities more difficult than before. For city governments, the dilemma is as follows: on the one hand, there is a growing demand for migrants as part of a strong labor force to meet the requirements of rapid economic development; on the other hand, governments are not ready to pay for education, housing, social welfare, and other related benefits for migrants in the cities. As it is, migrants' low level of integration is a cause of great concern as it may lead to crime, unrest, and other social insecurity.

1.2. Ranking of Hukou status and Hukou location

Because of its complexity, the Hukou system in China is divided into two related subsystems: one based on residential location and the other on socioeconomic eligibility. Hukou is prone to be classified and »ranked« based on these two subsystems due to the social welfare products attached to the registration.

The first subsystem of a person's Hukou registration is the »location of Hukou registration« (户口所在地 Hukou Suozaidi) based on the presumed permanent residence since birth. Each citizen is required to register in one and only one place of regular residence under the system, after which the ranking system functions as follows: the most popular Hukou are the Autonomous City Hukou (e.g., Beijing and Shanghai), the second most popular are Capital City Hukou (e.g., Guangzhou), followed by Prefecture Hukou, County Hukou, Township Hukou, and Village Hukou, which is completely undesirable (except in some rapidly developing east coast villages where people receive generous compensation for their land due to urban development: see Figure 1).

The second subsystem is the »status or type of Hukou registration« (户口类别 Hukou Leibie), which essentially refers to »rural« and »urban« Hukou. Before the 1980s, this system determined a person's access to state-subsidized grain and other privileges and was often more important than the location of Hukou registration. Specifically, urban Hukou consist of Permanent urban Hukou and Valid local urban Hukou (»Blue Seal« Hukou[7] and »Self-supplied Food Grain« Hukou[8]), the former of

7 The Blue Seal Hukou got its name because the official seal validating this type of registration uses blue ink as opposed to the usual red. »It allows the holder to have the same rights and status as local Hukou holders, with the possibility of becoming a permanent local Hukou holder after five years of qualified residency. The criteria to obtain such a transitional Hukou are, largely, wealth and education or skills. Self-sponsored applicants must be wealthy and capable of investing, whereas sponsored applicants must have an advanced education and skills that are in great demand or a record of high achievement. By the 2000s, such de facto national mobility for selected groups of people has become a nationwide practice.« See Wang 2005: 51.

8 In 1984, peasants in market towns were allowed to get a new type of urban Hukou, called »self-supplied food grain« Hukou, as long as they met a number of requirements. The main requirements are that these migrants must either run businesses or be employed in enterprises and have their own accommodations. They must also self-provide their own food grain. The State Council stipulated that the people with this kind of

which grants full rights and access to the urban social welfare system, with the latter giving only partial access (see Figure 1). Rural Hukou status grants more limited rights in every regard.

Chan and Zhang (1999) point out that the two classifications are based on different criteria; urban areas contain both urban Hukou populations as well as rural Hukou populations. Similarly, urban Hukou populations may be present in urban areas or in the countryside. Moreover, and more importantly they argue, the dual classification of Hukou registration is important for the state control of rural–urban migration in the sense that Hukou registration creates two bureaucratic barriers for rural–urban migrants. In addition, as I explain below, I would add that this ranking aspect of the Hukou system is very much related to the transition of migrants' statuses.



Figure 1: Ranking of Hukou Status and Location

Hukou be counted as part of the urban Hukou population, though that might not be the case in practice. See Chan & Zhang 1999.

1.3. The Hukou System in international comparison

China is not the only country that practices household registration, but as Wang argues it is the only country that defines people by »where you are,« while India categorizes people by »who you are,« and the United States by »what you have« (see Table 1) (Wang 2005: 10).

Type	**Type 1**	**Type 2**	**Type 3**	**Type 4**
Discrimination and exclusion based on	Who you are	What you have	Where you are	What you do/did
Example	Caste in India	Money in U.S.	Hukou in China	Criminal justice systems

Table 1: Exclusion standards of different countries. Source: Wang 2005.

