InterDisciplines

Journal of History and Sociology

Volume 8 - Issue 2

Done with Eurocentrism?

Directions, Diversions, and Debates in History and Sociology

InterDisciplines
Journal of History and Sociology

InterDisciplines
Journal of History and Sociology

Volume 8 - Issue 2

Done with Eurocentrism?

Directions, Diversions, and Debates in History and Sociology

Issue editors

Yaatsil Guevara González (Bielefeld University)

Mahshid Mayar (Bielefeld University)

Managing editor: Melanie Eulitz (BGHS)
Copy editor: Sandra Lustig
Layout: Anne C. Ware
Cover picture: *Map of the world created by traveller and writer, al-Idrisi in 1154 for Roger II, King of Sicily*.
Courtesy of the Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford.
Coverdesign: deteringdesign GmbH Bielefeld/Thomas Abel
www.inter-disciplines.org
www.uni-bielefeld.de/bghs
ISSN 2191-6721
This publication was made possible by financial support from the German Research Foundation—Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).

Contents

Done with Eurocentrism?

Unpacking a plural construct

Mahshid Mayar and Yaatsil Guevara González

Eurocentrism and the »post-« moment in academia: Centers and flows

In the past few decades, generations of scholars in history, sociology, and the neighboring disciplines have pursued their research and teaching amid a proliferation of »post-« movements.[1] Since the 1960s, academia seems to have actively avoided reaching consensus on all-inclusive grand narratives. Nevertheless, it is evident in the twenty-first century that a great number of these »post-« movements and turns have been transitory moments of resistance to or, at best, reactionary gestures against one grand narrative from which we have not fully departed: Eurocentrism.[2] Since the Enlightenment, and especially over the past century of scholarship, it appears, Eurocentrism has been considered to have been the source of the vocabulary, imagery, language, legal infrastructure, geopolitical imaginaries, scientific tools, executive leverage, even the geographical orientation by which we routinely make sense of ourselves, our histories,

1 As Julian Go suggests in the case of the postcolonial school, however, sociology seems to be lagging behind history and cultural studies in its interest in postcolonial thought as a focal anti-Eurocentric perspective. For a careful examination of this and the remedies thereto, see Go 2013, 25–55.

2 As one recent example, see the results of a nation-wide examination of history-teaching in Portugal conducted by Marta Araújo and Silvia Rodríguez Maeso (2016) and published as *The Contours of Eurocentrism: Race, History, and Political Texts*. For similar discussions, see Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui (2008) and Claude Alvares and Shad Saleem Faruqi (2012).

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v8-i2-174 ISSN 2191-6721

our futures, and our surroundings. Despite coordinated academic efforts in the past two or three decades (heated debates about and among disciplines, nuanced methodological shifts, and careful modifications to terminology) to mount systematic opposition against Eurocentric frames of thought, research, and teaching in a post-Saidian world (Said 1978; Mowitt 2001, 4–5), political correctness and ethics are still arbitrated along axes of »the self« and its »other(s).« Knowledge and capital are still produced and disseminated in specific forms that are molded by the colonial imperatives of supply-and-create-false-demand capitalism. It is not news that the practitioners of actively centrifugal and anti-hegemonic approaches such as postcolonial (Spivak 1988; Bhabha 1994; Mbembe 2000; Chakrabarty 2000) and decolonial studies (Mignolo 1994, 2007; Quijano 2000; Moraña, Dussel, and Jáuregui 2008; and Walsh 2012, among others), theories of local-global entanglements (for instance, Randeria 1999; Conrad, Randeria, and Sutterlüty 2002; Werner and Zimmermann 2002; and Epple 2013), transnational studies (Anthias 2006; Boatcă, 2015), feminist approaches (Anzaldúa and Keating 2002; Mohanty 2002; Yin 2006; Trotz 2007; Lugones 2007; Roth 2013; hooks 2015; and May 2015, among others), and history from below (Coronil 1994; Ferguson et al. 1999; Dirlik 2000; Schissler and Soysal 2005; and Sunar 2016, among others) are sorely aware of the extent to which »Europe« has sustained its power as the norm with which other thoughts, other definitions, other practices, other forms of knowledge, other value systems, other temporalities and spatialities are compared.

Taking a step out of the lively and essential lines of discussion triggered by our awareness of the historical moment we inhabit, we can observe a number of points: on the one hand, what persists today inside and outside academic circles are translucent patterns of systematic and deeply ingrained asymmetries in relations, affinities, and outlooks that cement »the global« together. On the other hand, two sweeping sets of endeavors have marked the path taken by the academy. Scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences has worked with the pernicious presence and the polarizing power of the »centrism« of Eurocentric perspectives (a) by de-emphasizing Eurocentrism by paying attention to many centers and

centrisms, and/or (b) through calling for »a history without a center,« while also, more recently, underscoring the significance of relations, flows, as well as blockages between Euro- and other centrisms.[3]

From this vantage point, the twenty-first century stands witness to a new relationship to history: a relationship that has departed from the hoped-for ideal of »history without a center« and arrived at the more modest and, we believe, more practical micro-historical stance toward »histories with multiple centers« (Dirlik 2002, 178). As Dirlik reminded us in 2002, »[w]hat we seem to have presently is not the abolition of centers, but the crowding of the center to history by proliferating claims to it, on the one hand, and a proliferation of centers, on the other« (ibid., 181). To arrive at a more revolutionary, non-Eurocentric draft of anti-Eurocentrism that Nick Hostettler (2012, 12) calls for is a long way from here and now, a path which, departing from universalist thinking, passes through many other centrisms (Said 1978; Xiaomei 1995; Carrier 1995; Quijano 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Shohat 2017) that are at work in other centers of historical (ex-)change and knowledge production such as the many and varied lines of thinking in the Muslim world, Africa, Asia, or Latin America. On the other hand, while Eurocentrism has long been viewed as a container of power inequality, many scholars have examined it as consisting of a centuries-old web of relations that Eurocentrism necessitates in order to sustain itself and its upper hand in global matters. Rather than the paradigm or the individual nodes within it, this trend in scholarly thinking has been invested in the many threads of interconnectedness and distanciation, flows and blockages that this paradigm establishes or denies between the entities involved (Randeria 1999; Subrahmanyam 1997; Conrad, Randeria, and Sutterlüty 2002; Manning 2003; Bayly 2004; Osterhammel 2009, 2014; Epple 2013).

Differences in their agenda and direction notwithstanding, what these attempts agree on rather universally is that European is not a one-to-one

3 See, for instance, Marius Meinhof, Junchen Yan, and Lili Zhu (2017), »Postcolonialism and China: Some Introductory Remarks,« in »Post-colonialism and China,« *InterDisciplines* 8 (1): 1–25.

synonym to Eurocentric. To unpack this seemingly basic assumption, we should pay heed to the fact that Eurocentrism is not a question of size and space (i.e., borders of Europe as a continent), but of geopolitical discrimination and benchmarking. As Mark Mazower (2014, 299) puts it in his discussion of the evolution of Eurocentrism in the nineteenth century, »as Europe expanded in power, Europe as a concept shrank.« Nor is Eurocentrism a question of history, but of privileging certain forms of historiography over others. Moreover, as several articles in this special issue evince, it is about denying certain societies access to platforms of knowledge dissemination, knowledge production, and resisting certain forms of knowledge. In any case, Eurocentrism has less directly to do with the philosophy of the Enlightenment and much more with the applications of its humanist hierarchies in mapping the world with the Europe of the colonial age as its outstanding, incomparable center of ideas.

Despite the efforts in the form of the series of timely and welcome academic challenges to Eurocentrism sketched out above, there still are some strong lines of research that tend to treat Eurocentrism as a rather coherent phenomenon with a clear timeline, overlooking its eclectic character and multiple origins. In order for us as heirs to and yet critics of Eurocentrism to challenge it more effectively, it is inevitable, this introduction holds, to keep questioning its origins and essence and to devise a deconstructivist approach toward it as a conglomerate entity, a family of constructs in plural, and an anthologized, omnibus artifact with a history of its own. In so doing, our aim is not to devalue the groundbreaking contributions by practitioners of the above-mentioned fields of study but to draw attention to the necessity of treating Eurocentrism the same way we treat globalization, subalternity, and otherness: not only as hybrid and synthetic in character, but also as conglomerated and plural entities with mixed stories of genesis. The esquisse of our call for a sensitizing course of action toward Eurocentrism is followed by the outline of the special issue you have in front of you.

Grappling with Eurocentrism: Confusions and conglomeration

In the early 2000s, Arif Dirlik (2002, 179) made two observations that are still central to the discussions made about the grip of Eurocentrism on contemporary scholarly and quotidian life: (1) that »the very desire to rescue history from Eurocentrism is entangled in the history of Eurocentrism;« and (2) that this desire to find a way out of the grip of Eurocentrism has also been »the source of confusion« in the discipline of history, and we may add, in any other discipline which is an offspring of the project of Enlightenment, such as sociology. Dirlik traced the roots of this confusion back to two sources: on the one hand, the »technical problems« and »conflicting ideologies« at work when writing non-Eurocentric histories (what he terms »the crowding of history«) (ibid., 178), and on the other, the contradiction inherent in Eurocentrism: the urge among researchers to steer clear of Eurocentric renderings of the past, while at the same time having little possibility to achieve that as long as we conduct research in disciplines which are born out of »European modernity« and are saturated in its engulfing myths of pristine superiority (ibid., 178–79).

However, as Dirlik (1999, 1) observes elsewhere, »[w]hether we see in the present the ultimate victory or the impending demise of Eurocentrism depends on what we understand by it, and where we locate it.« To unpack this significant argument in the spirit of what we lay claim to in this introduction, a number of issues should be raised with regard to the general critical attitude that our respective disciplines could take in order to constructively engage with the diffuse sense of guilt that these disciplines grapple with in the light of their Eurocentric origins:

1) The emergence of Euro-centered global relations has produced and long shaped the social relations at work in today's world. As inhabitants of the latest phase of modernity, what Bauman (2000, 2012) refers to as »liquid modernity,« our practices, values, and social relations are marked by fragility, discontinuity, uncertainty, hybridity, and a permanent sense of »becoming«. As such, Eurocentric structures and symbolisms are characterized by de-centered processes of constant and uncertain changes. As Bauman (2007, 4) asserts, we now live in a world of »endemic uncertainty«. As a result, Eurocentrism as the oft-supposed offspring of modernity, and

at least in its most recent reincarnations, appears to be a hybrid entity, imploding from within and with the help of instability, continuity, and change, and being held in check by different temporal conditions and spatial compartmentalizations.

Given the insights offered by the notion of »liquidity,« then, if we agree on the commonly invoked genealogy of Eurocentrism that considers it a direct descendant of European modernity, we have to consequently also agree that over the course of several eventful centuries Eurocentrism has gradually »melted« over and beyond its »original« borders. Eurocentrism as such has inherited matter and thought from the non-West, departing from its already mixed, piecemeal origins (see below), merging with other centrisms, as a result of which it has pushed against its imagined borders, learned and unlearned routines and rituals, and bled into other worldviews. Beyond any doubt, whether as the preaching of Christian missionaries, the exacting tools of cartographers and archaeologists, or the provisions of law sanctioning colonial governance, Eurocentrism has for centuries journeyed incessantly, leaving hardly any aspect of life or any community across the world unscathed—journeys that have led to its shape-shifting into the hybrid entity that it is understood to be today. Still racing toward unforeseen futures, Eurocentrism in its current form is too complex and amorphous to map, an impossible cartogram of power at work before, during, and after colonization took it on the Grand Tour.

2) In a more nuanced take, on the other hand, the history of Eurocentrism dates back to multiple points of origin beyond the Enlightenment. »The East,« for one, Hobson reminds us, »[…] provided a crucial role in enabling the rise of modern Western civilization« (2004, 2). In an extrapolation on Hobson's discussion of the Eastern roots of the rise of the West, what he refers to as »the oriental West« (ibid., 5), we argue that, far from the claims to an impervious, pristine state of ascendency since the Enlightenment (Hobson 2012, 9), Eurocentrism is a product of complex, mostly unrecorded global itineraries, centuries of intellectual, violent, and violating intimacies on the scale of the globe that were at work well before it was supposedly born to European modernity in a state of amnesia toward the roots and routes that linked it well beyond the borders of the geographical

West. »The notion of a ›pure‹ Europe originating in classical Greece«, assert Shohat and Stam, »is premised on crucial exclusions, from the African and Semitic influences that shaped classical Greece itself to the osmotic Sephardic-Judeo-Islamic culture that played such a crucial role in the Europe of the so-called Dark Ages (a Eurocentric designation for a period of oriental ascendancy) and even in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance« (1994, 14). In the same breath, it is our contention that it is imperative to further step beyond the age-old East-West binary, to discard the West's claims to primeval uniqueness and unprecedentedness, and to examine the Euro- of Eurocentrism as a product of the rise of Europe and its boundary-making attempts against its many, mostly older but also equally fledgling, hybrid »others.« Far from being a pristine worldview that popped up overnight, Eurocentrism has in fact survived centuries of colonial and anti-colonial friction worldwide through an infinite series of piecemeal responses to endless encounters. Given the numerous contracts it has signed or breached, while defining itself and marking the nature and intensity of its power-laden relationships with its »others,« Eurocentrism and its others have been made and re-made in each other's image. And, as such, to get a clear view of the complexity at hand one has to constantly switch one's gaze to what lies beyond the »Eurocentric mirror«—that »too partial and distorted« inter-reflection of selves and others (Quijano 2000, 222).

3) Accordingly, besides being a hybrid entity with a contested origin, Eurocentrism has been owned, pioneered, or preached by a large number of actors. Countless others and othering infrastructures have been fashioned as it evolved over time, maturing into a part that functions as a cog in an asymmetrically conglomerate entity entirely made of densely interwoven »others«—a family of others including Eurocentrism itself (when viewed from outside). This assorted understanding of Eurocentrism's formation over the centuries explains why the current latent Eurocentrism at work inside and outside academia contains seeming contradictions, assigning asymmetric roles and attributing conflicting, mutually exclusive subject positions such as storyteller, historian, subject, researcher, agitator, protectorate, barbarian, metropolitan, marginalized, founding father, etc. to its practitioners. Consequently, and while in full agreement

with Dirlik (2002, 181) that »the inclusion of others in history, or even the repudiation of Eurocentric teleology, does not suffice to exhaust the question of Eurocentrism«, we believe that from where we stand in the course of history Eurocentrism and its others cannot be discussed except as wear and tear on one and the same quilted global fabric. After all, »[t]he fact is that virtually the entire world is now a mixed formation« (Shohat and Stam 1994, 15).

Echoing Kaminsky's (2008, 19) view[4] that »Europe is not monolithic,« we would also argue that Eurocentrism too as a construct is an eclectic, amorphous entity, defined anew in relation to each old or new »other« it has encountered and given shape to in its globe-trotting in the carriage of (neo-)colonialism. Indeed, it has multiplied into a family of constructs that are in need of deconstructing. Given this, it is beside the point to look for Eurocentrism's birth certificate (where and when it was born): if we believe in Eurocentrism as a polymorphous entity in referring to which we have no possible form other than the plural, then the option in front of us is to leave the joys of genealogy aside and try to trace Eurocentrism(s)' numerous trajectories and stopovers on the most detailed maps of the world we could acquire.[5] Eurocentrisms are, in this sense, fields of observation in need of liberation from the old mirrors, vantage points, points of interest, and binaries that they have always rather automatically been associated with.

4) To further populate the critique of Eurocentrisms with the actors involved necessitates a global mapping of academic practices, which lies beyond the scope of the present discussion. Suffice to say here that in the twenty-first century no conscientious scholar, regardless of academic upbringing and affiliations, works within the exclusive frame of Eurocentrism

4 Confirmed by Kanth (2005) and Hobson (2012), among others.

5 It remains, however, an uneasy fact that, while several entities discussed and examined in relation to the critique of Eurocentrism, from globalization(s) to racism(s), have come to be discussed only in the plural form, one of the rare references to Eurocentrisms as a plural noun other than in its dictionary form is a passing mention in an oft-quoted sentence by Samir Amin in his now-classic work *Eurocentrism* (1989, 214).

because, as just argued, Eurocentrism itself is assorted and engulfed in a larger apparatus of power. Without losing sight of what Eurocentrism is and how it has shaped our understanding of history, we must remain constantly aware that »the critique of Eurocentrism is«— and we would insist *has to*—remain a part of »a diffuse characteristic of all kinds of critiques of power in our day« (Dirlik 1999, 2). The result of such thinking is to avoid subscribing to the reductionist view that Eurocentrism is the source of all evils in the world and to the naïve hope that its downfall will lead to the dawn of a bright new era in global equality and peace.

More importantly, if we understand Eurocentrism to be conceivable only in the plural, the outcome would be that no two scholars are informed by one and the same Eurocentric paradigm, and because of this they would have to exchange ideas in order to get a sense of one another's definitions and frames of thought. Indeed, academic practitioners of history and sociology are residents of larger, conglomerate apparatuses of power of which Eurocentrism is only a part. Different groups of academics therefore have different distances, angles, and access points to Eurocentrism, the result of which is their various degrees of being influenced and shaped by Eurocentrism. Ultimately, it is redundant to mention that Eurocentricity goes beyond the question of phenotype. Non-Europeans have sometimes been keener to adopt the Eurocentric gaze than Europeans have, to the extent that, as Bashir's article so eloquently demonstrates, tokens of European modernity have entered into contracts with non-European meaning-making practices that function entirely differently in a locality such as a wealthy neighborhood in Lahore, giving birth to unprecedented Eurocentrisms (25). At the dawn of a new century, we should remain open to this interpretation as seemingly incompatible entities go hand in hand, introducing conglomeration, eclecticism, and porosity into our lives as thinkers, citizens, and actors. Furthermore, while thinking of Eurocentrism as simultaneously a conglomerate entity and an element in a larger apparatus of power relations, we should remain cognizant of the fact that the omnipresent, omnibus nature of Eurocentrism is »too serious to be left in the hands of elites to whom

Eurocentrism is an issue of identity in intra-elite struggles for power (Dirlik 1999, 3).«

In this issue

The present special issue is the result of a three-day interdisciplinary conference »Done with Eurocentrism?« held at the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS), Bielefeld University, in summer 2016. The conference offered a platform for examining the trajectories departing from Eurocentrism, evaluating the sustainability of our strategies, diversifying our methodological toolboxes, facilitating theoretical border crossings, and turning our attention to knowledge produced in many languages and centers across the globe. Furthermore, and in response to the tendency in academia to develop non-Eurocentric research projects, the conference sought to highlight methodologically viable practices developed in different communities for re-mapping the world to account for a wider range of standards, needs, practices, values, and concerns. The papers included in the present issue touch upon these topics within various (trans)disciplinary contexts in the humanities and social sciences.

To start, and following Bauman's (1987, 110) criticism regarding Europe's project of modernity for »colonizing the future,« Eurocentrism is located at the heart of the material and social »modern« world. In the opening, independent contribution to the issue, **Shahzad Bashir** provides us with an illuminating tour into the persistent symbolism of Europe—either as »a place« or as a »set of ideas« (22)—and its embeddedness within the so-called periphery. He acknowledges Eurocentrism from two perspectives: first, as the practice of placing Europe in the world's center; and second, as a spatiotemporal practice used as a »measure« against which the rest of the world is judged. Eurocentrism, he asserts, is a ubiquitous practice that should be harnessed for the production of knowledge. While bringing up the question of the entanglements of history of Islam and Eurocentrism, Bashir gives a solid basis for understanding how to frame Eurocentrism and the history of what Orientalists referred to as »the Islamic civilization« by presenting two cases that marked the patterns for narrating the Islamic past in the nineteenth century.

The power of Eurocentric thinking has not only been materialized in territories and politics, but also constitutively reflected in knowledge production and its dissemination (Wallerstein 2001, 97–98). As already mentioned, Eurocentrism is not a question of history, but of privileging certain forms of historiography over others; nor is it a question of knowledge, but of denying certain groups of people access to platforms of disseminating knowledge, producing knowledge, and resisting certain forms of it. Under this premise, the two articles by **Mirjam Hähnle** and **Beate Löffler** portray, from different disciplines, how travel narratives and architectural history are addressed beyond Westernized circles of knowledge production. Hänhle's article discusses the epistemological dominance in knowledge production by analyzing Carsten Niebuhr's account of the Royal Danish Expedition to Arabia carried out in the eighteenth century. Drawing upon Michel de Certeau's concept of »heterologies,« the author analyzes the reciprocities and asymmetries present in Niebuhr's Eurocentric travel writing. She acknowledges such epistemological dominance by portraying strategies, narratives, and tactics applied in the Royal Danish Expedition's travelogues. Hähnle argues that knowledge production can be described as a »product of various forms of spatial appropriation« (45). In so doing, she discusses the importance of the different types of reproduction of Eurocentric dominations in European travel narratives. In the same spirit, Beate Löffler's article continues with the discussion around the dissemination and production of knowledge, reiterating the premise that Eurocentric approaches have privileged certain forms of historiography over others. As part of this debate, Löffler analyzes the roots of Japanese architectural knowledge within Western discourses. In her contribution, she uses discourses and narratives on Japanese architecture that emerged throughout the late nineteenth century in Europe and shows how Eurocentric perceptions continue to mark current architectural discourses about Japan. Touching upon concrete examples, Löffler explores architectural discourses sketched in newspaper articles and scholarly essays, among others, providing a detailed map of the ways knowledge about Japanese architecture is reproduced and represented in discursive constellations in the »West.«

Postcolonial studies arose in the late twentieth century as part of the criticism of Eurocentric thinking and Westernized historiography. Postcolonial thinkers such as Stuart Hall (1996), Hommi Bhabha (1994), and Robert Young (2016) reminded us to look at the dangers and problematics around the one-sided storytelling of Eurocentrism. Postcolonial scholars are aware of and have addressed the tensions and ambivalences between the understandings and productions of modernity across Eurocentrism and its »others.« In this vein, the contribution by **Julia Roth** reminds us how Eurocentric and colonial hierarchies still construct »universal stories« and »imperial landscapes« that define current social inequalities in the modern world (99). Her contribution intertwines radical intersectional theory and the concept of »critical Occidentalism« (Dietze 2010), bringing an innovative perspective to the study of the persistent geopolitics of knowledge around feminist approaches and Eurocentrism. Departing from a radical intersectional approach, Roth provides several examples of feminist approaches in order to address how »unequal geopolitics of knowledge« (98) are produced by feminist theorizing which in turn lead to the (re)production of epistemic inequalities. In her concluding remarks, she argues that epistemic sensitization and decentralization of the prevailing Eurocentric discourses and practices should build platforms of knowledge dissemination that reach beyond hegemonic Eurocentrism. In a similar manner, **Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar** and **Zubair Ahmad** address the persistence of Eurocentric postures by analyzing race and religion from the postcolonial perspective. Starting from the assumption that both categories should be considered as Eurocentric epistemic-political effects, the authors criticize the isolation of the categories of race and religion within the postcolonial studies approach by making visible the segregated discussions about race on the one hand and religion on the other. Their main argument is that this fragmented analytical *modus* ironically reproduces Eurocentric orders of knowledge. In their final remarks, Hernández Aguilar and Ahmad suggest that conceptual discussions about race and religion should contribute to the pursuit of historical junctures, as well as consider the role of Europe as an intrinsic practitioner for granting them new meanings.

Moving beyond race and religion, and based on the premise that Eurocentrism could be understood »more as a cultural expression than [a] cartographic one« (Wallerstein 2001, 97), the contribution by **Mirko Petersen** examines another central political actor that was at times pushed aside within the larger discussions about Eurocentrism: The United States. In his article, Petersen presents Argentina's involvement with Cold War international politics under the regime of Juan Domingo Perón as an in-between position enclosed by two global superpowers, i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union. His argument is based on the premise of global Cold War studies, which understands the Cold War period as a global political phenomenon. His discussion focuses on Argentina's geopolitical power within Latin America's Cold War scene, suggesting that Cold War studies should pay more attention to the role of peripheral relations developed within this timeframe, i.e., taking into account Latin-American scenarios, in order to rethink Eurocentric Cold War narratives. In so doing, Petersen reiterates the significance of viewing Eurocentrism not as a question of geography (borders of Europe as a continent), but of geographical discrimination and geopolitical benchmarking.

This last assumption leads us to the point that European does not necessarily mean Eurocentric, and that Eurocentrism goes beyond geographical borders. The final article in the volume, written by **Fabio Santos**, exemplifies similar arguments. Based on cross-border ethnographic research in the so-called »Outermost Regions« of the European Union, Santos illustrates his discussion with an in-depth analysis of life in the borderland between French Guiana and Brazil. Drawing upon the conceptual frame of »*geteilte Geschichten*« (shared and divided histories) developed by Randeria (1999), Santos examines a range of paradoxical examples of historical and current »post-colonial entanglements« with Eurocentrism by looking at the everyday cross-border life experiences in that borderland. He thus unveils the complexities of European geopolitical colonial claims and suggests a »re-mapping« of the discussions beyond Eurocentrism(s).

As discussed above, the polarizing power of Eurocentrism has led to multiple asymmetric acts of dominance over the »peripheries,« violations that have resulted from disparities rooted in a hybrid and eclectic history

of interconnectedness that challenge the very quintessence of Eurocentrism(s). Confusions, contradictions, and discontinuities, on the one hand, and fusions, conglomerations, and concurrences, on the other, have created an entangled, eclectic power entity that shapes our everyday lives in the modern world. The present volume aims at tracing new ways of critically engaging with this polarizing, plural entity (1) by appraising where in relation to Eurocentrism(s) we stand at this point in the twenty-first century and (2) by identifying the possible trajectories away from it in our ways of viewing the world and as we do research. As argued above, identifying and systematically challenging the Eurocentrism(s) inherent in centuries of hegemonic traditions, in individuals' outlooks toward »others,« in collective human encounters with the unknown or the uncharted, in silent and silenced assumptions about sources and applications of knowledge, in outpourings of pity toward the inferior other, in celebrating the European as better and best, in condemning the non-European as worse and worst, in research questions that assign the metropolitan (not even necessarily white and male) researcher an elevated, mature, supposedly objective position in contrast to the poorly focused, infantilized researched subjects, is at the heart of the discussions in this special issue.

The editors would like to express their sincere thanks to the individuals and institutions that helped us make this volume a reality since its inception in fall 2016: The administrative staff of the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology supported us in organizing the conference, which brought together exciting perspectives on the question of Eurocentrism. Our further thanks go to Marius Meinhof and Junchen Yan, with whom we co-organized the 6th BGHS Annual Seminar, and to the conference participants (keynote speakers, chairs, and panelists). Thanks also to colleagues who kindly sent us their contributions to the special issue in the first place; the editorial team of *InterDisciplines*, Melanie Eulitz, Sandra Lustig, Anne Ware, and Andreas Hermwille; and the anonymous reviewers of the articles. We would also like to thank Oxford University for their generous agreement to give us the right to use Al-Idrisi's map for the cover of this special issue free of charge. And, on a more personal note, we would also like to thank Professor Bashir (Brown University)

for his unrelenting support throughout the process and for agreeing to join the special issue with a contribution based on the keynote lecture he delivered at the conference, and to Niko Rohé and Marius Meinhof who read and commented on earlier drafts of this introduction.

References

Alvares, Claude, and Shad Saleem Faruqui. 2012. *Decolonising the University: The Emerging Quest for Non-Eurocentric Paradigms*. Pulau Pinang: Penerbit USM.

Amin, Samir. 1989. *Eurocentrism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Anthias, Floya. 2006. »Belonging in a Globalising and Unequal World: Rethinking Translocations.« In *The Situated Politics of Belonging*, edited by Nira Yuval-Davis, Kalpana Kannabiran, and Ulrike M. Vieten, 17–31. London: Sage Publications.

Anzaldúa, Gloria, and Anna Louise Keating. 2002. *This Bridge We Call Home: Radical Visions for Transformation*. New York: Routledge.

Araújo, Marta, and Silvia Rodríguez Maeso. 2016. The *Contours of Eurocentrism: Race, History, and Political Texts*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Bauman, Zigmunt. 1987. *Legislators and Interpreters*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

—— 2000. *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

—— 2007. Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press.

—— 2012. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bayly, C. A. 2004. *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*. Malden: Blackwell Pub.

Bhabha, Homie K. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. New York: Routledge .

Boatcă, Manuela. 2015. *Global Inequalities Beyond Occidentalism*. Surrey: Ashgate.

Carrier, James G., ed. 1995. *Occidentalism: Images of the West*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Conrad, Sebastian, Shalini Randeria, and Beate Sutterlüty. 2002. *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.

Coronil, Fernando. 1994. »Listening to the Subaltern: The Poetics of Neocolonial States.« *Poetics Today* 4 (15): 643–58.

Dietze, Gabriele. 2010. »Occidentalism‚ European Identity and Sexual Politics.« In *The Study of Europe*, edited by Hauke Brunkhorst and Gerd Grözinger, 87–116. Baden Baden: Nomos.

Dirlik, Arif. 1999. »Is There History after Eurocentrism? Globalism, Postcolonialism, and the Disavowal of History.« *Cultural Critique* 42:1–34.

—— 2000. *Postmodernity's Histories: The Past as Legacy and Project*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

—— 2002. »History without a Center? Reflections on Eurocentrism.« In *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective*, edited by Eckhardt Fuchs and Benedikt Stuchtey, 178–217. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Epple, Angelika. 2013. »Lokalität und die Dimension des Globalen**:** Eine Frage der Relationen.« *Historische Anthropologie* 21 (1): 4–25.

Ferguson, R., Martha Gever, Trinh T. Mihn-ha, and Cornel West. 1999. *Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures*. Cambridge: The New Museum of Contemporary Art and The MIT Press.

Go, Julian. 2013. »For a Postcolonial Sociology.« *Theory and Society* 42 (1): 25–55.

Hall, Stuart. 1996. »When was ›the post-colonial‹ Thinking at the Limit.« In *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons*, edited by Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti, 242–60. London: Routledge.

Hobson, John M. 2004. *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— 2012. *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

hooks, bell. 2015. *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*. New York: Routledge.

Hostettler, Nick. 2012. *Eurocentrism: A Marxian Critical Realist Critique*. London: Routledge.

Lugones, María. 2007. »Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System.« *Hypatia* 22 (1): 186–209.

Kaminsky, Amy K. 2008. *Argentina: Stories for a Nation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kanth, Rajani K. 2005. *Against Eurocentrism: A Transcendent Critique of Modernist Science, Society, and Morals*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Manning, Patrick. 2003. *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

May, Vivian M. 2015. Pursuing Intersectionality, Unsettling Dominant Imaginaries. New York: Routledge

Mazower, Mark. 2014. »The End of Eurocentrism.« *Critical Inquiry* 40 (4): 298–313.

Mbembe, Achille. 2000. *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Meinhof, Marius, Junchen Yan, and Lili Zhu. 2017. »Postcolonialism and China: Some Introductory Remarks.« *InterDisciplines* 8 (1): 1–25.

Mignolo, Walter. 1994. *The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

—— 2007. *La Idea de América Latina: La herida decolonial y la opción decolonial*. Barcelona: Gedisa.

Mohanty, Chandra T. 2002. »Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.« In *Comparative Political Culture in the Age of Globalization: An Introductory Anthology*, edited by Hwa Yol Jung, 159–88. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Moraña, Mabel, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui, eds. 2008. *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Mowitt, John. 2001. »In the Wake of Eurocentrism: An Introduction.« *Cultural Critique* 47 (Winter): 3–15.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. 2013. *Empire, Global Coloniality and African Subjectivity*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2009. *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*. Munich: Beck.

—— 2014. *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Quijano, Anibal. 2000. »Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America.« *Nepantla: Views from South* 1 (3): 533–80.

Randeria, Shalini. 1999. »Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne.« In *Zukunftsentwürfe: Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung*, edited by Jörn Rüsen, Hanna Leitgeb, and Norbert Jegelka, 87–96. Frankfurt am Main: Campus .

Roth, Julia. 2013. »Entangled Inequalities as Intersectionalities: Towards an Epistemic Sensibilization.« desiguALdades.net Working Paper series. Berlin: desiguALdades.net, Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America.

Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon.

Schissler, Hanna, and Yasemin Nohoglu Soysal, eds. 2005. *The Nation, Europe, the World: Textbooks in Transition*. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Shohat, Ella. 2017. *On the Arab-Jew, Palestine, and Other Displacements: Selected Writings of Ella Shohat*. London: Pluto Press.

Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. 1994. *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media*. London: Routledge.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. »Can the Subaltern Speak?« In *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossber, 271–316. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. 1997. »Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia.« *Modern Asian Studies* 31 (3): 735–62.

Sunar, Lufti, ed. 2016. *Eurocentrism at the Margins. Encounters, Critics and Going Beyond*. New York: Routledge.

Trotz, Alicia D. 2007. »Going Global? Transnationality, Women/Gender Studies and Lessons from the Caribbean.« *CRGS Caribbean Review of Gender Studies* 1 (April): 1–18. http://sta.uwi.edu/index.php.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2001. »El Eurocentrismo y sus Avatars: Los dilemas de las Ciencias Sociales.« *Revista de Sociología* 15:27–39. Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile.

Walsh, Catherine. 2012. »›Other‹ Knowledge, ›Other‹ Critiques: Reflections on the Politics and Practices of Philosophy and Decoloniality in the ›Other‹ America.« *TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripherial Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World* 1 (3): 11–26. Merced: University of California.

Werner, Michael, and Bénédicte Zimmermann. 2002. »Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung: Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderungen des Transnationalen.« *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28 (4): 607–36.

Xiaomei, Chen. 1995. *Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yin, Jing. 2006. »Toward Confucian Feminism: Critique of Eurocentric Feminist Discourse.« *China Media Research* 2 (3): 9–18.

Young, Robert. 2016. *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*. 15th ed. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.

***

Yaatsil Guevara González, Bielefeld Graduate School of History and Sociology, Bielefeld University: yaatsil.guevara_gonzalez@uni-bielefeld.de.

Dr. des. Mahshid Mayar, British and American Studies, Faculty of Linguistics and Literary Studies, Bielefeld University: mahshid.mayar@uni-bielefeld.de.

Eurocentrism, Islam, and the intellectual politics of civilizational framing

Shahzad Bashir

A curious thing that I came across recently is the fashion in Pakistan for constructing replicas of the Eiffel Tower in residential developments. There is a quarter-size one in Bahria Town, a high-prestige gated community in Lahore.[1] An earlier one exists in Rawalpindi, constructed by the same well-known developer. Urban housing formations such as those where these replicas are placed go back to British colonial reform programs that created »modern« neighborhoods in South Asian cities (Glover 2007). Upon exploring this further, it appears that replicas of the Eiffel Tower can be found all over the world, constructed since the late nineteenth century in Europe outside of Paris as well as in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The Tower's proliferation in visual media signifies modernity, technological capacity, monumentality, and high fashion. Large-scale replicas in places such as Pakistan have their own specific histories irrespective of the original reference. They project class aspiration and the leisurely lifestyle associated with travel to Europe that is possible for a minuscule percentage of Pakistan's population.

I begin with this example in order to highlight the difference between Europe as a place versus Europe as a set of ideas. The Eiffel Tower in Paris is the emblem of Europe as a geographical location. Its construction marks an important moment in modern French history, and the structure sits at the center of one of the most heavily touristed cities in the world. While connected to Paris, the similitudes of the Eiffel Tower betoken European ideas that have become indigenized in places far away

1 »Eiffel Tower, Bahria Town Lahore,« Bahria News, News and Information about Bahria Town, April 2015, http://bahrianews.blogspot.com/2015/04/eiffel-tower-bahria-town-lahore.html1.

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v8-i2-175 ISSN 2191-6721

from France. Unknown and unimportant to most Parisians and Europeans, these other Eiffel Towers hold significant positions in the material and social worlds that surround them. Most people who look at these towers know and care little about the history of Paris or the Eiffel Tower. But over the past two centuries, circumstances have developed in such a way that it is impossible to avoid Europe as a symbolic point of reference, no matter where one is located in the world.

The distinction between Europe as a place versus a set of ideas has direct bearing on the question of Eurocentrism. In a literal sense, Eurocentrism is the habit of regarding Europe as the global center and seeing European space and time as measures for other parts of the world. This involves constructing a particular view of Europe and then using this as a model for non-Europe. European space is valued above other regions of the earth. In conjunction with this, Europe's past becomes equated with the present time of other places, while its present is made the expected future for others. Spatiotemporal Eurocentrism is a major component of modern European and American imperial ideologies and still holds sway in popular opinion in most parts of the world. However, this form of Eurocentrism has been criticized intensively in academic circles since the 1960s. This has led to the criticism of academic and popular Orientalism and movements such as postcolonial and subaltern studies.[2]

The critique of spatiotemporal Eurocentrism has brought out a deeper aspect that has to do with Europe as an idea that permeates and governs structures of knowledge (e.g., Cohn 1996). The spatiotemporal variety posits relationships in which a center is deemed superior to its presumed peripheries. Although these relationships are ideological constructs born of particular times and places, they can reify into unquestioned, self-evident premises that act as foundations for further thought and action. As anti-colonial philosophical work and the continuing appraisal of Orientalism have shown, modern academic work on non-European

2 Apart from my discussion here, it is noteworthy that in recent scholarship, the epistemological novelty of modernity has been investigated with respect to European intellectual history as well. Bruno Latour's many works may be considered emblematic of this vein of academic literature.

societies is fundamentally Eurocentric in this vein, even when it contains no mention of European space and time. The centrality of the European gaze is encoded within the presumption that modern »scientific« observation is a neutral rather than value-laden enterprise. Eurocentric discourses on non-Europe are self-authenticating in that they preclude acknowledging the observers' sociopolitical positionality while, simultaneously, claiming objectivity with respect to the topic. To be operational as an epistemological structuring principle, Eurocentrism does not require its upholders to identify as Europeans. As discussed later in this essay, Eurocentrism has been a crucial enabling condition for ideologies explicitly opposed to European cultural and political hegemony.

I come to the question of Eurocentrism as someone whose professional work has focused largely on the premodern intellectual and social history of Asia and the Middle East. I spend most of my time reading materials in non-European languages, composed by authors who knew little or nothing of the region that is now called Europe. They also could not have had the slightest inkling of the »modern« material transformations we regard as having emanated from European societies. And yet, Eurocentrism is intrinsic to my reading, thinking, and expression because it is part of the intellectual scaffolding that makes my work possible. This is reflected in the most basic form in the fact that I write in English. It is relevant at a deeper level as well, with respect to what questions I ask of the materials and how my work fits within an established discourse centered in Euro-American institutions. While regarding all this to be true beyond any doubt, I do not consider the situation to be a source for despondency or an indictment that ought to lead to intellectual self-exorcism. Instead, I believe acknowledging the pervasiveness of Eurocentrism at the level of ideas invites reflection on processes and politics that undergird the production of knowledge under all circumstances.

In my view, Eurocentrism is neither something mysterious or conspiratorial nor a form of corruption that needs a counter-polemic. Rather, it denotes a non-homogenous set of ideas and practices that pervade the material and discursive worlds we inhabit and ought to invite dense analysis for purposes of greater self-awareness. Instead of ignoring or countervailing

Eurocentric knowledges, we can treat them as contingent representations that work on specific premises and have intelligible conditions of possibility and change. Analyzing Eurocentrism is then synonymous with a commitment to engaging critically with the disciplines and topical arenas that define our work.

My purview in this article is the question of history of Islam, meaning the pattern for narrating the Islamic past that has become normative in modern academic work. As recent detailed studies have shown, the form of historical writing that we consider the »real« past today evolved out of specific intellectual dispositions that came to the fore in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (e.g., Fasolt 2004; Schiffman 2011). Over time, in conjunction with the establishment of global European dominance in political and intellectual affairs, this pattern became naturalized and worked to disestablish earlier and alternative modes of understanding the past (cf. Grafton 2007). Later in this discussion, I provide the details for Gottlieb W. Leitner (1840–1899) and Jurji Zaidan (1861–1914), whose writings symptomize the process of creating a new historical understanding of Islam in the nineteenth century, congruent with the general transformation of the notion of history. I focus on the generative capacity of the phrase »Islamic civilization,« a notion that allowed these authors to incorporate materials pertaining to Islam in their understandings of global history. As I see it, Islamic civilization is a thoroughly Eurocentric idea in the sense that it pictures Islam in the mold of categories that originated in modern Europe but have come to be projected as universally applicable frames for comprehending the global past, present, and future. Appreciating the Eurocentric basis for turning data pertaining to »Islam« into »Islamic civilization« identifies the burdens imposed by the civilizational framing. This can, eventually, improve our ability to recast the relevant materials to create new understandings of the Islamic past as well as other cases with structural similarities.

My discussion emphasizes two interrelated points. The first is that, in the consideration of Eurocentrism, we can show Eurocentric thought to have been the source of discourses explicitly opposed to European intellectual and political hegemony. The men I discuss—one of European

and the other of Lebanese origins—saw themselves as championing the cause of Islam and the Arabs. We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of their stated commitments in this regard. The cases urge us to resist easy conflation between European intellectual constructs and the activities of European individuals and states aimed at dominating the world. Ideas always connect to sociopolitical developments via attenuated pathways that need substantiation through specific parsing rather than presumed complete interdependence. To relate this issue to the example with which I began, we can say that, even as it replicates a structure in Paris, the Eiffel Tower in Lahore is a monument that displaces European hegemony by domesticating the Tower's monumentality and significance to a scene in South Asia. In Pakistan, the desirability of seeing the Eiffel Tower and acquiring status through the aura it casts are matters indexed not to Paris but to the neighborhood in Lahore where the replica is located.

