

Done with Eurocentrism? Unpacking a plural construct

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Eurocentrism and the »post-« moment in academia: Centers and flows

In the past few decades, generations of scholars in history, sociology, and the neighboring disciplines have pursued their research and teaching amid a proliferation of »post-« movements.¹ Since the 1960s, academia seems to have actively avoided reaching consensus on all-inclusive grand narratives. Nevertheless, it is evident in the twenty-first century that a great number of these »post-« movements and turns have been transitory moments of resistance to or, at best, reactionary gestures against one grand narrative from which we have not fully departed: Eurocentrism.² Since the Enlightenment, and especially over the past century of scholarship, it appears, Eurocentrism has been considered to have been the source of the vocabulary, imagery, language, legal infrastructure, geopolitical imaginaries, scientific tools, executive leverage, even the geographical orientation by which we routinely make sense of ourselves, our histories,

1 As Julian Go suggests in the case of the postcolonial school, however, sociology seems to be lagging behind history and cultural studies in its interest in postcolonial thought as a focal anti-Eurocentric perspective. For a careful examination of this and the remedies thereto, see Go 2013, 25–55.

2 As one recent example, see the results of a nation-wide examination of history-teaching in Portugal conducted by Marta Araújo and Silvia Rodríguez Maeso (2016) and published as *The Contours of Eurocentrism: Race, History, and Political Texts*. For similar discussions, see Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui (2008) and Claude Alvares and Shad Saleem Faruqi (2012).

our futures, and our surroundings. Despite coordinated academic efforts in the past two or three decades (heated debates about and among disciplines, nuanced methodological shifts, and careful modifications to terminology) to mount systematic opposition against Eurocentric frames of thought, research, and teaching in a post-Saidian world (Said 1978; Mowitt 2001, 4–5), political correctness and ethics are still arbitrated along axes of »the self« and its »other(s).« Knowledge and capital are still produced and disseminated in specific forms that are molded by the colonial imperatives of supply-and-create-false-demand capitalism. It is not news that the practitioners of actively centrifugal and anti-hegemonic approaches such as postcolonial (Spivak 1988; Bhabha 1994; Mbembe 2000; Chakrabarty 2000) and decolonial studies (Mignolo 1994, 2007; Quijano 2000; Moraña, Dussel, and Jáuregui 2008; and Walsh 2012, among others), theories of local-global entanglements (for instance, Randeria 1999; Conrad, Randeria, and Sutterlüty 2002; Werner and Zimmermann 2002; and Epple 2013), transnational studies (Anthias 2006; Boatcă, 2015), feminist approaches (Anzaldúa and Keating 2002; Mohanty 2002; Yin 2006; Trotz 2007; Lugones 2007; Roth 2013; hooks 2015; and May 2015, among others), and history from below (Coronil 1994; Ferguson et al. 1999; Dirlík 2000; Schissler and Soysal 2005; and Sunar 2016, among others) are sorely aware of the extent to which »Europe« has sustained its power as the norm with which other thoughts, other definitions, other practices, other forms of knowledge, other value systems, other temporalities and spatialities are compared.

Taking a step out of the lively and essential lines of discussion triggered by our awareness of the historical moment we inhabit, we can observe a number of points: on the one hand, what persists today inside and outside academic circles are translucent patterns of systematic and deeply ingrained asymmetries in relations, affinities, and outlooks that cement »the global« together. On the other hand, two sweeping sets of endeavors have marked the path taken by the academy. Scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences has worked with the pernicious presence and the polarizing power of the »centrism« of Eurocentric perspectives (a) by de-emphasizing Eurocentrism by paying attention to many centers and

centrism, and/or (b) through calling for »a history without a center,« while also, more recently, underscoring the significance of relations, flows, as well as blockages between Euro- and other centrism.³

From this vantage point, the twenty-first century stands witness to a new relationship to history: a relationship that has departed from the hoped-for ideal of »history without a center« and arrived at the more modest and, we believe, more practical micro-historical stance toward »histories with multiple centers« (Dirlik 2002, 178). As Dirlik reminded us in 2002, »[w]hat we seem to have presently is not the abolition of centers, but the crowding of the center to history by proliferating claims to it, on the one hand, and a proliferation of centers, on the other« (ibid., 181). To arrive at a more revolutionary, non-Eurocentric draft of anti-Eurocentrism that Nick Hostettler (2012, 12) calls for is a long way from here and now, a path which, departing from universalist thinking, passes through many other centrism (Said 1978; Xiaomei 1995; Carrier 1995; Quijano 2000; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013; Shohat 2017) that are at work in other centers of historical (ex-)change and knowledge production such as the many and varied lines of thinking in the Muslim world, Africa, Asia, or Latin America. On the other hand, while Eurocentrism has long been viewed as a container of power inequality, many scholars have examined it as consisting of a centuries-old web of relations that Eurocentrism necessitates in order to sustain itself and its upper hand in global matters. Rather than the paradigm or the individual nodes within it, this trend in scholarly thinking has been invested in the many threads of interconnectedness and distancing, flows and blockages that this paradigm establishes or denies between the entities involved (Randeria 1999; Subrahmanyam 1997; Conrad, Randeria, and Sutterlüty 2002; Manning 2003; Bayly 2004; Osterhammel 2009, 2014; Epple 2013).