Wang provides a comparison of Brazil, China, and India as regards economic development, technological sophistication, and sociopolitical features. He argues that the closest case, the Soviet *propiska* system, is now dysfunctional and disgraced, replaced in Russia by a singular institutional exclusion of Type 2 (based on »what one has«). Brazil, China, and India, three large developing nations facing similar Lewis-transition challenges (see footnote 5), have quite different institutional exclusions and varied mechanisms affecting internal migration and population mobility (Wang 2005).

The Hukou system is also very similar to Japan's permanent residency (本籍) and actual residency registrations (住民登录), except that the Japanese system does almost nothing to restrict people´s mobility and has little effect on, for example, applications to public schools below university level.

2. The Hukou system: making space between regions

The Hukou system as a whole has acted as a domestic passport system in Chinese society and has served to produce and reproduce social segrega-

tion and social disparity. While economic dualism (rural/urban) is characteristic of most developing countries, including China, the Hukou system has reproduced a much stronger social dualism through both economic and, more importantly, institutional means. The outcome is a rigidly divided dual society both in pre-reform and in contemporary China.

This dual society is segregated by space, which is invisible to some extent as it is not marked by an object or accompanied by any milestones or signs. At the same time, social space is so obvious in every aspect of human life that it is as if it is ceremonially demarcated by a defined group on a delimited piece of soil:

> The group takes possession of it in such a way that a stranger who sets foot on it commits a sacrilege analogous to a profane person's entrance into a sacred forest or temple. (Van Gennep 1972: 15–16)

Born and registered in one place by the Hukou system, all of residents' social welfare provisions, including education, occupation, insurance, and even identification cards (or passport) applications are connected to the original registration location. In practice, this means that if you are registered in location A then you do not receive support for primary and high school education in location B, and must pay several times more than local people do if you attend location B schools. Yan, one migrant who moved from Anhui province to Beijing calculates the Hukou price as follows:

> Now, my child is going to school in Beijing, and we need to pay 600 Yuan[9] per semester for primary school and 1,000 Yuan per semester for high school, which means in nine years I will be able to save 13,200 Yuan by being from Beijing. If I am unemployed, my family of four will receive 300 Yuan per month according to the Beijing low-income welfare system. If I am unemployed for two

9 One Yuan (CNY) = 0.151 US Dollar (USD) on December 31, 2010; see currency conversion rate at: http://www.bankenverband.de/waehrungsrechner/index-xi.asp.

> months every year, I will get a 12,000 Yuan government subsidy in ten years. If I can participate as local Beijing people do in the medical insurance program, then by paying 100 Yuan per year I can get a maximum of 170,000 Yuan in health insurance. But the most favorable aspect is that I can apply for 90 square meters of *affordable basic housing* (经济适用房 Jingji Shiyong Fang[10]). According to the average price of housing in Beijing, it will cost around 20,000 Yuan per square meter; so if I sell the house, I can get 80 million, which is an extraordinary amount for me! (Interview in Beijing, 2010)

In fact, Yan has overlooked some hidden benefits connected to the Hukou system: In 2009, students from Beijing could get into the top Chinese universities with a much lower entrance score[11] than those from Anhui province. Furthermore, the best universities, such as Peking University, Tsinghua University, and other top universities in Beijing, accept hundreds of local students, but only dozens from each of the other provinces (except Shanghai) every year.

Chan and Zhang (1999) argue that the real power of the Hukou system in regulating migration does not come solely from the system itself but lies in its integration with other social and economic control mechanisms. They cite two scenarios: firstly, formal migration operates within a political and economic environment such that economic activities are strictly administered by the plan system, and therefore, few of these are available on the market at affordable prices. As a result, people's daily lives are closely connected to and monitored by various state administra-

10 Economically Affordable Housing is a special offer from the government for local families who have relatively low incomes. See Beijing Government 2007.

11 Chinese universities are classified systematically by the Ministry of Education. According to university enrollment standards, these scores make a huge difference as they may decide if students go to higher- or lower-class universities, or pursue more or less popular disciplines (the popularity of majors is calculated based on the employment rate after graduation).

tive organizations. Secondly, urban employment and labor transfers are controlled by the government; few chances for urban employment exist outside state channels. People's daily lives are thus tightly bound to work units (单位 Danwei) and under surveillance by police and residential organizations.