My second major point is that the significance of Eurocentrism in the thought of the two authors I consider can matter for current academic work in the humanities and the social sciences. Eurocentrism's domesticability that my cases highlight is an intellectual resource for us to look beyond a purely agonistic way to consider Eurocentrism. Our work, which we can acknowledge as being foundationally Eurocentric, need not be coextensive with Euro-American political and intellectual hegemony. Although we remain bound to conceptual and discursive schemes that began in Europe, origins do not determine historical trajectories. In fact, our intellectual heritage includes not just ideas of European origin, but also the indigenization and radical transformation of these ideas in countless forms all over the world during the past two centuries. Furthermore, the intellectual resources we rely on for our work do not predetermine the choices we must make when we decide to pursue certain topics over others and take positions on them that affect the environments in which we live.

Acknowledging Eurocentrism as a historically contingent, demystified fact underlying our work can be a source of freedom to imagine the future. Seeing how this process worked for predecessors such as the two men whose work I highlight can help us to become comfortable with our limitations as human subjects operating in complex worlds that contain

inescapable strictures as well as emancipatory possibilities. In this vein, describing the problems of conceiving Islam as a civilization in a Eurocentric mold helps to free us to imagine new ways of interpretation. The Eiffel Towers found in Paris, Lahore, and many other places in the world are significant structures that invite interpretation. What we are to do with them—how to interpret them and which to consider more or less significant—is a matter of intellectual and ethical choice that is not dictated purely by the fact that an Eiffel Tower first came to exist in Paris in 1889.

Imagining Islamic history in nineteenth-century India

Gottlieb Wilhelm Leitner was born in Pest (Hungary) in 1840 and died in Bonn (Germany) in 1899. A small monument over his grave, in the Brookwood Cemetery outside of London, contains two statements that characterize his life's passions. At the top, in English, it states »The Learned are Honoured in their Work,« and the bottom has, in Arabic, »Knowledge is Better than Wealth« (*al-'ilm khayr min al-mal*).[3] The latter statement, in a script unusual for a Victorian graveyard in Britain, references Leitner's eventful life outside of Europe. Born with the surname Sapier, he spent his early years in Istanbul and became known as Leitner after being adopted by a stepfather who worked as a doctor in the Ottoman Empire. Of Jewish origins, he stated his religion as Anglican at the time of naturalization as a British citizen in 1861. He spent much of his life championing Islam and Muslims before European audiences and readerships.

Possessing extraordinary capacity for learning languages, Leitner is claimed to have been fluent in 15 as a teenager and to have acquired 50 over the course of his life. His career is full of extraordinary achievements. He was appointed translator to the British commissariat in Istanbul, with honorary rank of colonel, at the age of 15. Appointed the first professor of »Arabic with Mohammedan Law« at King's College, London, at 21, he became dean of the oriental department at 24 (King's College Archive 1864). For 15 years (1864–79), he served as the first non-military principal

3 »Gottlieb Leitner Grave Brookwood,« Wikimedia Commons, October 17, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gottlieb_Leitner_Grave_Brookwood.jpg.

of Government College, Lahore, British India, during which time he also spearheaded the successful movement to raise the funds to start a university in the Punjab, also convincing the colonial government to allow this to happen. Upon return to Europe, he founded an institute for learning oriental languages in Woking, England, whose grounds included the first purpose-built mosque in Britain. Leitner's personality is captured in a biographer's statement that while »some regarded him as headstrong, wilful, and conceited, few questioned his energy or intellectual competence« (Rubinstein 2004).

During his eventful 15 years in Lahore, Leitner collaborated with Indian scholars interested in European methods and knowledge, regarding them as intellectual equals at a higher level than was the habit of other Europeans. Even as he minimized the significance of the Indians' work for his own claims, he did not portray them as mere »native informants« whose utility was limited to basic translation (Diamond 2011, 36–38).[4] In the effort to establish a new Indian university in Lahore, Leitner's insistence that Indian languages be taught and utilized as pedagogical vehicles set him apart from other British officials. His stance on this issue even went against the views of prominent Indians, such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (d. 1898), who believed that the inculcation of English and a clear break from the past were necessary for sociopolitical betterment of the Muslims of India ('Amir 2004, 32–35). Leitner's interest in law was instrumental in institutionalizing Islamic and Hindu law as official subjects in the new university that led to the conferral of titles *maulvi* and *pandit*, respectively, on graduates. His correspondence with officers in the highest echelons of the colonial government helped to establish Muslim legal experts (*qazis*) as colonial officials, emulating a pattern that Leitner had known from his experience in the Ottoman Empire (Ivermee 2014, 1082–85; Allender 2006, 168–72).

4 Leitner's most prominent local literary collaborator in Lahore, whom he seems to have held in high esteem, was Muhammad Husain Azad (d. 1910), a major intellectual and literary figure in nineteenth-century India. For details of Azad's work with Leitner, including on *Sinin-i Islam*, see Sadiq 1965, 24–26, 131–35; and Pritchett 1994, 31–33.

Leitner's obsession with linguistic specificity colored most of his projects, sometimes leading to irresolvable contradictions. On one hand, he was a connoisseur of languages, acquiring facility with more and more throughout his life. On the other, he also believed in a universal scale for measuring the worth of cultures, societies, and religions that he understood as the overall framework for human existence. For the first side, he emphasized high proficiency in idiomatic usage that could be appreciated only if one learned a particular language. His criticism of the way Europeans approached the cultures and societies that mattered to him reflects this investment, as in the following statement:

> The East is now often misrepresented by europeanized specimens, as England is flooded with the writings of popularity-seekers, whose knowledge of English and English audiences constitutes the real secret of their reputation as Orientalists. These publications have often diverted intending students from Oriental research in its original languages, which is the only road to Oriental learning. The public is satisfied with diluted and distorted information obtained at second-hand from those whose aim, in this age of hurry, is »to get on« not »to know« or to impart a linguistic knowledge that would destroy the rule of the one-eyed among the blind. (Leitner 1893, 374)

Leitner's exclusivist attitude, which would have required every European working in places like India to be an expert in multiple languages, was a source of friction with the colonial government. Particularly in areas such as primary and secondary level education, Leitner's purist attitude was deemed impractical and inappropriate to further colonial causes like the expansion of literacy (Allender 2007, 392–93).

Toward the end of his stay in Lahore, Leitner worked with an Indian scholar to produce a two-volume history of Islam in Urdu meant as a tool to teach scholars who would be employed as teachers in public institutions. Leitner's introduction to this work, written in English, reveals the Eurocentrism of his epistemological presumptions despite his avowed insistence on the significance of non-European vernaculars. After registering his deep admiration for the linguistic knowledge of Indian Muslim religious

professionals (*maulvis*), he laments their lack of historical sense, leading up to the impetus behind the authorship of his book:

> It, no doubt, was necessary to inform Maulvis that the History of Arabia had a chronological and well-ascertained sequence which did not allow them to consign it to the age of fable, however advantageous such a course might be in stimulating the sense of the reverence for the distant or unknown… [and] to impress the Maulvi with the conviction that the history of his country, creed or literature was merely a part of the Universal History of human events and thoughts. I, therefore, became anxious to point out how Arabian History had grown into that of Muhammadanism, and how its Literature had influenced the various populations professing that creed. I also endeavored to show what place the History of Muhammadanism has in the Universal History of civilization. (Leitner 1871, 1–2)

Following the short English introduction, the bulk of Leitner's *Sinin-i Islam* (The Annals of Islam) consists of a linear timeline for Islam, from Arabia before Muhammad to the states dominant over the Middle East at the time of writing. This »history« reproduces in easy Urdu what was, by Leitner's time, becoming the standard European representation of the Islamic past. As I have argued elsewhere, this version of the Islamic past derived from a selective reading of Islamic literatures concerned with the past, with overwhelming emphasis on political structures such as dynasties, empires, and states (Bashir 2014, 519–30). Moreover, it anchored Islam in the Middle East, making places such as India, where Leitner was located, peripheral to the history. His claim that Indian Muslims did not know their history is an absurdity at face value given the long list of works concerned with the Islamic past composed in India for eight centuries prior to Europeans' arrival in the subcontinent. Furthermore, Leitner's collaborators, such as Muhammad Husain Azad (d. 1910), were busy assessing these materials for the current social and intellectual needs of India's Muslims in the late nineteenth century. Even though aware of this literature, Leitner would not have considered it »Islamic history« because of his presumed, Eurocentric understanding of Islam as a »civilization« anchored perennially in the Middle East.

Leitner's argument that, brilliant as they may be, Indian Muslim professionals needed guidance from European scholars like him was rooted in his investment in the notion of a universal civilization. In this view, the world has a single continuous history that has, ultimately, led to one part of the world, namely Europe, pulling »ahead« of others. What Europeans possess most of all is the sense of history, which arranges all data about the past in the correct order. Treasures to be found in non-European languages must be appreciated on their own, as we can find Leitner insisting throughout his publications (Leitner 2002). But modern European frames are necessary to bring out the true value and measure of these materials. The method advocated in Leitner's work is thus based on a thoroughly Eurocentric epistemology, which he wishes to put into service for glorifying Islam, India, and all other matters non-European. This is the position we see reiterated throughout his work directed at Europeans as well as non-Europeans.

Eurocentrism as nativist pride

My second case in this article is Jurji Zaidan (1861–1914), a man of Lebanese, Greek Orthodox origin who was among the most widely published and read authors in Arabic at the end of the long nineteenth century. Zaidan began his higher education as a medical student in the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut (which later became the American University in Beirut), soon moving to a career in writing and publishing aimed at Arab societal and cultural rejuvenation. He migrated to Egypt in 1882, eventually becoming regarded as a major proponent of the movement known as the Arab renaissance (*nahda*). Having learned French, English, and German, he spent his life producing literature, in both fiction and non-fiction, in a distinctively modern literary idiom in Arabic (Philipp 2010, 21–34; Dupont 2006).

The fact that Zaidan's works spoke to issues of the day, with self-conscious attention to newness and reform, won him a significant popular audience in the Arab world and other parts of Africa and Asia through the circulation of the journal *al-Hilal* (The Crescent). But the contemporary topicality of his work also compelled authoritative stakeholders of domains he engaged to oppose him. As a Christian who criticized church authorities and glorified Islamic figures as great heroes of the Arab past, he ran afoul of his corel-

igionists. Although admired by ordinary Muslims for making Islamic stories accessible, he was censured by Muslim religious authorities as an outsider infringing on their domain. His use of European sources to tell Arab and Muslim stories could be seen as acquiescing to foreigners (Dupont 2013, 108–18). But a European reviewer of his work on pre-Islamic Arabs faulted him for not paying enough attention to European scholars' critique of Arabic sources, also expressing the hope that Zaidan's work would eventually lead his readers to consult the more correct work of European scholars of Arabic and Islam (Margoliouth 1909, 499).

In all these cases, Zaidan's habit of crossing established boundaries between communities and discursive domains was a source of both popularity and rebuke. In the long run, Zaidan's greatest source of fame and revenue were his novels, of which he published 22 between 1891 and 1914 (Philipp 2010, 420–26; Starkey 2013). All but one of these novels treated historical topics, turning selective information culled from premodern sources into narratives with protagonists and villains of the type found in modern European literatures. Published repeatedly in Arabic up to this day, these novels have been translated into numerous languages and have affected the development of a new literary idiom even in other languages such as Persian (Rastegar 2007).

As in the case of Leitner, Zaidan's work is based squarely and self-consciously on Eurocentric epistemological principles and narrative patterns, while arguing for the rights and value of non-Europeans. His primary mechanism to make this work was, again, the notion of »civilization« as the concept could be understood in a modern European frame. This perspective is at the forefront in the five-volume *Ta'rikh al-tamaddun al-Islami* (History of Islamic civilization), his major non-fiction work on Islamic history published in parts between 1902 and 1906. The mold for the work is set according to the following definition:

> The discussion of the civilization of a community includes considering what it comprises of with respect to extent of dominion, greatness, and wealth. And description of what is included in its culture regarding the provisions of development and its fruits. In this history is included knowledge, literature, and crafts, together with their

> concomitants such as schools, colleges, and universities, and the expansiveness of the purview of the state and its functionaries and the ease of life these bring to it. And what is the extent of the effects of these on its collective life, which requires description of the community's habits, societal manners, political patterns, and the imprint of these in its resources and motivations. (Zaidan 1902, 1:9)

The criteria for measuring societies laid out here are generic, applicable to all human groups. This fact belies Zaidan's investment in considering human »civilizations« as constituting a single »Civilization« extending through all time.

Although allowing everyone to participate in a universal Civilization, Zaidan's point of view followed the work of European predecessors in placing ethnicities, religions, and language groups on a ladder based on a sense of differentiated development. The key operationalizing principle here, for the understanding of the history of languages, ethnicities, and religions, was the modern theory of evolution: »Indeed, all of Zaidan's views on social reform and pedagogy were influenced by social evolutionary ones« (Elshakry 2013, 137). His commitment in this regard can be traced to his initial exposure to modern medicine, instantiating an intellectual journey running from »pathology to philology« (Dayeh 2016). This idea worked for his sociopolitical aims because it acknowledged European superiority while also insisting that others, such as Arabs and Muslims, were part of the same scheme. They simply needed to evolve a little more to become fully developed in the manner of Europeans. Notably, this perspective has remained the basis for the arrangement of international relations all the way into the twenty-first century.

While Zaidan's investment in evolutionary concepts exalted Europeans above others, the final picture in his works is not a straightforward case of wishing that everyone becomes like the Europeans of his day. Most of his knowledge of Europe and things European was derived from reading, giving his characterizations a bookish and idealizing cast. In 1912, two years before his death at the relatively young age of 53, he made a journey to France, England, and Switzerland and subsequently published a short account of his experiences. Nearly three-quarters of this work is dedicated

to France (mostly Paris), followed by an extended description of England and a short note on Switzerland. He provides details of matters such as government structures, economic output, and employment status of citizens, matters that he could have described easily without undertaking the trip. The descriptions of museums, palaces, churches, neighborhoods, and the mores of European men and women seem more personalized, although even here he could have relied on previous accounts, which are more detailed than what we find in his work.

As stated in the beginning of the work, his ultimate concern was not to give a detailed account of Europe but to identify what can be learned from life there to improve his own society. Around the middle of the work, he presents a summary of his assessment on this score that runs as follows:

> In French and other European civilizations, there are many good things that we ought to adopt and utilize. But these have evils [too] that we ought to shun and make distant. The good things, whose adoption is praiseworthy, are: 1. Knowledge of what is incumbent; 2. Keeping time and honoring appointments; 3. Proper public manners through correct training; 4. Women's education and cultural refinement; 5. Educational advancement and enlargement of literatures; 6. Work and diligence. As for the most important among the filth of this civilization, which we must reject: 1. Overabundance of freedom and its misplaced use; 2. What conflicts with Eastern decency, except that which provides knowledge and training to the extent that it accords with our habits; 3. Lassitude regarding religious belief and candid expression of unbelief, because that is the foundation of that corruption. (Zaidan 2002, 51)

The upshot of this statement is that, in terms of the overall evolutionary scale, Europeans were ahead in some matters and behind in others. Looking to them thus required discriminating carefully between admirable versus reprehensible traits.

Zaidan's presumed moral superiority of »Eastern« people is evident in many works in addition to the travelogue of Europe. This pervasive attribute of his output detracts from him being regarded as an admirer of things

European pure and simple. But his justification for making the moral distinction is the general idea of human Civilization, which feeds into his thought through his voracious assimilation of European literatures and philosophies. His thought then becomes a case of Eurocentric ideas being used to condemn European cultures and civilization in favor of non-Europeans. This is a dynamic familiar to us from much anticolonial and postcolonial thought. Its significance for the present discussion lies in the fact that we can identify »civilization« as the key term that is operating to argue for the equivalence between Europeans and non-Europeans while also creating hierarchical distinctions between them that differ based on whether the topic is sociopolitical ascendency or moral superiority.

Conclusion

In the four decades since its publication, Edward Said's book *Orientalism* has been a touchstone for the critique of Eurocentrism. Said's particular concern in that and a number of other books was the Euro-American understanding of the Middle East in specific. When asked about the book's impact ten years after its publication, he registered disappointment and said that the field that had been the main target had been affected the least. Said's explanation for this seemingly surprising fact connected to Islam:

> Central to Orientalism in the Middle Eastern instance is Islam. You can't study the Orient without dealing with Islam. For many Orientalists of past and even present generations, Islam is a deeply antipathetic and repulsive phenomenon. […] Every imperialist phenomenon resembles every other one, yet every one is quite different. How much is generic to imperialism? It could be a form of paranoia on my part, but it does seem to me that the Orientalism I was speaking of contains a unique set of attitudes, a kind of virulence and persistence that I haven't seen elsewhere. African studies have changed in fairly massive ways in the 20th century; Indian studies have changed; Latin American studies have changed. Orientalism has a remarkable holding power, supported by the media and popular discourse, in which Arabs and Muslims and terrorism

> and evil are all wrapped up together. There is a very powerful compactness that I don't find anywhere else. (»Orientalism Revisited« 1988)

Said's work has been discussed extensively in both frivolous and serious ways, including substantive critique pertaining to its premises and conclusions (e.g., Ahmad 1994; Varisco 2007). In the vein of criticism, one could (as scholars have) counter his perspective by bringing up figures like Gottlieb Leitner, who held a positive and appreciative view of Islam even as they identified as orientalists. To add to this, someone like Jurji Zaidan can be used to show that Middle Easterners themselves participated heavily in the production of Eurocentric discourses on Arabs and Islam. While they urge nuance, such corrections to Said's viewpoint do not diminish the general force of his argument that there is something special about the way Arabs and Islam get portrayed in Euro-American contexts. One just has to pick up a newspaper most days to be confronted by this fact.

Based on the preceding discussion, I suggest that we should look to issues connected to concepts of »history« and »civilization« to unpack the »powerful compactness« of Western discourses that suspect and condemn Islam, Muslims, and related subjects. Our way into a demystification of the power of orientalism runs through analyses of Eurocentrism at the granular level. When we evaluate the works of authors such as Leitner and Zaidan with respect to epistemology, rather than focusing solely on explicit representation, we see a complex enmeshing between Eurocentrism and the praise and condemnation of Europeans as well as groups such as Arabs, Indians, and Muslims. This is work that is necessary if we wish to counter discriminatory and prejudicial aspects of Eurocentrism. Critique of Eurocentrism may be counterproductive if it creates other, similarly problematic discourses such as Islamocentrism. The task is undertaken better if it leads to dismantling concepts such as civilization that appear as analytical prisons in the work of our predecessors. Rather than doing

away with Eurocentrism, doing *more* with is a better bet for the future of humanistic and social scientific inquiry.[5]

5 The work of Abdallah Laroui contains a particularly important account of the problems of using civilization as a historiographical category. For a summary assessment, see Riecken (2015).

References

Ahmad, Aijaz. 1994. *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*. London: Verso.

Allender, Tim. 2006. *Ruling Through Education: The Politics of Schooling in the Colonial Punjab*. Elgin: New Darwin Press.

Allender, Tim. 2007. »Bad Language in the Raj: The ›Frightful Encumbrance‹ of Gottlieb Leitner, 1865–1888.« *Paedagogica Historica* 43 (3): 383–403.

'Amir, Zahid Munir. 2004. *Tarikh-i Jami'a-yi Punjab*. Lahore: Punjab University.

Bashir, Shahzad. 2014. »On Islamic Time: Rethinking Chronology in the Historiography of Muslim Societies.« *History and Theory* 53 (4): 464–519.

Cohn, Bernard. 1996. *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dayeh, Islam. 2016. »'Ilal al-lugha: Rihlat Jurji Zaydan (1861–1914) min al-bathulujiya ila l-filulujia.« *al-Abhath* 64:9–30.

Diamond, Jeffrey M. 2011. »The Orientalist-Literati Relationship in the Northwest: G. W. Leitner, Muhammad Hussain Azad and the Rhetoric of New-Orientalism in Colonial Lahore.« *South Asia Research* 31 (1): 25–43.

Dupont, Anne-Laure. 2006. *Ǧurǧī Zaydān (1861–1914): Écrivain réformiste et témoin de la Renaissance arabe*. Beirut: Institut français du Proche-Orient.

Dupont, Anne-Laure. 2013. »How Should the History of Arabs be Written? The Impact of European Orientalism on Jurji Zaidan's Work.« In *Jurji Zaidan: Contributions to Modern Arab Thought and Literature*, edited by George C. Zaidan and Thomas Philipp, 85–122. Bethesda: The Zaidan Foundation.

Elshakry, Marwa. 2013. »Between Enlightenment and Evolution: Arabic and the Arabic Golden Ages of Jurji Zaidan.« In *Jurji Zaidan: Contributions to Modern Arab Thought and Literature*, edited by George C. Zaidan and Thomas Philipp, 123–44. Bethesda: The Zaidan Foundation.

Fasolt, Constantin. 2004. *The Limits of History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Glover, William. 2007. *Making Lahore Modern: Constructing and Imagining a Colonial City*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Grafton, Anthony. 2007. *What Was History? The Art of History in Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ivermee, Robert. 2014. »Shari'at and Muslim Community in Colonial Punjab, 1865–1885.« *Modern Asian Studies* 48 (4): 1068–95.

Kings College Archive. 1864. KA/IC/H47. Accessed November 26, 2017. http://www.kingscollections.org/catalogues/kclca/collection/k/gb100-kclca-ka-ic/ka-ic-h1-115.

Leitner, Gottlieb W. 1871–76. *Sinin-i Islam* [The annals of Islam]. 2 vols. Lahore: Indian Public Opinion Press.

Leitner, Gottlieb W. 1893. »Oriental Translations of English Texts.« *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Record*, n.s., 5 (10): 374–88.

Leitner, Gottlieb W. 2002. *Writings of Dr. Leitner: Islam, Education, Dardistan, Politics and Culture of Northern Areas*. Edited by M. Ikram Chaghatai. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel.

Margoliouth, D. S. 1909. Review of *Al-'Arab kabl al-Islam: The Arabs before Islam*, vol. 1 by Jurjî Zaidân. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*: 497–499.

»Orientalism Revisited: An Interview with Edward Said.« 1988. *Middle East Report* 150. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer150/orientalism-revisited.

Philipp, Thomas. 2010. *Jurji Zaidan and the Foundations of Arab Nationalism.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Pritchett, Frances. 1994. *Nets of Awareness: Urdu Poetry and Its Critics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rastegar, Kamran. 2007. »Literary Modernity between Arabic and Persian Prose: Jurji Zaydan's Riwayat in Persian Translation.« *Comparative Critical Studies* 4 (3): 359–78.

Riecken, Nils. 2015. »History, Time, and Temporality in a Global Frame: Abdallah Laroui's Historical Epistemology of History.« Theme issue, *History and Theory* 54: 5–26.

Rubinstein, W. D. 2004. »Leitner [formerly Sapier], Gottlieb Wilhelm (1840–1899), educationalist and orientalist.« In *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; online ed., 2017. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/51109.

Sadiq, Mohammed. 1965. *Muhammad Husain Azad: His Life and Works*. Lahore: West-Pak Publishing Company.

Schiffman, Zachary Sayre. 2011. *The Birth of the Past*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Starkey, Paul. 2013. »Romances of History: Jurji Zaydan and the Rise of the Historical Novel.« In *The Long 1890s in Egypt: Colonial Quiescence, Subterranean Resistance*, edited by Marilyn Booth and Anthony Gorman, 342–64. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Varisco, Daniel. 2007. *Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Zaidan, Jurji. 1902–06. *Ta'rikh al-tamaddun al-Islami* [History of Islamic civilization]. 5 vols. Cairo: Matba'at al-Hilal.

Zaidan, Jurji. 2002. *Rihla ila uruba 1912* [Journey to Europe 1912]. Edited by Qasim Wahab. Abu Dhabi: Dar al-Suwaydi li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi'.

***

Dr. Shahzad Bashir, Aga Khan Professor of Islamic Humanities, Brown University: shahzad_bashir@brown.edu.

Knowledge about the »Orient« between voice and scripture

Michel de Certeau and the Royal Danish Expedition to Arabia Felix (1761–1767)

Mirjam Hähnle

Introduction

In his *Beschreibung von Arabien: Aus eigenen Beobachtungen und im Lande selbst gesammleten Nachrichten abgefasset* [Description of Arabia: Drawn from his own observations and from reports collected in the land itself][1] (1772), geographer Carsten Niebuhr, a member of the Royal Danish Expedition to Arabia[2] (1761–67), writes about his biggest project, the mapping of Yemen:

> I have determined the location of their most distinguished cities […] in relation to one another with a compass, and their distance, as it were, in steps. For I observed how many steps our caravan took in a quarter of an hour, and always calculated the length of our path, which I noted precisely in hours and minutes. […] I placed the names

1 The translations from German to English in this contribution were made by the author.

2 Niebuhr's research was part of a venture funded by King Frederick V of Denmark and organized by the Göttingen professor Johann David Michaelis. The expedition sent five scholars and one servant to the Middle East in order to gain as much knowledge as possible »in the service of erudition« (Instruction § 1 in Michaelis 1762). Their journey started in Istanbul and then proceeded to Cairo and the Sinai. Then the travelers sailed down the Red Sea along the Arabian Peninsula. When they arrived at Yemen, they went to the capital Sanaa by land. In Yemen and during an unscheduled passage to Bombay, India, all the participants died except for the geographer Carsten Niebuhr. His trip home took him to, among other places, Persia, Syria, and Anatolia.

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v8-i2-176 ISSN 2191-6721

> of cities and villages I did not see myself on the map on the sole basis of collected reports. (Niebuhr 1772, XXIII–XXIV)[3]

This quotation and the full title of Niebuhr's *Beschreibung von Arabien* direct our attention to two things. First, Niebuhr explicitly reflects upon on-site knowledge production, though his *Beschreibung von Arabien* was written and published in Copenhagen after he had returned from his journey. Niebuhr accordingly ascribes importance to the local preconditions of knowledge and is keen to explain how he managed to perform measurements in the field. Second, the »reports« that filled the gaps in his information—and consequently covered the blind spots of Niebuhr's map of Yemen—invite speculation about their sources. How were local actors involved in the production of knowledge, and how do we address those actors? Both aspects—reflections on the conditions of knowledge production and the role of local actors—will be important in my subsequent reading of Niebuhr's texts about the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt.

Niebuhr was the only survivor of what was known as the Royal Danish Expedition. His narrative therefore stands *pars pro toto* for the whole undertaking.[4] Although the expedition has not attracted as much attention as other erudite ventures of the eighteenth century, such as those in the wake of Cook or Napoleon, Niebuhr has become paradigmatic for the

3 »Ich habe die Lage ihrer vornehmsten Städte […] gegen einander mit dem Compas, und ihre Entfernung gleichsam in Schritten bestimmt. Denn ich bemerkte, wie viele Schritte unsere Karwane in einer viertel Stunde machte, und berechnete allezeit die Länge unsers Weges, welche ich genau in Stunden und Minuten aufzeichnete. […]. Die Namen der Städte und Dörfer welche ich selbst nicht gesehen habe, habe ich nur aus gesammleten Nachrichten auf die Charte gesetzt« (Niebuhr 1772, XXIII–XXIV).

4 After Niebuhr returned to Copenhagen in 1767, he first published *Beschreibung von Arabien* (1772), which is structured thematically. He then later published the two-volume *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Ländern* [Description of the journey to Arabia and other neighboring lands] (1774–78), which offers a chronological account of the expedition. The third volume about his travels in Syria and Palestine was planned, but only published posthumously in 1837 due to a lack of interest on the part of his patrons in Copenhagen (see Rasmussen 1990a).

early use of expeditions in modern science (Beck 1971, 92; Feuerhahn 2004, 163; Rasmussen 1990b, 11). In many eyes, he also represents impartiality toward those he observed. [5] Niebuhr himself fuels these narratives by reflecting obsessively on his measuring techniques and by emphasizing the need to adapt to local ways of living in order to survive in the Middle East. Existing scholarship's verdict on him is consequently almost unanimous. Han Vermeulen, for example, who examines the genesis of anthropology in the eighteenth century and considers Niebuhr's travelogues, writes in his appraisal:

> Especially noteworthy are Niebuhr's openness, impartiality, and research methods. He was not judgmental, and his endeavor not to reproduce prejudices against Muslims is impressive. […] There was no asymmetry of power, and Niebuhr had a dialogic relationship with his informants. (Vermeulen 2015, 258)

Larry J. Baack, author of the only monograph about the Royal Danish Expedition, is also convinced of Niebuhr's »hard work, dedication to accuracy, open-mindedness, cultural generosity, unpretentiousness and humanity« (Baack 2014, 343) and concludes that »Niebuhr's portrayal of the Arab Middle East did not create or perpetuate pre-colonialist ideological frameworks or models of European superiority or Middle Eastern inferiority.« (Ibid., 381; see also Rasmussen 1990b, 12; and Guichard 2014, XIV).

This corresponds to Jürgen Osterhammel's thesis on the »disenchantment of Asia« by European scholars during the eighteenth century (Osterhammel [1998] 2012).[6] Osterhammel states that in encounters with Asia in the eighteenth century, the »connection between knowledge and power« described by discourse analysis existed »only in weak form,« since Europeans

5 This is also the tendency of many essays in the important anthology *Carsten Niebuhr und seine Zeit* (2002). Stephan Conermann is the only one who asks about Niebuhr's »orientalistic potential« and therefore places him in the debate about Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1979).

6 Osterhammel refers to the term »*Entzauberung*,« originally shaped by Max Weber. In English-speaking scholarship, it is usually translated as »disenchantment.« See, e.g., Kim (2017).

mainly went to Asia as travelers and merchants and not yet as colonizers (ibid., 21). What is more, for a short time, European *philosophes* viewed Asia not as Europe's »glorious« or »demonic« other but rather in a rational light. Europe and Asia could therefore meet in dialog as equals (ibid., 11). In this sense, continues Osterhammel, the eighteenth century can serve as a model for us today of cosmopolitanism and »global concepts of order without steep hierarchies and sharp contrasts« (ibid., 402).

In this way, Osterhammel implicitly contrasts intercultural encounters of the eighteenth century with those of the nineteenth century, which scholars such as Edward Said ([1979] 2003) and Mary Louise Pratt ([1992] 2008) have closely linked to the colonial ventures of European powers. It is advisable to maintain a certain skepticism about Osterhammel's position and its political implications. It seems to use eighteenth-century sources to find pre-colonial and therefore non-Eurocentric knowledge of the Middle East. The question of how to critically examine pre-colonial knowledge production remains open due to the tendency of existing scholarship to overlook crucial difficulties. Can we indeed assume that there is no asymmetry between the makers of knowledge and those being observed? What kind of insight into intercultural encounters can we gain by »reading the archives« of European expeditions? Can we locate traces of those being described?

Michel de Certeau (1925–86), a French Jesuit and scholar whose writings encompassed history, sociology, and anthropology, asked many of these questions about how to read European archives and how to approach actors who were erased from the record. He did so by looking at widely different sources and periods, such as the exorcism of possessed nuns in seventeenth-century France (Certeau [1970] 2000), sixteenth-century travelogs (Certeau [1975] 1988), language policies in revolutionary France (Certeau et al. 1975), and the twentieth-century practices of everyday culture (Certeau [1984] 2002). Despite the historical range of his topics, all of his works are influenced by the same, partially theologically motivated, experience of alterity and loss. In his eyes, both historiographical and ethnological writing consist in *heterologies*, in discourses on the absent other (see Certeau [1986] 2010; and Füssel 2007, 7). Bringing in elements of

psychoanalysis, Certeau engages cultural analysis to search for alterity both within the Western subject itself and in its relationship to those it silenced (Freccero 2001, 366). This approach does not intend to be a form of psychoanalytical diagnosis, but rather a methodology of free association »designed to make a space for the unconscious to speak« (Highmore 2007, 55).

According to Luce Giard, Certeau's readings of his varying sources are also driven by an interest in the circulation of speech (*parole*) in its oral and written forms; furthermore, his writings show a deep fascination for places (*lieux*) and spaces (*espaces*) as social sites and starting points of the historian's own »historiographical operation« (Giard 1997, XIII–XV; see also Füssel 2013, 24). In the analysis that follows, the perspectives offered by Michel de Certeau serve as a guideline for reading Niebuhr's travelogues. The first part of the analysis asks how the *voices* of the other were transformed into European »scripture« in the Royal Danish Expedition.[7] I then consider how knowledge gained in the field is a product of various forms of spatial appropriation. My reflections attempt to offer a somewhat different view on pre-colonial intercultural encounters, in contrast to the now-conventional interpretation absolving them of Eurocentrism.

Voice and scripture I: Writing that conquers

Certeau asks with utmost urgency who speaks in and through ethnological texts and travelogues. In his eyes, the issue is part of a larger »structure belonging to modern Western culture,« whose »›other‹—the Indian, the past, the people, the mad, the child, the Third World« (Certeau 1988, 3)—is constantly transformed, invented, and changed by »a writing located

7 Certeau reflects on ethnology by considering how local *voix* were inscribed into European *écriture* (Certeau 1975). The translator of Certeau's *L'écriture de l'histoire* [The Writing of History], Tom Conley, was well aware that *écriture* was one of Certeau's terms that »are not difficult to turn into English, but translated they convey little of the complexity expressed in the French usage« (Conley 1988, XX). Conley translates »writing« when the French original says »*écriture*.« I, on the other hand, wish to uphold and emphasize, in this reading, the canonical connotation of »*écriture*« as a »religious tradition,« as Certeau put it (Certeau 1988, 211). I have therefore opted to use the term »scripture.«

elsewhere« (Highmore 2007, 16). Certeau thus shares the epistemological doubts of writers such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak about »the Archive« or what Certeau calls »the scriptural economy« (Spivak 1985). Like Spivak and similarly to Edward Said, Certeau perceives ethnological writing (in the broad sense of the word) as a repressive inscription of power:

> This is *writing that conquers*. It will use the New World as if it were a blank, »savage« page on which Western desire will be written. It will transform the space of the other into a field of expansion for a system of production. From the moment of a rupture between a subject and an object of the operation, between a *will to write* and a *written body* (or a body to be written), this writing fabricates Western History [italics original]. (Certeau 1988, XXV–XXVI)

According to Certeau, the act of writing transforms local voices into what we might call European »scripture« (see footnote 7). Post-colonial writing would therefore be impossible, since all »writing as a praxis is already a colonization of a terrain not its own. […] Writing orders the world, composes it in terms of its own grammar« (Buchanan 1992). Certeau's texts maintain a critical stance that is not restricted to ethnographic accounts of the past. For one thing, Certeau believes his critique also applies to his own writing, which cannot solve the relationship between voice and scripture but rather »upholds the problem without resolving it« (Certeau 1988, 212). For another, he wants cultural theory as a whole to realize and accept its proximity to the primal scene of the ethnologic encounter (Highmore 2007, 18).

In the case of the expedition to Arabia which took place in the 1760s, the transformation of indigenous voices into canonical »scripture« for the purpose of gaining knowledge proves to be of great importance. The original mission for the expedition—as formulated by its organizer, the Göttingen-based professor Johann David Michaelis—was, indeed, to turn local voices and objects into tools for understanding a particular scripture: the Old Testament. The Arabic dialect spoken in Yemen and the region's natural history and culture were supposed to help investigate and explain uncertain passages and biblical miracles (see first of all Rauchstein 2017; also Achermann 2003; Hübner 2002; and Legaspi 2010).

Michaelis succinctly captures this relationship between voice and scripture in the preface to his one hundred *Fragen an eine Gesellschaft gelehrter Männer, die auf Befehl Ihro Majestät des Königes von Dännemark nach Arabien reisen* [Questions to a company of learned men who are traveling to Arabia by order of His Majesty the King of Denmark] (1762):

> Almost all the questions I have raised are related to explaining the Holy Scripture. […] [T]he Old Testament [is] a book that essentially forces us to delve into the whole natural history and customs of the Orientals [Morgenländer] if we want to understand it. (Michaelis 1762, »Vorrede«)[8]

Moreover, Michaelis also states that only present-day residents of the biblical lands can answer many of the pressing philological questions; understanding the ancient book requires, more than anything, their everyday speech:

> How few travel accounts about Lucky Arabia [i.e. Yemen] do we have? […] Its dialect is different from western Arabic, which we are familiar with […] what kind of enlightenment must we then properly expect for the most important book of antiquity, the Bible? What died out in one dialect will still perhaps be left in another. (Michaelis 1762, »Vorrede«)[9]

In fact, the travelogues of the Royal Danish expedition mention informants quite often. Residents of the regions they visited help with the Arabian names of villages, assist the philologist Frederik Christian von Haven in

8 »Die Fragen die ich aufgeworfen habe, beziehen sich beynahe alle auf die Erklärung der heiligen Schrift. […] [D]as alte Testament [ist] ein Buch, welches uns gleichsam zwinget in die ganze Naturgeschichte und Sitten der Morgenländer hineinzugehen, wenn wir es verstehen wollen« (Michaelis 1762, »Vorrede«).

9 »Wie wenige Reisebeschreibungen vom glücklichen Arabien haben wir? […]. Sein Dialect ist von dem uns bekannten westlichen Arabischen noch verschieden […], was für Licht müßen wir denn billig für das allerwichtigste Buch des Alterthums, für die Bibel, erwarten […]? Was in der einen Mundart untergegangen ist, wird vielleicht in der andern übrig seyn« (Michaelis 1762, »Vorrede«).

buying manuscripts, and bring flowers to the biologist Per Forsskål. When it comes to geographical knowledge, Niebuhr is sure that only a scientist's observations and measurements can guarantee reliable maps (Niebuhr 1772, XXIV). By contrast, he classes the acquisition of geographical information by questioning local informants as an inferior method of knowledge production. At best, Arabic informants who travel a lot—like merchants or camel drivers—are familiar with the regions they traverse (ibid.). But even in such cases, Niebuhr emphasizes that his informants' knowledge must be examined cautiously and needs to be systematized:

> One […] must ask only casually for everything one wants to know. That takes not only a lot of patience and time, but also one must be very cautious and suspicious about the answers, because also in the Orient [den Morgenländern], one finds people who tell lies on purpose or out of ignorance so as not to inform a foreigner about everything at once or to create the impression that they know everything. (Niebuhr 1772, XVIII)[10]

In his essay *Ethno-graphy: Speech, or the Space of the Other; Jean de Léry*, Certeau examines a traveler from the seventeenth century: Jean de Léry, who visited the Tupi people of Brazil.[11] Certeau writes that for Léry, »[b]etween ›them‹ and ›us‹ there exists the difference of possessing ›either sacred or profane‹ writing, which immediately raises the question of a relation of *power*« (Certeau 1988, 215). The notion of European supremacy is justified

10 »Man muß […] nach allem, was man zu wissen verlangt, nur beyläufig fragen. Hierzu gehört nicht nur viele Gedult und Zeit, sondern man muß auch sehr aufmerksam und mistrauisch auf die Antworten seyn, weil man auch in den Morgenländern Leute findet, die mit Fleiß, oder aus Unwissenheit Unwahrheiten sagen, um einen Fremden nicht gleich von allem zu unterrichten, oder um das Ansehen zu haben als wüßten sie alles« (Niebuhr 1772, XVIII).

11 Léry, Jean de (1534–1613) was a shoemaker, innkeeper and theologian. As a Huguenot, he took part in the short-lived mission sent by Johannes Calvin to build a French colony in Brazil called »La France Antarctique.« His »Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Bresil« (1578) described his journey and was widely recognized during and after his lifetime (Fornerod 2008).

by the possession of writing; writing that can preserve knowledge through time and space. Native orality, in contrast, remains tied to a body, and thus forgets its own past. It »is limited to the vanishing circle of its auditors« (ibid.).

The travelers of the Royal Danish Expedition show the same conviction that writing and knowing how to understand writing differentiates Europeans from »Orientals.« But the travelers do not believe that »Orientals« lack script because they have not yet progressed to that point; Niebuhr rather assumes they once had a scripture and have forgotten their own scriptural past:

> None of the [Arabic] scholars in Yemen, whom I got to know well enough that I dared to ask them for a clarification of these inscriptions, could read much more of them than I. […] But it would be superfluous to include them [their explanations, M. H.] because European scholars are probably even more familiar with the old Kufic handwriting than present-day Arabs. (Niebuhr 1772, 96)[12]

Like Jean de Léry, Niebuhr is convinced that the Arabs' inability to write and read has led them to forget or ignore their own past; they »care very little about more recent history and not at all about the history of their ancestors who lived before Mohammed« (Niebuhr 1772, 185).[13] When Niebuhr looks at hieroglyphs engraved on the column of Cleopatra in Alexandria, he regretfully states: »what care the ancient Egyptians employed to preserve their messages as if for eternity; it is not their fault that their

12 »Keiner von den Gelehrten im Jemen, mit welchen ich so bekannt wurde, daß ich mich unterstehen durfte sie um eine Erklärung dieser Inschriften zu bitten, konnte davon vielmehr lesen als ich selbst. […] Es würde aber überflüssig seyn diese beyzufügen, weil die europäischen Gelehrten vermutlich noch besser mit den alten Kufischen Schriftzügen bekannt sind, als die jetzigen Araber« (Niebuhr 1772, 96).

13 »Die Araber hingegen bekümmern sich sehr wenig um die neuere, und gar nicht um die Geschichte ihrer Vorfahren, welche vor Mohàmmed gelebt haben« (Niebuhr 1772, 185).

descendants can no longer read them« (Niebuhr 1774, 46).[14] Confirming a typical notion of anthropology since the Enlightenment, Niebuhr views modern Arabs as inauthentic *évolués* of an authentic and learned past (Fabian 2014, 11). This idea of *no longer* coincides with that of *not yet*, which places the other in a »waiting room of history,« as Dipesh Chakrabarty calls it (Chakrabarty 2000, 8). Niebuhr makes reference to such a state of *not yet* when he comments on a peasant who was afraid of one of Niebuhr's astronomical instruments, his binoculars. The binoculars show objects upside down and the peasant believes they will upend the whole city:

> One should not, of course, be very surprised that the Mohammedans become suspicious over such observations since, not long ago, one could still find plenty of Europeans who thought that everything they could not immediately understand was magic. (Niebuhr 1774, 50)[15]

To quote Johannes Fabian, ethnology seems, indeed, to be a »science of other men in another time« to the travelers (Fabian 2014, 143). But the comparison Niebuhr draws also shows that the difference between »Mohammedan« and European societies is not perceived as a natural difference (ibid., 147); to Niebuhr, the Arabs are superstitious and lack scientific skills »not because they lack ability, but rather books and a good education« (Niebuhr 1772, 104).[16] Niebuhr consequently gives the expedition a clear mission: to research and understand times and spaces that the local population can either not yet or no longer understand. Local informants may contribute to this mission, but transforming their imperfect knowledge into scientific scripture clearly remains the travelers' task.