Differences in their agenda and direction notwithstanding, what these attempts agree on rather universally is that European is not a one-to-one

3 See, for instance, Marius Meinhof, Junchen Yan, and Lili Zhu (2017), »Postcolonialism and China: Some Introductory Remarks,« in »Postcolonialism and China,« *InterDisciplines* 8 (1): 1–25.

synonym to Eurocentric. To unpack this seemingly basic assumption, we should pay heed to the fact that Eurocentrism is not a question of size and space (i.e., borders of Europe as a continent), but of geopolitical discrimination and benchmarking. As Mark Mazower (2014, 299) puts it in his discussion of the evolution of Eurocentrism in the nineteenth century, «as Europe expanded in power, Europe as a concept shrank.» Nor is Eurocentrism a question of history, but of privileging certain forms of historiography over others. Moreover, as several articles in this special issue evince, it is about denying certain societies access to platforms of knowledge dissemination, knowledge production, and resisting certain forms of knowledge. In any case, Eurocentrism has less directly to do with the philosophy of the Enlightenment and much more with the applications of its humanist hierarchies in mapping the world with the Europe of the colonial age as its outstanding, incomparable center of ideas.

Despite the efforts in the form of the series of timely and welcome academic challenges to Eurocentrism sketched out above, there still are some strong lines of research that tend to treat Eurocentrism as a rather coherent phenomenon with a clear timeline, overlooking its eclectic character and multiple origins. In order for us as heirs to and yet critics of Eurocentrism to challenge it more effectively, it is inevitable, this introduction holds, to keep questioning its origins and essence and to devise a deconstructivist approach toward it as a conglomerate entity, a family of constructs in plural, and an anthologized, omnibus artifact with a history of its own. In so doing, our aim is not to devalue the groundbreaking contributions by practitioners of the above-mentioned fields of study but to draw attention to the necessity of treating Eurocentrism the same way we treat globalization, subalternity, and otherness: not only as hybrid and synthetic in character, but also as conglomerated and plural entities with mixed stories of genesis. The esquisse of our call for a sensitizing course of action toward Eurocentrism is followed by the outline of the special issue you have in front of you.

Grappling with Eurocentrism: Confusions and conglomeration

In the early 2000s, Arif Dirlik (2002, 179) made two observations that are still central to the discussions made about the grip of Eurocentrism on contemporary scholarly and quotidian life: (1) that »the very desire to rescue history from Eurocentrism is entangled in the history of Eurocentrism;« and (2) that this desire to find a way out of the grip of Eurocentrism has also been »the source of confusion« in the discipline of history, and we may add, in any other discipline which is an offspring of the project of Enlightenment, such as sociology. Dirlik traced the roots of this confusion back to two sources: on the one hand, the »technical problems« and »conflicting ideologies« at work when writing non-Eurocentric histories (what he terms »the crowding of history«) (ibid., 178), and on the other, the contradiction inherent in Eurocentrism: the urge among researchers to steer clear of Eurocentric renderings of the past, while at the same time having little possibility to achieve that as long as we conduct research in disciplines which are born out of »European modernity« and are saturated in its engulfing myths of pristine superiority (ibid., 178–79).

However, as Dirlik (1999, 1) observes elsewhere, »[w]hether we see in the present the ultimate victory or the impending demise of Eurocentrism depends on what we understand by it, and where we locate it.« To unpack this significant argument in the spirit of what we lay claim to in this introduction, a number of issues should be raised with regard to the general critical attitude that our respective disciplines could take in order to constructively engage with the diffuse sense of guilt that these disciplines grapple with in the light of their Eurocentric origins:

1) The emergence of Euro-centered global relations has produced and long shaped the social relations at work in today's world. As inhabitants of the latest phase of modernity, what Bauman (2000, 2012) refers to as »liquid modernity,« our practices, values, and social relations are marked by fragility, discontinuity, uncertainty, hybridity, and a permanent sense of »becoming«. As such, Eurocentric structures and symbolisms are characterized by de-centered processes of constant and uncertain changes. As Bauman (2007, 4) asserts, we now live in a world of »endemic uncertainty«. As a result, Eurocentrism as the oft-supposed offspring of modernity, and

at least in its most recent incarnations, appears to be a hybrid entity, imploding from within and with the help of instability, continuity, and change, and being held in check by different temporal conditions and spatial compartmentalizations.