Moreover, migration control through the Hukou system (executed by the police) mainly serves to check unauthorized or »undocumented« migration. In the 1980s, migrants were required to apply for three permits in order to work and live in cities: (1) temporary residence permits (暂住证 Zanzhuzheng), (2) work permits (务工证 Wugongzheng) or business permits for the self-employed, and (3) proof of marital and pregnancy status for female migrants issued in the place of origin. Migrants also had to pay various fees when applying for these permits (Xiang & Tan 2005). Migrants without proper certificates, thus »undocumented migrants,« ran the risk of being removed from cities whenever the government chose, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. And even today, these certificates are still required in many cities, especially if migrants want to be formal contract employees.

The boundaries and spaces created by the different certificates mentioned above are especially important for migrant workers: as long as they do not have the completed certificates they may not be able to get good jobs. As mentioned earlier, the real power of the Hukou system is that it is intertwined with the other administrative systems, e.g. the Bureau of Public Security and the Bureau of Family Planning. Its delimitation of space is therefore rigorous and powerful. However, these are not the only reasons that migrants are bound to the past. Even if a person is not defined as a migrant worker, if for instance he or she is only interested in getting an education, he or she might still be faced with similar hurdles.

> Wu, 28 years old, is a student who migrated from a village to attend university in the capital city of the Yunnan Province. He received national sponsorship in 2009 to continue his PhD studies in Belgium. It took him more than two months to collect all of the documents necessary to exit China. Firstly, before doing anything

> else, he went back to his registration place to apply for a passport. Then he flew to Beijing from Yunnan, hoping to sign the contract with the National Scholarship Council. But they told him he needed more documentation of his current Hukou registration and Personal documents (个人档案 Geren Dang'an). Accordingly, he flew back to Yunnan, where he was registered, to collect all of the necessary documents. After that, he flew to Beijing again, where he signed the contracts. Finally, he flew to Guangzhou City (the capital of Guangdong province) to apply for a visa. According to administrative regulations, people who possess Yunnan Hukou (and that of some southern Chinese provinces) can only apply for a visa there. Only after all of this did he obtain his visa and successfully continue his studies in Belgium (Notes from an interview in Shanghai, 2011).

If Wu is unlucky and perhaps loses his passport or identification card one day, he will still need to return to his registration location to retrieve all of the necessary documentation. Worse yet, from January 1, 2012, all migrants will be required to be fingerprinted to get a new identification card as just announced by the Twenty-Third Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress on October 29, 2011 (NPC 2011).[12] This regulation may no longer fit a rapidly developing world where people are expected to migrate more frequently as demographic trends dictate. An aging population in developed countries (regions), young, growing

12 The Twenty-Third Session of the Eleventh National People's Congress Meeting voted to pass an act amending the decision concerning identity cards. The revised ID Act will affect all citizens as regards the renewal and replacement of ID cards. For all new cards, fingerprint information shall be collected. According to the regulations, permanent residence identity cards need to be handled at the location of origin; therefore, all migrants must return to their place of registration to complete all the necessary procedures. According to Deputy Department Head Mr. Huang Shuangquan of the Ministry of Public Security: »Although there are no technical problems in collecting fingerprints in cities of residence other than original registration locations, it's still required due to security considerations.«

populations in developing countries (regions), and growing employment opportunities combined with cheaper communication and transport have increased the »demand« for migration.

Institutions are the product of the historical conditions from which they emerged, and they tend to reflect and recreate the social patterns and belief systems that existed at their inception (Berger & Luckmann 1966). The space created by the Hukou system is the product of institutional processes and it has emerged from the structural conditions that make up major social institutions in China. As such, it constrains social life through its taken-for-granted nature.

3. Across the institutional passage: realization of status transition

Once institutions are established they »invisibly structure social life in ways that reinforce and recreate themselves« (Albiston 2010: 1103). Everyday social interactions conform to institutional structures and generate regular patterns of behavior that support the existing social order. This collective compliance gives meaning to social life, and reproduces and reinforces the patterns of behavior that make up social structure.[13]

An institution's socially constructed nature is largely invisible because »the social practices associated with it have become routine, rationalized, and taken for granted« (Albiston 2010: 1103). Institutions may seem real, objective, and autonomous, however they do not exist apart from the social interactions that continually recreate them. The spaces constructed between rural and urban China, between the periphery and the center, are taken for granted as are other institutional features of social life. However, social actors (migrants) are always looking for ways to traverse these spaces even if an institution like the Hukou system has set up visible and invisible barriers.