14 »welche Vorsicht die alten Egypter gebraucht haben, ihre Nachrichten gleichsam für die Ewigkeit aufzubewahren; es ist nicht ihre Schuld daß ihre Nachkommen sie nicht mehr lesen können« (Niebuhr 1774, 46).

15 »Man darf sich eben nicht sehr verwundern, daß die Mohammedaner über dergleichen Beobachtungen argwönisch werden, da man nicht vor langer Zeit auch noch Europäer genug gefunden hat, die alles für Zauberey hielten, was sie nicht gleich begreifen konnten« (Niebuhr 1774, 50).

16 »nicht weil es ihnen an Fähigkeit, sondern an Büchern und gutem Unterricht fehlet« (Niebuhr 1772, 104).

Voice and scripture II: Voice as a loss inside scripture

At first sight, it seems that both for Certeau and in the sources of the Royal Danish Expedition, the heterogeneous voices of the other are silenced through the act of ordering and writing, making them inaccessible to us. It is impossible to recover and hear the voice of the »native informant« as the archive alters his/her figure (Highmore 2007, 88). One of the strengths of Certeau's work, however, is that while he acknowledges the epistemological dominance of European writing, he also attempts to reveal those silenced voices by investigating the preconditions of scripture. In this sense, texts are sites of oppression that can nevertheless emerge as fields of play for different actors (see Hartnett 1998, 286).

In his inquiries, Certeau's traveler Jean de Léry is confronted with the songs of the Tupi, »›vocations‹ loosened from the orbits of meaning« that move him so much that he struggles to translate them into the productivity of his writing (Certeau 1988, 230). According to Certeau, those absent but simultaneously somehow present voices cannot be recovered as content; instead they only remain as a loss inside of scripture*:* »[N]ative speech takes on the figure of a missing precious stone. It is the moment of ravishment, a stolen instant, a purloined memory beyond the text« (ibid., 213). The voices at least influence the one who tried to erase them, and by doing so, they disturb the archival impulse. They stimulate moments of pleasure and confusion beyond the »utilitarian construct of the tale« (ibid., 227):

> Facing the work of the West, that is, Western man's actions that manufacture time and reason, there exists in Léry's work a place for leisure and bliss, the Tupi world, indeed a feast for the eyes and ears. […] These moments rend holes in the fabric of the traveler's time, just as the Tupi's festive organization was beyond all economy of history. Spending and loss designate *a present*; they form a series of »snippets,« nearly a lapsus in Western discourse. (Certeau 1988, 226–27)

The »savage world« that Léry describes therefore has two different functions, both serving as an object of Western discourse and necessarily distorting that discourse; necessarily because »the vocal exteriority is also

the stimulus and the precondition of its scriptural opposite« (ibid., 236). If we look at the travelers of the Royal Danish Expedition, it is hard to find moments that are »beyond all economy of history« (ibid., 227). The travelers barely seem to register the »Orient« as a »body of pleasure,« as Certeau calls it (ibid., 226). There are no signs of ecstasy or enthusiasm. It seems that the thesis of the »disenchantment« of Asian cultures during the Enlightenment fits the texts produced from the expedition.

What is striking, though, are the unconscious moments of scientific discourse in the travelogs—ruptures in the conviction of expertise and supremacy. These moments lead to fear and failure, which indeed »rend holes in the fabric of the traveler's time« and the economy of knowledge (Certeau 1988, 227). First, there are many situations that profoundly disrupt the possibility of knowledge in a hostile environment. For example, Niebuhr repeatedly mentions how difficult it is to map cities and landscapes properly if the region's residents do not want them mapped (e.g., Niebuhr 1774, 109; 191–92). Philologist von Haven recalls how he was almost beaten up when he tried to buy maps and books at a shop in Istanbul. Von Haven writes that he became »sick because of this annoyance« and no longer felt able to carry on collecting manuscripts or conducting his philological research in Istanbul. Indeed, his report about the city breaks off here (von Haven 2005, 538–39).

Similar events in Mocha in Yemen illustrate the degree to which the expedition's production of knowledge was endangered. All three travelers who wrote diaries—von Haven, Forsskål, and Niebuhr—recount the escalation of events during the inspection of their luggage at the local customs house (von Haven 2005, 384; Forsskål 2009, 357–58; Niebuhr 1774, 363–64). Against the travelers' wishes, their natural objects are examined first (Niebuhr 1774, 363–65). The inspector spills some fish specimens that were preserved in alcohol and the smell fills the room; then the crowd watching them discovers conserved snakes. A rumor spreads that the travelers want to poison the residents of the city, and the travelers find themselves thrown out of their accommodation (ibid., 365).

What is worse, the rashness of the inspection endangers the material evidence of their expedition: »A large portion of the shells that we had

packed up with great care was pulled out onto the floor and the rest were pierced with a pointed iron rod. We protested in vain that many would be broken« (Niebuhr 1774, 364).[17] This is an act of destruction against »Western« science and its artifacts, that is, the objects it has appropriated, »packed up,« dis-located and transformed into artifacts. Things are broken—ruptured. The voice (the »rumor«) silences the scripture. Niebuhr's report on Mocha consequently differs from those about cities like Constantinople, Alexandria, and Al Luḥayyah. There is no further description of the town beyond the inspection and the incidents that followed; nor is there a map or view of the town like those he made for many other places and cities. This time, the recording of local entities in European scripture fails.

Thus, although text orders and normalizes through the act of writing, it also registers within itself the presence of something it cannot control. The travelers cease to be the masters of their research and become the objects of a time and place. Sometimes, the omniscient »solar Eye« of the travelers is hindered from »seeing« at all, and the writing stops. Voices are absent, but can inscribe themselves, absent, in the fear they cause. Attending to these »epistemic anxieties« and »affective tremors« in European scripture entails reading »along the archival grain« with its extant, yet always contested ontologies and claims to truth (Stoler 2009, 19). Ann Laura Stoler demonstrates the challenges and possibilities of such an approach in her study on the colonial administration of the Dutch East Indies. She shows that Dutch colonial officials constantly worried about both the reliability of their knowledge of the colonized and the applicability of that knowledge to everyday interaction with local residents. Their anxieties thus created a »messy space between reason and sentiment« in European archives (ibid., 39). Speaking with Certeau, »messy spaces« appear in European texts because of the traces of disturbing voices. Such voices, »leftover[s]« and »waste product[s] of constructive thinking« (Certeau

17 »Von den Muscheln, welche wir mit der größten Sorgfalt eingepackt hatten, ward ein großer Theil bis auf den Boden heraus gerissen, und das übrige mit einem spitzen Eisen durchbohrt. Wir stellten vergebens vor, daß vieles zerbrochen werden würde« (Niebuhr 1774, 364).

1988, 227), can be described more adequately if we consider different ways of appropriating space. This is an issue in the following section.

Strategies and tactics, places and spaces

As we have established, Certeau interprets the relationship of scripture to voice in pre-modern »ethno-graphy« as deeply ambivalent. This ambivalence is connected to his dualistic approach: Certeau wants to demonstrate the West's epistemological dominance in knowledge production, but he also wants to create limited agencies for those who have been excluded by this knowledge (see Highmore 2007, 83).

The same tendency becomes apparent in Certeau's most influential work, *The Practice of Everyday Life* ([1988] 2002), which discusses topics such as consumption, strolling around the streets of a city, and everyday story-telling. A strong duality between critiquing science and conceding limited agency to the objects of the scientific gaze defines this collection of essays. Everyday practices, Certeau says, are always spatial practices emerging from two genuinely different kinds of space. First, there is abstract, geometric *place* (ibid., 117). Certeau illustrates it with his own experience looking down from the World Trade Center:

> The gigantic mass is immobilized before the eyes. […] Having taken a voluptuous pleasure in it, I wonder what is the source of this pleasure of »seeing the whole,« of looking down on, totalizing the most immoderate of human texts. […] An Icarus flying above these waters, he can ignore the devices of Daedalus in mobile and endless labyrinths far below. His elevation transfigures him into a voyeur. It puts him at a distance. It transforms the bewitching world by which one was »possessed« into a text that lies before one's eyes. It allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, looking down like a god. The exaltation of a scopic and gnostic drive: the fiction of knowledge is related to this lust to be a viewpoint and nothing more. (Certeau 2002, 91–92)

New York becomes a static place that is open to cartographic projection, which erases the differences between objects. Such projections claim to

be neutral metonymically based presentations, not metaphor-based *re*presentations (Hartnett 1998, 287). Certeau calls this distant, scientific view from above *strategic*. An agent of will and power, such as a municipal administration or scientific institution, possesses its own place and controls it. According to Certeau, »[p]olitical, economic, and scientific rationality has been constructed on this strategic model« (Certeau 2002, XIX). The similarities to his notion of scripture that conquers voices are easy to recognize.

Second, Certeau writes about a *space* of experience that is produced by movements of the body (ibid., 117). In an urban landscape, the operations of the controlling rationality are constantly subverted by the maze of practices inside urban spaces, a maze of footsteps and movements. In *The Practice of Everyday Life*, these heterogeneous practices are called *tactics*. Tactics do not own a *place*, but they can temporarily create *spaces*. Practices such as walking generate temporary, transient occupation of places owned by someone else.

In addition to the ephemeral space created by the physical movement of pedestrians, Certeau is interested in narratives of space: how representations of space not only describe, but produce it.

> Every story is a travel story—a spatial practice. […] These narrated adventures […] do not merely constitute a »supplement« to pedestrian enunciations and rhetorics. […] In reality, they organize walks. They make the journey, before or during the time the feet perform it. (Certeau 2002, 115–16)

The narratives, according to Certeau, constantly change static and stable places into living spaces and the other way around. Certeau's dualistic approach thus becomes apparent once more: for him, an everyday spatial description »oscillates between the terms of an alternative: either *seeing* (the knowledge of an order of places) or *going* (spatializing actions)« (ibid., 119). He accordingly delineates »two symbolic and anthropological languages of space« (ibid.). The first language of space is captured with the term *map*, which refers to »a plane projection totalizing observations« (ibid.). Maps are about seeing something. In contrast, *itineraries* show a series of

movements. Itineraries are about going somewhere. For Certeau, ordinary culture is associated with this language of space. In his point of view, *itineraries* were slowly replaced by *maps* during the birth of modern scientific discourse from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century. Seeing places became superior to going through spaces:

> The map, a totalizing stage on which elements of diverse origin are brought together to form the tableau of a »state« of geographical knowledge, pushes away into its prehistory […] the operations of which it is the result or the necessary condition. […] The tour describers have disappeared. (Certeau 2002, 121)

This is where my reading of the sources from the expedition to Arabia Felix diverges from Certeau. In what follows, I demonstrate that the sources are defined by a complex mélange of narratives, of maps and itineraries, and that the practices of research employed are strategic and tactical at the same time (see Füssel 2013, 34). In other words, the narratives oscillate between scientific maps or overviews of Arabia, which overlay and conceal the practices that produced them, and reflective itineraries that reveal the movements through Arabia as preconditions of the travelers' research.

If we regard maps and itineraries not only as genres, but as narrative patterns of spatial experience as Certeau did, then Niebuhr's travelogues seem to be shaped primarily by the spatial language of the map. Both his cartographic work and his travelogs exhibit a strong tendency toward the a-temporal and abstract description of locations and their residents. Take for example Niebuhr's »Anmerkungen zu Alexandrien« (Remarks on Alexandria), a city that in his eyes was primarily composed of »hills of rubble« (Niebuhr 1774, 43–54, here 45).[18] This chapter from the *Reisebeschreibung*

18 For a problematic view on Niebuhr in Egypt see Guichard (2014), who seems to reiterate the narrative of a static Orient regarding the customs and behavior of the local residents. For instance, Guichard comments on Niebuhr's anecdote of an Arabian beggar: »In some respects, not a great deal has changed in the 250-plus years since the Danish expedition was in Cairo« (ibid., 200).



Fig. 1: Schematic representation of monuments in Egypt. Engraving V from Niebuhr's Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Ländern [Description of the Journey to Arabia and Other Neighboring Lands], vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Nicolaus Möller, 1774).

nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Ländern [Description of the journey to Arabia and other neighboring lands] (1774) starts with the general topography of the city, then elaborates on its harbor, which »is already of little use and becoming worse every day« (ibid., 43),[19] the remnants of the old and newer town walls (ibid., 44), and the city's water supply system with its basins and canals (ibid., 45). These general observations are followed by exact descriptions and measurements of two significant monuments, the so-called Obelisks of Cleopatra (ibid., 45–46) and Pompey's Pillar (ibid., 48–49). Niebuhr's measurements are supported by an engraving that follows the textual description of Pompey's Pillar. On the engraving, Pompey's Pillar is labeled with an »A« and the one still-erect Obelisk of Cleopatra with a »C.« The summarizing portrayal of the urban topology and its graphic depiction claim to be a sovereign overview in the manner of Certeau's »solar Eye.« The experiences and movements of the geographer, which are a necessary precondition of his report and mapping activities, are excluded from the narrative.[20]

But after a while, Niebuhr's schematized description of Alexandria mutates into a temporalized narrative. This also happens in other parts of the *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien*, usually when local residents disturb Niebuhr's measurements. While Niebuhr's descriptions of cities like Alexandria are not tied to the physical presence of the observer, the narrator sometimes seems to realize his endangered position in the place he is currently describing. For example, his »Remarks on Alexandria« dwell on the Obelisk of Cleopatra and its precise orientation, when the narrator suddenly stops and complains that »[t]he Arabs always milled around the city and among

19 »[Der Hafen] ist schon sehr unbrauchbar, und wird es täglich mehr« (Niebuhr 1774, 43).

20 In addition to the abstract description of Alexandria's topography, one event is also described at the end of the report. Niebuhr recounts how, after arriving in the city, some nomads got into a fight with its residents, and were later killed (Niebuhr 1774, 53–54).

the ruins during our stay in Alexandria« (Niebuhr 1774, 49).[21] Shortly thereafter, he writes:

> One of the Turkish merchants who were present and noticed that I had pointed the astrolabe at the city, was very curious to look through the binoculars also, and was more than a little worried when he saw a tower upside down. This gave rise to a rumor that I had come to Alexandria to turn the whole city upside down. […] My Janissary no longer wanted to accompany me if I wanted to take along my instrument, so I did not obtain any more geometric measurements here. (Niebuhr 1774, 49)[22]

The travelogue's narrative style changes into the spatial language of an itinerary, which means that the scientific, objectifying gaze is restricted and a first-person narrator appears. This transformation can be interpreted in different ways. First, it shows that the travelers were conducting their research in places controlled by other agents of will and power. Consequently, their tactics of camouflage can only temporarily appropriate spaces, and their research is subject to conditions determined by others. For example, to conduct their research, they dress up like Arab Christians, hide their instruments, and measure things out of the corner of their eyes while talking to locals.

Second, one may conclude that local residents, who are largely absent from the narratives, do indeed become actors through their interventions. What is more, we here once again witness the »rumor«—the powerful manifestation of voice—interfering in the scriptural project. The inhabitants'

21 »Die Araber schwärmten während unsers Aufenthalts zu Alexandrien beständig um die Stadt und unter den Ruinen herum […]« (Niebuhr 1774, 49).

22 »Einer von den türkischen Kaufleuten, die zugegen waren, und bemerkten, daß ich das Astrolabium auf die Stadt gerichtet hatte, war so neugierig auch durch das Fernglas zu sehen, und ward nicht wenig unruhig als er einen Thurm umgekehrt erblickte. Dieß gab Gelegenheit zu einem Gerüchte, daß ich nach Alexandrien gekommen wäre um die ganze Stadt über den Haufen zu werfen. […] Mein Janitschar wollte nicht mehr mit mir gehen, wenn ich mein Instrument mit nehmen wollte, [und] so erhielt ich hier weiter keine geometrische Messungen« (Niebuhr 1774, 49).

tactics can hinder the travelers' production of knowledge or even stop it temporarily. Due to the inhabitants' interference, the utilitarian narrative is, for a short time, unable to make abstract statements *about* these actors. By disturbing the scientific appropriation of space, these actors might exert a kind of resistance that Certeau associates with his concept of the *itinerary*.

In any case, the travelers' footsteps—and that means their itineraries—literally mark the boundaries of the city maps that the geographer draws. In the end, Niebuhr himself admits how much his cartographic skills must yield to the conditions of Arabian cities:

> I generally believe that one will not be able to demand more precise measurements from a traveler in the Orient than by means of a compass and footsteps, because without permission of the authorities, it is just as dangerous and arduous to make maps of cities there as in Europe. On a map of an Oriental city, one will also not look for all the streets but only for its size, its location, and the location of the most noteworthy squares in it. One will find this both on my map of Constantinople […] and on all other drawings I have sketched of Oriental cities, even though the streets on this map are only largely indicated arbitrarily to fill in the space. (Niebuhr 1774, 24)[23]

23 »Überhaupt glaube ich daß man von einem in den Morgenländern Reisenden keine genauere Messungen als vermittelst der Boussole und Schritte werde verlangen können, weil es daselbst eben so gefährlich und beschwerlich ist, ohne Erlaubnis der Obrigkeit Grundrisse von Städten zu machen, als in Europa. Man wird auch auf einem Grundriß von einer morgenländischen Stadt nicht eben alle Straßen, sondern nichts mehr suchen, als ihre Größe, ihre Lage und die Lage der merkwürdigsten Plätze in derselben. Dieß wird man so wohl auf meinem Grundriß von Constantinopel […] als auf allen übrigen Zeichnungen, welche ich von den morgenländischen Städten entworfen habe, antreffen, obgleich die Straßen auf diesem Grundriß größtentheils nur willkürlich angezeigt sind, um den Platz auszufüllen« (Niebuhr 1774, 24).

Fig. 2: Map of Constantinople, Galata and Scudar. Engraving III from Niebuhr's Reisebeschreibung (1774).

Conclusion

> [This, M.H.] leads me to try to locate in travel narratives the forms that this combination of the rules of literary production and those controlling scientific production takes. The travel narrative oscillates between these two poles and permits the elaboration of a theory of this association: the travel narrative is a text of observation, haunted by its Other, the imaginary. In this way it corresponds to its object, a »culture« haunted by its »savage« exteriority. (Certeau 1991, 225)

These words are taken from a paper Certeau originally wrote in 1978, in which he presented an outline of his new main project »Travel narratives of the French to Brazil: Sixteenth to eighteenth centuries,« to which he planned to dedicate all his time (Giard 1991, 213). When Certeau died in 1986, he left much of his work about the New World and travelogues as a »scientific and literary genre« unfinished (Certeau 1991, 221). Thinking about travelogues with Certeau thus means connecting pieces from various texts and seeing how they interact with a travelog at hand. Certeau's paper does give some indications as to what is important to him in examining travel literature: first, literary production, and second, scientific production. Bringing the two together, I have tried to consider travel writing both as an act located between voice and scripture and as a scientific practice of appropriating spaces.

Modern scholarship on the Royal Danish Expedition and the Enlightenment in general generally considers the relationship between European producers of knowledge and those being observed to be symmetrical and dialogic (see, e.g., Baack 2014; Vermeulen 2015). However, Certeau's thoughts on the transformation of voice into scripture could prompt us to look at knowledge production as a process of translation. Niebuhr himself stresses the fact that the travelers alter local knowledge by assessing, selecting, and abstracting it. As we have seen, European epistemic authority also rests on asserting possession of scriptural knowledge of ancient Arabic languages. Local residents, in contrast, have supposedly forgotten this knowledge and therefore their own past. If we consider Certeau's notion of »scriptural economy,« then eighteenth-century European knowledge

production can be regarded as a process of taking possession despite the absence of colonial ambitions among the scholars and travelers.

But Certeau's ethical provocation (Highmore 2007, 18) reaches further than pointing out different forms of epistemic violence.[24] Perhaps the greatest merit of his work is his call to search for local voices in the disturbances of the text's economy. Yet the travelogs of the Royal Danish Expedition do not seem to regard »the Orient« as a »feast for the eyes and ears« that interrupts the rational pattern of the narrative (Certeau 1988, 227). The theses Certeau developed about Jean de Léry may thus be historically limited in their applicability.

A closer look at different languages of space shows, however, another possibility for considering absent voices in the sources of the Royal Danish Expedition. Beyond the a-temporal and abstract narratives of maps that influence Niebuhr's travelogs, there are also, as I have shown, narratives of itineraries. In such itinerary narratives, locals disrupt the narrative patterns of the author's texts. This happens when Niebuhr writes about how local residents endanger his research. The expedition to Arabia thus shows that scientific sources can be haunted in different ways—in this case less by lust and fascination than by fear and insecurity.

Looking at knowledge formations in Certeau's spirit can encourage cultural studies to consider the different layers of writing production from manuscripts from the field to printed books. Concerning the Royal Danish Expedition, travel notes and hundreds of letters from and to the travelers promise a textual corpus in which local actors play roles that differ from those manifest in the printed sources. In these manuscripts from the field, itinerary narratives tend to be more dominant. Thus, provisional types of texts, such as asides and travel notes, can point out the limits of the archive's »panoptic glare« (Stoler 2009, 23–24). This approach agrees with Certeau's demand to analyze history as an operation, which means considering analytical processes as objects of historiographical scrutiny in their own right (Certeau 1988, 72).

24 The concept of »epistemic violence« was shaped by Gayavatri Chakravorty Spivak; see Spivak 1988, 280.

Further, it seems advisable to trace various constellations of strategies and tactics through the different media that constitute the corpora of European expeditions. The relationship between scripture and voice, between strategies and tactics of spatial appropriation, must be examined for written texts, but also for collections of objects, pictures, and maps (about the expedition's objects, see Haslund Hansen 2016). For example, the pictures created during and after the expedition to Arabia and published with Niebuhr's texts speak a different language of space than the written sources (see Haslund Hansen 2013, 142).

Certeau was well aware that his essay about Jean de Léry did not break the rules of the scriptural economy but rather repeated them (Certeau 1988, 211–12). The same holds true for my readings. When I look at the sources of the Royal Danish Expedition, I sometimes have to remind myself that not only one, but two »solar Eyes« are directed at the regions formerly called ›the Orient‹: the eye of the travelers, whose sole goal was to create as much empirically based ethnological, biological, and geographical knowledge as possible; and my own eye, which observes the expedition from a place far away in time and space. In the end, I can only assume the »existence and survival of a polytheism of concealed or disseminated practices« inside the texts—without really knowing them (Certeau 2010, 188).

References

Achermann, Eric. 2003. »Reisen zwischen Philologie und Empathie: Michaelis und die Niebuhr-Expedition.« *Cardanus* 3:51–78.

Baack, Lawrence J. 2014. *Undying Curiosity: Carsten Niebuhr and The Royal Danish Expedition to Arabia (1761–1767)*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Beck, Hanno. 1971. *Große Reisende: Entdecker und Erforscher unserer Welt*. Munich: Callwey.

Buchanan, Ian. 1992. »Writing the Wrongs of History: De Certeau and Post-colonialism.« *Journal of the South Pacific Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies* 33:39–46.

Certeau, Michel de. 1975. *L'écriture de L'histoire*. Paris: Gallimard.

—— 1988. »Ethno-graphy: Speech, or the Space of the Other; Jean de Léry.« In *The Writing of History*, translated by Tom Conley, 209–43. New York: Columbia University Press.

—— 1988. *The Writing of History*. Translated by Tom Conley. New York: Columbia University Press.

—— 1991. »Travel Narratives of the French to Brazil: Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries.« *Representations* 33:221–26.

—— 2000. *The Possession at Loudun*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—— 2002. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

—— 2010. *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*. 8th ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Certeau, Michel de, Dominique Julia, and Jacques Revel. 1975. *Une politique de la langue: La Révolution Française et les patois; L'enquête de Grégoire*. Paris: Gallimard.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000 *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Conermann, Stephan. 2002. »Carsten Niebuhr und das orientalistische Potenzial des Aufklärungsdiskurses—oder: ist das Sammeln von Daten unverdächtig?« In *Carsten Niebuhr, 1733–1815, und seine Zeit: Beiträge eines interdisziplinären Symposiums vom 7.–10. Oktober 1999 in Eutin*, edited by Josef Wiesehöfer and Stephan Conermann, 403–32. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Conermann, Stephan, and Josef Wiesehöfer, eds. 2002. *Carsten Niebuhr, 1733–1815, und seine Zeit: Beiträge eines interdisziplinären Symposiums vom 7.–10. Oktober 1999 in Eutin*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Conley, Tom. 1988. »Translator's Introduction: For a Literary Historiography.« In *The Writing of History*, by Michel Certeau, translated by Tom Conley, VII–XXIV.

Fabian, Johannes. 2014. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Feuerhahn, Wolf. 2004. »A Theologian's List and an Anthropologist's Prose: Michaelis, Niebuhr, and the Expedition to ›Felix Arabia.‹« In *Little Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays on Academic and Bureaucratic Practices*, edited by Peter Becker, 4th ed., 141–68. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Fornerod, Nicolas. 2008. »Léry, Jean de.« *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz*. Accessed July 17, 2017. http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D15871.php.

Forsskål, Peter. 2009. »Peter Forsskål's Journal.« Translated by Silvester Mazzarella. In *The Linnaeus Apostles: Global Science and Adventure*, vol. 4, *Europe—Middle East—North East & West Africa*, edited by Lars Hansen, Eivor Cormack, Per Sörbom, and Bertil Nordenstam, 283–379. London: IK Foundation.

Freccero, Carla. 2001. »Toward a Psychoanalytics of Historiography: Michel de Certeau's Early Modern Encounters.« *South Atlantic Quarterly* 100 (2): 365–79.

Füssel, Marian. 2007. »Einleitung: Ein Denker des Anderen.« In *Michel de Certeau: Geschichte, Kultur, Religion*, edited by Marian Füssel, 7–19. Constance: UVK.

—— 2013. »Tote Orte und Gelebte Räume: Zur Raumtheorie von Michel de Certeau S. J.« *Historical Social Research* 38:22–39.

Giard, Luce. 1991. »Epilogue: Michel De Certeau's Heterology and the New World.« *Representations* 33:212–21.

—— 1997. »How Tomorrow Is Already Being Born.« In *The Capture of Speech and Other Political Writings*. Edited by Luce Giard. Translated by Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Guichard, Roger H. 2014. *Niebuhr in Egypt: European Science in a Biblical World*. Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press.

Hartnett, Stephen. 1998. »Michel de Certeau's Critical Historiography and the Rhetoric of Maps.« *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 31:283–303.

Haslund Hansen, Anne. 2013. »Niebuhr and the Visual Documentation of the Arabian Voyage, 1761–1767.« In *Early Scientific Expeditions and Local Encounters: New Perspectives on Carsten Niebuhr and »the Arabian Journey«: Proceedings of a Symposium on the Occasion of the 250th Anniversary of the Royal Danish Expedition to Arabia Felix*, edited by Ib Friis, Michael Harbsmeier, and Jørgen Bæk Simonsen, 119–44. Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab.

—— 2016. *Niebuhr's Museum: Artefacts and Souvenirs from the Royal Danish Expedition to Arabia 1761–1767*. Translated by Dan A. Marmorstein. Copenhagen: Forlaget Vandkunsten.

Haven, Frederik Christian von. 2005. *Min sundheds forliis: Frederik Christian von Havens rejsejournal fra den Arabiske Rejse 1760–1763*, edited by Anne Haslund Hansen and S. T. Rasmussen. Copenhagen: Forlaget Vandkunsten.

Highmore, Ben. 2007. *Michel de Certeau: Analysing Culture*. London: Continuum.

Hübner, Ulrich. 2002. »Johann David Michaelis und die Arabien-Expedition 1761–1787.« In *Carsten Niebuhr, 1733–1815, und seine Zeit: Beiträge eines interdisziplinären Symposiums vom 7.–10. Oktober 1999 in Eutin*, edited by Josef Wiesehöfer and Stephan Conermann, 363–402. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Kim, Sung Ho. 2017. »Max Weber.« In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Winter ed., 2017. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed December 11, 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/weber/.

Legaspi, Michael C. 2010. *The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Léry, Jean de. 1578. *Histoire D'un Voyage Fait En La Terre Du Brésil, Autrement Dite Amérique […]*. La Rochelle.

Michaelis, Johann David. 1762. *Fragen an eine Gesellschaft gelehrter Männer, die auf Befehl Ihro Majestät des Königes von Dännemark nach Arabien reisen*. Frankfurt am Main: Johann Gottlieb Garbe [Contains »Vorrede« and »Instruction«].

Niebuhr, Carsten. 1772. *Beschreibung von Arabien: Aus eigenen Beobachtungen und im Lande selbst gesammleten Nachrichten abgefasset*. Copenhagen: Nicolaus Möller.

—— 1774–78. *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Ländern: Vol. 1–2*. Copenhagen: Nicolaus Möller.

—— 1837. *C. Niebuhr's Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und andern umliegenden Ländern.* Vol. 3, *C. Niebuhr's Reisen durch Syrien und Palästina, nach Cypern und durch Kleinasien und die Türkey nach Deutschland und Dänemark: Mit Niebuhr's astronomischen Beobachtungen und einigen kleineren Abhandlungen*, edited by J. N. Gloyer and J. Olshausen. Hamburg: Friedrich Perthes.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2012. *Die Entzauberung Asiens: Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert*. 2nd ed. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Pratt, Mary Louise. 2008. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Rasmussen, S.T. 1990a. »Carsten Niebuhrs Hovedværker.« In *Den Arabiske Rejse 1761–1767: En dansk ekspedition set i videnskabshistorisk perspektiv*, edited by S. T. Rasmussen, 347–81. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

—— 1990b. »Indledning.« In *Den Arabiske Rejse 1761–1767: En Dansk Ekspedition Set I Videnskabshistorisk Perspektiv*, edited by S. T. Rasmussen, 9–12. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

Rauchstein, Maike. 2017. *Fremde Vergangenheit: Zur Orientalistik des Göttinger Gelehrten Johann David Michaelis*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Said, Edward W. 2003. *Orientalism*. New edition with new preface. London: Penguin.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1985. »The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives.« *History and Theory* 24 (3): 247–72.

—— 1988. »Can the Subaltern Speak?« In *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 271–313. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Stoler, Ann Laura. 2009. *Along the Archival Grain. Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Vermeulen, Han F. 2015. *Before Boas: The Genesis of Ethnography and Ethnology in the German Enlightenment*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

***

Mirjam Hähnle, Department of History, University of Basel:
mirjam.haehnle@unibas.ch.

Petrified worldviews

The Eurocentric legacy in architectural knowledge bases on Japan

Beate Löffler

Introduction

Some years ago, I prepared a master's course for architects on Japanese architecture. I intended to teach the historical development of forms and types of cities, religious and public buildings as well as dwellings within the sociocultural frame of Japan and encountered a problem: the library holdings did not provide the information necessary for some of the planned student assignments. While in some cases the literature was only available in Japanese, in other cases it was superficial or even completely absent. As further inquiry showed, the library was not to blame, but the knowledge base on Japanese architecture, which is insufficient to cover the topics usually discussed in architectural history.

My ensuing research into the literature available in English, German, or French, in public and academic libraries as well as at bookshops, revealed three phenomena with respect to the lack of knowledge and the deficiency of discourse. First, there is not a single encyclopedic and topical overview of the history of Japanese architecture suitable for the classroom.[1] Secondly, while some topics, such as the tea house, are discussed repeatedly, even

1 Overviews were common in the early twentieth century but went out of fashion after World War II (e.g., Commission Impériale du Japon à l'Exposition universelle de Paris 1900; Harada 1936; Sadler 1941). Topical overviews are handbooks of well-studied cases but do not cover the overall context (e.g., Nishi 1983; Young 2004). Even regarding the modern era of Japanese architecture, which is well analyzed as a whole, some issues remain unsolved.

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v8-i2-177 ISSN 2191-6721

if on a sometimes superficial level,[2] other topics are poorly studied or missing altogether. This affects some standard issues in discourses of architectural history such as modern religious architecture, diverse urban models across history, theory of architecture, or even some basic topics regarding the generally very popular issue of Japanese dwellings. Lastly and most disturbingly, many of the texts use expressions and conceptualizations which simplify and polarize cultural phenomena along a dichotomy of East versus West.[3] This includes assessments of architectural phenomena based on biased concepts of culture and/or civilization. The latter is known from texts on »national« architectural traditions in Europe from the nineteenth century onward as well,[4] but notions like this subsequently disappeared from academic discourse regarding European architectural history during the latter half of the twentieth century. Yet it remains part of the architectural historiography regarding Japan.

This observation was unexpected. Japan became popular with architects especially of classical modernism before World War II and remained in discourse for decades, which should have gotten rid of colonial perceptions and evaluations. In the end, the significant difference between the general interest in Japanese culture and architecture on the one hand and the amount of reliable information about it on the other inspired a long-term research project about the generation, evaluation, and management of knowledge within the field of architectural history. The study is a complex

2 Beyond travelogues, souvenir photographs, and catalogues of the World's Fairs (e.g., Chicago 1893), Franz Baltzer was the first to discuss the architecture (Baltzer 1903). Okakura Kakuzō (1906) introduced the cultural practice to a Western audience. For a complete analysis see Surak (2012).

3 This phenomenon is apparent in the seminal works of Surak (2012) and Tagsold (2017) in neighboring fields as well as in Delank (1996) or Vogel Chevroulet (2010).

4 See, e.g., Viollet-le-Duc's *Histoire de l'habitation humaine, depuis les temps préhistoriques jusqu'à nos jours* (1875), Rudolf Henning's *Das deutsche Haus in seiner historischen Entwickelung* (1882), or the more abstract discourses, such as Heinrich Hübsch's *In welchem Style sollen wir bauen?* (1828).

hermeneutical analysis of texts and images, media and actors evolving around the architectural artifacts in their Japanese environment and the European practice of the authors involved. However, while the research approaches toward architectural history may be legitimately applied globally, many concepts are deeply influenced by European schools of thought and the resulting patterns of perception. To somewhat compensate for this, the research is influenced by conceptual approaches from cultural studies such as Clifford Geertz's holistic understanding of cultural phenomena and Homi K. Bhaba's concepts of cultural hybridity and otherness. Based on the preliminary results, I argue that both the gaps in knowledge and the remnants of the Eurocentric perspective date back to the formation of Japan-related studies during the latter half of the nineteenth century. I will further show which circumstances and ideas shaped the Western study of Japanese art and architecture at this point in time and how the institutionalization of modern academia influenced the field and petrified normative frames.

For the matter at hand, I will address only some of the many parameters that influenced the generation of knowledge on two different levels. First, I will broach very briefly the issues of authorship and expertise regarding Japanese architecture on the one hand and the possibilities of data acquisition by Westerners in Japan during the late nineteenth century on the other. Second, I address the in-field parameters that shaped the perception, evaluation, and integration of incoming information regarding Japanese architecture. I assume that the actors' self-conception and attitude predominantly shaped this process and embedded their professional worldview as well as their understanding of relevance in the knowledge base on Japanese architecture long-term. To do so, I look at three of the main topics of Western discourse regarding Japanese architecture and mirror the argumentations against the contemporary European doctrines. The three topics of art production, the danger constituted by fire and earthquakes, and the general problem of hygiene represent distinct parts of an architect's portfolio at the time and are closely linked to the main social discourses in these years.

Historical background

The exchange of knowledge between Europe and Japan came about in the middle of the sixteenth century through trade and Christian mission while Japan was engaged in civil war. The foreign influence proved momentous and was consequently crippled as soon as a new political balance was achieved with the establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1603. Along with the complete prohibition of the Christian faith and worship and all missionary activities, foreign trade was limited to a Dutch and a Chinese trading post in the harbor of Nagasaki from 1640 on.[5]

In the mid-nineteenth century, Japan experienced pressure from the Western hegemonies to end its isolationist policy and to take part in the power competition in East Asia. The foreign interference resulted in a number of bilateral commercial treaties and the establishment of some settlements for foreign residents as well as in two decades of political restructuring in Japan. Driven by the Chinese example, the newly established Meiji government tried to avoid colonization by initiating a complex process of modernization in 1868. It introduced a Western administrative machinery as well as technological and cultural knowledge, dispatched students to renowned educational institutions abroad, and hired experts from Europe and North America as advisors and teachers.[6] This added considerably to the international community of diplomats and tradesmen, missionaries and military personnel, which had been the first to settle in Japan during the late 1850s.

The Japanese government alone contracted approximately 3,000 experts over a period of about four decades; a similar number of foreigners came

5 The knowledge transfer between Japan and Europe in this period is best studied in regard to actors such as Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716) and Philipp Franz von Siebold (1796–1866) (e.g., Bonn 2003; Plutschow 2007). Information regarding the transfer of architectural ideas is mostly embedded in specific contexts such as the Christian mission (e.g., Meid 1977; Löffler 2011, 63–67) or the contemporary castle buildings (e.g., Coaldrake 1996, ch. 5).

6 For an overview on this issue, see Jones (1980) and Beauchamp (1990).

on their own or with private contracts (Jones 1980, xv). Civil engineers and architects arrived from Britain, the United States, Germany, and France to plan and supervise the construction of factories, administration buildings, railway stations, schools, barracks etc. all over Japan, introducing brick, cast iron, and concrete for some purposes. Art dealers, collectors, and artists visited to extend their collections and holdings, to gain inspiration for their creative work, or to advise the government regarding the further development of art production and art education. As many more came from other fields of expertise, they not only transferred Western knowledge to Japan but explored the country and reported home. This led to a sudden increase in publications about Japan in Europe and the appearance of Japan-related topics in popular and academic discourse. These sources make it possible to analyze the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of knowledge regarding architecture paradigmatically.

Authorship and expertise

The evaluation of the available publications shows that authorship is not necessarily related to formal expertise in the field. Aside from travelogues, regional studies, and World's Fair catalogues, I identified about 220 newspaper and journal snippets and articles, essays, and monographs addressing architectural topics regarding Japan in its widest sense between 1860 and 1900, ranging from descriptions of urban environment, construction, fire protection and earthquake resistance, singular buildings or building types, hygiene and social practices of dwelling to sightseeing, decorative detailing or new building projects and infrastructural development.[7] For texts in which the author is named or can otherwise be

7 Journal articles from 27 periodicals of Japanese/Asian studies, art and architecture/engineering are included in the analysis for this time period: *Journal Asiatique* (1822–, analyzed 1855–1940), *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (1847–), *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1858–1948, analyzed 1858–1922), *Revue Orientale et Américaine* (1859–1900, analyzed 1859–75), *The Chinese and Japanese Repository* (1863–65), *Mitteilungen der deutschen Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens* (1873–, analyzed 1873–1979), *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* (1874–, analyzed 1874–1910), *Österreichische Monatsschrift für den*

inferred, less than half of the authors had professional experience with architecture, art, or construction of any kind. Among those with experience in architecture or at least with art, half never visited Japan, but derived their knowledge from secondary sources. Thus, the majority of information on architectural issues was provided by authors with very diverse backgrounds (law, linguistics, ethnology, transport engineering, trade) and levels of insight, which created a relatively comprehensive but random flow of information from which others generated analyses and surveys. While all of them contributed to the flow of information toward the West and the development of a certain body of knowledge, the number of authors whose input allowed the European colleagues to engage in specialist discourse on architecture was small: The reliable basic knowledge on Japanese architecture up to the turn of the twentieth century was provided by three architects (Josiah Conder (1852–1920), Charles Thompson Mathews (1863–1934), and Ralph A. Cram (1863–1942)), two art scholars (Christopher Dresser (1834–1904), Okakura Kakuzō (1862–1913)), three (civil) engineers (Henry R. Brunton (1841–1901), M. Jules Lescasse (1842–1901), Georg Cawley (1848–1927)), a number of seismologists (John Milne (1850–1913), Kotō Bunjirō (1856–1935), Omori Fusakichi (1868–1923)), and zoologist Edward S. Morse (1838–1925). Their accounts, mostly essays of a dozen pages, went beyond the pure listing of buildings and topographical settings and

Orient (1875–1918), *Revue Française du Japon* (1892–97), *Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society, London* (1892–1941, analyzed 1892–1928), *The Art Journal* (1839–1912, evaluated 1849–1912), *Gazette des Beaux-arts* (1859–1925), L'art (1875–1907), *Die Kunst für alle* (1885–1943), *Studio: International Art* (1893–1925), *Ver Sacrum* (1896–1903), *Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration* (1897–1932), *The Builder* (1842–1966, analyzed 1851–1925), *Zeitschrift für Bauwesen* (1851–1931, analyzed 1851–1900), *The Building News and Engineering Journal* (1863–1926, analyzed 1863–1925), *Deutsche Bauzeitung* (1867–, analyzed 1867–1923), *The British Architect and Northern Engineer* (1875–1919), *American Architect and Building News* (1876–1938, analyzed 1876–1909), *Centralblatt der Bauverwaltung* (1881–1931), *Schweizerische Bauzeitung* (1883–1978), *Journal (RIBA)* (1884–1993, analysed 1884–93), *La Construction Moderne* (1885–, analyzed 1885–1938), *L'architecture* (1888–1939), *Architectural Record* (1891–, analyzed 1891–1924).

addressed architecture in its physical, built sense. This was based both on on-site experience in Japan and on either a relevant professional background or a long-term interest in the matter. This interest did not necessarily correlate with approval for the observed phenomena. While Edward S. Morse appreciated the functional and esthetic solutions of Japanese buildings, Josiah Conder and many of the others trained in engineering did not approve of the construction principles, the used materials or the (lack of) artistic expression of the Japanese buildings.[8]

Independent of the level of their authors' formal competence, the accounts were disseminated and discussed in journals either on Japanese /Asian Studies or on architecture, in the latter case usually by colleagues without on-site experience. While some texts gained lasting influence within and outside the field, such as Edward S. Morse's monograph *Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings* (1885), many others received barely any acknowledgement whatsoever.