13 In this view, social structure means »the tendency of patterns of relations to be reproduced, even when actors engaging in the relations are unaware of the patterns or do not desire their reproduction.« See Sewell 1992.

3.1. Purchasing a Hukou by purchasing an apartment?

There are many large billboards located outside of communities in Yanjiao, Sanhe City, Hebei Province that announce: »No good Hukou, no good School; one apartment solves two problems!« Migrants need Hukou to obtain good local education. The website »Focus on Real Estate« conducted a survey that asked, »What is the main reason that you want to get the Blue Seal Hukou?« Eighty-two percent of those surveyed replied their motivation was that their »children can go to a better school.«

The people who purchase apartments in these communities receive the Hukou of Hebei Province rather than that of Beijing. But Hebei is one of the provinces closest to Beijing, so the local Hukou can also provide people some access to its educational resources. That is why people come to Hebei to buy apartments (and thus, obtain Hukou). People in Yanjiao even anticipate that it will later be incorporated into the Beijing district and its Hukou will then become a Beijing Hukou. As Beijing is one of the four autonomous administrative municipalities with a population of more than 19.6 million (NBS 2011b), and a per capita GDP of approximately US$ 10,298 in 2009 (ranking second among Chinese provinces and autonomous administrative municipalities (NBS 2010a)), people assume that everything related to Beijing is associated with high social welfare benefits.

There are also very similar »Apartment-Hukou« regulations in nearby cities like Tianjin, Dalian, Shijiazhuang, Baoding, Qingdao, and Qinghuangdao. In February 2010, a new regulation in Tianjin (one of the four autonomous administrative municipality cities, also near Beijing) was issued that allowed people to get Tianjin Hukou (Blue Seal Hukou) by purchasing an apartment with a value between 400,000 and 800,000 Yuan (US$ 62,000 to 124,000). The »Blue Seal Hukou« would be changed into a local Hukou after three years.

The competition near Shanghai is quite similar. Hangzhou is a very attractive city just outside of Shanghai and its regulations require purchasing an apartment valued between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Yuan (US$

124,000 and 155,000) to obtain a Hangzhou Hukou. The other capital cities, such as Hefei in Anhui Province and Nanning in Guangxi Province, have similar regulations but the requirements are much lower as the economic development levels of these cities are also much lower (Yan 2010).

But the most interesting development in the regulation of »Apartment-Hukou« is that in 2010, Beijing called for a halt to unlimited apartment purchases due to the booming real estate market. The price per square meter increased from 3,000 Yuan in 2000 to 30,000 Yuan in 2010. The »Apartment Purchasing Limitation Act« (限购令 Xian Gou Ling), based on Hukou issued in February 2011, mandates that residents with Beijing Hukou cannot purchase more than two apartments. It further stipulates that residents without Beijing Hukou cannot purchase apartments without having paid taxes for more than five years and may buy no more than one apartment (Beijing Government 2011). Similar acts are being issued in other cities according to a regulation set forth by the National Council.

The above regulation is considered the strictest with regard to purchasing apartments and has provoked huge discussions concerning the institutional barriers migrants face in cities. Regardless, the »Apartment-Hukou strategy« remains the most popular strategy for migrants to change their status from outsiders to insiders because the new economy has fostered the growth of enormous new groups of wealthy people who may have enough financial capital to achieve this status transition.