The possibilities of data acquisition

The many activities of foreign residents in Japan at this time conceal two limiting factors in regard to data acquisition in general and architecture in particular: mobility and language. The discourses on Japanese art developed around collection holdings kept in Europe or North America, assisted by improving methods of visual reproductions. The latter supported the study of architecture as well, but architectural artifacts are by definition immobile and require on-site inspection. Regarding Japan, this created challenges. While foreigners from the treaty nations were free to settle in one of the trade harbors, they were initially not allowed to leave the settlement and its immediate surroundings. Exceptions were made for foreign advisors who had to travel in relation to their contract obligations. Over time, foreigners took advantage of modifications allowed for travel permits for health reasons and for the promotion of Japanese scholarship and pushed them to the limits for touristic activities as well (Toyosawa

8 See, e.g., Brunton (1874, 1875) and Conder (1878, 1883, 1884), or in an analyzed form Clancey (2006) and Löffler (2017).

2008, 143–46; see Bird 1881, 84). This made the exploration of the Japanese built environment beyond the vernacular neighborhoods possible and feasible. As the comments in travelogues and travel guides show, the infrastructural parameters of travel were of higher relevance for the choice of the locations visited than the legal limitations (Toyosawa 2008, 145–46; Hockley 2007). This made another defining parameter for the acquisition of data and generation of knowledge on Japanese architecture even more relevant: language. While understanding structural systems, spatial organization, and design parameters of the actual built artifacts does not necessarily require language skills, language is needed to gain entrance, to obtain background information on building history, and to learn about the relevance of locations, buildings, and sites in general. Beyond this, language is needed to obtain information about interesting sites, possible routes, means of transportation, and accommodation along the way. Since only a small number of the authors on Japanese architecture had the necessary skills, Japanese guides and translators came to be indispensable facilitators for any research. Their specific influence on the choice of cases and the resulting insights often remain unclear, not least since their role was rarely acknowledged in the resulting publications.[9]

These conditions, which were in part specific to Japan, in part common challenges for field research outside of the touristically developed parts of Europe at the time, shaped the collection of data and the creation of knowledge in the available texts.

There was, however, an altogether different layer of parameters that gained even more influence on the emerging knowledge on Japanese architecture, namely the building-related fields of professional expertise jockeying for position. The emergence and subsequent academization of engineering professions applied pressure on the fields of the building

9 An exception is Christopher Dresser's Japan, its Architecture, Art and Art-Manufactures (1882). His diary gives insights into the role of his Japanese support staff, namely Ishida Tametake and Sakata Haruo, and Ishaida's report on this trip serves as a counter-narrative (Scholtz 2011, chap. 1, 20–108).

trades and of artistic (architectural) design. As a consequence, each of the fields involved campaigned to highlight their own competence and to devalue the opposing parties. This included a struggle for the prerogative of interpretation regarding the conceptual meaning of »architecture.« Thus, the incoming information on Japanese architecture was evaluated, discussed, and disseminated according to its usefulness in this dispute. Qualities that proved helpful for a particular line of argumentation became embedded in the knowledge systems, others were disregarded (Löffler 2017).

Thus, only a small number of issues with respect to Japanese architecture initially addressed in the many publications were repeated, given constant attention, or initiated discourse. The most obvious are art production, the dangers constituted by fire and earthquakes, and questions of hygiene. Incidentally, these three topics allow us not only to trace the processes of knowledge production on Japanese architecture, but point toward the complex and interwoven character of architecture as an art form, an engineering profession, and as a social practice. It underlines the fundamental transformation that the field of architecture underwent in the course of the academization of civil engineering, architecture, art, art history and, later, urban planning on the one hand and the Eurocentric reference system that framed the evaluation of that knowledge on the other.

Discursive topics/art

The discourse regarding Japonism in the fine and applied arts has been widely studied and written about, spanning Impressionism, the Arts and Crafts movement, Art deco, and ethnographic collections, among many others (e.g., Lancaster 1963; Wichmann 1999; Sigur 2008; Lambourne 2007; Mae 2013; Irvine 2013). The craze at that time and the immense impact of artifacts and art technologies from Japan on Europe's art history may obscure the fact that Western acknowledgement of Japanese art was not unconditional. While the design decisions for ceramics, fans, or lacquerware were appreciated for their inspiring creativity, Japanese buildings, ink paintings, and sculptures did not adhere to European rules of proper artistic expression. Sir Rutherford Alcock (1809–97), British

diplomat in China and Japan and an avid collector of Japanese art, marked the distinction in his book *Art and Art Industries in Japan*:

> Of high Art, such as has been cultivated in Europe since the dark ages, the Japanese know nothing. But the range of true artistic work in its application to industrial purposes in Japan is very wide, and more varied than anywhere in Europe. (Alcock 1878, 15)

Alcock refers to the canon of arts that ruled art education and art connoisseurship of the time. It draws a precise line between fine art, taught at art academies like the arguably leading École des Beaux-Arts in Paris and aiming to train artists, on the one hand, and applied art, taught at often local industrial schools to provide further training to craftsmen, on the other. Art historian James Jackson Jarves (1818–88), who never visited Japan but gained his insights from images, takes the same position as Alcock and explains his evaluation in *A Glimpse at the Art of Japan*.

> Indeed, painting, sculpture, and architecture, in their supreme significance—the fine arts, with human soul and form as their fundamental motives, and human excellence or spiritual loveliness as their distinctive aims in expression—are not found in the aesthetic constitution of the Japanese. (Jarves 1876, 22)

He argued that since Japanese art did not perceive man as the prime subject of artistic expression, as the Greek tradition did, it was thus to be judged as essentially different from the European standards:

> Far narrower in range, unscientific in our meaning, less profound in motives, unambitious in its aims, less fettered by technical rule or transitory fashions, it is more subtile [*sic*], intense, varied, free, and truthfully artistic in decorative expression; more abounding in unexpectedness and delicious surprises, in aesthetic coquetries and charms of aesthetic speech intelligible to every degree of culture. (Jarves 1876, 22)

Jarves' and Alcock's statements are comparatively explicit in drawing a clear line between »artistic enjoyment« and »true fine art,« but while many other texts use gentler descriptions and explanations, they express

just the same conviction about Western superiority in fine arts (e.g., Gonse 1883, vol. 2, 11, 18; Godwin 1878, 85).

The valorization of European artistic traditions led the authors to dismiss Japanese architecture as well. Jarves wrote:

> Architecture, in its noblest condition, is equally unknown in Japan. There is shown no elaborate attempt to develop it, either in intellectual or spiritual shapes. Instead they erect temporary homes or shrines, tent-like in principle, bizarre in construction, mostly of wood or frailer material, and in nowise responding to that fine instinct of immortality which materializes itself in our finest religious edifices, or even those aspirations which find vent in our ambitious palaces and public buildings. (Jarves 1876, 21)

British architect Josiah Conder (1852–1920), Founding Professor of the Department of Western Architecture at the Imperial College of Engineering in Tokyo, adopted a more pragmatic approach when he addressed his students in 1878:

> Upon one thing I insist, and that is, that a building must be substantial, and that in its very essence and nature it is to be a secure protection from the elements, and from all probable destructive forces. Without a certain necessary amount of substantial material we can produce only sheds and bungalows which cannot be dignified by the name of Architecture. […] It seems to me that there is little use of changes in building in your country, if the chief aim is not solidity and strength. (Conder 1878, 3–4)

The words of both authors point toward the ruling architectural canon of the time, which appointed notions of architectural art only to representative stone buildings and within a clear European hierarchy of artistic value. At the head of this hierarchy stood the temples of Ancient Greece, the Acropolis in Athens representing the ideal, followed by Renaissance churches such as St. Peter's Basilica in Rome, the cathedrals of the French Gothic period, and finally the later academic styles. Against this background and the Vitruvian ideals of *firmitas* (solidity), *utilitas* (usefulness), and *venustas* (aesthetics) in architectural theory, vernacular buildings did

not qualify as architecture, nor did wooden or—for that matter—cast-iron constructions, no matter how technically or aesthetically elaborate or monumental.

This explains the distinction between the building itself and its artistic decoration in the summary on Japanese architecture that Japanologist Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850–1935) provided in his influential handbook *Things Japanese* (1890). He addresses the memorial sites of the Tokugawa shogunate, which were famous for their plentiful decorative details and were considered highlights for sightseeing:

> Nikko and Shiba are glorious, not as architecture (in the sense in which we Europeans, the inheritors of the Parthenon, of the Doges' Palace, and of Lincoln Cathedral, understand the word architecture), but for the elaborate geometrical figures, the bright flowers and birds and fabulous beasts, with which the sculptor and painter of wood has so lavishly adorned them. (Chamberlain 1891, 33)

In addition, the holistic professional profile of the Japanese carpenter did not meet the European expectations regarding the division of labor and status (see Coaldrake 1990; Clancey 2006). It clashed with the contemporary process of professional differentiation between the empirically based blue-collar construction of buildings and an architect's supposedly scientific and artistic white-collar design process. As a result of this evaluation, the interest in Japanese architecture was in its picturesque characteristics, such as the composition of building parts, the relationship between building and landscape, and the decorative detailing. It was perceived as an expression of a non-modern culture, soon to be overwritten and extinguished by necessary modernization. While some regretted the impending loss, Japanese architecture was subject to phenomenological observation of curious or picturesque characteristics alone and did not become a field of deeper study. The disseminated visual material—(photographs, paintings, and sketches) of the existing architectural heritage in Japan—followed

this interest and was dominated by souvenir photography of exotic places, foreign customs, and social practices.[10]

Discursive topics—Danger from fire and earthquakes

The second field of discursive interest arose from everyday experience in Japan. The densely populated urban environments consisted predominantly of wooden structures. While the regulations, infrastructures, and drills for fire prevention were strict, the many earthquakes caused not only damage to the buildings but often also conflagration. Within the Western community, the issue was perceived as easily solvable by comprehensive implementation of Western building techniques in stone and brick. Christopher Dresser (1834–1904)—admittedly not a building expert himself—was the only one who suggested keeping the traditional building practice, but to treat the wood with fire-retardant fluids (Dresser 1882, 236).

What remained open to discussion was the issue of earthquake-resistant construction. Older sources had already reported on the interconnectedness between seismic risks and local building technologies in Japan. German physicist Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716), who worked in Nagasaki for the Dutch East India Company (VOC), wrote in his *History of Japan*:

> The reason of their building their houses so very low, is the frequency of earthquakes, which prove much more fatal to lofty and massy buildings of stone, than to low and small houses of wood. (Kaempfer 1727–29, vol. 2, 411–12)

He added:

> I took notice, that the roof, which is covered with planks, or shingles of wood, rests upon thick, strong, heavy beams, as large as they can get them, and that the second story is generally built stronger and

10 The documentary photographs of major architectural sites taken during the Jinshin Survey of 1872 were never published. The colored woodblock prints of the time that addressed contemporary topics depicted quite a number of buildings and urban environments. Their focus, however, was not so much on Japanese buildings, instead, they often commented on the strange customs and houses of the Western foreigners.

> more substantial than the first. This they do by reason of the frequent earthquakes, which happen in this country, because they observe, that in case of a violent shock, the pressure of the upper part of the house upon the lower, which is built much lighter, keeps the whole from being overthrown. (Kaempfer 1727–29, vol. 2, 412)

Kaempfer's account was often reproduced or adopted in travelogues and area studies and became an issue of dissent as soon as engineers took up the topic. British railway engineer Richard Henry Brunton (1841–1901) commented in 1874 regarding the Japanese house:

> [W]ith its unnecessarily heavy roof and weak framework, it is a structure of all others the worst adapted to withstand a heavy earthquake shock. (Brunton 1874, 72)

He rejected the notion of any empirical or cultural reasons for the Japanese building practices and advocated massive stone and brick buildings with sufficient reinforcement in earthquake-endangered areas, in keeping with the European teachings of the time.

French civil engineer Jules Lescasse (1842–1901) worked for the Japanese government and planned infrastructure, service buildings, and dwellings, especially for the Ikuno mine (Hyogo) (Nishibori 1991; Lagarde-Fouquet 2014, 60, 62–63). He examined the Japanese construction principles more closely and considered the Japanese arguments for the form of foundations, the heaviness of the roofs and the design of joints. In the end, he acknowledged the ability of the low buildings to sway in case of a tremor but saw serious weaknesses in regard to their resistance to stronger horizontal jolts. He suggested wide-meshed wooden frameworks with infill in masonry reinforced by iron armature (Lescasse 1877, 451–58).

While Lescasse's solution took Japanese practices and resources into consideration, his main objective was the same as Brunton's: striving to find universal and comprehensive principles for building's complete physical resistance to all imaginable environmental influences. In case of earthquakes, this was apparently to be found in the utmost rigidity of the construction. Consequently, these ideas were confidently applied in Japan at the sites of modern building projects, be it factories, schools, or train

stations, and even in some dwellings like in Tokyo's showcase district Ginza (Meid 1977; Finn, 1995; Coaldrake 1996, 208–50).

With the engineers all on the same page, debate regarding earthquakes and Japanese construction principles arose in other professions. In his book *Japan. Its Architecture, Art, and Art Manufactures* (1882), Christopher Dresser not only commented on fire-retardant fluids, but argued in general in favor of the Japanese construction principles and against their wholesale replacement by Western structures.

> To me nothing could be more absurd than this departure from architectural custom which has had the sanction of ages; and the result of this incongruous innovation will probably be a return to the native style of building after the occurrence of some dire calamity. (Dresser 1882, 236–37)

While his approach to the matter might have been driven by some romanticism, he strengthened his argument by referring to Japanese expertise and included information given by his interpreter, Haruo Sakata. With his help, Dresser describes the Japanese house and the Japanese pagoda as wooden constructions resilient against the impact of earthquakes:

> It is obvious that while an object fixed to the earth might, if rocked, be broken off from the ground or become strained and destroyed, that that which is loose would simply oscillate and settle down again after the cause of its vibration had ceased. For instance, we may cause a chair or a table to rock by jolting it, but in a very short time it will become stationary and will be uninjured; whereas, were the legs fixed, the application of a small amount of pressure on the upper part (especially if the top was heavy), or any upheaving of a portion of the ground on which it rests, would be likely to injure or destroy it. (Dresser 1882, 235)

He elaborated especially on the built-in flexibility that allows for the tower-like pagoda to remain upright and to last through centuries of seismic occurrences (Dresser 1882, 237–38). The text met a friendly reception by the architectural and engineering journals in Britain but gave rise to opposition from Josiah Conder, causing a number of counterstate-

ments in the respective journals (Clancey 2006). Interestingly enough, the acknowledged architect failed to refute the layman's account convincingly and the discourse petered out after two years without a winner.[11] At the same time, actual research was taken over by experts from physics and the new field of seismology, thus moving away from building matters toward theoretical and experimental approaches.

When the Mino-Owari earthquake struck Japan in 1891, the shortcomings of both Western and Japanese ways of construction became visible. This did not diminish the faith in modern engineering knowledge and building technologies. Both the Japanese and the Western research that ensued concentrated on even more reinforcement. Even after the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, when analyses showed the value of elastic structures in timber and steel and thus of resilience over resistance (Engineering reports 1907, The Effects of the San Francisco Earthquake 1907), solutions were sought in Western engineering technologies alone. Rarely did anyone reexamine Japanese practices. While Fusakichi Omori (1868-1923) sketched the genesis of the pagoda construction system in 1921 and thus factually resolved Dresser's and Conder's dispute (Omori 1921, 110–52), the implementation of reinforced concrete during the 1920s actually provided a technology which was able to largely solve the problem on a practicable daily basis. This technological success marginalized interest in the earthquake resilience of Japanese wooden constructions even further.

While Western technology identified construction principles that allow for earthquake-resilient high-rises over the course of the twentieth century, the overall development left a Eurocentric gap in our knowledge bases. It is not due to systematic research by civil engineering that the mechanisms

11 This shows the fluidity of expert status in architecture at this time, which is especially apparent in Conder's case. As he was a highly qualified British architect and professor of architecture at the highest-ranking architectural department in Japan, his expertise should have been the leading voice in regard to Japanese architecture. However, one can assume that in addition to his comparatively low interest in the topic, his extended stay in Japan and his limited activity within the British architects' networks undermined his standing in Europe.

which enable Japanese pagodas and temples to remain upright are basically known today. It is due to building surveys in the course of heritage preservation that we gained access to case studies and learned about the elaborate and sustainable workings of constructional features for the earthquake resilience of traditional Japanese architecture (e.g., Henrichsen 2003; Larsen 1994; Enders and Gutschow 1998).

Discursive topics—Hygiene

The issue of hygiene in nineteenth-century discourse is likewise related to everyday observations in Japan and links technological development, urban planning, housing conditions, public health, and morals. While this topic was partially relocated into the field of civil engineering over time and became mostly obsolete in Western cities during the late twentieth century, debates regarding hygiene were for the longest time an essential topic in architecture and planning, even more so in the course of urbanization and industrialization in the nineteenth century. Hygiene encompasses diverse phenomena from heating of and fresh air for dwellings to drinking water supply, toilets, and sewage disposal, and is addressed by diverse authors across all the textual media available from travelogues to papers by experts in specialized journals.

In 1858, Andrew Hull Foote (1806–63), captain of the US Navy, wrote in his report on the *Visit to Simoda and Hakodai in Japan*:

> The streets of Simoda are fifteen or twenty feet wide and partly paved with stone. At the sides are gutters and sewers for draining the refuse water and filth into the harbor, or into a small stream, running through the outskirts of the town—another evidence of an advanced state of civilization over the Chinese. (Foote 1858, 131)

In a similar travelogue from 1856, German artist Wilhelm Heine (1827–85) links the cleanliness of the city to its residents' individual conduct:

> Within the houses as well as on the streets, great cleanliness prevails, and the latter are even swept at least once a day, just as the residents

> bathe every day. The better-off have the bath in their homes, the poorer use public baths […]. (Heine 1856, vol. 2, 33)[12]

This observation, however, generated a problem of interpretation since the practices of body cleansing, while exemplary in terms of hygiene, violated the understanding of cause and effect and the moral compass of many observers. German geographer Johann Justus Rein (1835–1918) struggled with this problem when he described the customs of Japan in the 1880s:

> The unconcern with which the female members of the household use the bath in view of the men and of passers-by has caused many a European no little astonishment. (Rein 1888, 412)

A paragraph later, his account additionally points toward the adaptations in public behavior in Japan due to the Christianity-based ethics of the Western cultures that served as a model for the modernization process:

> There are many public bath-houses for the people in every town. […] Formerly both sexes bathed together without any concern, they are now separated by a plank partition barely one and a half metres high. (Rein 1888, 412)

Rein's disapproval of some hygienic practices shows the problems which all foreigners faced in Japan: their patterns of interpretation frequently did not fit the case. While Japan was doubtless perceived to be a highly developed culture, it lacked the markers of European civilization, especially the technological infrastructure that had become a self-evident indicator of a progressive society in the West. However, the technologically inferior Japanese culture managed to ensure high hygienic standards across all levels of society and thus challenged the Western self-image. Consequently,

12 »In den Häusern wie auf den Straßen herrschte eine große Reinlichkeit und selbst letztere werden alltäglich wenigstens einmal gefegt; eben so pflegen die Bewohner alltäglich zu baden. Wohlhabendere haben das Bad im Hause, Ärmere besuchen öffentliche Badeanstalten […].« (translated by the author).

Rein's argument is no longer consistent when he tries to come to a clear interpretation and evaluation of the observed customs:

> The Japanese, though on the whole he does not stand upon a high level of morality, did not upon such occasions indulge himself in anything that was unseemly even according to our ideas. It was only contact with Europeans that opened his eyes, and put an end to this Paradisiacal simplicity. […] Bashfulness is undoubtedly a product of social life and civilization, as was pointed out long ago by Rousseau. It is no criterion of morality, appears in different forms, and varies with the education of mankind and with the climate in which they have to live. (Rein 1888, 413)

This is not least due to the fact that the Western understanding of hygiene itself was comparatively new in this form and not coherent in itself. It fused elements of the Christian tradition, which included a guarded attitude toward physicality and sexuality, with the enlightened understanding of the links between sewage disposal and bodily cleanliness on the one hand and health care and disease prevention on the other. This somewhat haphazardly connected hygiene, especially bodily cleanliness, with technological innovation and civilization as well as with paternalistic concepts of national education and morality.

The densely populated Japanese urban areas proved superior in this matter since all the leading Western cities of the time were subject to the dire threat of epidemics due to the lack of sufficient sanitation. A key event in this regard was the Great Stink in London in 1858, which finally triggered extensive reconstruction of the urban sewer system. As in London, the well-known urban redevelopments such as Haussmann's renovation of Paris, 1853–70, or James Hobrecht's *Radialsystem* for Berlin, 1873–90, that addressed the health risk, among other issues, were still in their planning stages or in the very beginning of realization at the time.[13]

13 For an introduction into the issue see for example Mumford 1966, especially the chapter 15 Paleotechnic Paradiese: Coketown, 446–81.

While the Japanese model of individual hygiene, drinking water supply, and sewage disposal was functioning very well, even in cities with about a million inhabitants like Tokyo, it was not perceived as a solution for the European plight. It relied on manual labor instead of technological infrastructure and was thus not seen fit to provide suggestions for progressive modern Western cities. In addition, it depended deeply on the socio-cultural conditions of Japan, as Edward Morse elaborated in 1886 in his evaluation of the Japanese privy (Morse 1886, 231–33).

When Basil Chamberlain provided a single-sentence synopsis on the topic in 1891, the technological solutions in European cities had become successfully established, thus solving the issue:

> [T]he physicians who have studied Japanese dwelling-houses from the point of view of hygiene, give them a clean bill of health. (Chamberlain 1891, 35)

As observed similarly in the other cases above, the Western interest in Japanese hygienic practices was inspired by a critical situation in Europe. Therefore, study and analysis focused on potential solutions and rejected the Japanese low-tech approach as soon as it became obvious that it was not consistent with the Western ideas of technological development and social progress. Thus, the information collected remained fragmentary and evaluations made at one time were rarely reconsidered against the background of new data.

Conclusion

The discursive constellations in relation to Japanese architecture presented above represent three significant fields of Western interest that mirror the close interconnectedness between architectural issues and general social discourse. Beyond these, three more topics came up repeatedly: the social role of the Japanese artisan, the relationship between building and landscape, and the simplicity and starkness of Japanese interior design and use of materials. All the analyzed texts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century provided factual information and contextualized it within the general systems of European world perception and the

respective knowledge systems of competing specialists' fields. In doing so, the discourses about Japan, while providing information, primarily negotiated cultural hierarchies and an understanding of levels of civilization against the background of technological development alone. On the one hand, the analysis of Japanese phenomena served a general self-affirmation of European cultural and technological superiority, but on the other, it served to demarcate professionalism and specialization in the fields of architecture, art, and civil engineering within Europe and without integrating the available non-Western input.

The Enlightenment had given rise to the professionalization of natural science and the shift from *artes liberales* to the academically institutionalized humanities. In parallel, the technological fields of the traditionally low-ranking *ars mechanicae* gained influence in the course of industrialization and fought for an acknowledgment of their work as scientific and rational and thus equal to the well-established older disciplines. The fine arts remained in limbo in their search for precise delineations between high art on the one hand and craftsmanship on the other. Each of the actors in these interest groups strove to strengthen his position and his respective specialist's prerogative of interpretation within society.

This competition within the European intellectual elite led to a conscious devaluation and marginalization of established empirical practices and knowledge systems. Trade-based competence was labeled »traditional« and »non-scientific« in contrast to the »modern« and »scientific« processes of knowledge production in modern academia. These efforts to delineate precise territories of competence created artificial fields of study, as is the case with architecture, which still maintains a contested claim that it connects technological advancement with high art and social organization.

In terms of the management of knowledge regarding Japanese architecture, this historical situation during the latter half of the nineteenth century proved crippling. While the amazement and curiosity in contact with the foreign culture had initially created a holistic approach to information gathering, the pragmatic approach of experts aware of the field soon led to a focus on the usefulness of any information for the European knowledge system. Since the Japanese architectural solutions did not fit

any of the parameters sought for, data never underwent deeper reflection or analysis but was shelved as it was collected. In the long run, it was not widely discussed and thoroughly analyzed knowledge that became the foundation of modern Japanese architectural studies in the West, but raw, superficial data, interwoven with cultural biases.

References

Alcock, Rutherford. 1878. *Art and Art Industries in Japan*. London: Virtue.

Baltzer, Franz. 1903. *Das Japanische Haus: Eine Bautechnische Studie*. Berlin: Ernst & Sohn.

Beauchamp, Edward R., and Akira Iriye, eds. 1990. *Foreign Employees in Nineteenth Century Japan*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Bird, Isabella Lucy. 1881. *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan: An Account of Travels on Horseback in the Interior; Including Visits to the Aborigines of Yezo and the Shrines of Nikkô and Isé*. 2 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Bonn, Gerhard. 2003. *Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716): Der Reisende und Sein Einfluß auf die Europäische Bewußtseinsbildung über Asien*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Brunton, Richard Henry. 1874. »Constructive Art in Japan (1).« In *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan II*, 64–86. Tokyo: Asiatic Society of Japan.

—— 1875. »Constructive Art in Japan (2).« In *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan III*, 20–30. Tokyo: Asiatic Society of Japan.

Chamberlain, Basil Hall. 1891. *Things Japanese*. 2nd ed. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner.

Clancey, Gregory. 2006. *Earthquake Nation: The Cultural Politics of Japanese Seismicity, 1868–1930*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Coaldrake, William H. 1990: *The Way of the Carpenter: Tools and Japanese Architecture*. Tokyo: Weatherhill.

—— 1996. *Architecture and Authority in Japan*. New York: Routledge.

Commission Impériale du Japon à l'Exposition universelle de Paris, ed. 1900. *Histoire de l'art du Japon*. Paris: Maurice de Brunoff.

Conder, Josiah. 1878. *Lecture upon Architecture: Addressed to the Architectural Students*. Tokyo: Kobudaigakko, Tokei, Japan.

—— 1883. »Japanese Pagodas and Their Construction.« Letter to the editor. *Building News and Engineering Journal* 44 (April 20): 529.

Conder, Roger Thomas. 1884. »Japanese Pagoda.« *Building News and Engineering Journal* 47 (December 19): 1017.

Delank, Claudia. 1996. *Das Imaginäre Japan in der Kunst: »Japanbilder« vom Jugendstil bis zum Bauhaus*. München: Iudicum.

Dresser, Christopher. 1882. *Japan: Its Architecture, Art, and Art Manufactures*. London: Longmans, Green.

Enders, Siegfried R. C. T., and Niels Gutschow, eds. 1998. *Hozon: Architectural and Urban Conservation in Japan*. Stuttgart: Edition Axel Menges.

»Engineering reports on the San Francisco earthquake.« 1907. *The Builder* 92 (June 1): 656.

Finn, Dallas. 1995. *Meiji Revisited: The Sites of Victorian Japan*. New York: Weatherhill.

Foote, Andrew Hull. 1858. »Visit to Simoda and Hakodai in Japan.« *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*: 129–37.

Godwin, Edward William. 1878. »Japanese Building.« *The British Architect and Northern Engineer* (August 30): 85.

Gonse, Louis. 1883. *L'Art Japonise*. 2 vols. Paris: A. Quantin.

Harada, Jiro, and Charles Geoffrey Holme, eds. 1936. *The Lesson of Japanese Architecture*. London: The Studio.

Heine, Wilhelm. 1856. *Reise um die Erde nach Japan an Bord der Expeditions-escadre unter Commodore M.C. Perry in den Jahren 1853, 1854 und 1855: Unternommen im Auftrage der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten*. 2 vols. Leipzig: Hermann Costenoble.

Henning, Rudolf. 1882. *Das Deutsche Haus in seiner Historischen Entwickelung*. Strassburg: Karl J. Trübner.

Henrichsen, Christoph, ed. 2003. *Historische Holzarchitektur in Japan: Statische Ertüchtigung und Reparatur/Historic Wooden Architecture in Japan; Structural Reinforcement and Repair*. Stuttgart: Theiss.

Hockley, Allan. 2007. »Globetrotter's Japan: People; Foreigner on the Tourist Circuit in Meiji Japan.« Accessed December 5, 2017. https://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/gt_japan_places/index.html

Hübsch, Heinrich. 1828. *In welchem Style sollen wir bauen?* Karlsruhe: Chr. Fr. Müller'sche Hofbuchdruckerey.

Irvine, Gregory, and Tayfun Belgin. 2013. *Japonisme and the Rise of the Modern Art Movement: The Arts of the Meiji Period*. London: Thames & Hudson.

Jarves, James Jackson. 1876. *A Glimpse at the Art of Japan*. New York: Hurd and Houghton.

Jones, Hazel J. 1980. *Live Machines: Hired Foreigners and Meiji Japan*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Kaempfer, Engelbert. 1727–1729: *The History of Japan, Giving an Account of the Ancient and Present State and Government of that Empire: Of Its Temples, Palaces, Castles and Other Buildings, of Its Metals, Minerals, Trees, Plants, Animals, Birds and Fishes, of the Chronology and Succession of the Emperors, Ecclesiastical and Secular, of the Original Descent, Religions, Customs, and Manufactures of the Natives, and of Their Trade and Commerce with the Dutch and Chinese; Together with a Description of the Kingdom of Siam*. 2 vols. London: printed for the translator [J. G. Scheuchzer].

Lagarde-Fouquet, Annie. 2014. »Contribution d'ingénieurs et architectes français à la construction de Yokohama (Japon) entre 1860 et 1900.« In *Les Acteurs de la composition urbaine (édition électronique)*, edited by Brigitte Bertoncello, 56–69. Paris: Éditions du CTHS.

Lambourne, Lionel. 2007. *Japonisme: Cultural Crossings between Japan and the West*. London: Phaidon Press.

Lancaster, Clay. 1963. *The Japanese Influence in America*. New York: W. H. Rawls.

Larsen, Knut Einar. 1994. *Architectural Preservation in Japan*. Trondheim: Tapir.

Lescasse, M. J. 1877. »Étude sur les Constructions Japonaises, &c.« *Memoires de la Societé des Ingénieurs Civils* (April 6): 211–18, 451–58.

Löffler, Beate. 2011. *Fremd und Eigen: Christlicher Sakralbau in Japan seit 1853*. Berlin: Frank & Timme.

—— 2017. »Verhinderte Innovation: Der japanbezogene Erdbebendiskurs als fachhistorisches Phänomen.« In *Alltag und Veränderung—Praktiken des Bauens und Konstruierens*, edited by Gesellschaft für Bautechnikgeschichte, 191–204. Dresden: Thelem.

Mae, Michiko, and Elisabeth Scherer, Elisabeth, eds. 2013. *Nipponspiration: Japonismus und japanische Populärkultur im deutschsprachigen Raum*. Cologne: Böhlau.

Meid, Michiko. 1977. *Der Einführungsprozeß der europäischen und nordamerikanischen Architektur in Japan seit 1542*. Cologne: Abteilung Architektur des Kunsthistorischen Instituts der Universität Köln.

Morse, Edward Sylvester. 1886. *Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings*. Boston: Ticknor & Company.

Mumford, Lewis. 1966. *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects*. 3rd ed. London: Secker & Warburg.

Nishi, Kazuo, and Kazuo Hozumi. 1983. *What is Japanese architecture?* Tokyo: Kodansha.

Nishibori, Akira. 1991. »Meiji jidai no kōzan kankei furansuhito ni tsuite (1). Kan'ei Ikuno kōzan.« *Yokohama keiei kenkyū: Yokohama Business Review* 12 (3): 61–72.

Okakura, Kakuzō. 1906. *The Book of Tea*. London: Putman's Sons.

Omori, Fusakichi. 1921. »Measurement of Vibration of Gojunotos, or 5-Story Buddhist Stupas (Pagodas).« *Bulletin of the Imperial Earthquake Investigation Committee* 9 (3): 110–152.

Plutschow, Herbert. 2007. *Philipp Franz von Siebold and the Opening of Japan—A Re-evaluation*. Folkestone: Global Oriental.

Rein, Johann Justus. 1888. *Japan: Travels and Researches*. 2nd ed. 2 vols. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

Sadler, Arthur. J. 1941. *A Short History of Japanese Architecture*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.

Scholtz, Amelia Catherine. 2011. »Dispatches from Japanglia: Anglo-Japanese Literary Imbrication, 1880–1920.« PhD diss., Rice University Houston.

Sigur, Hanna. 2008. *The Influence of Japanese Art on Design*. Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith.

Surak, Kirsten. 2012. *Making Tea, Making Japan: Cultural Nationalism in Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Tagsold, Christian 2017. *Spaces in Translation: Japanese Gardens and the West*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

»The Effects of the San Francisco Earthquake of April 18th, 1906, on Engineering Constructions: Reports of a General Committee and of Six Special

Committees of the San Francisco Association of Members of the American Society of Civil Engineers.« 1907. *Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers* 33 (3): 299–354.

Toyosawa, Nobuko. 2008. »The Cartography of Epistemology: The Production of »National« Space in Late 19th Century Japan.« PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène. 1875. *Histoire de l'habitation humaine, depuis les temps préhistoriques jusqu'à nos jours*. Paris: Bibliothèque d'éducation et de récréation.

Vogel Chevroulet, Irène. 2010. *La création d'une japonité moderne (1870–1940) ou le regard des architectes européens sur le Japon. Josiah Conder, Robert Mallet-Stevens, Bruno Taut et Charlotte Perriand*. Sarrebruck: Université Européenne.

Wichmann, Siegfried and Mary Whittall, eds. 1999. *Japonisme: The Japanese Influence on Western Art Since 1858*. London: Thames & Hudson.

Young, Michiko, David Young, and Tan Hong Yew. 2004. *Introduction to Japanese architecture*. Hong Kong: Periplus Editions.

***

Dr. Beate Löffler, IN-EAST School of Advanced Studies, University of Duisburg-Essen: beate.loeffler@uni-due.de.

Feminism Otherwise

Intersectionality beyond Occidentalism

Julia Roth

Based on the paradigm of Eurocentric hegemony and the respective cartographies of of knowledge, feminist theorizing is conventionally perceived as being situated in the academy and in the so-called Global North. Feminism thus seems to be owned by Western European and North American academic (and mostly white) feminists, while other regions and epistemes serve as the objects of knowledge production. For example, the concept of intersectionality has by now entered the humanities and the social sciences, where its origins in Black American feminist and activist contexts has been erased. Moreover, Black feminists from peripheral spaces such as the Caribbean or Brazil had for a long time been claiming the need for an examination the interdependent inequalities they experienced. While these links are addressed in the concept of intersectionality, the terminology is usually different.

Using the concept of Occidentalism as an example of a way to address epistemic inequalities, this article elaborates on the persistent geopolitics of knowledge within and between different feminism(s) and between different feminisms in different regions of the world. Against the backdrop of the paths in which the feminist concept of intersectionality has travelled in order to address interdependent axes of stratification in the context of the mentioned geopolitics of knowledge, the article seeks to discuss possible forms of solidarity and theorizing across and beyond borders. The article argues for a critical Occidentalist and radical intersectional practice approach which is critical of hegemony and based on a relational understanding for imagining feminist practice and theorizing.

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v8-i2-178 ISSN 2191-6721

»The danger of the single story«: Occidentalism as epistemic violence

> [D]ecolonizing feminism involves a careful critique of the ethics and politics of eurocentrism, and a corresponding analysis of the difficulties and joys of crossing cultural, national, racial, and class boundaries in the search for feminist communities anchored in justice and equality. (Mohanty 2003, 11)

Nigerian author Chimamanda Adichie has recently referred to the violence of the Western interpretive dominance to define in her seminal TED talk as »The Danger of the Single Story«:

> Power is the ability not just to tell the story of another person, but to make it the definitive story of that person. […] The consequence of the single story is this: It robs people of dignity. It makes our recognition of our equal humanity difficult. It emphasizes how we are different rather than how we are similar. (Adichie 2009)

The respective »single story« of feminism is that feminist theorizing is conventionally perceived as being situated in the academy. This perception reduces feminism is thus reduced to the so-called Global North and in the humanities and the social sciences, whereas other regions and knowledge forms serve merely as objects of knowledge production and their visions tend to be absent or invisible in the academy. Sylvia Wynter respectively speaks of a subordination of »theory-givers/theory-takers« classified into »human populations/geographical spaces, cultures, and societal groups, i.e. ethnic, class, gender, sexual preference etc.« (Wynter 1990, 359). This trend of highly unequal geopolitics of knowledge in feminist theorizing is emphasized by the predominance of English-language journals, books, and conferences, most of which are mostly produced in the US and Europe.[1]

1 The fact that a newly emerged German right-wing organization PEGIDA makes reference to the »Salvation of the Occident« in its very name, points to the timeliness of such thinking and the relevance of a critical Occidentalist frame in order to confront the related exclusion and violence.

The period of European colonial expansion was defined by spatial differentiations and an emerging process of racialization and en-gendering. Based on the thus established colonial hierarchies, the power to define and tell presumably universal stories has been the preserve of Occidental voices and knowledge forms. Cultural techniques such as travel writing and cartography helped to turn the cognitive landscapes related to territorial expansion and occidental truth claims into imperial landscapes. Accordingly, »imperial maps« (Coronil 1996, 52) were constructed around concepts of »race,« ethnicity, religious identity, and gender. Feminist postcolonial thinkers have elaborated the ways in which colonial and post-colonial structures of inequality have been marked by a racialized gender dimension (Wade 2009; Dietze 2013), while gender itself is embedded in colonial power relations (Lugones 2008; Wynter 1990). Anne McClintock has convincingly shown how gendered and sexualized fantasies have marked colonial mappings, often depicting the presumably newly »discovered« or »conquered« lands in terms of »virginity« and the landscape in terms related to metaphors of the female body features. McClintock has identified Columbus' depiction of the earth as a woman's breast as a genre of »porno- tropics,« evoking »a long tradition of male travel as an erotic of ravishment« (McClintock 1995, 22). Respectively, McClintock speaks of the colonial »porno-tropics,« and refers to Christopher Columbus' depictions in his logbook as »Columbus' breast fantasies« (McClintock 1995, 22).

Such »universal histories« and global designs were related to a claim of objective, universal truth and the power to define and implement these representations. Starting with the colonization of the Americas and European Enlightenment ideas and ideologies, the West European powers thus constructed their position as the center of civilization and knowledge. Since the—very local—knowledge produced in Europe was constructed as universal, this powerful but small space implicitly considered itself authorized to judge other regions according to its own parameters and to export its economic, belief and knowledge systems to the colonized regions.

In this context, Edward Said's (1978) study examines the West's patronizing cultural representations of »the Orient« as profoundly tied to the power and politics of the imperialist societies that produce these images. Said's

book and concept of *Orientalism* has become a paradigmatic text in postcolonial studies.[2] From a postcolonial feminist perspective, such stereotypical hierarchical images and representations can be revealed as constructions based on colonial mindsets and power hierarchies and criticized for their claim to universality.

Seen more structurally, on the epistemic level, Occidentalism addresses not the construction of Otherness, but an earlier production of hegemony. The concept thus provides a valid frame for problematizing the described asymmetries concerning feminist knowledge production, evaluation, and circulation. For example, focusing on Occidentalism as the precondition of Orientalist projections shows how the Othering of e.g. Islamic women and men serves to construct or reassure presumed Occidental more progressive and emancipated gender relations. This works though situating sexism, homophobia and patriarchal rule outside of the own society by ascribing it to Islamic Others, as we can currently see in countless media images and claims by rightwing activist and politicians, including the current US president and his travel ban for a selection of Muslim countries.

Occidentalism—Producing the Western self through the non-Western Other

The concept of Occidentalism refers to the respective construction of a superior, more civilized »Occidental« self against the backdrop of which projections of »Oriental,« exotic, less civilized, inferior Others could be invented. Occidentalism refers to a discursive construction of »Occidentalism« as superior which includes, for example, the United States and »Occidenatlized« spaces within the regions or places labeled as »peripheral.«

2 Said's much lesser known follow-up book *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) traces the connection between imperialism and culture in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries to describe a more general pattern of relationships between the modern metropolitan west and its overseas territories. In this book, Said defines »imperialism« as »the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory.« His definition of »culture« is more complex, but he strongly suggests that we ought not to forget imperialism when discussing it.

Unlike wider received understandings of Occidentalism as »the West in the Eyes of its Enemies« (see Buruma 2004, see also Carrier 1995), the term and concept of Occidentalism as understood here was coined by Fernando Coronil, (1996), who belonged to a group of critical post-colonial critics now often referred to as decolonial thinkers or critics. Established postcolonial theory stems from the fields of literary and cultural studies and predominantly focuses predominantly on European colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and on the former British colonies, where most of the canonized authors have roots.[3] The Latin American Subaltern Group[4] formed around the turn to the twenty-first century by academics (sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, semiologists, cultural studies scholars) with predominantly Latin American background–but many of whom now hold professorship in the US (e.g., Aníbal Qujiano, Walter Mignolo, Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Catherine Walsh, Augustín Lao-Montes, and María Lugones) who based their findings on postcolonial and anti-colonial thinkers,[5] world-systems theory, dependency theory, liberation theology, and Chicana feminism (see Escobar 2007; Moraña, Dussel, and Jáuregi 2008). Decolonial critics seek to expand postcolonial thought to other regions, particularly the Americas, and to include the developments prior to the peak of colonial expansion. From a respective Latin American perspective, colonialism began with the arrival of the European conquerors in what they perceived as the »New World« in (at latest) 1492. Colonialism is closely tied to capitalist expansion, while *coloniality* refers to the structural worldwide division of power resulting in global inequalities that persist s and is continuously revived up to the present day, for example in the form of migration, racial and gender regimes. Moreover, decolonial thinkers Aníbal Quijano and later Walter Mignolo introduced

3 Most evidently canonized authors include the postcolonial »Holy Trinity« of Homi Bhabha, Edward Said, and Gayatri Spivak.

4 See Wikipedia, s.v. »Subaltern Studies,« last modified December 29, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subaltern_Studies.

5 Such as, José Martí, José Carlos Mariátegui, Aimé Césaire, and Frantz Fanon.

the coloniality/modernity paradigm according to which European (and Eurocentric) modernity is inseparably linked to and dialectically entangled with coloniality and colonialism. Coloniality as a power hierarchy and an epistemic system is understood not as the outcome and opposite to modernity, but as Eurocentric modernity's other side, or underside (see, e.g., Castro-Gómez 2007; Coronil 1996, [2008] 2013; Grosfoguel 2006; Lugones 2007, 2009, 2010; Maldonado-Torres 2004, 2007; Quijano 2000a, 2000b). Colonized spaces such as the Americas served as a »Laboratory for Modernity.« Regions like the Caribbean which constituted the hub of the plantation slavery system have been constitutive and formative for modernity. Seen in this way, the concept of Occidentalism—as Occidental/formerly Western superiority—represents not the result of but the condition of possibility for the creation of an inferior Other as »Oriental.« Occidentalism serves to capture exactly the epistemic dimension of the hierarchical and unequal ordering of knowledge that started with the colonial endeavor and persisting until today. In his 1996 essay »Beyond Occidentalism: Towards Non-imperial Geo-historical Categories« Fernando Coronil describes Occidentalism as follows:

> the ensemble of representational practices that participate in the production of conceptions of the world, which 1) separate the world's components into bounded units; 2) disaggregate their relational histories; 3) turn difference into hierarchy; 4) naturalize these representations; and thus 5) intervene, however unwittingly, in the reproduction of existing asymmetrical power relations (Coronil 1996, 57).

Occidentalism according to Coronil mobilizes stereotypical representations about non-Western societies for what he calls the »ethnocentric hierarchization of cultural difference« (ibid., 57). Furthermore, and importantly, as a system of classification that expresses forms of cultural and economic difference in the modern world, Occidentalism is inseparably tied to the constitution of international asymmetries embedded in global capitalism. Occidentalism is thus specifically modern, tied to capitalism, Western dominance, and it establishes the West as source and locus of modernity, as well as possessor of the power to define. By establishing Occidental

knowledge as superior und universal, Occidentalism creates a knowledge hierarchy according to which other forms of knowledge are not considered relevant. Underscoring the relational character of such asymmetries, and elaborating on earlier works on »multiple modernities« by Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000) and Göran Therborn (1999), Shalini Randeria (2006) has referred to this epistemic hierarchy as »entangled histories of uneven modernities.« To describe the destruction of non-Western ways of perceiving the world and the resulting dominance of Western perceptions, Gayatri Spivak (1989) has employed Michel Foucault's term of »epistemic violence.« Spivak has claimed that the »epistemic violence« resulting from Occidentalism specifically relates to women whereby the »Subaltern [woman] must always be caught in translation, never [allowed to be] truly expressing herself« (Spivak 1989, 76), because the colonial power's destruction and marginalization of her culture pushed her non-Western ways of perceiving, understanding, and knowing the world to the social margins.

An Occidental viewpoint can also be observed in Western feminisms whose protagonists, claiming to be authorized to speak for women everywhere, continually engage in the endeavor Gayatri Spivak has famously described as »White women saving brown women from brown men« (Spivak 1989, 93), claiming to be authorized to speak for women everywhere. Following Ella Shohat (2002), this power hierarchy is also reflected in the separation between »gender studies« and »area studies,« whereby »gender studies« refers to gender relations in the West, while in all other contexts, the situation of »women« is analyzed as unrelated from the—thus constructed—Western center. Alicia Trotz speaks of »notions of the global that underlie the imperial divide between area studies and women/gender studies« in the academy as »practices of exclusion via Eurocentric renderings of global sisterhood based on a putatively universal notion of ›woman,‹ and efforts to ›go global‹ that reduce areas, and people from those areas, to gendered types« (Trotz 2007, 2). Ella Shohat bemoans a tendency she observes in »multicultural feminist and queer cartographies of knowledge« in which »the diverse regions are often presumed in isolation from the ›center‹ and from each

other.« (Shohat 2003, 68). The path taken by the concept of intersectionality provides an example of how theory and knowledge travels and changes meaning along lines unequal distribution of power, thus supporting a persistent geopolitics of knowledge within and between feminism(s) in different regions of the world. Manuela Boatcă (2015) and Claudia Brunner (2007) have elaborated on Occidentalism from a feminist and decolonial perspective as structurally en-gendered along colonial lines, a notion which shall also frame my discussion of the concept of intersectionality.

In order to avoid continuing hierarchizations, Othering strategies, and exclusions, the combination of a hegemony critical Occidentalist perspective and a »radical intersectionality« (Xiang 2017, n.p.)[6] as a practice is urgently required.

Intersectionality from activist practice to theory

For a long time, feminist activists have long been pointing out the importance of taking into account interlocking axes of oppression such as racism, classism, sexism, or homophobia in order to give consideration to the experiences of women (and men) situated at different socio-cultural and geopolitical locations. The concept of intersectionality aims at capturing the interlocking character and the simultaneous articulation of different axes of stratification. That is, gender is always also and always already articulated through the respective class, race/ethnic, sexual and geopolitical dimension. Intersectionality has become a crucial concept in feminist research, and increasingly also in the social sciences in general.

Black feminists from spaces such as the Caribbean have long been claiming the need for examining the interdependent inequalities they experience as addressed in the concept, however usually not using the same terminology.[7] Trotz respectively claims the Caribbean as »a space

6 Comment by Zairong Xiang at the conference »Race, Power, and Privilege in Academia,« Panel »Queer of Color Critique« July 27–28, 2017 at Humboldt University Berlin. Notes taken by the author.

7 For the history of women's resistance to slavery in the Caribbean, see Shepherd 2008 and 2011.

that produces knowledge with important lessons for a remapping of women/gender studies« (Trotz 2007, 2).

As early as so-called first-wave US feminism in the 19th century—coinciding with and partly stemming from the movement for the abolition of slavery—African American women have addressed the multiple and intertwined oppressions they were opposed to as enslaved or formerly enslaved women without human or civil rights, subject to unpaid or low-paid labor, sexual abuse and the denial of the institutions of marriage and motherhood. Sojourner Truth' famous intervention at the Women's Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio in 1851 provides a fitting illustration:

> Well, children, where there is so much racket there must be something out of kilter. I think that 'twixt the Negroes of the South and the women at the North all talking about rights, the white men will be in a fix pretty soon. But what's all this here talking about?
>
> That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place! And ain't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! […] I could work as much and eat as much as a man—when I could get it—and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? I have borne thirteen children, and seen most all sold off to slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me! And ain't I a woman? (Truth 1851)[8]

By referencing her experience as a black and formerly enslaved woman, Truth scrutinized the universal claim of the (predominantly white bourgeois) feminist movement. Also Socialist and working class feminists have also long challenged the classical Marxist notion of class as the primary contradiction, while gender and other forms of oppression are seen as »secondary« contradictions. During the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s and '70s, Black and Chicana (as well as LGBT) feminists

8 Available online at: »Sojourner Truth: ›Ain't I a Woman?‹ December 1851,« Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham University, accessed January 21, 2018, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/sojtruth-woman.asp.

voiced their concern about the neglect of their experiences and about exclusions related to the universalization of »womanhood« or »sisterhood.« It was also during these politically turbulent times, that ideas of the interdependencies of different axes of stratification emerged—first and foremost in activist circles. For instance, the black lesbian feminist collective »The Combahee River Collective« published a statement in 1979 in which they claim they are

> actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking. The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As Black women we see Black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face. (Combahee River Collective 1979, 210)

In a similar manner, during the 1975 Congresso das Mulheres Negras Brasileiras (Congress of Black Brazilian Women), black feminists in Brazil presented the »Manifesto das Mulheres Negras« (Manifesto of Black Women) and demonstrated how practices of racial domination have shaped gender relations in Brazil (see Caldwell 2007).

In her seminal book *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*, Chicana author, activist and theorist Gloría Anzaldúa (1987) emphasized the experience of being »in-between« cultures, languages, national borders and international border regimes, sexual identities, social classes etc. as a relevant site or location of knowledge and epistemic production.

> Opposite to the theory of the pure Aryan, and to the policy of racial purity that white America practices, this is a theory of inclusivity. […] From this racial, ideological, cultural and biological cross-pollinization, an »alien« consciousness is currently in the making—a new *mestiza* consciousness, *una conciencia de mujer*. It is a consciousness of the Borderlands.
>
> […]

> Because I, a *mestiza*,
> continually walk out of one culture
> and into another,
> because I am at all cultures at the same time,
> *alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro,*
> *me zumba la cabeza con lo contradictorio.*
> *Estoy noretada por todas las voces que me hablan simultáneamente.*
>
> (Anzaldúa 1987, 99)

The *mestiza* consciousness she promotes in this book thereby scrutinized hegemonic notions of purity (of cultures, identities, sexualities). In the US, the Caribbean and throughout Latin America afro-descendant,[9] indigenous and other marginalized feminists (for example Angela Davis in her seminal work *Woman, Race and Class* (1981), as well as Toni Morrison, bell hooks, Audre Lorde and many others claimed a multidimensional perspective on the simultaneous articulation of inequalities. Black feminists have also emphasized the crucial role of Whiteness for racist structures and the necessity of a critical reflection of this privileged and hegemonic position as unmarked norm, including a critique of epistemology (see Morrison 1992; Hill Collins 1990; Frankenberg 1993; more recently, Wekker 2016). So-called standpoint feminists, who have emphasized the situatedness and locatedness (or standpoint) of all knowledge production (see, e.g., Haraway 1988; Harding 2006, 2008), and so-called Third World feminists have put special emphasis on the Eurocentrism of hegemonic feminisms (e.g., Anzaldúa and Moraga 1981; Anzaldúa and Keating 2002; Mendoza 2010; Mohanty 1984, 1991, 2003a, 2003b; Suárez Návaz and Hernández 2008). The multi-level exclusion of Black women is most illustratively expressed in the title of the 1982 volume *All the Women Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of US Are Brave* (Hull, Bell-Scott, and Smith 1982), while the authors of »Challenging Imperial Feminism« (Amos and Parmar 1984) render the (post)colonial geopolitics of feminist knowledge production and circulation problematic.

9 In Latin America, the political term most used is »mujeres afrodescendientes.«

In her 1989 essay »Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex,« the scholar of Law Kimberlé Crenshaw finally coined the term of intersectionality—for a lawsuit against General Motors (GM)—in order to underline the juridical invisibility of the multiple dimensions of oppression experienced by African-American female workers at the US-American car company. Crenshaw aimed to create concrete juridical categories to address discriminations at multiple and varying levels. GM had hired no black women until 1964. In turn, the black women hired after 1970 lost their jobs, after the court had rejected the plaintiff's sex discrimination claim (GM did hire women, but all of them were white) as well as the plaintiff's race discrimination claim (GM did hire blacks, but all of them were male). Based on this observation, Crenshaw claimed that:

> Black women's experiences are much broader than the general categories that discrimination discourse provides. Yet the continued insistence that black women's demands and needs be filtered through categorical analyses that completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their needs will seldom be addressed (Crenshaw [1989] 2011, 30).

The sociologists Patricia Hill Collins, Leslie McCall, and others have elaborated on the concept, and by now, intersectionality has become a central term of feminist theory.[10]

Current Eurocentric discourses on intersectionality mostly ignore that the »interlocking systems of oppressions« they theoretically seek to render problematic, have been the lived experiences and the object of struggle and resistance by feminists of Color for more than a century. Academics speaking from non-hegemonic positions have elaborated on the concept of intersectionality and worked towards adopting, appropriating, utilizing or owning it for their needs (see, e.g., Wade 2008; Wade, Urrea Giraldo,

10 For a critical approach to intersectionality discussing the pitfalls and shortcomings, but also the potential of the concept, see, e.g.: Knapp (2005); Klinger (2007); Gutiérrez-Rodríguez et al. (2008); Haschemi Yekani et al. (2008); Lorey (2008). For intersectionality and/in postcolonial/global contexts (and Latin America in particular), see Roth (2013, 2014).

and Viveros Vigoya 2009; Junco 2011; Viveros Vigoya 2013; Zapata Galindo, García Peter, and Chan de Ávial 2013; and the MISEAL project) and thus contributed to shifting the map of Occidental geopolitics of knowledge as expressed in hegemonic notions of intersectionality. Caribbean feminist interventions such as the volumes *Daughters of Caliban* (1997) and *Afrocubanas* (2011) are valuable contributions for an intersectional feminist perspectivation. By contrasting hegemonic feminist narratives with their situated experiences and combining a postcolonial/decolonial perspective with a broad and multi-axis understanding of gender inequalities—as deeply entangled with colonial, geopolitical, patriarchal hierarchies—and calling hegemonic feminists to reflect their privileged positions and their blind spots, Caribbean feminist thinkers of African descent offer a radical notion of intersectionality and claim a critical Occidentalism. In her introduction the volume *Daughters of Caliban*—which already in its title hints at their colonially structured and en-gendered position as embodied by Shakespeare's famous Caliban character of *The Tempest* and the notion of an afrodescendent Black Atlantic (as proposed by Paul Gilroy 1992)—Consuelo López Springfield describes the interdisciplinary book as on bearing witness to »the multiplicity of Caribbean women's roles […]: interregional immigrant female labor, the interplay of race and gender in the construction of national cultures, the impact of developmentalist policies and colonialist legal practices on women's lives, and women's creative roles in providing cultural continuity in exile communities.« (Gilroy 1992, xi) The contribution by Lizabeth Paravisini-Gebert focuses on »decolonizing feminism« (ibid., 3–5), and Suzanne LaFont and Deborah Pruitt trace the »colonial legacies« of gendered law in Jamaica (ibid., 215–17). Gender hierarchies are this always also and always already entangled and articulated simultaneously as colonial and racialized hierarchies.

Moreover, the strict separation within feminist discourse between what Silvia Wynter (1990) has termed »theory givers« in the West and in the academy and »theory takers« in activism, art and non-Western contexts in feminist discourses has also led afro-descendant and »Third World« feminists to denounce »theory itself as inherently Western, and as an

impediment to activism« (Shohat 2002, 71). Shohat therefore suggests, despite this indispensable critique, claiming a broader and less exclusive understanding of what counts as feminist and intersectional theorizing:

> (1) the importance of looking critically at activist practices, and of theorizing them as part of feminist agendas; (2) that every practice is undergirded by some kind of theory, philosophy, worldview, or discursive grid—even when the practitioners claim not to have a theory; (3) that theorizing and theories are not a Western monopoly, a view that would inscribe in reverse a colonialist vision of the West as theoretical mind and the non-West as unreflecting body; and (4) that Third World women and women of color have themselves contributed to theorizing not only by writing theory per se, but also by their own multiaxis thinking and activism, which has challenged multiple hegemonic discourses. In this sense, activism itself can be seen as a form of theorizing, a practical testing of ideas. Ironically, I think that many activists have underestimated their own historical contribution to the West's questioning of totalizing narratives. (Shohat 2002, 71)

In light of the need for more transnational and relational approaches to intersectional inequalities, Floya Anthias (2006) considers intersectionality to be tied to what she calls »translocational positionality« that is, the way, positions and relations change, vary, and reconfigure from location to location. »Translocational positionality« refers to a social process (rather than group identities) and to related practices and arrangements that create positionalities. She thus argues that the focus should be shifted from groups toward forms of violence and exclusion and should incorporate the notion of hierarchy. This would also mean including the parameters of unequal power relations that create positionalities within and between cultures that create positionalities and taking the local into consideration in connection with the transnational/global.[11] According to her notion of translocational positionalities, differences and inequalities should be considered as a dynamic and changeable process. A radical

11 For an ethnographical example, see Santos' article in this volume.

intersectionality understood in this way can provide a productive and necessary corrective for Occidentalism.

De-centering (single) story tellers, diversifying stories, decolonizing feminism

The starting point of this article was the observation that the access to and the evaluation of what counts as relevant feminist theorizing is marked by power structures that render academic knowledge produced in the centers of the Occident universal and marginalize other forms. In order to analyze and address this asymmetry in its structural and global dimension, the article has proposed the concept of Occidentalism as a set of representational practices that turn difference into hierarchy privileging the Occident and rendering interrelations invisible. The (critical) focus on Occidentalism in the tradition of critical whiteness Studies/approaches is interested in analyzing and critiquing the self-construction and self-critique of Western hegemony. In a gesture to translate a critical whiteness approach to other (German) contexts, Gabriele Dietze (2010) suggests a »critical Occidentalism.« As a paradigmatic and epistemic starting point for thinking beyond hierarchies and refocusing on relationalities, critical Occidentalism requires a self-critical stance towards the own privilege and all hegemony (including one's own). Such approaches require the critical reflection of the own privileged location, and the consideration of global inequalities and respective manifold positionalities.

As we have seen, the critical endeavor of feminists speaking from the academy and the (self-proclaimed) centers, the radical contextualization and relational historicization of our terms and narratives/genealogies is an urgent and necessary task. Feminist approaches interested in not only describing, but also overcoming colonial and ethnic/racial hierarchies, include perspectives from non-hegemonic positions and forms of knowledge. Considering the unequal geopolitics of (feminist) knowledge (about intersectionality) intersectional approaches need to take the geopolitics of knowledge underlying the own location into account, as well as critically reflect on their own privileged location/position, as a

critical Occidentalist perspective requires. For example, gender gains a new meaning for women travelling to poorer countries. As, for example, the Austrian film *Paradies: Liebe* (Ulrich Seidl 2013) illustratively shows, »disadvantages« of age and class in the Austrian home society can turn into privileged positions based on racial, economic, and citizenship capital in the context of encounters of so-called romance tourism with men in poorer countries like Kenya (see Roth 2013; Boatcă and Roth 2016). The implicitly power-sensitive and hegemony critical dimension of the concept of Occidentalism is helpful for a respective approach to feminism aware of the described hierarchies.

Shohat claims a relational understanding of feminism, »beyond a mere description of the many cultures from which feminisms emerge […] transcends an additive approach […] where each ethnically marked feminist speaks in her turn, dressed in national costume.« (Shohat 2003, 68). Such an approach famed by a critical Occidentalist lens should consider global inequalities (and colonial legacies) and reflect the way, positions and relations change, vary, and reconfigure from location to location. Intersectionality understood as and expanded to mean »translocational positionality« (Anthias 2006) provides a frame and an epistemic sensibilization in order to bring such interrelations into view, going beyond binary paradigms.[12] Thereby, spaces like the Caribbean turn from margins to centers of relevant knowledge and theorizing. Feminists from such spaces have long been practicing a politics of alliances and solidarity, linking interlocking axes of oppression with one another and to structural inequalities such as colonial legacies and geopolitical location. Including their knowledges and approaches can help to reconnect feminism with its political and activist roots, revealing

12 Which categories and locations are relevant cannot be fixed a priori, but must be developed in context from the concrete material at hand. A respective »multichronotopic« (Shohat) awareness to thinking new forms of conviviality and connectedness and the inclusion of »Other« than Occidental knowledges of »intersecionality« provides an analytical framework of new spaces beyond traditional boundaries and new analytical categories beyond national or cultural paradigm alone.

notions of purity, hierarchy, and separation as fictions. Ideally, different feminisms could become one another's reference points as coeval and horizontal positions, decentering received existing hegemonies organized around the interlocking axes of oppression the concept of intersectionality addresses. A critical Occidentalist framing helps avoid the re-inscription or reproduction of hierarchies and asymmetries.

Outlook—Towards a critical Occidentalist radical intersectional practice

While I terminate writing these lines, a broad movement to oppose the racist, sexist and anti-immigrant, and white supremacist politics of the newly elected Trump administration is taking shape in the United States and elsewhere under the banner of the »Women's March.« This movement connects a critical Occidental perspective with radical intersectional practice with a new quality. Whereas the term »women« had been met by harsh criticism during the second wave feminisms for generalizing and universalizing the concerns of *certain* (white Western) women, it is now being strategically applied in order to mobilize solidarity across and beyond differences. The planning process of the marches was accompanied by harsh controversies among feminists from differing positions. However, the organizers seemingly succeeded in uniting not only the different feminist movements, but also a broad coalition of other emancipatory groups (see Hess 2017). Departing from the minimal communality of being objectified by and politically opposed to the politics of the administration, the protests united afro-descendant, Chicana, Latina, Native American/indigenous, white, activist, academic, undocumented, migrant, refugee, and LGBTIQ women and men from all social strata. This is also expressed on the March's homepage, where the event is described as one uniting »people of all backgrounds—women and men and gender nonconforming people, young and old, of diverse faiths, differently abled, immigrants and indigenous […] answering a call to show up and be counted as those who believe in a world that is equitable, tolerant, just and safe for all, one in which the human rights and dignity of each person is protected and our planet is safe from

destruction.«[13] Notably, from the outset of the first protest marches, a number of signs claiming an intersectional feminism were prominently omnipresent, while others united claims for women's rights and against sexism with claims against racism and for the protection of immigrants' laws.[14] Similar marches took place also in cities around the world to say no to racist, sexist and anti-immigration politics and to white supremacy (the homepage lists 673 »sister marches« around the world, mobilizing 4956,422 protesters).[15] In her speech held during the march in Washington, D.C. on January 21, 2017, Latina actress America Ferrera referred to her own position as a woman immigrant to the US in order to then call for solidarity and a united, intersectional, struggle:

> As a woman and as a proud first-generation American born to Honduran immigrants, it's been a heartbreaking time to be both a woman and an immigrant in this country. Our dignity, our character, our rights have all been under attack. […]
>
> We are gathered here and across the country and around the world today to say, Mr. Trump, we refuse. We reject the demonization of our Muslim brothers and sisters. We condemn the systemic murder and incarceration of our black brothers and sisters. We will not ask our LGBT families to go backwards. We will not go from being a nation of immigrants to a nation of ignorance. We won't build walls and we won't see the worst in each other.[16]

By strategically uniting and addressing the relational character of different forms of exclusion, oppression, and inequalities faced by women, immigrants,

13 See »The March,« website of the Women's March, accessed July 20, 2017, https://www.womensmarch.com/march.

14 For video recording of the march, see »Women's March on Washington,« live stream, *New York Times*, January 21, 2017, https://nyti.ms/2jScbh8.

15 See https://www.womensmarch.com/march.

16 See Jaimie Primeau, »America Ferrera's Women's March Speech Spreads Powerful Message About Immigrants,« *Bustle,* January 21, 2017, https://www.bustle.com/p/america-ferreras-womens-march-spe.ch-spreads-a-powerful-message-about-immigrants-32061.

Muslims, LGBT people, etc., Ferrera on the one hand scrutinized the notion of differences as hierarchies, and on the other hand of cultures and nations (and genders, »races,« and sexualities, respectively) as separate, pure entities. The multiple origins, identities, and politics the claimed by the protesters as making up »America« implicitly scrutinized Occidentalist superiority, patriarchy, and white supremacy. The protests might be a starting point for future and more forceful efforts of de-linking intersectionality from its entanglements with Occidentalism. By taking to the streets and including arts and activism, the protesters have begun to tie the concept back to its radical activist roots and simultaneously elaborate on the theorizing of the concept for concrete social contexts, struggles, new forms of alliances and visions of conviviality.

References

Adichie, Chimamanda N. 2009. »The Danger of the Single Story.« Lecture given at the TED Global Conference, Oxford, July 21–24, 2009. Accessed September 29, 2013. http://bit.ly/1hK8SSi.

Álvarez, Sonia E. 2014. »Introduction to the Project and the Volume: Enacting a Translocal Feminist Politics of Translocation.« In *Translocalities/Translocalidades: Feminist Politics of Translation in the Latin/a Américas*, edited by Sonia Álvarez, Claudia de Lima Costa, Veronica Feliu, Rebecca Hester, Norma Klahn, and Millie Thayer, 1–18. Durham: Duke University Press.

—— Claudia de Lima Costa, Veronica Feliu, Rebecca Hester, Norma Klahn, and Millie Thayer, eds. 2014. *Translocalities/Translocalidades: Feminist Politics of Translation in the Latin/a Américas*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Amos, Valerie, and Pratibhar Parmar. 1984. »Challenging Imperial Feminism.« *Feminist Review* 17:3–19.

Anthias, Floya. 2006. »Belonging in a Globalising and Unequal World: Rethinking Translocations.« In *The Situated Politics of Belonging*, edited by Nira Yuval-Davis, Kalpana Kannabiran, and Ulrike M. Vieten, 17–31. London: Sage Publications.

Anzaldúa, Gloria. 1987. *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*. Austin: Aunt Lute Books.

Anzaldúa, Gloria, and Keating, Anna Louise. 2002. *This Bridge We Call Home: Radical Visions for Transformation*. New York: Routledge.

Anzaldúa, Gloria, and Moraga, Cherrie. 1981. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. Watertown, MA: Persephone Press.

Boatcă, Manuela. 2015. *Global Inequalities Beyond Occidentalism*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Boatcă, Manuela, Sergio Costa, and Encarnación Guitiérrez-Rodríguez, eds. 2010. *Decolonizing European Sociology: Transdisciplinary Approaches*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Boatcă, Manuela and Julia Roth. 2016. »Unequal and Gendered: Notes on the Coloniality of Citizenship.« *Current Sociology Monograph* 64 (2): 191–212.

Brunner, Claudia. 2007. »Occidentalism Meets the Female Suicide Bomber: A Critical Reflection on Recent Terrorism Debates.« *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 32 (4): 957–71.

Buruma, Ian. 2004. *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies*. New York: Penguin.

Caldwell, Kia Lilly. 2007. *Negras in Brazil: Re-envisioning Black Women, Citizenship, and the Politics of Identity*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Carrier., James G., ed. 1995. *Occidentalism: Images of the West*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Castro-Gómez, Santiago. 2007. »Decolonizar la Universidad: La hybris del punto cero y el diálogo de saberes.« In *El giro decolonial: Reflexiones para una diversidad epistémica másallá del capitalismo global*, edited by Santiago Castro-Gómez and Ramón Grosfoguel, 79–91. Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores, Pontífica Universidad Javeriana, Universidad Central.

Césaire, Aimé. (1950) 1994. *Discours sur le colonialisme*. Paris: Présence Africaine.

Christian, Barbara.1987. »The Race for Theory.« *Cultural Critique* 6:51–63.

Combahee River Collective. (1977) 1981. »A Black Feminist Statement.« In *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*, edited by Cherry Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, 210–18, New York: Kitchen Table Women of Color Press.

Coronil, Fernando. 1996. »Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories.« *Cultural Anthropology* 11:51–87.

—— (2008) 2013. »Latin American Postcolonial Studies and Global Decolonization.« *Worlds & Knowledges Otherwise* (Spring): 400–423. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6c71/cb02a4aba7a9dc7b9af481c6eca4d55e07d7.pdf.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1989. »Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine.« *The University of Chicago Legal Forum*: 139–67.

Davis, Angela. 1981. *Woman, Race and Class*. New York: Vintage.

Dietze, Gabriele. 2010. »Occidentalism‚ European Identity and Sexual Politics.« *The Study of Europe*, edited by Hauke Brunkhorst and Gerd Grözinger, 87–116. Baden Baden: Nomos.

—— 2013. *Weiße Frauen in Bewegung: Genealogien und Konkurrenzen von Race- und Genderpolitiken*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel. 2000. »Multiple Modernities.« *Daedalus* 129 (1): 1–29.

Escobar, Arturo. 2007. »Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American Modernity/Coloniality Research Program« *Cultural Studies* 21 (2/3): 179–210.

Fanon, Frantz. 1952. *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs*. Lyon: Editions de Seuil.

—— 1961. *Les damnés de la terre*. Paris: François Maspero Éditeur S. A. R. L.

Frankenberg, Ruth. 1993. *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Gilroy, Paul. 1992. *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*. London: Verso.

Grosfoguel, Ramón. 2006. »World-System Analysis in the Context of Trans-modernity, Border Thinking and Global Coloniality.« *Review: Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center* 25 (2): 167–87.

Gutieérrez-Rodríguez, Encarnación, Umut Erel, Jin Haritaworn, and Christian Klesse. 2008. »On the Depoliticisation of Intersectionality Talk: Conceptualising Multiple Oppressions in Critical Sexuality Studies.« In *Out of Place: Interrogating Silences in Queerness/Raciality*, edited by Adi Kunstman and Esperanza Miyake, 265–92. York: Raw Nerves Publishers.

Haraway, Donna. 1988. »Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.« *Feminist Studies* 14 (3): 575–99.

Harding, Sandra. 2006. *Science and Social Inequality: Feminist and Postcolonial Issues*. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

—— 2008. *Sciences From Below: Feminisms, Postcolonialities, and Modernities*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Haschemi Yekani, Elahe, Daniela Hrzán, Jana Husmann-Kastein, Carsten Junker, Karolina Krasuka, and Beatrice Michaelis. 2008. »Where, When and How? Contextualizing Intersectionality.« In *New Subjectivities: Negotiating Citizenship in the Context of Migration and Diversity*, edited by

Dorota Golańska and Aleksandra R. Rózalska, 19–47. Łóźd: Łóźd University Press.

Hess, Amanda. 2017. »How a Fractious Women's Movement Came to Unite the Left.« *New York Times*, February 7, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/magazine/how-a-fractious-womens-movement-came-to-lead-the-left.html.

Hill Collins, Patricia, and Andersen, Margaret. 1992. *Race, Class, and Gender: An Anthology*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing.

Hill Collins. 1990. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge,Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. Boston: UnwinHyman.

Hull, Gloria T., Patricia Bell-Scott, and Barbara Smith, eds. 1982. *All the Women AreWhite, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave*. New York: Feminist Press.

Junco, Yulexis Almeida. 2011. »Género y racialidad: Una reflexión obligada en la Cuba de hoy.« In *Afrocubana:. Historia, pensamiento y prácticas culturales*, edited by Daisy Rubiera Castillo and Inés Maria Martiatu Terry, 133–49. Havana: Ciencias Sociales.

Klinger, Cornelia. 2007. »Transnational Care Work: Intersections of Gender Regimes, Welfare Regimes and Migration Regimes.« *European Journal of Women's Studies* 8 (2): 228–48.

Knapp, Gudrun-Axeli. 2005. »Race, Class, Gender. Reclaiming Baggage in Fast Travelling Theories.« *European Journal of Women's Studies,* 12 (3): 249–65.

Mendoza, Breni. 2010. »La epistemología del sur, la colonialidad del género y el feminismo latinoamericano.« In *Aproximaciones críticas a las prácticas teórico-políticas del feminismo latinoamericano*, edited by Yuderkis Espinosa Miñoso. Buenos Aires: En la frontera.

MISEAL Project—Medidas para la inclusión social y equidad en instituciones de educación superior en América Latina. Transnational Observatory of Social Inclusion and Equity in Higher Education. http://www.oie-miseal.ifch.unicamp.br/es/interseccionalidad.

Morrison, Toni. 1992. *Playing in the Dark, Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

López-Springfield, Consuelo. 1997. *Daughters of Caliban. Caribbean Women in the Twentieth Century*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lorey, Isabell. 2008. »Critique and Category: On the Restriction of Political Practice Through Recent Theorems of Intersectionality, Interdependence and Critical Whiteness Studies.« Translated by Mary O'Neill. Transversal Texts. europäisches institut für progressive kulturpolitik (eipcp). Accessed March 15, 2016. http://bit.ly/156Pdnj.

Lugones, María. 2007. »Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System.« *Hypatia* 22 (1): 186–209.

—— 2008. »The Coloniality of Gender.« In *Worlds & Knowlesges Otherwise* (Spring): 1–17.

McClintock, Anne. 1995. *Imperial Leather: Race, Class and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*. New York: Routledge.

Mignolo, Walter D. 2000. *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade 1984. »Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse.« *Boundary* 2 (3): 333–58.

—— 2003a. *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Moraña, Mabel, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregi. 2008. *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Pratt, Mary Louise. (1992) 2009. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. New York: Routldege.

Quijano, Aníbal. 2000a. »Colonialidad del poder, Eurocentrismo y América Latina.« In *Colonialidad del saber, Eurocentrismo y ciencias sociales*, edited by CLACSO-UNESCO, 201–46. Buenos Aires: CLACSO-UNESCO.

—— 2000b. »Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America.« *Nepantla* 1 (3): 533–79.

Randeria, Shalini. 2006. »Entangled Histories of Uneven Modernities: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial India.« In *Civil Society—Berlin Perspectives*, edited by John Keane, 213–42. New York: Berghahn. Accessed July 20, 2017.

Rubiera Castillo, Daisy, and Inés Maria Martiatu Terry. 2011. *Afrocubanas: Historia, pensamiento y prácticas culturales*. Havana: Ciencias Sociales.

Roth, Julia. 2014. *Occidental Readings, Decolonial Practices: A Selection on Gender, Genre, and Coloniality in the Americas*. Series Inter-American Studies/Estudios Interamericanos. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier.

—— 2013. »Entangled Inequalities as Intersectionalities: Towards an Epistemic Sensibilization.« desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series No. 43, desiguALdades.net—Research Network on Interdependent Inequalities in Latin America, Berlin.

Said, Edward. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Shepherd, Verene A. 2008. »Women and the Abolition Campaign in the African Atlantic.« *The Journal of Caribbean History* 42 (1): 131–53.

—— ed. 2011. *Engendering Caribbean History: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.

Shohat, Ella. 2002. »Area Studies, Gender Studies, and the Cartographies of Knowledge.« *Social Text* 20 (3): 67–78.

Spivak, Gayatri. 1989. »Can the Subaltern Speak?« In *Other Worlds: Essays on Cultural Politics*. New York: Routledge.

Suárez Návaz, Liliana, and Rosalva Aída Hernández. 2008. *Descolonizando el feminismo: Teorías y prácticas desde los márgenes*. Madrid: Cátedra.

Therborn, Göran, ed. 1999. *Modernities and Globalizations. European and Latin American Experiences and Perspectives*. Stockholm: FRN.

Trotz, Alicia D. 2007. »Going Global? Transnationality, Women/Gender Studies and Lessons from the Caribbean.« *CRGS Caribbean Review of Gender Studies* 1 (April): 1–18. https://sta.uwi.edu/crgs/april2007/journals/AlissaTrotz_Going_Global_pm%20_2.pdf.

Truth, Sojourner. 1997. »Ain't I a Woman? Speech to the Women's Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio, 1851.« In *The Norton Anthology of African American Literature*, edited by Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Nelly McKay, 198–201. New York: W. W. Norton.

Viveros Vigoya, Mara. 2013. »Movilidades y desigualdades espaciales y sociales en el contexto del multiculturalismo latinoamericano: Una lectura en clave

de género.« In *Espacios de género: Adlaf Congreso Anual 2012*, edited by Juliana Ströbele-Gregor and Dörte Wollrad, 189–203. Buenos Aires: Nueva Sociedad, Fundación Friedrich Ebert, Adlaf.

Wade, Peter. 2009. *Race and Sex in Latin Am*erica. London: Pluto Press.

Wade, Peter, Fernando Urrea Giraldo, and Mara Viveros Vigoya, eds. 2008. *Raza, etnicidad y sexualidades. Ciudadanía y multiculturalismo en América Latina.* Bogotá: CES.

Wekker, Gloria. 2016. *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Zapata Galindo, Martha, Sabina García Peter, Jennifer Chan de Avila. 2013. »La interseccionalidad en debate.« In *Interseccionalidad en debate: Actas del Congreso Internacional »Indicadores Interseccionales y Medidas de Inclusión Social en Instituciones de Educación Superior*,« edited by Martha Zapata Galindo, Sabina García Peter, Jennifer Chan de Avila, 7–13. Berlin: MISEAL.

Zapata Galindo, Martha, Sabina García Peter, Jennifer Chan de Avila, eds. 2013. *Interseccionalidad en debate. Actas del Congreso Internacional »Indicadores Interseccionales y Medidas de Inclusión Social en Instituciones de Educación Superior.«* Berlin: MISEAL. http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Stella_Gonzalez_Arnal/publication/263071514_Interseccionalidad_y_diversidad._En_defensa_de_un_modelo_de_anlisis_categorial_no_opresivo_que_respeta_la_diferencia/links/0deec539b05b4215f7000000.pdf.

***

Dr. Julia Roth, Center for InterAmerican Studies, BMBF Research Project »The Americas as Space of Entanglements,« Bielefeld University:
julia.roth@uni-bielefeld.de.

Persistence of Eurocentric orders and divisions

Reflections on »postcolonial scholarship« and the disentanglement of »race« and »religion«

Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar and Zubair Ahmad

Introduction

Since its appearance as a discipline, the field of postcolonial studies has been contested, elusive, and open in terms of its boundaries, analytical lenses, and interrogations. Its formation and history do not resemble the emergence of »a new [and neat] discipline, nor [that of] a clearly identifiable field of research« (Seth, Gandhi, and Dutton 1998, 8). Rather, its critical terrain has been imagined and conceptualized as »a gesture […] towards an examination and critique of knowledges« (Seth, Gandhi, and Dutton 1998, 8). Equally, its multiple statuses as »a chronological moment, a political movement, and an intellectual activity« have rendered an »exact definition difficult« (Moore-Gilbert 1997, 1), while challenging a single answer to the questions of »what is« and »when was« the post-colonial (Hall 1996, 242). However, as postcolonial scholars themselves have noted, the moment of »institutional validity« (Seth, Gandhi, and Dutton 1998, 9)—the moment of being exposed to the epistemological seductions of canonicity and disciplinarity in Western universities—did not simply vanish without a trace. Quite the contrary, this moment informed which foci were to be set, which research questions were to be asked, and which modes of interpretations were to be evoked and applied in order to understand the inclusion and exclusion of (post-)colonial societies.[1] As a result, these epistemological movements became rooted

1 In doing so, the very term *postcolonial* has not gone uncontested (cf. McClintock 1995; Shohat 1992; West-Pavlov 2013, 158–74; Stoler 2016).

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v8-i2-179 ISSN 2191-6721

in »selective directions« (Stoler 2016, 40) and in particular analytical pathways of postcolonial scholarship and analysis. One major and important debate addressing issues and consequences of selective directions has divided postcolonial scholars along Marxist and poststructural lines of inquiry (cf. Parry 2004, 2012; Young 2012). As this debate illustrates, it is not only the exclusion but also the reiteration of definitions, research questions, and frameworks as well as modes of inquiry and critique which institutionalize and strengthen selective directions (cf. Lazarus and Varma 2008). We are convinced that this also holds true for the isolated interrogations of race and religion in strands of postcolonial scholarship.

The selective directions chosen by—or forced upon—strands of postcolonial analysis have from the very outset focused on the one while isolating the other: focusing on race at the expense of religion. While postcolonial scholars have problematized the emphasis on race and ethnicity for some time now,[2] it is only recently that others have suggested bringing religion back into the focus of postcolonial analysis.[3] To say this is, at the

In the following, we differentiate between postcolonial and post-colonial, the former delineating critical conversations and interrogations aligned with the toolbox of postcolonialism and the latter designating a temporal and unfinished trajectory.

2 In one of the first issues of the *Journal for Postcolonial Studies*, Michael Dutton, Michele Grossman, Leela Gandhi, and Sanjay Seth briefly mention the problem of taking race as the master signifier of postcolonial analysis while sidelining other analytical categories: »As the categories of nation and class have been relegated to the sidelines, ethnicity and race have become the central organising principles of postcolonialism. The unfortunate result has been that problems and inequalities that do not have their origins in ethnicity or race become neglected or else misunderstood, while these categories become inflated in their reach, sometimes even reinforcing the ethnic essentialisms that postcolonial critics in fact intend to deconstruct« (Dutton et al. 2001, 12–13).

3 In particular, this has happened by bringing Islam into the focus. Robert Young (2012, 28), for example, argues that while »the question of representing or covering (up) Islam was always central to the work of Edward W. Said, it was not a major preoccupation of postcolonial studies as a whole in its first twenty or so years of existence. If, since its inception in academic form with Said's *Orientalism* in 1978, postcolonial thinking

very least, to suggest that race has remained a master signifier of analysis, or that religion has remained sidelined and absent from postcolonial thinking in general. Just as race has been developed into an entangled category—for example with that of gender or/and sexuality (Zantop 1999; Stoler 1995)—religion, too, has been examined in order to trace the violence related to the colonial (cf. Asad 1993; Chidester 1999; Fitzgerald 2007; King 1999; Masuzawa 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2008). This is not to suggest that the entanglement of race and religion has yet to be voiced, interrogated, or conceptualized as such (cf. Anidjar 2003, 2008; Kalmar 2009; Meer 2013a, 2013b; Meer and Moodod 2010; Said 1978, 1985). Nevertheless, we believe that strands and gestures of postcolonial thinking have been isolating the inquiry of race and religion, underscoring the history and violence of one at the expense of the other. By not taking the above-mentioned work into consideration sufficiently, these strands have reproduced not only Eurocentric orders and divisions in their analytical proceedings but have omitted a better understanding of the entanglement of race and religion.[4]

However, a lack of simultaneous engagement with the categories of race and religion, taken as discursive effects, is not unique to postcolonial studies. Les Back and John Solomos, for instance, pointed out that the

broadly defined has become integrated within dominant cultural and institutional practices, then one reason why it found relatively easy acceptance was because it tended to sideline not only the Israel-Palestine conflict, but also the question of Islam and the role of religion in anticolonial struggle more generally—this despite the fact that *Orientalism* was published just a year before the Iranian revolution of 1979.«

4 It is important to acknowledge that we neither see nor approach postcolonial studies as a single, coherent, and sealed-off field of inquiry or critical project. However, following Ann L. Stoler (2016, 37), it is important to engage and re-think the »production of occlusions« and »histories of colonial recursions« within and from postcolonial studies. Stoler's (2016, 67) argument centers on postcolonial studies' occlusion regarding Palestine, as one »horizon of work to be done.« In the same vein, our aim is to posit the reexamination of race and religion, their conjoined and detached histories, as another horizon of further inquiry and critical engagement within the open field of postcolonial studies.

study of race and racism has been left out of the question of anti-Semitism almost entirely, »treating it almost as a separate issue« (2000, 191). In a different but related discussion, Nasar Meer (2013a) has critically documented how current debates and approaches to Islamophobia have not sufficiently engaged with established concepts and tools of scholarship on race and racism. For instance, the immediate academic responses around the concept of Islamophobia, prompted by the publication of the Runnymede Trust (1997) report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All: Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia* showed how violence against Muslims and Islam was attributed to a different register than that of racism (cf. Halliday 1999). And even historical comparisons between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia characterized these phenomena as different from racism and instead aligned them with religious discrimination and bigotry (Bravo Lopez 2012). In contrast, more recent scholarship on the issue of Islamophobia has tended to see it as a form of racism (Klug 2012) or cultural racism (Balibar 1991; Werbner 2013; Attia 2009; Shooman 2014; Meer 2013a, 2013b; Meer and Moodod 2010).