3.2. Shanghai: the »Green Card« and Point System

Shanghai is one of the four autonomous administrative municipalities. It has a population of more than 23 million (NBS, 2011) and its per capita GDP, approximately US$ 11,320 in 2009, ranks first among Chinese provinces and autonomous administrative municipalities (NBS 2010a). Since 2002, there is no longer a policy that allows a person to purchase a Shanghai Hukou by purchasing an apartment. But now there is a new regulation for obtaining a Shanghai Hukou, similar to the U.S. point system for obtaining a green card:

> Chen, 30 years old, who originally migrated from Zhejiang province, received a Master's degree in the Netherlands and spent five years working in a company's procurement department, obtained a Shanghai Hukou in 2010 via the »Regulation on Hukou Transfer for Overseas Talent Working in Shanghai.« Her husband, Zhang, aged 33 and also originally a migrant from Zhejiang Province, who received a bachelor's degree in computer science and spent ten years working for a Taiwanese computer company, obtained a Shanghai Hukou in 2010 via the »Regulation on Shanghai Residence Card Holder Transfer to Shanghai Hukou Holder.« (Notes from an interview in Shanghai, 2010)

The basic procedure for obtaining a Shanghai Hukou involves two steps. Firstly, one must obtain a »Residence Card,« which utilizes a point calculation based on human resource qualifications, including age, education level, professional level, employment level, whether the applicant is an apartment owner, and so on. Further, the prestige of the employer, especially the economic contributions of the employer, is also taken into consideration. In short, normally only young and well-educated elites would be eligible to enter into the system of »Residence Card« holders. The final decision concerning how long a »Residence Card« is valid—e.g., for 6 months, 1 year, 3 years or 5 years—also depends on the applicant's qualifications. Only individuals who accumulate 100 points are eligible to obtain a 5-year »Residence Card« (Human Resources Bureau, 2002). Secondly, only after seven years of holding a »Residence Card« are individuals allowed to apply for a local »Hukou.« The number of people who have actualized this type of transfer is still unknown as the new regulation was only issued in December 2009 and as yet no government data is available (Shanghai Human Resources Bureau 2009).

The point system represents a new strategy for the status transition of migrants. As long as a person is educated enough or makes enough of a contribution to the development of Shanghai by paying enough taxes, there is a chance of obtaining a formal transfer into urban life. This strategy demonstrates that human capital can, in some way, be transferred into the social welfare system.

3.3. Hukou transfer in Chongqing: an »Institutional« strategy?

Chongqing is one of the four autonomous administrative municipalities with a population of more than 28.8 million (NBS 2011) and a per capita GDP of approximately US$ 3,000 in 2009, ranking eighteenth among Chinese provinces (NBS 2010a). Chongqing City initiated reforms in 1994 during the Small City and Town Hukou Management Reform Experiments. By 1997, reforms were expanded to include Hukou transfer for all non-agricultural workers with steady employment and a fixed domicile in towns and villages.

These reforms were realized steadily, the small cities and towns in Chongqing City increased their Hukou transfer by 80,000 people per year on average. In 2000, Hukou transfer regulations were relaxed for relatives and skilled laborers, investment and industry (above certain tax payment levels), and students. Then, from September 2003, agricultural and urban Hukou were cancelled and replaced with unified Chongqing City Resident Hukou.

Several cities were approved for the »Hukou system urban and rural reforming experiments« in 2007, and Chongqing again became one of the model cities. The targets for Hukou transfer remain focused on four groups: 1) migrant workers in Chongqing; 2) university students whose Hukou is not from the local city; 3) soldiers who return to their hometowns after completing army service; and 4) farmers with rural Hukou who have not transferred to the city Hukou after losing their former residence because of urban development.[14] Obtaining Chongqing Hukou is voluntary for targets groups 2, 3, and 4, but those in target group 1 are supposed to have stable income and employment before applying for a Chongqing Hukou (Chongqing Government 2010). It is estimated that more than three million residents qualify for the Hukou

14 It is not uncommon that the government (the land management agency or the licensing authority) in some cities requisitions land collectively and dismantles houses in the name of national, social, and public interests, relocating residents with some compensation. See Ministry of National Land Resource 2011.

transfer; the government is planning to transfer three million Hukou from 2010 to 2011 and seven million from 2012 to 2020 (Huang & Liu 2011).

The Chongqing reforms did not address the needs of the temporary population because of the requirement for »stable employment and stable residence.« Purchasing an apartment was a high bar, therefore few of the Hukou transfers during this period involved migrant workers. In short, the institution has not fundamentally changed. Moreover, as Wang and Liu argue, even though Chongqing City appeared to have removed Hukou dualism, the treatment of city residents remained different in areas such as land compensation, veteran care, traffic accident compensation, social security, and others (Wang & Liu 2006). Nevertheless, the case of Chongqing City represents a good step toward a new strategy for status transition when institutional reform exists, even if it is not fundamental reform.