In brief, religion has troubled the examination of race and racism, mostly in relation to a common tendency to think of race and racism as a historiography »explicitly secular and ›modern‹ […] one that has its genesis in Atlantic slavery and Enlightenment-informed colonial encounters« (Meer 2013a, 386). In other words, more often than not, race and racism have been approached as a singular phenomenon, with a singular and rather recent history (that of color) and trajectory (transiting from biology toward culture) in which the different forms of how religion served to craft races and racism served to delineate religion have been occluded.

However, there have also been voices challenging the neat division between race and religion. Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1978) and more specifically in *Orientalism reconsidered* (1985) already hinted at the relation between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia through the figure of the Semite. Following Said, Ivan Kalmar (2009) has also investigated the complex and »long history of the joint construction of Jew and Muslim« in Europe, that is to say, the history of Semitism and anti-Semitism (see also Massad 2015; Anidjar 2003, 2008). Building upon these critiques, our aim is to

investigate the many cases where the historiography has obliterated the moments where the categories of race and religion, as well as their effects, have operated conjointly.

The present contribution is divided into two sections covering how strands of postcolonial scholarship have addressed race and religion in a disentangled manner. Firstly, we map some of conversations related to race and racism and subsequently explore the difficulty of tackling the question of religion. Secondly, we highlight moments of postcolonial scholarship addressing religion, which from its onset disentangled religion from questions of race and racism. While it is true that religion has not necessarily been regarded as a »standalone category« (Masuzawa 2008), the emphasis has been on the operations of secularism rather than on the ones effected by race. Finally, we turn our attention toward Europe and its governing of race and religion.

Thinking »race« (without religion)

The academic debate concerning race and racism embraces a wide range of approaches, diverse theoretical points of departure, and conceptualizations emerging from several disciplines. The academic study of racism (and not of race) in the US can be traced back to the pioneering work of W.E.B. Du Bois ([1903] 2005) in the early twentieth century, the Chicago school led by Robert E. Park (1939) during the 1920s and 1930s, followed by Aimé Césaire's ([1955] 2000) *Discourse on Colonialism* and Frantz Fanon's ([1952] 2008, [1959] 1965, [1961] 2004) critique in the midst of the decolonization processes in the aftermath of the Second World War. However, it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that racism as an academic field of inquiry was established and developed in many areas of the social sciences and the humanities. Particularly important in this regard was the work of Stuart Hall (1971), Michael Banton (1967), John Rex (1983), and Robert Miles (1989) as well as the contributions of black feminists, which expanded the conceptualization and scope of race and racism by

emphasizing its entangled operations with the category of gender (Davis 1983; hooks 2000; Hill Collins 1990).[5]

Particularly in Europe during the 1980s, important changes occurred pertaining to understandings of how racism operated and was expressed. Specifically, this can be found in the sociopolitical context of the rise and success of right-wing parties as analyzed by Pierre-André Taguieff (1991) and Etienne Balibar (1991) in France, and Martin Baker (1981) and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (1982) in Britain, which produced theoretical concepts such as culturalist/differentialist racism, neo-racism, and new racism, respectively.[6] A common denominator in these accounts posited the translation of racial hierarchies and relations based on biology and color into cultural ones; thus, racism was treated as an evolving, yet singular, phenomenon. And even though some of these elaborations such as Balibar's neo-racism put forward a »religious group,« i.e., Muslims, as the main target of this form of racism, the core argument postulated a linear reconfiguration of color into culture; therefore, religion was again separated from the operations of race and treated as a cultural register.

According to Robert Miles (1993), one common problem with the postulations about new racism surrounds the conceptualization of the

5 This survey is merely analytical and certainly not exhaustive. For a wider and more comprehensive account of the theories and history of the study of racism, see Back and Solomos (2000); Solomos and Bulmer (2007); Hall (1971); Essed and Goldberg (2002); Miles and Brown (2003); Wieviorka (1995).

6 Stoler (1995, 24) raises an interesting argument concerning the debate about new racism in Europe: Europe was marked by an absence of race politics during the 1970s, which led to the conceptualization of racism as »bracketed in specific stories.« This context created a void in academic debates situating racism at the core of European societies. In comparison, the civil rights movement strongly influenced the political and academic sphere in the US. Thus, it was not until the 1980s that the topic began to be considered through the notion of new racism »as inherent in the deep structure of Europe's contemporary social order« (Stoler 1995, 24), emerging as an issue in the context of the so-called immigration problem.

previous form, which confers substance to the idea of novelty. This is because the core arguments sustaining the transition and novelty—right-wing postulations about culture, the European character, and the role of the state—can all be traced back to historical formulations of colonialism, imperialism, the slavery system, or in reference to National Socialism. Miles (1993, 40) further implies that the idea of new racism has undergone a uni-linear development, thus giving rise to successive stages in accordance with hermetic time periods. However, even Miles' sharp critique lacked critical engagement with the category of religion and its entanglements with race.

Within the trajectory of examining race and racism, the appearance of postcolonial studies can be seen as the attempt to unravel the connections between »scientific racism and imperialism and colonialism« as well as the inquiry into »the role race played in structuring social relations in colonial societies« (Back and Solomos 2000, 253). In this sense and contrary to the figurations of religion within postcolonial studies, the examination of race and racism has, as we argue below, occupied a central place within the field. However, due to its elusive configuration as a field, as a discipline, or as a theoretical framework, it is difficult to outline a clear-cut line of inquiry pertaining to a postcolonial examination of race and racism. Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus that the works of Edward W. Said (1978, 1994), Gayatri C. Spivak (1994, 1999), and Homi K. Bhabha (1994) should be considered as the cornerstones of postcolonial studies (Castro Varela, do Mar, and Dhawan 2005).

For instance, in one of the first compendiums of postcolonial studies and its operative concepts, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffith, and Helen Tiffin (2000) trace the genealogy of race back to the first occurrence of the word in the English language in 1508, arguing that at that time race »remained essentially a literary word denoting a class of persons or things« (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2000, 218). Afterward, the authors posit »[i]t was only in the late eighteenth century that the term came to mean a distinct category of human beings with physical characteristics transmitted by descent« (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2013, 219). Moreover, as Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin unpack race, genetics, physical appearance,

and biology, appear to be key categories, whereby race operates, ranks, and classifies humans; thus, this entry in a key compendium of postcolonial studies seems to circumscribe the operations of race to what is often labeled as the color line in general and the appearance of what is deemed scientific racism in particular. Since the effects and affects of race have not been deployed and operated exclusively through the English language, this genealogy obliterates the variegated historiographies of race in other contexts and languages.[7] Equally troubling, but more important for our argument here, Ashcroft's genealogy makes the complex entanglement of race and religion unreadable. Moreover, circumscribing race to categorizations based on color disregards how even racial hierarchies predicated on color were deeply intertwined with supposed cultural characteristics, behaviors, and conceptualizations of historical progress.

Thinking »religion« (without race)

In the last two decades in particular, scholars of religion have repeatedly turned to the question of religion from the perspective of postcolonial thinking. Acknowledging its Eurocentric historicity in terms of conceptualization, these valuable interventions have traced the concept's violent

7 Maria Elena Martínez, for instance, explored the convoluted rise and development of the concept of purity of blood (*limpieza de sangre)* in the Iberian Peninsula prior to 1492 and its ensuing reconfiguration in colonial Spain, whereby race (*raza*) was »[l]inked to sin and heresy« and »tended to be applied to communities—namely, Jews, Muslims, and sometimes Protestants—deemed to be stained or defective because of their religions histories« (Martínez 2008, 54; see also Anidjar 2014). Furthermore, Martínez's study fleshed out how the statutes of purity of blood, while originally designed to exclude Jewish converts to Christianity—and later Muslims too—from public offices, changed its meanings and operations when it traveled from the Iberian peninsula and was deployed in the colonial setting, thereby setting the basis for a highly calculated racial hierarchy in »New Spain« and giving rise to the race/caste system categories which still resonate today. That is, according to Martínez, conceptualizations of blood and religion were fundamental not only for the imaginaries and policies of the colonial Spanish project in America and the Iberian Peninsula, but also key in the prefiguring and the appearance of a notion of race.

translatability and dissemination outside Europe and its various colonial effects (Balagangadhara 1994; Chidester 1999, 2001; Fitzgerald 2000; King 1999; Masuzawa 2005; Nehring 2012). In doing so, they have fundamentally offered thoughtful suggestions for new ways to think of and conceptualize religion.

Perhaps no one has been more emblematic than Talal Asad for making us understand the emergence as well as the deployments of the modern idea and concept of religion as being a distinguishable and distinct category. It is due to his oeuvre that the category of religion can be thought of not only as a modern construction but also as a historically evolved category embedded within larger structures of power and knowledge,[8] or as he puts it, as »the historical product of discursive processes« (Asad 1993, 29). For Asad (1993, 40), the seventeenth century offered the first systematized attempts to begin producing a universal definition of religion. Emphasizing belief »as a set of propositions« while excluding practice, the modern category of religion became something to which believers »gave assent« and which could be »judged and compared« with other propositions as well as situated within an epistemic order (Asad 1993, 40–41). It is due to this process, according to Asad, that religion could be conceptualized and defined as being »everywhere and at all times *essentially* the same«; that it could become »the object of a single comprehensive theory« (Asad 1992, 4; emphasis in original). It is precisely this »great creative fiction of the modern world« (Asad 1992, 4; emphasis in original), the fiction of religion being of transhistorical

8 It is important to note that while for some religion has been »solely the creation of the scholar's study« and has »no independent existence apart from the academy« (Smith 1982: xi), for Asad, the making-of-the-definition of religion, constituting what it signifies and how it operates »is not merely an abstract intellectual exercise; […] not just what modern scholars do.« Asad rightly insists, »[t]he act of defining religion is connected with anxieties and comforts, it responds to different problems and interests, connects with institutional disciplines and emotional attachments. […] [We have] open[ed] up questions about *where*, *by whom*, and *in what manner*—i.e. in what social context and in what spirit—the *definitions are produced and put into circulation*« (Asad 2009, 398; author's emphasis).

character, which makes it a Eurocentric concept. The problem with this, as scholars of religion have been elaborating for some time,

> […] is not simply that differences are underplayed in order to identify the essential sameness of religion in all times and places. The deeper problem is that transhistorical accounts of religion are themselves implicated in shifts in the way authority and power are distributed, while claiming to be purely descriptive (Cavanaugh 2009, 82).

In operating as such, then, Eurocentrism has been effective in concealing the conditions of power under which a transhistorical understanding of religion could emerge and conceptually divide itself from politics, economy, and, for our purpose, race.

Since Asad's intervention we can now better reflect upon the epistemological and sociopolitical conditions for the emergence of religion *as* a modern concept and the related shifts accompanying this emergence: »a new kind of state, a new kind of science, a new kind of legal and moral subject« (Asad 1993, 43; see also Asad 1983, 2003, 2006; Cavanaugh 1995). By now, work within and outside postcolonial studies has brought closer the formerly divided geographies, histories, and experiences of the colony and the European metropole in order to suggest that the emergence of religion as a modern concept did not only take place »in a Europe undergoing political, economic, and cultural transition,« but »took shape during a period of colonial expansion.« Hence, religion did not only »develop in Europe« but was equally »[a product] of, functioned within and served the expanding colonial projects of European power in places such as Africa« (Davaney 2009, 1329).

However, strands of postcolonial conversations seem to have overlooked these crucial insights. Instead of approaching religion as a modern and historically evolved concept, as a discursive effect closely tied to colonialism's violent histories—as is rightly done in relation to the category of race—religion either remains absent or appears as an almost natural kind of category: a category without any historical formation and in isolation from race as such. It seems as if Susan Harding's words (1991, 375) »that antiorientalizing tools of cultural criticism are better

suited for some »others« and not other »others«—specifically, for cultural »others« constituted by discourses of race/sex/class/ethnicity /colonialism but not religion« still have currency within strands of postcolonial conversations.

This play of absence and presence looms large and is traceable within the discipline's aforementioned key compendium *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*.[9] While the first edition (2001) offers no entry on religion, the second edition (2007, 188) maintains that the entry on religion is relevant due to a »dramatic shift in recent times in post-colonial studies« and »the growing awareness of the role religion has played in both the practices of colonization and the developments which have occurred since political independence in the post-colonial world.« The very phrasing points to the absence of debates on the topic within what the authors see as »post-colonial studies.« In effect, the entry evaluates two approaches in order to address the lacuna: First, the authors suggest there has been a »growing awareness« of the complexities of religion in colonial times, making it possible to conceptualize religion as a shaping force for »colonizers and colonized« and to conceptualize and analyze it as »a means of hegemonic control« or »resistance« (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2007, 188). Second, we are told that although the »acknowledgement of the neglect of religion« in the colony has grown, postcolonial explorations and analytics have likewise turned to examining the contemporary role of religion »in the modern post-colony« (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2007, 189). This, the authors suggest, has been done by situating »religious and other social and cultural practices within the framework of globalization.« In doing so, religion has either been interrogated in relation to »the resurgence of fundamentalist forces« or, more »positively,«

9 The point we are raising in the following, however, is not just about this one particular compendium, but how this compendium, in a compressed way, represents epistemological structures available and operative within strands of postcolonial conversation. In setting foci, posing research questions, and offering frames of interpretation (while excluding others), such compendia precisely contribute and consolidate the »selective directions« (Stoler 2016, 40) through which religion has been conceptualized and thought of.

has been identified as being »part of a broader humanist critique« (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2007, 189).[10]

In mapping the growing interest in the concept, religion is, for some reason, neither addressed nor treated as a historically evolved concept, but rather as an already constituted phenomenon applicable to various operations in the colony and post-colony. Unlike race, which is addressed as a historically evolving signifier one entry of the compendium—religion, as an idea, as a concept, as a practice—is never granted the same status, which is to say, the privilege of historicity, of having a history. In a strange way, this gesture of recognizing one (race) as having a history and characterizing the other (religion) as ahistoric, the discipline's compendium echoes, certainly unintentionally, a quite colonial gesture: reiterating that it is Europe (and its histories of race and racial dynamics with the world at large) that have *made* history, which have mentionable histories, while the colony and the colonial are religious and therefore without any (relevant) history.

Thus, the entry on religion, unlike the one on race, does not cover the signifier »religion« in its historical formation *as* a discursive effect, nor does it analyze the epistemological status of religion, and, hence, does not interrogate religion as a power/knowledge effect of the very Eurocentric orders which postcolonial scholarship as such aims to problematize, decolonize, or intends to provincialize. Rather, as the entry implicitly suggests, religion remains an almost natural object, a phenomenon out there, which can be found, addressed, approached, and its different colonial and post-colonial histories and operations traced uniformly. This gesture of naturalizing the concept of religion, occluding its Eurocentric formation and status as a transhistorical concept, concealing

10 Despite its Eurocentric genealogy and pedigree, »religion« as a »traveling theory/concept« (Said 1984) has been lived, used, and transformed in variegated ways in postcolonial worlds. Given the scope of our argument, we cannot detail these multiple operations and the way they have also shaped and influenced discussions about »religion« in the »West«; for an account see, among others, Mahmood (2011); Massad (2008).

its epistemological emergence, as already elaborated along Asadian lines, is kept in place even in the third edition (2013).

This state of affairs is, however, not restricted to this key compendium. Such traces can be found in other conversations too, indicating, we believe, a reluctance among strands of postcolonial scholarship to come to terms with the historicity and the evolving character of (the concept of) religion. In a debate among postcolonial scholars in 2012, which has been described as maybe »the last significant engagement with the field's status as a whole« (McLaughlan and Srivastava 2014, 251), Robert Young (2012) unintentionally reiterated this difficulty while addressing the question of Islam.

In thinking about the unreadability of Islam within postcolonial studies, Young argues that the field not only sidelined »the question of Islam,« but also the »the role of religion in anticolonial struggle more generally« (Young 2012, 28). Young, however, attempts to make Islam visible and readable in regard to two different accounts: first, in relation to its history of »political Islam« (Young 2012, 22), indicating a religiously informed struggle against European colonialism, a »political story [going] far back into the colonial era« (Young 2012, 27), and second, by focusing upon the idea of tolerance practiced during the Islamic Empire in Al-Andalus. By reminding readers of Al-Andalus, this »often-forgotten history […] of equitable relations between different communities, different people living in the same place, tolerating each other's differences« (Young 2012, 32), Young offers a possibility to address the question of the »other«: a question which has been a major preoccupation of postcolonial scholars. For Young, both investigations into history offer possibilities to rethink the terrain of postcolonial analysis anew, to show how its modes of investigation remain significant in order to identify colonialism's »unfinished business,« and to address »the continuing projection of past conflicts into the experience of the present« (Young 2012, 21). In doing so, Young alternates casually between the different temporalities mentioned, the various European imaginations, realities, and anxieties tied to signifiers such as »9/11,« »Al-Qaeda,« »the Iranian Revolution,« the controversies around *The Satanic Verses* (Rushdie 1988), or trajectories going far back in

history (the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate by Atatürk's new assembly in 1924 or the issue of tolerance during Al-Andalus). These movements are possible in the first place because Young can forcefully bring these vast geographies, histories, and sociopolitical issues under one heading: namely that of Islam, further subsumed in a wider transhistorical understanding of religion. In attempting to counter aspects of the unintelligibility of Islam within postcolonial studies, Young himself displays »Islam« as a transhistorical category: »While an intense interest in postcolonial theory has developed in Islamic countries, in 2001 Islam was just as unreadable for most postcolonial theorists in the West as for everyone else« (Young 2012, 30).

The problem is not necessarily one of representation, but rather that Young has nothing to say about the very concept of Islam he uses to trace, order, and make sense of various colonial and post-colonial events and their contemporary relevance. Hence, neither Islam nor its attribution as a religion are addressed in this work as modern categories closely tied to the project of Eurocentric knowledge production and colonial expansion, but are instead treated as transhistorical phenomena. As a postcolonial scholar, Young seems unable to undo or even think through and address the theoretical and epistemological presumptions and preoccupations informing his understanding of Islam. By assuming a transhistorical understanding of religion, attributing the concept of religion with no historicity which involves interrogating the Eurocentric orders and divisions of inclusion and exclusion, Young can thus easily move through time and space, offering references ranging from 1492 and Spain to Hobbes and Locke, while finally arriving at the more recent return of religion and political Islam. In doing so, Young reproduces not only the very registers of power he intends to take a stand against, but also the epistemic categorizations without interrogating his own use of the concepts of »Islam« and »religion« as well as the epistemic status and power they hold due to universalizations tied to European colonialism. In additional, race does not appear even once in these interrogations. Here as well, Islam is mapped only in relation to religion and neatly disentangled from race. In effect, these strands of postcolonial conversations

while attempting to unravel Eurocentrism have instead reproduced religion as a Eurocentric category; thus, as a transhistorical and transcultural essence distinct from politics, the economy, and—most importantly for our context—race. In doing so, these moments of postcolonial interrogations have made it impossible to trace the transmutation of religion as a historically evolving category and its proximity with race.

While these engagements have completely ignored the Asadian turn and have in effect reproduced Eurocentric orders and ways to conceptualize religion, another strand of conversations, broadly following the work of Talal Asad, has systematically disentangled race from religion, interrogating one at the expense of the other.

Talal Asad's work is best known for directing our attention to the relational character of politics and religion, and of the secular and the religious within the nation-state:

> The concept of the secular cannot do without the idea of religion. True, the »proper domain of religion« is distinguished from and separated by the state in modern secular constitutions. But formal constitutions never give the whole story. On the one hand objects, sites, practices, words, representations—even the minds and bodies of worshipers—cannot be confined within the exclusive space of what secularists *name* »religion.« They have their own ways of being. The historical elements of what come to be conceptualized as religion have disparate trajectories. On the other hand the nation-state requires clearly demarcated spaces that it can classify and regulate: religion, education, health, leisure, work, income, justice, and war. The space that religion may properly occupy in society has to be continually redefined by the law because the reproduction of secular life within and beyond the nation-state continually affects the discursive clarity of that space. The unceasing pursuit of the new in productive effort, aesthetic experience, and claims to knowledge, as well as the unending struggle to extend individual self-creation, undermines the stability of established boundaries. (2003, 200–201)

Secularism, according to Asad, has been religion's »Siamese twin« (2001, 221). While religion has been part of a »restructuration of practical times and spaces, a rearticulation of practical knowledges and powers, of subjective behaviours, sensibilities, needs, and expectations in modernity,« secularism has been trying to »guide that rearticulation and to define »religions« in the plural as a species of (nonrational) belief« (ibid., 221). According to Asad, secularism has been an important condition of possibility through and upon which religion has taken its epistemic shape in the post-Enlightenment West.

Other postcolonial scholars have also argued in favor of bringing together the modern idea of religion with the concept of the secular. Postcolonial scholar and critic David Scott in his *Refashioning Futures* (1999, 67–68) argued that the process of secularization is not only one of institutional differentiation »in which the ecclesiastical establishment comes to be assigned a new position in social and political life,« but equally »*an epistemic shift in which a field of discourse and practice comes to be constituted as »religion« as such*. This involves […] a cognitive alteration in which »religion« ceases to be the background of thought.« (Scott 1999, 68; emphasis added) In a similar vein, Timothy Fitzgerald (2008) has insisted on entangling religion with the operations of the secular by suggesting that religion »is not a stand-alone category with its own distinctive referent but is unintelligible without simultaneous cognizance of those practices which in any strategic context get put in the category »non-religion,« which is the bottom-line meaning of »secular« in modern rhetoric.« Tomoko Masuzawa (2008) has even characterized »the story of secularization« and the »discursive apparatus« sustaining our understanding of religion as »two essential body-parts of a single beast.«

However, ever since these contributions to the examination of religion as a historically evolving concept crafted by and crafting secular rule, different scholars have fleshed out the intertwined operations of religion and the secular as patterns of political governance. In doing so, religion in particular has been interrogated while isolating its entanglement and co-operations with race. In this line of inquiry, Schirin Amir-Moazami (2011, 2013) has analyzed the working of secular rule as a means to

govern and regulate Muslims in contemporary Germany, particularly along questions regarding gender and sexuality, but not considering the possible links between the workings of the categories religion, secular, and race. Similarly, but examining the case of France, Mayanthi L. Fernando (2014) has exposed the way in which French secularism seeks to transform and regulate the meanings and practices associated with being a Muslim. Likewise, Fernando (2014, 16) stresses that analyses focusing on the discrimination of Muslims in France have tended to either »collapse religion into culture« or to underscore the centrality of race and class, thus disregarding discrimination based on religious grounds and therefore »misunderstand[ing] the nature of secular rule« (2014, 17). Thus, without discarding the operations of race and class, Fernando opts to approach the situation of Muslims and Islam in France through the lens of the entangled operations of »religion and secularity« (2014, 17). Nadia Fadil (2016; see also 2009, 2013, 2015) has recently argued for entangling state sovereignty, race, and religion in order to address particularly the governmentalization of the Muslim subject in post-racial times. This important and valuable line of inquiry, its force and foregrounding of entangling religion with secularism in order to pursue political patterns of governmentalization and regulation, we believe, has reiterated what scholarship on race has done to religion and has tended to opt for religion when isolating possible entanglements with race.

By way of concluding: On Europe

What, then, to do with race and religion, with their separated interrogations within and outside of strands of postcolonial conversations and interrogations?

One way of concluding this contribution would be to list the wealth of scholarship attempting to bring together race and religion in their operations (cf. Anidjar 2008; Kalmar 2009; Meer 2013a, 2013b; Meer and Moodod 2010). This list, then, would precisely indicate in which ways, at which historical junctures, and toward what ends these categories have been entangled, and in relation to what particular figurations race and religion have emerged and operated in tandem. However, we believe that

not just the entangled operations of race and religion or the disentanglement of these categories in scholarly interrogations are at stake, but more importantly, the very question of Europe itself.

What about Europe? Should we not interrogate it too, or maybe interrogate it in the first place? What about »this little thing that is Europe« (Gasché 2007, 3), irrespective of whether it is thought of as a »cognitive truth,« deemed a »feeling« (Gasché 2000), constructed as an idea (Pagden 2002), characterized as an »unfinished adventure« (Bauman 2004), or identified as a »community of memory« (Assmann 2007)? Among the various moments of questioning, problematizing, and dismantling Europe (Almond 2014), Dipesh Chakrabarty's call to »provincialize Europe« has been quite influential and has gone far beyond the scope of postcolonial scholarship. Ironically, while deconstructing Europe's presence as a »silent referent« (Chakrabarty 2000, 28) and »subject of all histories« (Chakrabarty 2000, 29), there has also been, as postcolonial scholars have been arguing more recently, an »absence of Europe within postcolonial studies« (Ponzanesi and Blaagaard 2011, 4). This lack of Europe as a site of (postcolonial) inquiry has kept it »a hollow signifier in the postcolonial debate, but also a blind spot« (Ponzanesi and Blaagaard 2011, 4). In other words, the question of Europe, or Europe as a set of questions, seems in some sense to be kept out of interrogation.

What we would like to suggest by way of concluding is that the reciprocities of race and religion, their coming together and separation in colonial and post-colonial histories, should be entangled with the »*conceptual* level assigned to ›Europe‹ understood not merely as a geographical space but as an apparatus of dominant power-effects« (Scott 2005, 24); Europe as precisely the signifier not only introducing but also (dis-)entangling and governing through these categories. Rather than a polemical dismissal of Europe, a »Fanonian rhetoric of forgetting Europe« (Scott 2005, 24), we employ race and religion as pertinent categories in order to interrogate Europe and the epistemic, economic, and political structures it has offered in its globalizing gestures—violently and otherwise. In effect, then, »not less Europe, […] but a problematized one,« as David Scott (2005, 29) has suggested. The task would less be to ask about the meaning of race

and religion, entangled or disentangled, but rather about the points of their emergence, (isolated or entangled) discursive operations, and their political effects in relation to a Europe governing, debating, and putting into practice these categories.

While analyzing the figure of the Semite, Gil Anidjar (2008) has lamented the isolated histories of race and religion. According to him, for much too long, the histories of the Jew (of race) and the Arab (of religion) have been written in isolated ways, distinct from each other, and have been attributed either to historical accounts of anti-Semitism or to that of Orientalism. In doing so, these accounts have not only ignored »the possibility of hidden links and explicit associations between these pairings« but have »fail[ed] to engage the three ›elements‹ at once (Europe, the Jew, the Arab), [have failed] to engage both religion and race« (2008, 35) in order to address Europe. What, then, about not only race and religion, but also Europe? What about their isolation and their coming together; whether in terms of anti-Semitism or Orientalism; whether in form of the Semite—the Jew and the Arab; or the recent analyses positing the existence of a »new anti-Semitism« in Europe (Bunzl 2007) and the role of the Muslim figure in this supposedly new anti-Semitism, particularly in Germany (Özyürek 2016)?

Should we not also remember the debate around Thilo Sarrazin's book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (*Germany Undoing/Abolishing Itself*)?[11] when reflecting on race and religion in relation to Europe? Or remember the bringing together of the Muslim and of the Jew? Should we not ponder Sarrazin's

11 The Sarrazin debate refers to the public reaction to the book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* in 2010, roughly translated as »Germany undoing/abolishing itself,« by former Berlin Senator for Finance Thilo Sarrazin. He calls for stricter immigration policies and the reduction of welfare benefits. The arguments supporting these proposals are based on Sarrazin's racially informed ideas that Muslims and immigrants are for the most part taking advantage of the German welfare system. Sarrazin also posited the inherent violence of Islam and Muslims, linking them with crime, terrorism, and high birthrates. Sarrazin's book related statistics to eugenics and became Germany's best-selling book in 2011. For a critical and detailed account of Sarrazin's discourse, see Foroutan (2010); Shooman (2014).

argument about the possible disintegration of Germany due to the »growing« Muslim population while also writing about the »»average higher intelligence of the Jews passed through a Jewish gene« (quoted in Gilman 2012)? In doing so, Sarrazin once again conjured up the Semites, race, and religion in order to advance his apocalyptic scenario where the Germany of the »Germans« would vanish in the future. Was it not the publication of this very book which implicitly reiterated Renan's teachings that religion is equivalent to race and that race can be mapped onto religion? Did Sarrazin not »explain« that »all Jews share a certain gene, all Basques have certain genes that make them different from other people« while relegating the other Semite, the underachiever Muslim, to the position of the one to blame for making Germany »on average, becoming dumber in a natural way«?[12] To this extent, Sarrazin's discourse and the reactions toward it show that race and religion can be strategically joined and detached in nationalistic and racial fervor, and used once again to generate processes of inclusion and exclusion.

Just as David T. Goldberg (2015) has argued that we must ask »Are we all Postracial yet?« as a means to unravel the persistence of race and how discourses of post-raciality mask the very operations of race, we suggest that the persistence of Eurocentrism has been not only producing and separating race and religion on a conceptual basis, but has also been continuing to conjoin the two in supposedly post-Eurocentric political times.

12 »Injurious, Defamatory and Polemical: New Book Plunges Germany into Immigration Debate,« *Der Spiegel Online*, August 25, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/injurious-defamatory-and-polemical-new-book-plunges-germany-into-immigration-debate-a-713796.html.

References

Almond, Ian. 2014. »Five Ways of Deconstructing Europe.« *Journal of European Studies* 44:50–63.

Amir-Moazami, Schirin. 2011. »Dialogue as a Governmental Technique: Managing Gendered Islam in Germany.« *Feminist Review* 98:9–27.

—— 2013. »Islam and Gender under Liberal-Secular Governance: The German Islam Conference.« In *Religion, Identity and Politics: Germany and Turkey in Interaction*, edited by Haldun Gülalp and Günter Seufert, 72–86. New York: Routledge.

Anidjar, Gil. 2003. *The Jew, The Arab: A History of the Enemy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

—— 2008. *Semites: Race, Religion, Literature*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

—— 2014. *Blood: A Critique of Christianity*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Asad, Talal. 1983. »Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz.« *Man*, no.18, 237–59.

—— 1992. »Religion and Politics: An Introduction.« *Social Research* 59 (1): 3–16.

—— 1993. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. London: The John Hopkins University Press.

—— 2001. »Reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith's The Meaning and End of Religion.« *History of Religions*, no. 40, 205–22.

—— 2003. *Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

—— 2006. »Understanding French Secularism.« In *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*, edited by Hent de Vries and Lawrence Sullivan, 494–526. New York: Fordham University Press.

—— 2009. »Response to Gil Anidjar.« *Interventions*, no. 11, 394–99.

Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin. 2000. *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*. 1st ed. London: Routledge.

—— 2007. *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

—— 2013. *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

Assmann, Aleida. 2007. »Europe: A Community of Memory.« *GHI Bulletin*, no. 40, 11–25.

Attia, Iman. 2009. *Die westliche Kultur und ihr Anderes*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Back, Les, and John Solomos. 2000. *Theories of Race and Racism*. London: Routledge.

Baker, Martin. 1981. *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe*. London: Junction Books.

Balibar, Étienne. 1991. »Is There a Neo-Racism.« In *Race, Nation and Class: Ambiguous Identities*, edited by Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, 17–28. London: Verso.

Balagangadhara, S. N. 1994. *The Heathen in His Blindness: Asia, the West and the Dynamic of Religion*. Leiden: Brill.

Banton, Michael. 1967. *Race Relations*. New York: Basic Books.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 2004. *Europe: An Unfinished Adventure*. Malden: Polity.

Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.

Bravo Lopez, Fernando. 2012. *En Casa Ajena: Bases Intelectuales del Antisemitismo y la Islamofobia*. Barcelona: bellaterra.

Bunzl, Matti. 2007. *Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.

Castro Varela, Maria do Mar, and Nikita Dhawan. 2005. *Postkoloniale Theorie: Eine kritische Einführung*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Cavanaugh, William T. 1995. »A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the rise of the State.« *Modern Theology* (11): 397–420.

—— 2009. *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. 1982. *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain*. London: Routledge.

Césaire, Aimé. 2000. *Discourse on Colonialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Comaroff, John, and Jean Comaroff. 2008. *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chidester, David. 1999. *Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

—— 2001. »›Classify and Conquer.‹ Friedrich Max Müller, Indigenous Religious Traditions, and Imperial Comparative Religions.« In *Beyond Primitivism: Indigenous Religious Traditions and Modernity*, edited by Jacob Olupona, 71–88. London: Routledge.

Davaney, Sheila G. 2009. »The Religious-Secular Divide: The U.S. Case.« *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 76 (4): 1327–32.

Davis, Angela. 1983. *Women, Race and Class*. New York: First Vintage Books.

DIK, Editorial-Team. 2011. *Zwischenbericht über die Arbeit der Arbeitsgruppe Präventionsarbeit mit Jugendlichen*. Berlin: DIK.

Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt. (1903) 2005. *The Souls of Black Folk*. New York: Bantam Books.

Dutton, Michael, Michele Grossman, Sanjay Seth, and Leela Gandhi. 2001. »Negotiating Difference.« *Postcolonial Studies* 4 (1): 7–9.

Essed, Philomena, and David Theo Goldberg. 2002. *Race Critical Theories*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Fadil, Nadia. 2009. »Managing Affects and Sensibilities: The Case of Not-Handshaking and Not-Fasting. « *Social Anthropology* 17 (4): 439–54.

—— 2013. »Praying at Work: Secular and Pious Muslims Negotiating the Contours of the Public in Belgium.« *Ethnicities* 14 (6): 729–50.

—— 2015. »Recalling the Islam of the Parents: Liberal and Secular Muslims Redefining the Contours of Religiosity.« *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 24:82–99.

—— 2016. »›Are We All Secularized Yet?‹: Reflections on David Goldberg's ›Are We All Postracial Yet?‹« *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (39): 2261–68.

Fanon, Frantz. 1965. *A Dying Colonialism*. New York: Grove Press.

—— 2004. *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.

—— 2008. *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove Press.

Fernando, Mayanthi. 2014. *The Republic Unsettled: Muslim French and the Contradictions of Secularism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Fitzgerald, Timothy. 2000. *The Ideology of Religious Studies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

—— 2007. *Religion and the Secular: Historical and Colonial Formations*. London: Equinox.

—— 2008. »Religion Is Not a Standalone Category.« *The Immanent Frame*, October 29, 2008. http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/10/29/religion-is-not-a-standalone-category/.

Foroutan, Naika. 2010. *Sarrazins Thesen auf dem Prüfstand: Ein empirische Gegentwurf zu Thilo Sarrazins Thesen zu Muslimen in Deutschland*. Berlin: Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.

Foucault, Michel. 1973. *The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Vintage Books.

Gasché, Rudolphe. 2000. »Feeling the Debt: On Europe.« In *Future Crossings: Literature between Philosophy and Cultural Studies*, edited by Krzystof Ziarek, 123–43. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

—— 2007. »This Little Thing That Is Europe.« *CR: The New Centennial Review* 7:1–19.

Gilman, Sander L. 2012. »Thilo Sarrazin and the Politics of Race in the Twenty-First Century.« *New German Critique* 39 (3): 47–59.

Goldberg, David Theo. 2015. *Are We All Postracial Yet? Debating Race*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, Stuart. 1971. »Race, Articulation and Societies Structured in Dominance.« In *Sociological Theories: Race and Colonialism*, edited by Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg, 305–45. Paris: Unesco.

Hall, Stuart 1996. »When Was ›the Post-Colonial‹ Thinking at the Limit.« In *The Post-Colonial Question*, edited by Ian Chambers and Lidia Curti, 242–59. New York: Routledge.

Halliday, Fred. 1999. »Islamophobia Reconsidered.« *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 (5): 892–902.

Harding, Susan. 1991. »Representing Fundamentalism: The Problem of the Repugnant Cultural Other.« *Social Research* 58 (2): 373–93.

Collins, Patricia H. 2000. »Black Feminist Thought.« In *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader*, edited Les Back and John Solomos, 421–30. London: Routledge.

hooks, bell. 1990. *Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics*. Boston: South End Press.

Kalmar, Ivan. 2009. »Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: The Formation of a Secret.« *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self- Knowledge* 7 (2): 135–44.

King, Richard. 1999. *Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and the »Mystic East.«* London: Routledge.

Klug, Brian. 2012. »Islamophobia: A Concept Comes of Age.« *Ethnicities* 12 (5): 665–81

Lazarus, Neil, and Rashmi Varma. 2008. »Marxism and Postcolonial Studies.« In *Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism*, edited by Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis, 309–32. Leiden: Brill.

Mahmood, Saba. 2011. *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Martínez, Maria Elena. 2008. *Genealogical Fictions: Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Massad, Joseph A. 2008. *Desiring Arabs*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

—— 2015. *Islam in Liberalism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Masuzawa, Tomoko. 2005. *The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

—— 2008. »The Burden of the Great Divide.« *The Immanent Frame*, January 30, 2008. http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/01/30/the-burden-of-the-great-divide/.

McClintock, Anne. 1995. *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*. New York: Routledge.

McLaughlan, Robert, and Neelam Srivastava. 2014. »Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory.« *The Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory* 22: 240–70.

Meer, Nasar. 2013a. »Racialization and Religion: Race, Culture and Difference in the Study of Antisemitism and Islamophobia.« *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (3): 385–98.

—— 2013b. »Semantics, Scales and Solidarities in the Study of Antisemitism and Islamophobia.« *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (3): 500–515.

Meer, Nasar, and Tariq Modood. 2010. »The Racialisation of Muslims.« In *Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives*, edited by Salman Sayyid and Abdoolkarim Vakil, 69–84. London: Hurst & Company.

Miles, Robert. 1989. *Racism*. London: Routledge.

—— 1993. »The Articulation of Racism and Nationalism: Reflections on European History.« In *Racism and Migration in Western Europe*, edited by John Wrench and John Solomos, 35–52. Oxford: Berg.

Miles, Robert, and Malcolm Brown. 2003. *Racism*. Key Ideas. London: Routledge.

Moore-Gilbert, Bart. 1997. *Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics*. London: Verso.

Pagden, Anthony. 2002. *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ponzanesi, Sandra, and Bolette B. Blaagaard. 2011. »In the Name of Europe.« *Social Identities* 17:1–10.

Nehring, Andreas. 2012. »Postkoloniale Religionswissenschaft: Geschichte—Diskurse—Alteritäten.« In *Schlüsselwerke der Postcolonial Studies*, edited by Julia Reuter and Alexandra Karentzos, 327–41. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Park, Robert. 1939. *Race Relations and the Race Problem: A Definition and an Analysis*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Parry, Benita. 2004. *Postcolonial Studies: A Materialist Critique*. London: Routledge.

—— 2012. »What Is Left in Postcolonial Studies?« *New Literary History* 43 (2): 341–58.

Rex, John. 1983. *Race Relations in Sociological Theory*. London: Routledge.

Runnymede Trust. 1997. *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*. Report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia. London: Runnymede Trust.

Rushdie, Salman. 1988. *The Satanic Verses*. London: Viking.

Said, Edward W. 1978. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin Books.

—— 1984. *The World, the Text, and the Critic*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—— 1985. »Orientalism Reconsidered.« *Race and Class* 27:1–15.

—— 1994. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage Books.

Sarrazin, Thilo. 2010. *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*. Munich: DVA.

Scott, David. 1999. *Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

—— 2005. »Colonial Governmentality.« In *Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics*, edited by Jonathan Xavier Inda, 23–49. Oxford: Blackwell.

Seth, Senjay, Leela Gandhi, and Michael Dutton. 1998. »Postcolonial Studies: A Beginning.« *Postcolonial Studies* 1 (1): 7–11.

Shohat, Ella. 1992. »Notes on the ›Post-Colonial.‹« *Social Text* 31/32:99–113.

Shooman, Yasemin. 2014. *…weil ihre Kultur so ist: Narrative des antimuslimischen Rassismus*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.

Smith, Jonathan Z. 1982. *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. 1963. *The Meaning and End of Religion*. New York: Macmillan.

Solomos, John, and Martin Bulmer. 2007. *Researching Race and Racism*. London: Routledge.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1994. »Can the Subaltern Speak?« In *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, edited by Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, 66–111. New York: Columbia University Press.

—— 1999. *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of The Vanishing Present*. Calcutta: Seagull Books.

Stoler, Ann L. 1995. *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things*. Durham: Duke University Press.

—— 2016. *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Taguieff, Pierre-André. 1991. *The Force of Prejudice: On Racism and Its Doubles*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Wieviorka, Michel. 1995. *The Arena of Racism*. London: SAGE.

Werbner, Pnina. 2013. »Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism: Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism in the Twenty-first Century.« *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36 (3): 450–67.