4. Conclusion: the context of time and space

China is achieving amazing GDP growth. At the same time, it is also characterized by an enormous population, accompanied by rapidly growing internal migration. Migrants are experiencing the vast inconsistencies created by the dual economic structure and the Hukou system, which remain potent and powerful and cover every aspect of human life.

The Hukou system, as a special institutional arrangement, is creating spaces between zones, between rural and urban areas, and between small cities and big cities. And it is abundantly clear that »[w]hoever passes from one to the other finds himself physically and magico-religiously in a special situation for a certain length of time: He wavers between two worlds« (Van Gennep 1972: 18). Migrants who travel between the zones »suffer« from the transition of identity and the passage from one social, economic, political, and even psychological position to another. These zones are created within contemporary society and are not precise, but visible in people's social lives. Even when migrants are physically located in urban centers, they are, on some level, still bound to their past; the place where they are formally and formerly registered.

I was interviewing one 40-year-old migrant selling telephone cards in front of the main entrance of one top university. He had already lived in Shanghai for ten years: »Then, what are your plans for the future?« I asked. He turned his head to the sunshine and answered me: »Future? Of course, I would go back to my hometown—after I earn enough money. This city does not belong to me.«

»Going back« is only one of the solutions that exist for migrants. Most remain struggling in the city, trying to protect their own rights by looking for an institutional passage to transfer their status. »Buying a Hukou« or »Achieving a Green Card« are two possible strategies to cross this institutional passage, and eventually, to enable themselves to partake fully in their urban lives. Staying and waiting for the relaxation of institutional arrangements is another strategy, however it is one that is not controlled by migrants but by policymakers. And these policymakers will only change these arrangements once they have recognized that an institution like the Hukou system hinders rather than promotes the economic and social development of the country.

However, the current situation may not be the end of the story. As Wang believes, the PRC Hukou system as a Type 3 institutional exclusion based on location differences (»where one is«) is gradually shifting toward a Type 2 institutional exclusion based on the fault lines between haves and have-nots (»what one has«). »The wealthy, the talented or educated, and the powerful now have essentially nationwide mobility under the Hukou system« (Wang 2005: 26). On the one hand, we can expect the emergence of more strategies by migrants for achieving a transition of status; on the other, institutional reform or adaptation is a more decisive and forward-looking step.

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Pictures of Cities—Cities in Pictures

Anna Lisa Müller

Introduction

A city is a specific societal environment that consists of both physical and social elements. Designing such an environment follows particular ideological concepts: the environment is planned according to people's perceptions of what a city should look like (see Hirst 2005). However, city planners are not the only people who play a role in designing a city. Everyone who uses the city shapes it to varying degrees. Inhabitants influence a city's appearance with their practices of everyday life—be it work or leisure activities. Visitors contribute by using the city during their visit, a usage that often differs from that of inhabitants. Both visitors and inhabitants are important for cities in two respects: on the one hand, they actively shape the city when they use it, i.e., when they, among other things, create the space by placing objects in relation to living beings—Martina Löw calls this practice spacing—on the basis of processes of memory, perception, and imagination, which Löw calls »Syntheseleistung« (Löw 2001: 159, from now on »synthesis«), and by interacting in this urban space. On the other hand, they serve as a reference for the city's urban planners and decision makers who organize their planning strategies according to the assumed needs of inhabitants and visitors. The planning then finds its physical expression in the urban space—this space is thus associated with images, ideas, etc. To put it in Henri Lefèbvre's terms: a city is a social space that is produced by the society's spatial practices, by representations of space (like urban planners' conceptions of space), and by representational spaces, i.e., the experienced space that is significantly constituted by symbols and images (see Lefèbvre 1991: 38f.). Carrying out an empirical study in Dublin and Gothenburg, I found evidence for three essential ways of constituting a city: by using urban space according to their needs, people shape that

space in specific ways (A), local history is used by urban planners as a strategy to shape future urban design (B), and graffiti is a means to communicate in urban spaces (C). These three findings can be conceptualized with Lefèbvre's three dimensions of social space mentioned above. Using urban space constitutes spatial practices, designing the space by utilizing the city's history is a representation of space, and representational space is created by graffiti, among other things. With the assistance of photographed visual impressions I will now present these findings in more detail after a short methodological note.

Methodological Note

As soon as a researcher attempts to carry out an empirical analysis of a city and its interrelation with society, he or she is confronted with visual impressions. In the majority of cases, these visual impressions lose importance as the findings are written up, because the social sciences are still very much dominated by texts. This essay[1] is an attempt to take the visual impressions, recorded in photographs, seriously. The photos, all taken during my fieldwork in Dublin and Gothenburg from 2008–2009, are used as empirical data. Their value goes beyond mere illustration. I was inspired by Bazon Brock's 1986 photo essay »Sozio-Design« (Socio-Design) to use photographs in a more prominent way to present research findings. This is my first attempt to present findings by relying mainly on visual data and is thus an experiment. In using the essay as form, I refer to Theodor W. Adorno's notion of the essay: »Therefore the law of the innermost form of the essay is heresy. By transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes visible in the object which it is orthodoxy's secret purpose to keep invisible« (Adorno 1984: 171).

To my mind, the analysis of complex social phenomena benefits from alternative forms of presentation. This photo essay is one such alterna-

1 For an exemplary description of the essay as specific form of writing (and thinking), see Adorno 1988, for an English translation see Adorno 1984.

tive form of presenting the interrelation of cities, urban spaces, and societies.

A. People Shape Urban Space—Spatial Practices

Älvrummet

Älvrummet in Gothenburg is an information center that presents developments about Gothenburg's urban planning and that is further repurposed as recreational space. People make use of the existing physical elements—namely the building, the wooden stairs, and the lawn—and arrange themselves relationally to other people and living beings (such as dogs or birds) and objects to constitute this recreational urban space via the practice of spacing. In combination with certain memories, individual forms of perception, and imagination, *Älvrummet* becomes a particular local space imbued with an intrinsic logic and emotionally and physically bound to this place and its people.

Flea market in Haga

Flea market in Haga. Haga is one of Gothenburg's central quarters and has become a major tourist attraction after going through a process of gentrification. Tourists gathering at the flea market constitute the space as one of vitality, recreation, and social mingling, whereas inhabitants passing by or watching it from the windows might create this space as one that displays urban vitality by concealing social inequality and processes of displacement.

Temple Bar Cultural Night 2008

Temple Bar Cultural Night 2008—a cultural event for tourists and inhabitants to celebrate Dublin's cultural amenities. Visitors and inhabitants alike use the urban space for cultural activities and for exploring cultural

institutions. During this event, the urban space is constituted in a particular way that is different from the everyday space. Different people use the space in varying ways, and thereby the processes of spacing differ. Through practices that are characteristic of performing and watching cultural events, space is thematically, locally, and temporally limited. In addition, people not taking part in the *Cultural Night* constitute a different space that is nonetheless unlike everyday space as they include cultural performances, performers, and visitors—all extraordinary elements in the practice of spacing.



Excise Walk in Dublin

Excise Walk in Dublin on a weekday at noon—it is located in Dublin's regenerated docklands area, a plaza near the *International Financial Services Centre*. Here again, the importance of people and objects for constituting

urban space is visible. Formerly a blue-collar worker's district, the Docklands' space on a weekday at lunchtime is nowadays mainly made up of white, middle-aged business-men—as seen in the photograph—who perceive their constructed and social surroundings in a certain way. Additionally, all other people present include these men in their spacing practices and therewith create an urban space very different from a long gone age.