West-Pavlov, Russell. 2013. *Temporalities*. New York: Routledge.

Young, Robert. 2012. »Postcolonial Remains.« *New Literary History* 43:19–42.

Zantop, Susan. 1997. *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany*. Durham: Duke University Press.

***

Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar, Islamic Human Rights Commission: luis.hernaguilar@gmail.com.

Zubair Ahmad, Berlin Graduate School Muslim Cultures and Societies, Freie Universität Berlin: ahmad@bgsmcs.fu-berlin.de.

Beyond bipolarity?

The rise and fall of the Argentine Third Position (1947–1950)

Mirko Petersen

Introduction—The Latin American challenge to global Cold War studies

The classical account of the Cold War highlights the contest between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, often with Europe as the center of attention. What representatives of the field of so-called Global Cold War Studies propose is to leave this at times Eurocentric (or Western-centric) perspective behind and to understand the Cold War as a truly global phenomenon (for explicit pleadings of this kind, see Westad 2005, 396; McMahon 2010, 30; McMahon 2013, 3; Pieper Mooney and Lanza 2013, 6). It is certainly true that the United States and the Soviet Union dominated international politics after World War II. Nonetheless, as historian Prasenjit Duara (2011, 458) points out, »we need to attend to the emergent differences, counter-movements, and resistances that crack, weaken, or sometimes strengthen the hegemonic order« of the Cold War. In order to detect these aspects at the global scale, it is not enough to simply analyze the expansion of the superpower conflict to all parts of the world.[1] Instead, scholars should take local and regional dynamics seriously.

While many scholars have contributed to the rethinking of Eurocentric Cold War narratives, the global entanglements in this time period have not been studied for every world region in the same way. In comparison to other world regions of the so-called Third World that are included in

1 If so, this would amount to ignoring Dipesh Chakrabarty's warning about the construction of global historical time following a »first in Europe, then elsewhere‹ structure« (Chakrabarty 2008, 7).

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v8-i2-180 ISSN 2191-6721

the global approach to Cold War Studies, especially Asia and Africa, Latin America seems to be an anomalous case. The doubts about the impact of the Cold War in Latin America can be observed in a statement by historian Odd Arne Westad in his famous book »The Global Cold War« (2005, 3): »Without the Cold War, Africa, Asia, and *possibly also Latin America* would have been very different regions today« [emphasis added]. So, while the impact on Asia and Africa seems to be evident, the author is not entirely sure about Latin America.

Why is that? I Interpret Westad's uncertainty with regard to Latin America as a result of the minor influence of the USSR in this region. Asia and Africa witnessed a battle of influence between the Soviet Union and the United States, but Latin America was only a »minor theatre« (Zanatta 2013, 426) of the Cold War because of its dependence on the United States. Historian Greg Grandin (2003, 38) states: »An honest assessment would admit that there was only one superpower involved in the Latin American Cold War: the United States.«

Despite this geopolitical constellation, »Latin America became one of the most militaristic and ›dirty‹ battlegrounds of the Cold War« (Duara 2011, 471) when left-wing revolutionaries faced right-wing militaries in various parts of the region. Recent scholarship (among others, Joseph and Spenser 2008; Brands 2010; Garrard-Burnett, Lawrence, and Moreno 2013a; Iber 2015; Pettinà and Sánchez Román 2015; Rupprecht 2015; Manke and Březinová 2016) has gone beyond the few well-known events[2] and has shed more light on the Cold War in Latin America.[3] The focus of the majority

2 Those well-known events are especially the coup d'état against the government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the coup against the government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, and the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979.

3 For detailed discussions of the literature on the Cold War in Latin America, see Joseph (2008, 8–29); Garrard-Burnett, Lawrence and Moreno (2013b, 7–13); Manke, Březinová, and Blecha (2017).

of these studies[4] is on the time after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. In this paper, I would like to address the often-overlooked early phase of the Latin American Cold War, a phase during which important developments took place which pointed the way ahead.

First, I provide a brief overview of the early phase of the Cold War in Latin America, especially by looking at the three Inter-American Conferences that took place between 1945 and 1948. Afterward, I focus on the case of Argentina under the regime of Juan Domingo Perón. His declaration of a Third Position between capitalism and communism attracts attention in a world that seemed to be caught between two poles. In my elaboration on this Third Position, I discuss to what extent it subverts the hegemonic order of the Cold War, especially in Latin America. Accentuating Latin American agency in Global Cold War Studies should not lead to underestimating US influence.[5] The rise and especially the fall of the Argentine Third Position cannot be understood without taking Washington's attitude toward this position into consideration, which I do in the penultimate part of this paper, followed by a few brief concluding thoughts.

Latin America in the early phase of the Cold War

During the Second World War, the United States strengthened its hold on the Western Hemisphere and European powers lost most of their influence in the Americas (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 183; Westad 2005, 144). The US was now one of the two global superpowers and its main

4 The special issue of the *Culture & History Journal* edited by Pettinà and Sánchez Román (2015) concentrates on the early phase of the Cold War in Latin America. Iber (2015) as well as Manke and Březinová (2016) also offer numerous insights with regard to this time period, although these works do not focus exclusively on it.

5 A warning against writing »Washington […] out of the picture« is issued by historians Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio Moreno (2013b, 4): »The differential in power between the United States and Latin American governments, as well as the obvious intentions among U.S. officials to exploit that differential at many points during the Cold War, are simply too obvious to justify pushing Washington too far into the background.«

focus lay on the reconstruction of Europe in order to prevent the other superpower, the USSR, from gaining influence there. The famous Long Telegram by US diplomat George F. Kennan of February 1946, the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, the Marshall Plan, which was announced in June 1947, and the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949 are the well-known steps from the US side which initiated the era we call the Cold War.

Latin American countries did not play a role or were even mentioned in any of these four steps. The US administration considered it the region least threatened by an alleged Soviet will to expand (Bethell and Roxborough 1988, 181–82). »So,« historian Tanya Harmer (2014, 136) rightfully asks, »does the concept of the Cold War have any meaning for the region at all?« Her answer is yes, and I agree. Although the direct influence of the Soviet Union in this part of the world was small, the developments in Latin America were closely connected to ideological struggles elsewhere.[6]

In its early phase, the Cold War's relevance for Latin America was especially visible in the inter-American integration policies of the postwar era. The starting point for these policies was the Inter-American Conference in Chapultepec, Mexico, which took place during the last months of World War II. During this conference, it became visible that the United States wanted to strengthen regional organization under its guidance. Although the fight against the common fascist enemy still made Washington and Moscow collaborate, the former wanted to make sure that it had a Pan-American bloc in the newly formed United Nations Organization behind it in order to outplay the USSR there if necessary (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 97; Vacs 1984, 11). At the Chapultepec conference, even Argentina, which remained neutral during the war[7] and did not completely follow the US

6 This is in line with the more general statement by Westad (2005, 3) that »the argument that the Cold War conceptually and analytically does not belong in the south is wrong.«

7 Only after external pressure did Argentina break off relations with the Axis on January 26, 1944 and, in the final phase of the war, on March 27, 1945, declare war on the Axis.

line of conduct in the region, was invited to the next Inter-American Conference, and the US negotiated with the Soviet Union to let Argentina join the United Nations.[8]

The USSR had gained certain prestige in Latin America during the war and many communist parties could establish themselves as part of the political systems of their countries (Bethell and Roxborough 1988, 173–74). During the time of the Chapultepec conference, when the alliance between the United States and the USSR was still more or less intact, especially the extremely anti-communist Latin American militaries feared a widespread recognition of the Soviet Union in the postwar era (López-Maya 1995, 138). This fear was shared by the traditional »bastion of anti-communism« (Bethell and Roxborough 1988, 179) in the region, the Catholic Church. This also shows that the Cold War discourse in Latin America was not simply something implemented from outside, but rather had local origins which existed before and in the postwar era entered into dialogue with the US line of conduct (for a similar argumentation, see Brands 2010, 15; Harmer 2014, 134).

The next important step after Chapultepec in terms of inter-American integration in the field of defense policies was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the so-called Rio Treaty named after the city of Rio de Janeiro where it was signed in August 1947, even before the creation of a Euro-Atlantic security association. The Rio Treaty was a forerunner of NATO for the American continent. It was a contract for reciprocal assistance by the American states in case of »an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict.«[9] The expression »extra-continental conflict« was already an indirect reference to the Cold War, but the anti-communist character of inter-American integration became even more obvious when the Organization of American States (OAS) was founded at the

8 In exchange, the Soviet republics of Ukraine and Belarus were counted as individual members of the UN (Vacs 1984, 11).

9 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Department of International Law—OAS, Multilateral Traties, accessed May 1, 2017, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-29.html.

Inter-American Conference in Bogota in April 1948. There, the communist parties of the hemisphere were openly named as a security threat (Bethell and Roxborough 1988, 182–83). The anti-communist hysteria was fostered when the murder of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the leader of the Colombian Liberal Party, during the conference in Bogota, was blamed on »international communism« by US Secretary of State George Marshall, although he was unable to provide any evidence for this allegation (Grandin 2013, 34). The backlash against democracy gained momentum after Bogota: communist parties were outlawed in different parts of the continent, and militaries started to overthrow elected governments (in Peru in October and in Venezuela in November 1948).

So, while the militaries were able to take advantage of the Cold War discourse, Latin American governments interested in economic development were not. Besides the formation of an inter-American geopolitical bloc, the US government tried to promote a system of market liberalism and to erase economic nationalisms while many Latin American governments were hoping in vain for a development plan for the region similar to the Marshall Plan for Europe. However, the US focused solely on Europe and left Latin America to private investments only (Grandin 2013, 32–33; López-Maya 1995, 140–41; Morgenfeld 2010, 40; Rinke 2012, 102–04). As much as the Latin American governments showed their backing for the Cold War policies of the United States, it did not pay off in the form of a Latin American Marshall Plan.[10] Between 1946 and 1977, not a single Latin American country was among the top ten receivers of US development aid (Conteh-Morgan 2010, 72–73). Between 1945 and

10 Historian Vanni Pettinà (2015) demonstrates that during the presidency of Miguel Alemán, Mexico was an exception in the regional context. In contrast to other Latin American countries, the Alemán government was able to obtain US public funds for its industrialization project. The reasons for this success were the special internal political situation of Mexico and the Alemán administration's skillful foreign policy.

1950, Belgium and Luxemburg alone received more US development aid than the whole of Latin America (Bethell and Roxborough 1988, 186).[11]

The Argentine Third Position

Following the description of US domination in Latin America after World War II, it now almost seems contradictory to introduce a Latin American government which in 1947 proclaimed a Third Position between capitalism and communism. How does this Third Position fit into the picture of the early phase of the Cold War in Latin America which I have drawn so far? I start by briefly describing the origins and characteristics of the government behind this position, that of Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina, in order to answer this question in a more comprehensive way.

On June 4, 1943, the Argentine military overthrew the government of conservative President Ramón Castillo and took over state control for three years. The political views within the military were heterogeneous, but the armed forces were united by the will to end the pseudo-democratic practices, initiated in the early 1930s, that were characterized by falsified electoral results (Potash 1969, 183). Colonel Juan Domingo Perón became the most important political protagonist within the military. In November 1943, Perón took over the National Labor Department and in a radio speech announced the beginning »of the era of Argentine social policy.«[12] He established personal contacts with blue-collar workers and trade unions and helped them strike new agreements. As historian Mariano Plotkin (1994, 49) points out, Perón was successful in binding the working class

11 The US view of Latin America's role was also visible in the scientific priorities of the postwar era. The new approach of »area studies« was determined by geopolitical strategy, mainly the containment of communism. Most of the money was invested to study the Soviet Union and China, while Japan and Latin America enjoyed the lowest priorities (Wallerstein 1997, 200–201).

12 Juan D. Perón, radio speech, December 2, 1943 [Translation: MP], Biblioteca Peronista del Congreso Argentino, Discursos de Gral. Juan D. Perón, Carpeta 1.

and the trade unions to his political project, but had trouble convincing the economic elites and parts of the military to support him.

On October 9, 1945, the opposition to Perón within the military forced him to resign from all his political appointments, and he was even imprisoned on October 12. This move was not just a move against Perón by his military foes, but could also be seen as a tactic to calm anti-government protests. The (mostly middle- and upper-class) protesters identified Perón as the leading figure of the junta which they denounced as an ideological holdover of German and Italian fascism.[13] What happened next opened a new chapter in Argentine politics: October 17, 1945, went down in history as the hour of the birth of Peronism, as a huge mass of workers from the Buenos Aires outskirts entered the city center to demand Perón's release. The military forces in charge complied and later announced that democratic elections were to take place in February 1946. In these elections, Perón was elected president.

Especially the first years of the new government were very successful. During wartime, Argentina had accumulated gold reserves worth 1.6 billion dollars (Page 1983, 168). In addition, Argentina profited from the European demand for its agricultural products after the destruction the war had caused (Rein 2006, 159). This postwar bonanza was used for a program of industrialization, promoted in the government's Five-Year Plan which started in 1947, as well as for numerous social improvements for the working class. The impressive first year of his government made Perón declare in August 1947: »Never has our country achieved such a situation of brilliance like the current one«.[14] According to Perón, officials from other countries could not even find Argentina on the world map in earlier years, but now »they call us one of the three greats«[15] in the international

13 One of the main reasons for this denunciation was the decision of the military regime to remain neutral until the final phase of World War II.

14 Perón, speech at the University of La Plata, August 16, 1947 [Translation: MP], Biblioteca Peronista del Congreso Argentino, Discursos de Gral. Juan D. Perón, Carpeta 11.

15 Ibid.

field. This feeling of self-confidence was reflected especially by the declaration of a Third Position between capitalism and communism, more human than both the exploitation by big capital and the exploitation by an all-powerful state apparatus. A radio speech by Perón on July 6, 1947, which was broadcast not only in Argentina, but worldwide, is usually considered the official starting point of the Third Position (Galasso 2005, 472; Morgenfeld 2010, 20). In this speech, Perón talked about the necessity to abandon antagonistic ideologies to avoid another war.[16]

The Third Position had different ideological dimensions. One inspiration for the Peronist Third Position certainly was the fascist attempt to create an alternative to liberalism and communism (Page 1983, 89). Perón, who visited Italy in the early phase of the Second World War, was especially inspired by the political organization of Benito Mussolini's regime (Plotkin 1994, 44), and Catholic-nationalist circles in Argentina were expressing views which were similar to those of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. Following the Catholic-nationalist worldview, the Third Position could be understood as the expression of a Hispanic-Catholic civilization, superior to both the Slavic and Anglo-Saxon civilization represented by the two Cold War superpowers (Zanatta 2013, 25–26). It is important to consider fascism and Catholic nationalism as sources of inspiration for Peronism—especially concerning political organization and iconography. However, this dimension of the Third Position can easily mislead us to simply interpret Peronism in a Eurocentric fashion and label it as a South American version of European totalitarian and authoritarian experiences.

To avoid this pitfall, two other, more important, dimensions of the Third Position should be considered as well. First, it must be mentioned that Argentina stayed neutral in both World Wars I and II, and there existed something like a tradition of Argentine neutrality and non-interference in international warfare. This is a position that went far beyond Peronism and was also the consensus among many conservatives and liberals (Rein 2006, 155). This tendency toward neutrality also had to do with the difficult

16 Perón, appeal for peace (radio speech), Juli 6, 1947, Biblioteca Peronista del Congreso Argentino, Discursos de Gral. Juan D. Perón, Carpeta 9.

relations Argentina had with the United States. Argentine elites saw the increasing influence of the US in South America, especially since the 1930s, as problematic because the US economic structures were not complementary to the Argentine ones (both were exporters of agricultural goods). This is why Argentina preferred trade with Great Britain and other European countries. The United States were never able to establish the same kind of relations with the Argentine elites as the ones Great Britain had (Rapoport 1997, 92–93). The US initiative to make the entire American continent abandon neutrality in World War II (following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor) was interpreted by many Argentine politicians and militaries as an attempt by Washington to expand its influence in the continent even further.

Besides this tradition of neutrality, the Third Position also implied the aspiration to tame predatory capitalism and to create a socially more just society in a non-communist way. The constant use of the symbol of Lady Justice in Peronist iconography fit well for the Third Position, which was presented as a weighing up of the two systems, capitalism and communism (Prutsch 2001, 32). As already indicated above, in the first years of the Peronist regime, workers benefited substantially from the government's social policies—wages increased, trade union organization rose, and a social security system was established (James 1990, 11). Perón presented his social policy as a measure to prevent a more radical political project. He portrayed pre-1943 Argentina as a time of social inequality which had made the rise of socialist and capitalist tendencies in the sphere of politics and trade unionism possible. In his view, »these formations which call themselves socialism and communism [do not] react to a different cause than that of the so-called capitalist regime of exploitation.«[17]

After this brief description of the Perón regime and the different dimensions of the Third Position, I return to the question of the connection between the Argentine position and the Latin American Cold War. It

17 Perón, speech at a conference of the League of Workers, November 20, 1947 [Translation: MP], Biblioteca Peronista del Congreso Argentino, Discursos de Gral. Juan D. Perón, Carpeta 12.

should be highlighted that, although Peronist rhetoric sometimes seemed to suggest this, the Third Position should not be seen as a symmetrical geopolitical position between the two poles of the Cold War (Paradiso 2008, 544). Although the Argentine government established bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in June 1946, Perón declared as early as December 1945 (even before becoming president), in a statement to United Press journalists, that in case of a future conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, Argentina would support the former.[18] He maintained this position during the entire duration of his government. Part of the idea behind this declaration was an economic calculation. While the Argentine and the US economies were not compatible during times of peace, Argentina could have become one the most important exporters to the US market if Washington had switched to a wartime economy (Horowicz 2005, 125).

As we have seen, the Argentine Third Position was not symmetrical in terms of geopolitics. Nor was it symmetrical in terms of economics either because the economic relations with the USSR could not counterbalance the US influence. After the establishment of diplomatic relations, the negotiations for a trade agreement between Argentina and the Soviet Union were not successful, partly because of the USSR's weak postwar economic situation and partly because the Argentine government did not want to risk too close an alliance with the communist superpower in times of increasing Cold War tensions (Rapoport 1987, 33–34).[19] Until 1953, when a modest trade agreement between the two countries was signed, Soviet economic relations with Argentina were almost non-existent.

18 Published in the newspaper *Democracia*, February 11, 1946. Even before that, in April 1945, Perón announced Argentine support for the United States in a possible future war to a secretary of the US embassy in Buenos Aires (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 198). This shows that the Argentine Third Position should not be interpreted as a position of non-alignment like, for example, India's foreign policy at that time.

19 Although no trade agreement between Argentina and the USSR was signed at that time, the former signed small agreements with other countries from the socialist bloc between 1947 and 1949: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (Llairo, Siepe, and Gale 1997, 33–39).

Recapitulating the facts mentioned above, we should not think of the Third Position as a symmetrical positioning between the Cold War superpowers, but rather as an attempt to loosen the fetters of the Latin American Cold War. While other countries were unconditionally supporting the US line of conduct in the region, Argentina showed more signs of resistance. Buenos Aires did not break off diplomatic relations with the USSR as other Latin American countries did (for example, Brazil and Chile in 1947), and it dared to question at least some of the US proposals at the Inter-American Conferences.

The cautious Argentine rebellion could be exemplified by the way Perón's government dealt with the Rio Treaty. Although Argentina presented itself as quite cooperative toward the United States at the conference in Rio de Janeiro (Morgenfeld 2010, 46), the treaty was later submitted for ratification to just one of the two chambers of the Argentine congress. Perón did not want to have it discussed in the Chamber of Deputies, knowing very well that the opposition party as well as parts of his own party would not welcome signs of compliance with the United States. So, until 1950 when pressure was heightened, Argentina remained outside of the inter-American security system.

This did not mean that Perón's government completely questioned the Latin American Cold War. On the one hand, Perón, as mentioned above, expressed his doubts about the repressive approach toward communism and stressed the socioeconomic reasons for the attractiveness of this ideology to the working class. On the other hand, the Argentine government even tried to exaggerate the alleged Soviet threat for its own benefits. Let us briefly look at two examples of this.

The first one was a diplomatic episode around the inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro in August 1947. Two weeks before the conference started, Argentine vice foreign minister Enrique Corominas tried to convince secretary of the US embassy in Argentina Guy Ray of the importance of a pact between the United States and Argentina »against extra-hemispheric aggression, particularly against Russia« and he mentioned Soviet attempts to play off Argentina against the United States. At the same time, he urged for an extension of the Marshall Plan to Latin

America, especially Argentina.[20] Guy Ray also informed the State Department about other high-ranking Argentine officials, including Perón himself and foreign minister Juan Atilio Bramuglia, who stressed the importance of Argentine-US cooperation in the run-up to the conference in Rio de Janeiro (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 246). During the Rio Conference, Bramuglia had a conversation with US Secretary of State Marshall and proposed to him a secret anti-communist pact between Argentina and the United States which would include repressive measures against communism in the hemisphere (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 247–48). These attempts remained fruitless. The Soviet threat to the hemisphere was not considered serious enough to make concessions to Argentina. Washington understood very well which game Buenos Aires was trying to play.

Another episode of Argentina exaggerating the Soviet threat took place in the context of the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan. It is also with regard to this aspect of the early phase of the Cold War that we have to broaden the Europe-centered perspective and look at the global economic entanglements connected to this plan. First, it seemed that Argentina was to be invited to contribute to the Marshall Plan with agricultural exports. This would have meant important income in US dollars for the South American country. But when the United States, Canada, and Australia were able to increase their agricultural productivity in 1948, Argentina's exports were no longer desperately needed for European reconstruction (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 269–75). Nonetheless, Perón kept trying to push for Argentine participation by pointing to Europe potentially becoming dependent on the USSR. In a newspaper commentary in June 1948, the Argentine president pointed at the possibility of a poor harvest in the United States or Canada and warned, »Inevitably the European states in need of grain would be dependent on the supply which Russia could undertake to provide […]. There is no doubt that […] Russia would of course set conditions for satisfying hunger in Europe.«[21]

20 Guy Ray to George C. Marshall, Buenos Aires, August 1, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Online Archive, 1947, Vol. VIII, The American Republics, Document 31.

21 *Democracia*, June 15, 1948 [Translation: MP].

This argumentation did not convince the US administration, and Argentina was not included in the exports to Europe in the context of the Recovery Program. Additionally, Argentina lost European clients due to their supply through the Marshall Plan. The above-mentioned increase in productivity in the United States and elsewhere helped the US government isolate Argentina and keep it more dependent on US loans, as we will see in more detail in the following subchapter.

The United States and the Third Position

As described above, the Argentine government, and especially Perón, repeatedly made clear to US officials that in case of a war, Argentina would support the United States. In a conversation in April 1948 with US ambassador to Argentina James Bruce Perón explicitly called the Third Position a policy for times of peace which was simply more attractive to workers than straightforward capitalism.[22]

Nonetheless, Washington was not willing to accept such a Third Position, even if it was only designed for peacetime and only for the Argentine population.[23] In a State Department memorandum from December 1948, the Argentine Third Position was described as a serious obstacle to the unity of the hemisphere and the common struggle against communism. Even if the policy was only meant for the Argentine population, it had repercussions beyond Argentina's borders.[24] And, when the two countries converged in 1950, the State Department was still complaining about the

22 James Bruce to George C. Marshall, Buenos Aires, April 28, 1948, FRUS, Vol. IX, The Western Hemisphere, Document 205.

23 Political scientist Mary Kaldor (1990, 105) points out that the Cold War discourse »stimulated and justified the process of compromise and, at the same time, marginalized and discredited those who could not accept its terms.« The Third Position could not be included in an anti-communist compromise between the US government and the Perón administration and constituted a reason to marginalize and discredit the latter.

24 Memorandum by the Chief of the State Department's Division for River Plate Affairs, Howard H. Tewksbury, December 9, 1948; documented in van der Karr (1990, 206–7).

damage which the Third Position caused to Argentine-US relations and hemispheric relations in general, and which Moscow could profit from (Escudé 1988, 10).

The United States not only blamed Argentina for supposedly weakening the anti-communist hemispheric policies, but the Third Position was seen as a case of economic nationalism which was supposed to be replaced by a more liberal approach. The US steadily tried to push the Argentine government toward a more investor-friendly economic policy and a retreat of the state from economic affairs. While the Perón government was able to defend its approach during the first postwar years, this changed after 1949. When Argentina's gold reserves were exhausted, its important economic partner Great Britain declared Argentine reserves in sterling unconvertible because of economic problems, and Argentina was excluded from participating in the Marshall Plan, the country was increasingly dependent on loans from the United States.

In 1950, the geopolitical and economic dimensions of the relationship between the United States and Argentina converged. As mentioned above, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies had still not ratified the Rio Treaty, which had been signed in August 1947. When the tensions between the US and the Soviet Union heightened in the context of the Korean War, the State Department pushed Argentina to finally sign the Rio Treaty to demonstrate hemispheric unity. The Argentine desire for a loan from the United States and the will to purchase US arms, which would only be sold to Rio-Treaty countries, served as additional pressure for Argentina to ratify. But it was also Perón who considered it necessary to sign the Rio Treaty because he thought of the Korean War as the possible start of a war between the United States and the USSR (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 327–29). In this situation, as already mentioned, he was hoping for profitable access to the US-market for Argentine agricultural products. On June 28, 1950, the treaty was finally ratified by the Argentine Chamber of Deputies.[25] After the ratification, there were even rumors about

25 Only a part of the political opposition voted against the ratification of the treaty.

Argentine troops participating in the Korean War. When protests against this were launched in different parts of the country by pro-Perón as well as oppositional groups, Perón announced he would follow the popular will and refrain from sending troops to Korea (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 331–32).

Although the conflict between the United States and the USSR did not turn into a direct military confrontation, the changes in the US economy in the context of the Korean War made the export of certain materials (wool, canned meat, leather, quebracho extract) from Argentina to the United States necessary and made the United States the number one importer of Argentine goods until 1953. These increased relations did not have predominantly positive effects. The terms of trade in the exchange between the two countries were not favorable for Argentina and could not solve its economic crises, especially between 1951 and 1953 (Rapoport and Spiguel 2009, 349). The whole episode around Argentina ratifying the Rio Treaty, the rumors about it participating in the Korean War, and the new economic relations between Argentina and the United States constitutes a telling example of the interconnectedness of geopolitical and economic developments in different parts of the world in this phase of the Cold War.

During a short period before and after the ratification of the Rio Treaty, the Argentine government kept the Third Position at a low profile on the national and international level. But after the protests against Argentine participation in the Korean War, Perón and other members of his government returned to a more aggressive proclamation of this position (Zanatta 2013, 254–55). Too close an affiliation with the United States would not have been compatible with Peronist ideology at that point. However, the circumstances had changed, and the window of opportunity for the Third Position was much narrower after 1950 when the US-Argentine relations changed. This development was summarized very well by historian Mario Rapoport (1997, 118–19):

> The election of Perón in 1946 had been a defeat for the United States. As the other countries of Latin America consolidated their Second World War alignment with the United States in the new

> conditions of the Cold War and adjusted their domestic and international policies accordingly, Perón's Argentina, though never denying its affiliation with the West in international politics and remaining strongly anti-Communist at home, continued to represent a challenge to U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere.
>
> The period from 1950, however, witnessed a growing rapprochement between Perón and Washington, so that even before the fall of Peron in 1955 Argentina was much less out of line with the rest of Latin America. In this respect, […] Argentina's exceptionalism was short-lived.

Conclusions

The case of the Argentine Third Position presented in this paper was at the same time atypical and typical of the Latin American Cold War. On the one hand, the more or less open confrontation between the Perón regime and the United States and the demonstration of an independent domestic and foreign policy in form of the so-called Third Position was rather atypical. On the other hand, the often fruitless attempts to capitalize on the new global bloc confrontation, especially in form of financial concessions by the United States, were typical. The »power of the weak« (McMahon 2010) in the Cold War, that is to say the capacity of so-called developing countries to play one superpower off against the other for their own benefit, was limited in Latin America because of the lack of influence of the Soviet Union in the region.[26] The attempts by the Argentine

26 It is no coincidence that historian Robert J. McMahon (2010) names only Asian and African examples to demonstrate the »the power of the weak« in the Cold War. »Latin America,« as Vanni Petinà (2015, 13) explains, »because of its geographical position and increasing American pressures determined by geopolitical calculation, but also as a consequence of the acceleration of economic and political integration experienced during the 1930s and the 1940s, was forced to seek accommodation almost exclusively with the United States.« Nonetheless, as mentioned in this paper, there were actors in Latin America (such as the militaries and the Catholic Church) that benefitted from the geopolitical constellation of the Cold War.

government to exaggerate the Soviet threat for the hemisphere could not make an impression in Washington, either.

The Argentine Third Position is just one object of study from the early phase of Latin America's Cold War which might contribute to a history beyond the more high-profile events in the region, sometimes beginning with the coup d'état against the Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 or, much more often, with the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Studies on the Latin American Cold War should take regional and local dynamics of day-to-day politics seriously without neglecting the important influence of the conflict between the superpowers. The United States played an important role in imposing the Cold War on Latin America. At the same time, the expansion of Cold War ideology in the region was based on local attitudes that had been present before and then entered into dialogue or conflict—or both at the same time—with the new form of US leadership.

As mentioned at the beginning of the article, scholars in the field of Global Cold War Studies have contributed to rethinking Eurocentric Cold War narratives, but have not sufficiently taken Latin America into account, especially in the early phase of the bloc confrontation. I have focused on these early years of the Cold War in Latin America because they were important for the development of the region.

Historian Loris Zanatta (2013, 7) claims that for Latin America, the Cold War meant a continuation of old conflicts and that the only change was the adaptation of a »new vocabulary« related to the contest between the two superpowers—new wine in old bottles. I cannot disagree completely with this statement, but my evaluation of this finding differs from his. This »new vocabulary« was not just the background music to what really happened on the ground. It was powerful, and it shaped geopolitical and societal relations in Latin America.

References

Bethell, Leslie and Ian Roxborough. 1988. »Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Some Reflections on the 1945–48 Conjuncture.« *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20 (1): 167–89.

Brands, Hal. 2010. Latin America's Cold War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2008. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Reissue with a new preface by the author. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Conteh-Morgan, Earl. 2010. »Die US-Entwicklungshilfe während des Kalten Krieges.« In *Ökonomie im Kalten Krieg*, edited by Bernd Greiner, 63–81. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

Duara, Prasenjit. 2011. »The Cold War as a Historical Period: An Interpretive Essay«. *Journal of Global History* 6 (3): 457–80.

Escudé, Carlos. 1988. »Crónicas de la Tercera Posición: La ratificación argentina del TIAR en junio de 1950.« *Todo es* Historia, no. 257, 6–26.

Galasso, Norberto. 2005. *Perón. Formación, Ascenso y Caída (1893–1955)*. Buenos Aires: Colihue.

Garrard-Burnett, Virgina, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio E. Moreno, eds. 2013a. *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

—— 2013b. »Introduction«. In *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War*, edited by Virgina Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence and Julio E. Moreno, 1–20. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Grandin, Greg. 2013. »What Was Containment? Short and Long Answers from the Americas.« In *The Cold War in the Third World*, edited by Robert J. McMahon, 27–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harmer, Tanya. 2014. »The Cold War in Latin America.« In *The Routledge Handbook of the Cold War*, edited by Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Craig Daigle, 133–48. London: Routledge.

Horowicz, Alejandro. 2005. *Los cuatro peronismos*. Buenos Aires: Edhasa.

Iber, Patrick. 2015. *Neither Peace nor Freedom. The Cultural Cold War in Latin America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

James, Daniel. 1990. *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946–1976*. Reprint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Joseph, Gilbert M. 2008. »What We Now Know and Should Know: Bringing Latin America More Meaningfully into Cold War Studies.« In *In from the Cold*: *Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War*, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, 3–46. Durham: Duke University Press.

Joseph, Gilbert M., and Daniela Spenser, eds. 2008. *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Kaldor, Mary. 1990. *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Van der Karr, Jane, ed. 1990. *Perón y los Estados Unidos*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Vinciguerra.

Llairo, María Montserrat, Raimundo Siepe, and Nidia Gale. 1997. *Perón y las relaciones económicas con el Este, 1946–1955*. Buenos Aires: Editores de América Latina.

López-Maya, Margarita. 1995. »The Change in the Discourse of U.S.-Latin American Relations from the End of the Second World War to the Beginning of the Cold War.« *Review of International Political Economy* 2 (1): 135–49.

Manke, Albert, and Kateřina Březinová, eds. 2016. *Kleinstaaten und sekundäre Akteure im Kalten Krieg. Politische, wirtschaftliche, militärische und kulturelle Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Europa und Lateinamerika*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Manke, Albert, Kateřina Březinová, and Laurin Blecha. 2017. »Conceptual Readings into the Cold War: Towards Transnational Approaches from the Perspective of Latin American Studies in Eastern and Western Europe.« *Estudios Historicos* 30 (60): 203–18.

McMahon, Robert J. 2010. »Die Macht der Schwachen.« In *Ökonomie im Kalten Krieg*, edited by Bernd Greiner, 30–44. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

—— 2013. »Introduction.« In *The Cold War in the Third World*, edited by Robert J. McMahon, 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Morgenfeld, Leandro Ariel. 2010. »Del TIAR a la OEA: Argentina, Estados Unidos y el sistema interamericano.« *CONfines* 6 (12): 13–49.

Page, Joseph A. 1983. *Perón, a Biography*. New York: Random House.

Paradiso, José. 2008. »Vicisitudes de una política exterior independiente.« In *Nueva historia argentina*. Vol. 8, *Los años peronistas*, edited by Juan Carlos Torre, 523–72. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.

Pettinà, Vanni. 2015. »Adapting to the New World: Mexico's International Strategy of Economic Development at the Outset of the Cold War, 1946–1952.« *Culture & History Digital Journal* 4 (1): e003.

Pettinà, Vanni, and José Antonio Sánchez Román, eds. 2015. »Beyond US Hegemony: The Shaping of the Cold War in Latin America.« *Culture & History Digital Journal* 4 (1): e001–e007.

Perón, Juan D. 1943–47. *Discursos de Gral: Juan D. Perón*. Biblioteca Peronista del Congreso Argentino, Carpetas 1, 9, 11, 12.

Pieper Mooney, Jadwiga E., and Fabio Lanza. 2013. »Introduction: De-centering Cold War History.« In *De-centering Cold War History: Local and Global Change*, edited by Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney and Fabio Lanza, 1–12. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

Plotkin, Mariano Ben. 1994. *Mañana es San Perón: Propaganda, Rituales Políticos y Educación en el Régimen Peronista (1946–1955)*. Buenos Aires: Ariel.

Potash, Robert A. 1969. *The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928–1945: Yrigoyen to Perón*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Prutsch, Ursula. 2001 »Revolutionäre Magie und politische Utopie—Getulio Vergas, Juan und Eva Perón, Hugo Chávez und Subcomandante Marcos.« In *Lateinamerika im Umbruch: Geistige Strömungen im Globalisierungsstress; Beiträge zu einer Ringvorlesung im Wintersemester 2001/02 an den Universitäten Innsbruck und Wien*, edited by Axel Borsdorf, Gertrud Krömer, and Christof Parnreiter, 129–41. Innsbruck: Selbstverlag des Instituts für Geographie der Universität Innsbruck.

Rapoport, Mario. 1987. »Capítulo 1: Diplomacia, comercio y factores internos; Los orígenes de las relaciones entre la Argentina y la Unión Soviética, 1917–1955.« In *Política y diplomacia en la Argentina: Las relaciones con EE. UU. y la URSS*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Tesis.

—— 1997. »Argentina.« In *Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948*, edited by Leslie Bethell und Ian Roxborough, 92–119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rapoport, Mario, and Claudio Spiguel. 2009. *Relaciones tumultuosas: Estados Unidos y el primer peronismo*. Buenos Aires: Emecé Ed.

Rein, Raanan. 2006. *Juan Atilio Bramuglia: Bajo la sombra del líder; la segunda línea de liderazgo peronista*. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Lumiere.

Rinke, Stefan. 2012. *Lateinamerika und die USA: Von der Kolonialzeit bis heute*. Darmstadt: WBG.

Rupprecht, Tobias. 2015. *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and Exchange between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vacs, Aldo César. 1984. *Discreet Partners: Argentina and the USSR Since 1917*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1997. »The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies.« In *The Cold War and the University: Towards an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*, edited by Noam Chomsky, Ira Katznelson, Richard C. Lewontin, David Montgomery, Laura Nader, Richard Ohmann, Ray Siever, Immanuel Wallerstein, and Howard Zinn, 195–231. New York: The New Press.

Westad, Odd Arne. 2005. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zanatta, Loris. 2013. *La internacional justicialista: Auge y ocaso de los sueños imperiales de Perón*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.

***

Dr. Mirko Petersen, Faculty of History, Philosophy and Theology, Bielefeld University: mirko.petersen@uni-bielefeld.de.

Re-mapping Europe

Field notes from the French-Brazilian borderland

Fabio Santos

Introduction

Day by day, dozens of children and adolescents who live in Brazil's northernmost city of Oiapoque contest and conquer a Fortress called Europe.[1] Day by day, early in the morning, they embark on small boats which bring them from Oiapoque to Saint-Georges, a small town in neighboring French Guiana. By doing so, the Brazilian children enter a little-known part of the French Republic and, as consequence, of the European Union. As soon as they leave the boats, after a ride of about fifteen minutes, and set foot on the small town of Saint-Georges, they are in the EU, where they attend one of the local public schools.

Although European borders are gaining increasing attention within the social sciences (e.g., Heimeshoff et al. 2014; Hess and Kasparek 2010; Hess et al. 2016; Klepp 2011; Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe 2007), the French-Brazilian and, hence, EU-Brazilian border clearly remains a blind spot. Look at mainstream sociological journals or university curricula and research projects, and you will learn that the EU's southern shores lie in the Mediterranean. Yet as a matter of fact, they lie far further to the south. These far-away regions—official EU terminology calls them »Outermost Regions« of the European Union—consist of territories in

1 I would like to thank the organizers of the 8th Annual Seminar of the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology, especially Yaatsil Guevara González and Mahshid Mayar who are also the editors of this issue of *InterDisciplines*. Moreover, I wish to express my gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v8-i2-181 ISSN 2191-6721

the Indian Ocean (Réunion, Mayotte), in the Atlantic Ocean (Canary Islands, Azores, Madeira), in the Caribbean Sea (Guadeloupe, Martinique), and in South America (French Guiana). By placing emphasis on the latter, this contribution aims to raise awareness of these overlooked overseas territories, and poses a number of questions: How can sociology, and the social sciences more generally, adequately take this »conundrum of geography« (Sharpley-Whiting and Patterson 2011) into consideration? Which shifts in (conventional) perspectives are necessary to deal with *Europe d'outre-mer*? Which insights can be gained from such an approach? Finally, which questions may be addressed in and to the territories that seem to cause much trouble for the established academic notion of clear-cut borders between allegedly homogeneous European nation-states?

In order to give (preliminary) answers to these broad questions, this article proceeds along the following lines: First, I will make some introductory remarks about »Overseas Europe« and highlight some literature in this small—but growing—field of research. Departing from this current state of research, I will provide a brief theoretical discussion that rejects mainstream sociological traditions and supports the conceptual lens of *geteilte Geschichten* (shared and divided histories). In a third step, these histories will be illustrated by means of selected historical accounts about French Guiana. Fourth, I will emphasize the on-going post-colonial entanglements between French Guiana, its geographical neighbor Brazil, and »mainland« France by providing first-hand ethnographic insights obtained in the French-Brazilian borderland.[2] The article concludes by summarizing the main arguments and by highlighting the potential that lies in future research at and about these rarely studied EU borders.

2 The term »borderland« has gained increasing conceptual attention and denotes a »cross-border perspective, in which the region on both sides of a state border is taken as the unit of analysis. This approach allows us to take into account the paradoxical character of borderlands« (Baud and van Schendel 1997, 216).

»Overseas Europe«—A growing field of research

It was only recently that scholars of various disciplines have begun to stress the need to research the blind spots of the European Union's spatial, post-colonial configuration. »Out of sight, out of mind« (Boatcă, forthcoming), the overseas territories of several EU member states easily escape conventional research perspectives. Revised maps (see Fig. 1; see also Bonilla and Hantel 2016) aid in getting a better idea of the various parts of the world which belong, though to varying degrees, to the European Union. While »Outermost Regions« (OMRs) such as French Guiana are fully-fledged parts not only of the respective nation-state (in this case France), but also of the European Union, those parts of the world labeled »Overseas Countries and Territories« (OCTs) »are constitutionally tied to a member state without being part of the EU« (Gad and Adler-Nissen 2013, 3). This, for instance, is the case with the French »overseas collectivity« of Saint-Martin which is falsely declared as OMR in Figure 1, but in fact obtained »collectivity«-status on the national level and OCT-status on the European level in 2007, resulting from a referendum in 2003. Many of the overseas territories—whether OMRs or OCTs—are located in the Caribbean, which »was also where Europe first achieved the systematic destruction of the Other« (Trouillot 1992, 20). Therefore, the Caribbean has the most entangled colonial history with Europe, the legacies of which are still apparent today due to the ongoing (inter-)dependencies and »overlapping zones of affiliation« recently stressed by anthropologist Yarimar Bonilla (2013, 156–57).



Fig. 1: Map of EU overseas countries and territories and outermost regions. (Source: Adler-Nissen and Gad 2013, xx)

In her ethnography of the 2009 labor strike in the French »overseas department« of Guadeloupe, Bonilla (2015) demonstrates how collective social action questions the complex political status of the island without opting for independence. As one of her informants put it, »[w]e want to transform our lives, even if it's under the French flag« (Bonilla 2015, 3). Located in a wider (Caribbean) region where *non*-sovereignty is not the exception but the norm, Guadeloupian workers undertook the longest strike in French history (six weeks) to fight against various articulations of inequality which are apparent in virtually all *départements d'outre-mer*. These include high rates of unemployment, impressive price differentials and »the lingering social legacies of colonialism and slavery, particularly the racial hierarchies that persist on the island« (Bonilla 2015, 2). Despite the fact that agreements were signed between protesters and the French government, the achievements of the strike are usually regarded as partial at best.