Spontkajen

Spontkajen: a newly designed boardwalk in Gothenburg's docklands, Norra Älvstranden. The docklands are located at an estuary facing the North Sea and are now a place for comparatively expensive apartments

and the technology park *Lindholmen Science Park*. Spontkajen is used as sidewalk—and reclaimed as recreational space that might otherwise be lacking in the apartment buildings next to it. Different spaces interfere with each other and become visible in this photo: first, the man in the deck chair creates a recreational space with the help of the objects around him—the wooden boardwalk, the deck chair he brought with him, the water, the buildings, the sculpture, the lantern, not least the sun, but also the people. Second, the people toward the back of the photo each create their own spaces—of shopping, exercise, just walking, or business—and thereby use the same objects, but because the synthesis differs, the spaces are different. Some of them might remember the docklands as a shipyard industry location, some might perceive sun and water as signs of summer, and another might constitute the docklands' space as one of decline.

B. Local History and Urban Design—Representations of Space

***chq*, Custom House Quay, Dublin**

The façade of the shopping center *chq* at Custom House Quay in Dublin's docklands is representative of the city's strategy of shaping a new urban design on the basis of specific local history. The building was originally a tobacco store with cellars to store wine. Because it is protected as a historic monument, the façade received a modern touch with the help of glass, allowing the old relicts to shine through. This integration of the past becomes visually accessible for passersby, thus forcing them to integrate it in their practices of spacing and evoking particular understandings of past and present that are important for synthesis.

Smithfield Horse Market, Dublin

The rejuvenated urban quarter Smithfield, with newly designed apartment buildings, still plays host to the traditional *Smithfield Horse Market* every first Sunday of the month. This is an example of a conflict situa-

tion between traditionalists and current city planners. As the latter try to ban this aspect of Dublin's history, a history that is actually remembered and integrated in the city's identity, the former fight for their right to remain in this urban space. Thus, it is also an ideological conflict carried out in the physical environment.

Norra Älvstranden in Gothenburg

Norra Älvstranden in Gothenburg: Eriksberghallen, a building that was part of the old Eriksberg Dockyards, has been re-used as part of the *Quality Hotel 11 Gothenburg* as a conference and event space. It symbolizes the transformation of an industrial economy towards a service economy by using the material artifacts of the past for new purposes. Parts of the city identity are therewith re-interpreted: the industrial past—including exploitation, pollution, and social inequality—is ideologically smoothed over to be used as a positive element of present and future understandings of Gothenburg as city.

Lindholmen Science Park

At Gothenburg's technology park, *Lindholmen Science Park*, eider ducks made of wood are integrated into the new design. They symbolize the continuity of the city's identity as ocean port city in the new technologi-

cal age, an approach promoted by the political planning institutions. It is connected to the programmatic development of the city as ecologically sustainable and thus represents a certain understanding of what the future should look like and which elements of its environmental surroundings, e.g., nature and wildlife, it should integrate.

C. Communication in Urban Spaces—Representational Space

Graffiti, Dublin

Maser, a graffiti artist, contributes to the visual design of Dublin and takes part in communication in urban space by expressing a specific attitude toward the city. The artist is assigned a visual voice that is accessible for all passersby and undermines hierarchical communication structures on development of and in the urban space.

Sannaplan, Gothenburg

»They are so afraid of graffiti,« says an interviewee in Gothenburg, speaking of the city planners. Is this an alternative form of graffiti? Found in July 2009 at the tram stop Sannaplan, Gothenburg. This is a

visual voice different than the Dublin graffiti artist's described above. It causes irritation and amusement among those who discover it and itself becomes an object of communication, adding a new element to the constitution of space.

Graffiti, Dublin

Who receives these messages? Not only is this a direct message to anyone passing by, but, in combination with the other graffiti next to it, layers of communication become visible and materialized in Dublin's urban space. Different styles of different graffiti seem to correspond to different voices or speakers, but this might be an illusion, as anonymity is a constitutive element of graffiti artists.

Tixter Teater, Gothenburg

Being afraid of graffiti part II—painting on a façade in an area of Gothenburg that has not yet been rejuvenated. It is the façade of *Tixter Teater* at Andreégatan 13 as seen in June 2009. The question marks can be interpreted differently depending on the ideological position of the spectator. Are they referring to the process of urban development, a feeling of general misunderstanding of urban processes, or to the fact that it is hard to detect that a theater is situated inside this building? In any case, the artist(s) engage with the passersby via these visual signs placed on the urban fabric in communication on a topic that is unde-

fined and remains open to interpretation as long as the graffiti remains on the walls.

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