Similar observations could be made with regard to the very recent series of protests and strikes in French Guiana. In March and April of 2017, large parts of the population took to the streets under the motto of »Nou bon ké sa« (meaning »enough is enough« in Guianan Creole) and brought life to a standstill for several weeks.[3] Undoubtedly, this topic should be considered for future research by scholars with an expertise in social movements. Some of the most astonishing protests of our time take place in the EU's overseas territories, and important contributions such as Bonilla's work point to the promising potential of research about these collective social actions. Why then is there so little to be found about such topics, about *Europe d'outre-mer* more generally and French Guiana more specifically? In the pages that follow, I will briefly explore how mainstream strands of social thought for a long time constrained—and continue to constrain—the decentering of Europe, all too easily conflating the EU with Europe and with the epicenter of modernity.

3 A first overview and analysis of this social movement was recently written by Mam Lam Fouck and Moomou (2017).

From Eurocentric to entangled modernity

Several attempts have been made in recent years to »read sociology against its grain—exposing and disposing of its conventional European genealogy of thought and revealing its national boundaries as limitations to knowledge of global interconnections« (Boatcă, Costa, and Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2010, 1). Yet despite the fact that questions of disciplinary internationalization have become a »favourite topic at world congresses« (Keim 2010, 169), one can observe a »continuing, in some respects even increasing dominance of US-American and (West) European knowledge production« (Çelik et al. 2014, 5; see also Roth in this volume). To date, sociology's curricula, academic elite, and most-cited authors are predominantly male, White and centered around North Atlantic social thought that is blind to global entanglements (see Heilbron 2012; Reuter and Villa 2010a, 26).

As shown elsewhere (Boatcă and Spohn 2010; Costa et al. 2006), one of the major disciplinary roots of this blindness is the impact of modernization theory. The belief in a unidirectional model of modernity is deeply engrained in sociological thinking and only came under attack at the end of the last century, when a number of scholars (e.g., Eisenstadt 2000; Therborn 1995, 2003; Wallerstein 1997) pointed to the insufficiencies of conceptualizing modernity as a one-way street whose final point would be those parts of the world that are commonly referred to as the West. »The Rest«—itself the product of the West's discursive attempt to create its Other (see Hall 1995)—would thus only strive to reach the standards set by the West. Yet even if an important contribution such as Eisenstadt's seminal notion of »multiple modernities« stresses the »multiplicity of cultural and social formations« (Eisenstadt 2000, 24), it also perpetuates ideas of seemingly clear-cut entities and finally locates the reference point of modernity in the West (see Spohn 2006).

Around the same time, the anthropologist and sociologist Shalini Randeria (1999a; 1999b) joined the debate, playing a pioneering role in the dissemination and establishment of Postcolonial Studies in the German-speaking context. Refusing essentializing ideas of disparate modernities, Randeria speaks of an »entangled modernity« which grew out of the *geteilte Geschichten*

between metropoles and colonies. She skillfully plays with the ambiguity of the German verb *teilen* which can—depending on the context—refer to a *division* or a *mutuality*, to something that is *divided* or something that is *shared*. Yet the colonial histories (and their present legacies) she has in mind are not shared *or* divided; they are always shared *and* divided: They are *shared* in the sense that exchange and circulation irrevocably led to histories which cannot be treated as separate from each other. A large part of these momentous interactions and of these entangled, mutual histories across borders are based on the power asymmetries inherent to any colonial endeavor. Yet the possible modalities of interaction are manifold, ranging »from enforced adoption, voluntary assimilation, violent destruction to mutual restructuring« (Conrad and Randeria 2013 [2002], 40).[4]

Yet how are these histories *divided*? Randeria shows that colonial aspirations and encounters produced new demarcations between »us« and »them.« These demarcations—symbolized by the nation-state, its hymns, flags and constitutions—disguise the multiplicity of interactions between people from virtually every corner of the world in favor of essentialized, seemingly static cultures (in the plural). Sociology as a discipline significantly facilitated and profited from this division, as it »was constituted as the science of ›modernity‹« (Randeria 1999b, 375) and in opposition to anthropology which came to fill the »savage-slot« (see also Trouillot 2003). Consequently, Randeria (1999b) calls for a research agenda »beyond sociology and socio-cultural anthropology« and, in other words, for the inclusion of the »non-Western world in a future social theory,« as signaled by the title of her article. First steps into this direction have been undertaken (see Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Boatcă, and Costa 2010; Reuter and Villa 2010b), but postcolonial perspectives still play a marginal role in sociology. Interestingly, Randeria herself (Randeria and Römhild 2013, 22–23) pointed to neglected fields of research in which the »entanglement«-approach could be studied empirically:

4 Original quotation: »[…] von erzwungener Übernahme, freiwilliger Assimilation, gewaltsamer Zerstörung bis zu wechselseitiger Umstrukturierung […].«

> Despite the new attention paid to historical and more current dimensions of global entanglements, the present project of »Europe« itself was hardly addressed by postcolonial analyses. It remains, for instance, largely unnoticed both by postcolonial discourse and by research into Europeanization that there are clear overlaps between the formerly colonized world and today's European Union. With Cyprus, Malta, Greenland (as an autonomous administrative division within the Danish Realm) or the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Réunion and Mayotte, colonial history is a direct part of the EU-European present […].[5]

This important remark about the »tiny rests of European colonial power,« as Hauke Brunkhorst (2014, 14) calls these regions, corresponds with my above-mentioned thoughts and offers a whole new research agenda which urges social scientists to re-think the supposed convergence of EU borders and European (continental) borders. If the European Union's actual borders extend to far-away continents and islands—that is, if »Europe is also located on a North-South axis with its furthest reaches where the Atlantic Ocean meets the Caribbean Sea« (Sharpley-Whiting and Patterson 2009, 84)—then how can we design our research in a way that tries to elucidate the EU's forgotten »margins« and their relations to »mainland« Europe? Before turning to empirical insights gained in the French-Brazilian borderland, on the following pages I will provide a brief account of how *geteilte Geschichten* unfolded in this region. Rejecting »the retreat of sociologists into the present« (Elias 1987), I will embed the

5 Original quotation: »Trotz aller neueren Aufmerksamkeit für historische und aktuelle Dimensionen globaler Verflechtungen ist das gegenwärtige Projekt ›Europa‹ selbst noch kaum zum Gegenstand dezidiert postkolonialer Analysen geworden. So bleibt etwa—sowohl im postkolonialen Diskurs wie in der Europäisierungsforschung—relativ unbeachtet, dass es deutliche Überschneidungen zwischen der ehemals kolonisierten Welt und der heutigen Europäischen Union gibt. Mit Zypern, Malta, Grönland (als heute selbstverwalteter, autonomer Teil des Königreichs Dänemark) oder den französischen ›Übersee-Départements‹ Guadeloupe, Martinique, Französisch-Guayana, Réunion und Mayotte ist Kolonialgeschichte ein ganz unmittelbarer Teil EU-europäischer Gegenwart […].«

area of what today comprises the French-Brazilian borderland into its complex and overlooked history.

The entangled histories of French Guiana and its border with Brazil

The current borderlines of today's share of France in South America were disputed and unclear for a very long time. Different European colonial powers »explored« the continent's Northeastern corner, a fact that is still apparent when looking at the three exceptional cases of Guyana (British colony until 1966), Suriname (Dutch colony until 1975) and French Guiana (French »overseas department« since 1946) in a region of predominantly Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries, that is, of former Spanish and Portuguese colonization (see Hoefte et al. 2017).

In fact, it was only in 1900 that a Swiss conciliation demarcated the exact course of the border in favor of the Brazilian territorial claims (see Granger 2012). After a long period of border disputes—termed as the *Contestado franco-brasileiro/Contesté franco-brésilien*—the Oyapock River now forms the official border between (what is today the Brazilian state of) Amapá and French Guiana, between Brazil and France as well as between the economic blocs of the Mercosur and the EU (see Fig. 2 and 3).

La mise en relation de deux »bouts du monde«



Fig. 2: Geographic location of French Guiana and Amapá.
(Source: Letniowska-Swiat 2012)

Le pont sur l'Oyapock dans son environnement local

Fig. 3: Geographic location of Saint-Georges and Oiapoque.
(Source: Letniowska-Swiat 2012)

What kind of colony was French Guiana, what were its characteristics and what did it look like? Among the poorest and least populated French colonies, French Guiana was not only profitless to its »mother country« (*mère-patrie*), but it also had a bad reputation due to its high death rate. As historian Miranda Frances Spieler (2011, 264) describes:

> Sugar production scarcely existed there. In the final years of the monarchy, Guiana had virtually no commercial dealings with the

> metropole. Cayenne, the colonial capital, was a forlorn village split by ramparts that locked at night. The inner town sheltered the officials, the arsenal and an unruly (possibly criminal) garrison. In 1788 there were 10.430 slaves, 483 free coloured people, 763 white male settlers, 330 white women and 253 white children in all of Guiana.

While the total population was extremely low by the end of the eighteenth century, one is struck by the vast amount of slaves (and ex-slaves) that were forced to work on the plantations. A total number of more than 20.000 slaves were shipped from Africa to French Guiana between 1765 and 1831 (see Piantoni 2011, 31), but it is clear that smaller numbers of African slaves were brought to the larger region since the mid-seventeenth century (see Salles 1971, 13). Horrified by the inhumane experience of slavery, some slaves managed to escape and founded *mocambos*, that is, small communities of escaped slaves that were hard to reach for slaveholders and the colonial authorities. Although borders were fuzzy and disputed, »the two Crowns signed a treaty [in 1732] by which each would send back the other's fugitives« (Gomes 2003, 254). As Flávio Gomes (2003, 256) further elaborates:

> Escapes by slaves from colonial dominions in particular were an important cause for concern in the border regions. These borders were not fixed because they were the subject of constant disputes, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth century. The Amapá region—which bordered on French Guiana—was the greatest source of apprehension. With the help of settlers, merchants, and indigenous groups, black slaves were continually migrating and establishing *mocambos*.

Gomes' research (1999, 2003, 2015) about *mocambos* demonstrates that runaway slaves developed escape strategies, established a variety of relationships, and created their own (temporary) safe spaces, weighing up the pros and cons of settling in one place or another, on this or that side of the French-Brazilian border. For example, archival material reveals that runaway slaves from Brazil were well aware of the Haitian revolution, the temporary abolition of slavery in the French Guiana (1794–1802; see

Spieler 2011 and 2013), and its permanent abolition in all of the French colonies in 1848 (Gomes 2003). This is how a number of fugitive slaves migrated to French Guiana and are, by way of their offspring, still present on this territory today. These deeply »entangled histories«—histories which not only constitute important aspects of today's Brazil and Latin America more generally, but also of present-day French Guiana, France, and Europe—are prime examples of how the European sciences produce a limited version of history and silence other parts of the past (see Trouillot 1995).[6]

Other violent, silenced and »entangled« histories include the decision to turn French Guiana into a penal colony (*bagne*) with a variety of prisons and concentration camps. Over the course of a century, from its inception until its formal closure (1946), more than 70.000 convicts—criminals and dissidents—were sent to French Guiana in order to serve their sentence under inhumane conditions: »The *bagnards* languished, and many of them, perhaps half of the 70.000 total transported, died before completing their sentence« (Redfield 2005, 57; see also Spieler 2012, 3). Although there are almost no traces left of this tragic past (Spieler 2012, 1–16), the time of the penal colony still shapes French Guiana today, as do past experiences of slavery. Also, the *bagne* clearly indicates the role which French Guiana played as an »experimental laboratory« (Randeria 1999a, 93) for the *métropole*. The techniques of imprisonment and surveillance played a significant role in the further installment of the penitentiary system »at home.« It is thus possible to speak of a »displacement of the panopticon« (Redfield 2005) and to regard the *bagne* as a precursor of what was to come in the future.

6 Interestingly, it was only in 2001 that the French government acknowledged the horrors of the Atlantic slave trade and of slavery as a crime against humanity by introducing the *loi Taubira* thanks to the efforts of Christiane Taubira, undeniably French Guiana's most popular politician and former Minister of Justice (2012–16). In general, however, the »provincialization of France« (Mbembe 2011)—and its academic traditions, right-wing tendencies, *Hexagone*-centered media discourses, etc.—has only just begun and is anything but finished.

After World War II, French Guiana made an astonishing move from penal colony to *département d'outre-mer*. It seems to be a paradox that, in 1946, the people of French Guiana—the majority of whom had been subordinated, exploited and/or imprisoned over centuries—decided to become a fully integrated part of France just like the other three »old colonies« Martinique, Guadeloupe and Réunion instead of choosing independence. In fact, this turn can only be understood in light of a long process of *assimilation*—an orientation towards and adoption of French institutions, customs, etc.—which preceded the *loi de départementalisation* proposed by the Martinican poet-politician Aimé Césaire.[7]

What did *départementalisation* mean for French Guiana in the long run? It triggered an astonishing demographic and economic change which lasts until today. This sparsely populated region increased its population from only 33.295 in 1961 to 250.109 in 2013 (Mam Lam Fouck 2015, 61). This change must be largely attributed to the vast amount of immigrants from neighboring countries—mostly Suriname, Brazil, and Haiti—but also from »mainland« France (Mam Lam Fouck 2015, 61–91). The decision to build the *Centre Spatial Guyanais*—the EU's launch site in South America to send rockets into outer space—certainly triggered the arrival of thousands of people to help build and maintain this new »experimental laboratory« in the French ex-colony (Redfield 2000). Despite these technological innovations and the fact that French Guiana is indeed an »€udorado« (Police 2010) for its impoverished geographic neighbors, who often migrate because of the incredible differences in terms of wages, health services, and education (Arouck 2000, 76; Martins and Rodrigues 2012; Piantoni 2011; Silva 2016, 9), French Guiana usually still hovers at the bottom of national rankings measuring the standards of living. For instance, French Guiana's GDP of €15.513 represents only half of the »metropolitan« GDP (IEDOM 2015, 28–29). But French Guiana not only still lags behind in economic and demographic terms: 70 years after its full integration into the French republic, it also remains

7 A more detailed history of how *assimilation* had led the local *créole* elite to fight for legal recognition by means of becoming French citizens was written by Mam Lam Fouck (2007).

»a remarkably insignificant artifact of the political landscape—rarely noticed by most of France, let alone anyone else—as well as one of the least settled regions of the world« (Redfield 2000, xiv). Additionally, to complicate the picture, French Guiana is relatively alienated from the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean, most notably in political and economic terms, since its status makes it difficult to institutionalize links of cooperation by means of membership in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) or the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) (Bishop, Clegg, and Hoefte 2016; Hoefte, Bishop, and Clegg 2015). However, cross-border projects such as the construction of a bridge over the Oyapock River have been initiated in recent years, resulting in ambiguous socio-spatial changes on which I will reflect in the following section.

Ethnographic insights from the French-Brazilian border

My ethnographic insights are based on three stages of fieldwork—an explorative phase (February–March 2016), a more focused stage (October–December 2016) and a final stay (November 2017). The methods employed include informal conversations, semi-structured interviews, (participant) observations in institutions such as public schools, and during diplomatic meetings as well as in public spaces more generally. With the consent of my informants, many conversations and all interviews were recorded; I also used a notebook for jotting down notes and a digital diary for more extensive descriptions and reflections. Accordingly, I followed an open, qualitative approach in order to craft a »reflexive ethnography« (Davies 1999). From the very beginning, I understood my time in the borderland as a mutual learning process, seeing my informants as experts at eye level, as »comrades instead of instruments« (Martins 2014, 63). Nevertheless, this should not hide the fact that hierarchical relationships are intrinsic to ethnography.

As I have learnt during my stay, the borderland is traditionally regarded as a shared space of daily exchanges and encounters across the Oyapock River. Obvious examples include shopping trips and family visits to the other side of the river. Another striking example, to which I have already alluded, is the great number of children who cross the Oyapock River on

a daily basis. Many parents, pupils and teachers—both in Oiapoque and Saint-Georges—hold a critical view of the underfunded public schools in Brazil. Therefore, a large number of parents residing in Brazil decide to send their children to school in Saint-Georges where the learning environment is said to be better: In smaller groups, children can use the latest learning materials and almost automatically learn French as a second language. The opposite pattern—French children attending school in Brazil—is nonexistent due to the above-mentioned negative assessments made by my informants.

Every morning, shortly after sunrise, dozens of children gather at the Brazilian side the Oyapock river bank. Some hold each others' hands, some are held by one of their parents when they walk down the slippery little path of wooden plates that leads to the many *catraias*, as the little boats are called in Oiapoque. A few times, I joined the kids on their way to school and watched them sleep, yawn, play with their smartphones, tease others or drink hot chocolate, as children do all over the world when they go to school. While this may not seem to be a usual way of getting to school—you cross a river *and* a national border—it is the most natural thing to do for Daniel, Diogo, Ana and the other twenty children who take the boat every day. The children who were sitting next to me in the *catraia*—or in one of several other boats full of schoolchildren—cross the French-Brazilian border on a daily basis because their parents decided it would be better for their children's future to attend a *French* school.

Although several teachers and parents highlighted that the schools in the border town of Saint-Georges are the worst in all of France, they clearly have a much better reputation than the schools in Oiapoque. Just how are the Brazilian children allowed to attend a French school? Kelly Boucq, the former head of one of the *écoles maternelles* (kindergartens) in Saint-Georges, explained that in order to attend a French school, all you need is to prove that you live on French territory. Everyone in Saint-Georges and in neighboring Oiapoque knows that the children who cross the river day by day do not live in France. But in theory, they do. Officially, they live with their aunt, a family's friend or their grandparents

on the French side. Off the record, they continue to live with their parents on Brazilian soil. This is one of the peculiarities at the French-Brazilian border: Everyone knows that things are against legal requirements, but no one really cares. In the end, not only Brazilian families take advantage of this *laisser-faire* attitude. To save money, a number of French teachers, for instance, also live on the Brazilian side—which is officially forbidden for public servants—and sit in the same boat as their Brazilian pupils. The *Police aux Frontières*, it seems, turns a blind eye to the crossings of children as well as to the place of residence of French colleagues and friends. However, more than once was I able to observe border controls, always directed towards non-White people, both Brazilian and French. A woman who lives right next to the shore in Saint-Georges explained that from her house she witnesses border controls every day and that they have increased tremendously in recent years.

During the days I spent in the classroom of a kindergarten in Saint-Georges, and during the hours I watched children running around in the schoolyard and commuting by boat, I could in fact observe an everyday conviviality between children who hold different passports and live in different countries where they speak different languages. Kelly Boucq told me that »they mix quite easily, we're not worried, I mean, kids are just kids, and that's great, that's the great advantage here at the kindergarten.« According to her estimates, 70 percent of the children come from Brazilian families, although she had to admit that such estimations become increasingly difficult because of »binational« families made up of French and Brazilian family members. Also, obviously, not all of these 70 percent actually live in Oiapoque. Many do live in Saint-Georges where their Brazilian parents settled years ago or where they were even born. Although »they mix quite easily,« it bears mentioning that the large number of Brazilian children in French schools evokes divergent opinions, including critical voices among parents and teachers who think the infantile border crossers have gained (»too much«) ascendancy. Kelly Boucq also cited another interesting case in this region where »nationality« is important, but only one of many other variables:

> The indigenous people, they don't know any border, that is to say, it's their territory, so sometimes you have indigenous children arriving from the Brazilian side and they don't have French papers. So that's a really complicated case, but in the end French law requires pupils to be accommodated in France.

It is true that for many members of the four indigenous groups in the area (Palikur, Galibi Kali'na, Karipuna, and Galibi Marworno) the Oyapock River does not represent a border. This is extremely well-illustrated by the fact that archeological findings were discovered in the course of the planning and construction of the Oyapock River Bridge, which now connects the border towns of Saint-Georges and Oiapoque. Indigenous people have lived there for hundreds of years and did not have any ideas about national borders simply because national borders did not exist before the arrival of Europeans and were fuzzy even afterwards.

A very interesting example is the case of the Galibi Kali'na—an indigenous group who historically settled in the region of Maná, which today forms French Guiana's Northwestern region (see Collomb and Tiouka 2000). As shown by anthropological research (Vidal 2000), a part of this group migrated to Oiapoque in the 1950s for a variety of reasons, most notably because of disputes within the group as well as for political reasons: In Brazil, this group was offered a protected area of land (*terra indígena*) neighboring the Oyapock River and, consequently, French Guiana. While some members of this group have returned to Maná over the past decades, a group of around thirty people still lives on the demarcated land or in the city of Oiapoque. Born and raised in Brazil, most of the Galibi Kali'na living there today are of Brazilian nationality. Historically labelled by others (see Collomb 2011, 2013; Guyon 2013), the indigenous groups in the region still struggle (and sometimes strategically decide) to identify within the constraints of seemingly strict disparate categories such as *índio*, Brazilian and French. Those who hold a Brazilian passport have difficulties when trying to visit family members in French Guiana or—as Kelly Boucq has pointed out—send their children to school in Saint-Georges. But would they even want to do the latter?

I spoke with two young mothers from the Galibi Kali'na who had mixed feelings about sending their children to school in French Guiana. Although they also believed that the French schools were better than the ones in Oiapoque, they feared that their children would become detached from indigenous knowledge in the French centralized public school system. While children in the protected *terras indígenas* (ideally) attend schools with indigenous teachers and a curriculum adapted specifically for indigenous communities, the French educational system does not allow for regional or ethnic differences, as highlighted by one of the mothers:

> [A]nd there in French Guiana it's very different, there this recognition doesn't exist. In French Guiana, the *indígenas* don't have the same status they have in Brazil. But with respect to many other things, it is probably much better than in Brazil.

These two indigenous mothers were well aware of the pros and cons that attendance at a French school would imply for their children. Both emphasized the fragile health care system in Oiapoque and referred to the higher standard of living on the other side of the river. Yet when it comes to the overall—institutionalized—appraisal of indigenous heritage, they prefer Brazil. Additionally, they have not forgotten the reasons why, in part, their parents and grandparents left French Guiana. They are well aware of the manifold (post-)colonial forms of exploitation of their ancestors, ranging from the colonial exhibition of deceased family members in the *Jardin d'Acclimatation* (Paris) or at the *International Colonial and Export Exhibition* in Amsterdam (see Abbal 2010; Collomb and Tiouka 2000, 87–102; Macedo and Grupioni 2009, 803–4) in the late nineteenth century to the imposed and indiscriminate assimilation into the customs and institutions of the *Hexagone* (see Collomb 2011). Therefore, at least some members of the local population actively reflect on the legacies of colonialism, basing their decisions of whether or not to cross the border on this painful past, amongst other considerations.

The example of daily cross-border practices by some of Oiapoque's youngest inhabitants suggests that the French-Brazilian border is literally fluid. Yet even if local authorities allow a certain degree of permeability and cross-border exchange, the idea of a purely fluid border without

limits is misleading. The fact that people migrate and commute across the border does not mean that it is not a clear demarcation of differences and inequalities. School attendance illustrates quite well how strong the differences are as regards the quality of education—but also regarding adaption to culturally specific contexts. Although the *école maternelle* offers special language classes for its indigenous pupils, the larger issue of indigenous and *créole* histories is not even rudimentarily reflected in the school curricula, which are basically the same as in Paris. This leads to the peculiar fact that pupils learn about the French revolution, but have no idea about »other« revolutions which took place on the territory which today forms French Guiana (see Spieler 2013). Also, as I observed during fieldwork, they learn how to prepare a *crêpe*, but do not know what to do with the *açaí* which grows right next to the school building. These are crucial concerns, especially for indigenous parents deliberating whether or not to send their children to school in French Guiana.

The *catraieiros* (boat drivers) who bring the children—and many others—to one or the other river banks are concerned about the future of crossing the river by boat. As a large bridge was built across the Oyapock, many fear they will lose their jobs. For most politicians with whom I conducted interviews, the bridge—finished in 2012 but only inaugurated shortly after my second research stay in spring 2017 (see Grenand 2012; Kramsch 2012, 2016)—symbolizes and is aimed at cross-border cooperation and exchange (see Silva 2010, 2016; Silva and Superti 2015; Superti 2011). However, first observations from my final short research trip suggest that though finally »put in place,« the bridge is »out of place«: it is a prime example of a regional planning process that disregards the needs and interests of the local population and—instead—creates social and spatial divides. In other words, it seems to be an »opening« which increasingly leads to more »closure.« Large parts of the (especially non-French population) fear that the bridge might increasingly resemble the eye of a needle and facilitate border controls. Most *catraieiros* with whom I spoke since the opening of the bridge have complained about less fluvial traffic and, therefore, less money in their pockets. As one of my informants put it, »the Oyapock River Bridge is the first bridge that separates the

people.« Just how exactly the opening of the bridge will change people's movement between Saint-Georges and Oiapoque must be analyzed in the near future.

Concluding remarks

The Oyapock River represents a forgotten border of the world. This article has underlined the importance of shifting our focus and doing research in and about the various EU overseas territories by which the European Union and its respective member states stretch into various parts of the world, first and foremost due to colonial history. I have shown that theoretical-conceptual contributions such as the notions of *geteilte Geschichten* and entangled modernity provide important correctives to Eurocentric traditions in sociology. French Guiana is complexly interwoven with France, Europe and its geographic neighbors in Latin America. Colonial histories—slavery, the *bagne*, etc.—have irrevocably tied this region to the *métropole* where shortsighted versions of history were written and continue to be written. These versions neglect the very same colonial histories that tied French Guiana to Europe and the *Hexagone* in the first place. This is how French Guiana and the wider region *shares* its history with former European colonial powers, which in turn regard it as *separate* from their allegedly independent history. This disregard is represented not only in history books, but also in the ways in which disciplines such as sociology and anthropology are often incapable of disentangling the complexities of today's world and, for instance, the European Union.

Analyses in and about the French-Brazilian borderland aid in identifying these complexities because they force researchers to re-map their container-like images of the EU and to confront a peculiar reality of inequalities which can be partly traced back to colonial history. If children go to school on the other side of the Oyapock River and if people with a non-EU passport (sometimes without any passport at all) migrate to French Guiana, then this usually happens because of the various advantages provided by French Guiana's status as a French »overseas department« and as an »Outermost Region« of the European Union. Yet

although *égalité* is often referred to when legitimizing this status, the French state is far from providing equal opportunities for its citizens on the other side of the Atlantic, as became evident in the frustration that sparked the 2017 general strike and social movement. This complex nesting—French Guiana as France's and the EU's poor backyard in Latin America *and* French Guiana as a prime destination for people without prospects from neighboring Brazil and other countries—provides a difficult but highly innovative field for future research. In particular, the recent opening of the Oyapock River Bridge (see Fig. 4) poses a variety of questions to social scientists interested in the socio-spatial transformations at a border whose fluidness seems to turn more and more into fixedness. Such research is necessary in order to continue to draw new maps of the European Union and the world more generally.

Fig. 4: Oyapock River Bridge. © Fabio Santos.

References

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca and Ulrik P. Gad, eds. 2013. *European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: The EU Overseas Countries and Territories*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Arouck, Ronaldo. 2000. »Brasileiros na Guiana Francesa: novas migrações internacionais ou exportações de tensões sociais na Amazônia?« *Lusotopie*, no. 7, 67–78.

Baud, Michiel, and Willem van Schendel. 1997. »Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.« *Journal of World History* 8 (2): 211–42.

Bishop, Matthew Louis, Peter Clegg, and Rosemarijn Hoefte. 2016. »Hemispheric Reconfigurations in Northern Amazonia: the ›Three Guianas‹ amid Regional Change and Brazilian Hegemony.« *Third World Quarterly* 38 (2): 356–78.

Boatcă, Manuela. Forthcoming. »Caribbean Europe: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?« In *Constructing the Pluriverse*, edited by Bernd Reiter. Durham: Duke University Press.

Boatcă, Manuela, Sérgio Costa, and Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez. 2010. »Introduction: Decolonizing European Sociology; Different Paths towards a Pending Project.« In *Decolonizing European Sociology—Transdisciplinary Approaches*, edited by Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Manuela Boatcă, and Sérgio Costa, 1–10. Farnham: Ashgate.

Boatcă, Manuela, and Willfried Spohn, eds. 2010. *Globale, multiple und postkoloniale Modernen*. Munich: Rainer Hampp Verlag.

Bonilla, Yarimar. 2013. »Ordinary Sovereignty.« *Small Axe* 17 (3): 151–65.

—— 2015. *Non-sovereign Futures: French Caribbean Politics in the Wake of Disenchantment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bonilla, Yarimar, and Max Hantel. 2016. »Visualizing Sovereignty: Cartographic Queries for the Digital Age.« *sx archipelagos* 1 (1). Accessed December 29, 2017. http://smallaxe.net/sxarchipelagos/issue01/bonilla-visualizing.html.

Brunkhorst, Hauke. 2014. *Das doppelte Gesicht Europas: Zwischen Kapitalismus und Demokratie*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

Çelik, Ercüment, Christian Ersche, Wiebke Keim, and Veronika Wöhrer. 2014. »Introduction.« In *Global Knowledge Production in the Social Sciences: Made in*

Circulation, edited by Wiebke Keim, Ercüment Çelik, Christian Ersche, and Veronika Wöhrer, 1–19. Farnham: Ashgate.

Collomb, Gérard. 2011. »Une ›citoyenneté‹ kali'na? Constructions citoyennes, affirmations identitaires, jeux de niveau en Guyane française.« *Citizenship Studies* 15 (8): 981–91.

—— 2013. »Indiens‹ ou ›Brésiliens‹? Mobilités karipuna vers Cayenne (Guyane française).« *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales* 29 (1): 113–31.

Collomb, Gérard, and Félix Tiouka. 2000. *Na'na kali'na: Une histoire des Amérindiens Kali'na en Guyane*. Matoury: Ibis Rouge Éditions.

Conrad, Sebastian, and Shalini Randeria. 2013: »Einleitung: Geteilte Geschichten—Europa in einer postkolonialen Welt.« In *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, 2nd ed., edited by Sebastian Conrad, Shalini Randeria, and Regina Römhild, 32–70. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.

Costa, Sérgio, J., Maurício Domingues, Wolfgang Knöbl, and Josué P. da Silva, eds. 2006. *The Plurality of Modernity: Decentring Sociology*. Munich: Rainer Hampp Verlag.

Davies, Charlotte Aull. 1999. *Reflexive Ethnography: A Guide to Researching Selves and Others*. London: Routledge.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. 2000. »Multiple Modernities.« *Daedalus* 129 (1): 1–29.

Elias, Norbert. 1987. »The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present.« *Theory, Culture & Society* 4 (2): 223–47.

Gad, Ulrik P., and Rebecca Adler-Nissen. 2013. »Introduction: Postcolonial Sovereignty Games.« In *European Integration and Postcolonial Sovereignty Games: The EU Overseas Countries and Territories*, edited by Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Ulrik P. Gad, 1–24. Abingdon: Routledge.

Gomes, Flávio dos Santos. 1999. »Fronteiras e mocambos: O protesto negro na Guiana Brasileira.« In *Nas terras do Cabo Norte: Fronteiras, colonização e escravidão na Guiana Brasileira—séculos XVIII/XIX*, edited by Flávio dos Santos Gomes, 225–318. Belem: Editora Universitária UFPA.

—— 2003. »Other Black Atlantic Borders: Escape Routes, Mocambos, and Fears of Sedition in Brazil and French Guiana (Eighteenth to Nineteenth

Centuries).« *New West Indian Guide/Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* 77 (3–4): 253–87.

—— 2015. *Mocambos e quilombos: Uma história do campesinato negro no Brasil*. São Paulo: Claro Enigma.

Granger, Stéphane. 2012: »O Contestado franco-brasileiro: Desafios e consequências de um conflito esquecido entre a França e o Brasil na Amazônia.« *Revista Cantareira* 17:21–39.

Grenand, Françoise. 2012: »Enjeux de territoires sur une frontière méconnue: Entre la France et le Brésil; Le fleuve Oyapock.« *confins* 16. Accessed November 29, 2017. http://confins.revues.org/7961.

Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Encarnación, Manuela Boatcă, and Sérgio Costa. 2010. *Decolonizing European Sociology—Transdisciplinary Approaches*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Guyon, Stéphanie. 2013. »Des ›Primitifs‹ aux ›Autochtones‹: Savoirs ethnologiques et politiques publiques en Guyane de 1946 à nos jours.« *Genèses* 2 (91): 49–70.

Hall, Stuart. 1995. »The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power.« In *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, edited by Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson, 184–227. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Heilbron, Johan. 2012. »A ciência social europeia como campo transnacional de pesquisa.« *Mana* 18 (2): 289–307.

Heimeshoff, Lisa-Marie, Sabine Hess, Stefanie Kron, Helen Schwenken, and Miriam Trzeciak, eds. 2014. *Grenzregime II: Migration, Kontrolle, Wissen; Transnationale Perspektiven*. Berlin: Assoziation A.

Hess, Sabine, and Bernd Kasparek, eds. 2010. *Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa*. Berlin: Assoziation A.

Hess, Sabine, Bernd Kasparek, Stefanie Kron, Mathias Rodatz, Maria Schwertl, Simon Sontowski, eds. 2016. *Grenzregime III: Der lange Sommer der Migration*. Berlin: Assoziation A.

Hoefte, Rosemarijn, Matthew Louis Bishop, and Peter Clegg. 2015. »Still Lonely after all these Years? Contemporary Development in the ›Three Guianas.«« *Caribbean Studies* 43 (2): 83–113.

Hoefte, Rosemarijn, Matthew Louis Bishop, and Peter Clegg, eds. 2017. *Post-colonial Trajectories in the Caribbean: The Three Guianas.* Abingdon: Routledge.

IEDOM. 2015. *Guyane: Rapport Annuel.* Accessed November 29, 2017. http://www.iedom.fr/IMG/pdf/ra_2015_iedom_guy_pour_menl.pdf.

Keim, Wiebke. 2010. »The Internationalisation of Social Science: Distortions, Dominations and Prospects.« In *World Social Science Report*, edited by International Social Science Council 2010, 169–171. Unesco Publishing: Paris.

Klepp, Silja. 2011. *Europa zwischen Grenzkontrolle und Flüchtlingsrecht: Eine Ethnographie der Seegrenze auf dem Mittelmeer*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Kramsch, Olivier Thomas. 2012. »Re-conociendo la Frontera UE-MERCOSUR: Espacio, Visión e Imaginación ›Dreyfusard‹ Sobre el Puente del Río Oyapock.« In *Espacios Urbanos y Sociedades Transfronterizas en la Amazonia*, edited by Carlos Gilberto Zárate Botía, 127–153. Leticia: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Sede Amazonía.

—— 2016. »›Spatial Play‹ at the Ends of Europe: Oyapock Bridge, Amazonia.« *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* 107:209–13.

Letniowska-Swiat, Sylvie. 2012. »Oyapock, un pont trop loin? Un pont pour quoi?« Géoconfluences. Accessed November 29, 2017. http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/doc/typespace/frontier/FrontDoc6.htm.

Macedo, Valéria, and Luis Donisete Grupioni. 2009. »Exposições e invisíveis na antropologia de Lux Vidal.« *Revista de Antropologia* 52 (2): 789–814.

Mam Lam Fouck, Serge. 2007. »Les fondements idéologiques et politiques de la départementalisation de la Guyane des années 1820 à 1946.« In *Comprendre la Guyane d'aujourd'hui: Un département français dans la région des Guyanes*, edited by Serge Mam Lam Fouck, 83–103. Matoury: Ibis Rouge Éditions.

—— 2015. *La société guyanaise à l'épreuve des migrations 1965–2015*. Matoury: Ibis Rouge Éditions.

Mam Lam Fouck, Serge, and Jean Moomou. 2017. »Les racines de la mobilisation de mars/avril 2017 en Guyane.« *Amerika* 16. Accessed November 29, 2017. https://amerika.revues.org/7872 .

Martins, José de Souza. 2014. *Uma sociologia da vida cotidiana: Ensaios na perspectiva de Florestan Fernandes, de Wright Mills e de Henri Lefebvre*. São Paulo: Editora Contexto.

Martins, Rosiane Ferreira, and Carmen Izabel Rodrigues. 2012: »Fronteiras em construção: Representações de migrantes brasileiros na Guiana Francesa.« *Novos Cadernos* 15 (1): 333–51.

Mbembe, Achille. 2011. »Provincializing France?« *Public Culture* 23 (1): 85–119.

Piantoni, Frédéric. 2011. *Migrants en Guyane*. Arles: Actes Sud/Musée des Cultures guyanaises.

Police, Gérard. 2010. *€udorado: le discours brésilien sur la Guyane Française*. Matoury: Ibis Rouge Éditions.

Randeria, Shalini. 1999a. »Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne.« In *Zukunftsentwürfe: Ideen für eine Kultur der Veränderung*, edited by Jörn Rüsen, Hanna Leitgeb, and Norbert Jegelka, 87–96. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.

—— 1999b. »Jenseits von Soziologie und soziokultureller Anthropologie: Zur Ortsbestimmung der nichtwestlichen Welt in einer zukünftigen Sozialtheorie.« *Soziale Welt* 50 (4): 373–82.

Randeria, Shalini, and Regina Römhild. 2013. »Das postkoloniale Europa: Verflochtene Genealogien der Gegenwart—Einleitung zur erweiterten Auflage (2013).« In *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, 2nd ed., edited by Sebastian Conrad, Shalini Randeria, and Regina Römhild, 9–31. Frankfurt: Campus.

Redfield, Peter. 2000. *Space in the Tropics: From Convicts to Rockets in French Guiana*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

—— 2005. »Foucault in the Tropics: Displacing the Panopticon.« In *Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics*, edited by Jonathan Xavier Inda, 50–79. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

Reuter, Julia, and Paula-Irene Villa. 2010a. »Provincializing Soziologie: Postkoloniale Theorie als Herausforderung.« In *Postkoloniale Soziologie: Empirische Befunde, theoretische Anschlüsse, politische Intervention*, edited by Julia Reuter und Paula-Irene Villa, 11–46. Bielefeld: transcript.

—— 2010b. *Postkoloniale Soziologie: Empirische Befunde, theoretische Anschlüsse, politische Intervention*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Salles, Vicente. 1971. *O negro no Pará: Sob o regime da escravidão*. Rio de Janeiro: FGV.

Silva, Gutemberg de Vilhena. 2010: »Interações Espaciais Amapá (BR)-Guiana Francesa (FR): Uso Político do Território e Cooperação Transfronteiriça.« In *Interações fronteiriças no platô das Guianas: Novas construções, novas territorialidades*, edited by Jadson Luís Rebelo Porto and Durbens Martins Nascimento, 73–103. Rio de Janeiro: Publit Soluções Editoriais.

—— 2016: »France-Brazil Cross-border Cooperation Strategies: Experiences and Perspectives on Migration and Trade.« *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 32 (3): 1–19.

Silva, Gutemberg de Vilhena, and Eliane Superti. 2015: »Fronteira internacional do Amapá: Processos de interação e estratégias de defesa e segurança.« In *A fronteira setentrional brasileira: Das histórias pós-coloniais à formação de uma fronteira tardia*, edited by Jadson Luís Rebelo Porto, David Chavez, and Andrius Noronha, 38–74. Macapá: Editora da UNIFAP.

Sharpley-Whiting, Tracy, and Tiffany Ruby Patterson. 2009: »The Conundrum of Geography, Europe d'outre mer, and Transcontinental Diasporic Identity.« In *Black Europe and the African Diaspora*, edited by Darlene Clark Hine, Stephen Small, and Trica Danielle Keaton, 84–91. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Spieler, Miranda Frances. 2011. »The Destruction of Liberty in French Guiana: Law, Identity and the Meaning of Legal Space, 1794–1830.« *Social History* 32 (3): 260–79.

—— 2012. *Empire and Underworld: Captivity in French Guiana*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

—— 2013. »Abolition and Reenslavement in the Caribbean: The revolution in French Guiana.« In *The French Revolution in Global Perspective*, edited by Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Max Nelson, 132–47. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Spohn, Willfried. 2006. »Multiple, Entangled, Fragmented and Other Modernities: Reflections on Comparative Sociological Research on Europe, North and Latin America.« In *The Plurality of Modernity: Decentring Sociology*, edited

by Sérgio Costa, José Maurício Domingues, Wolfgang Knöbl, and Josué Pereira da Silva, 11–22. Munich: Rainer Hampp Verlag.

Superti, Eliane. 2011. »A Fronteira Setentrional da Amazônia Brasileira no contexto das políticas de integração sul-americana.« *PRACS: Revista de Humanidades do Curso de Ciências Sociais da UNIFAP*: 1–16.

Therborn, Göran. 1995. *European Modernity and beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies*. London: Sage.

—— 2003. »Entangled Modernities.« *European Journal of Social Theory* 6 (3): 293–305.

Transit Migration Forschungsgruppe, eds. 2007. *Turbulente Ränder: Neue Perspektiven auf Migration an den Grenzen Europas*. Bielefeld: transcript.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 1992. »The Caribbean Region: An Open Frontier to Anthropological Theory.« *Annual Review of Anthropology* 21:19–42.

—— 1995. *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Boston: Beacon Press.

—— 2003. »Anthropology and the Savage Slot: The Poetics and Politics of Otherness.« In *Global Transformations: Anthropology of the Modern World*, edited by Michel-Rolph Trouillot, 7–28. New York: Palgrave.

Vidal, Lux. 2000. »Outros Viajantes: De Maná ao Oiapoque, a trajetória de uma migração.« *Revista USP* 46:42–51.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1997. »Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science.« *New Left Review* 226:93–107.

***

Fabio Santos, International Research Training Group »Between Spaces,« Freie Universität Berlin: fabio.santos@fu-berlin.de.