Given the insights offered by the notion of »liquidity,« then, if we agree on the commonly invoked genealogy of Eurocentrism that considers it a direct descendant of European modernity, we have to consequently also agree that over the course of several eventful centuries Eurocentrism has gradually »melted« over and beyond its »original« borders. Eurocentrism as such has inherited matter and thought from the non-West, departing from its already mixed, piecemeal origins (see below), merging with other centrisms, as a result of which it has pushed against its imagined borders, learned and unlearned routines and rituals, and bled into other worldviews. Beyond any doubt, whether as the preaching of Christian missionaries, the exacting tools of cartographers and archaeologists, or the provisions of law sanctioning colonial governance, Eurocentrism has for centuries journeyed incessantly, leaving hardly any aspect of life or any community across the world unscathed—journeys that have led to its shape-shifting into the hybrid entity that it is understood to be today. Still racing toward unforeseen futures, Eurocentrism in its current form is too complex and amorphous to map, an impossible cartogram of power at work before, during, and after colonization took it on the Grand Tour.

2) In a more nuanced take, on the other hand, the history of Eurocentrism dates back to multiple points of origin beyond the Enlightenment. »The East,« for one, Hobson reminds us, »[...] provided a crucial role in enabling the rise of modern Western civilization« (2004, 2). In an extrapolation on Hobson's discussion of the Eastern roots of the rise of the West, what he refers to as »the oriental West« (ibid., 5), we argue that, far from the claims to an impervious, pristine state of ascendancy since the Enlightenment (Hobson 2012, 9), Eurocentrism is a product of complex, mostly unrecorded global itineraries, centuries of intellectual, violent, and violating intimacies on the scale of the globe that were at work well before it was supposedly born to European modernity in a state of amnesia toward the roots and routes that linked it well beyond the borders of the geographical

West. »The notion of a »pure« Europe originating in classical Greece«, assert Shohat and Stam, »is premised on crucial exclusions, from the African and Semitic influences that shaped classical Greece itself to the osmotic Sephardic-Judeo-Islamic culture that played such a crucial role in the Europe of the so-called Dark Ages (a Eurocentric designation for a period of oriental ascendancy) and even in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance« (1994, 14). In the same breath, it is our contention that it is imperative to further step beyond the age-old East-West binary, to discard the West's claims to primeval uniqueness and unprecedentedness, and to examine the Euro- of Eurocentrism as a product of the rise of Europe and its boundary-making attempts against its many, mostly older but also equally fledgling, hybrid »others.« Far from being a pristine worldview that popped up overnight, Eurocentrism has in fact survived centuries of colonial and anti-colonial friction worldwide through an infinite series of piecemeal responses to endless encounters. Given the numerous contracts it has signed or breached, while defining itself and marking the nature and intensity of its power-laden relationships with its »others,« Eurocentrism and its others have been made and re-made in each other's image. And, as such, to get a clear view of the complexity at hand one has to constantly switch one's gaze to what lies beyond the »Eurocentric mirror«—that »too partial and distorted« inter-reflection of selves and others (Quijano 2000, 222).

3) Accordingly, besides being a hybrid entity with a contested origin, Eurocentrism has been owned, pioneered, or preached by a large number of actors. Countless others and othering infrastructures have been fashioned as it evolved over time, maturing into a part that functions as a cog in an asymmetrically conglomerate entity entirely made of densely interwoven »others«—a family of others including Eurocentrism itself (when viewed from outside). This assorted understanding of Eurocentrism's formation over the centuries explains why the current latent Eurocentrism at work inside and outside academia contains seeming contradictions, assigning asymmetric roles and attributing conflicting, mutually exclusive subject positions such as storyteller, historian, subject, researcher, agitator, protectorate, barbarian, metropolitan, marginalized, founding father, etc. to its practitioners. Consequently, and while in full agreement

with Dirlík (2002, 181) that »the inclusion of others in history, or even the repudiation of Eurocentric teleology, does not suffice to exhaust the question of Eurocentrism«, we believe that from where we stand in the course of history Eurocentrism and its others cannot be discussed except as wear and tear on one and the same quilted global fabric. After all, »[t]he fact is that virtually the entire world is now a mixed formation« (Shohat and Stam 1994, 15).

Echoing Kaminsky's (2008, 19) view⁴ that »Europe is not monolithic,« we would also argue that Eurocentrism too as a construct is an eclectic, amorphous entity, defined anew in relation to each old or new »other« it has encountered and given shape to in its globe-trotting in the carriage of (neo-)colonialism. Indeed, it has multiplied into a family of constructs that are in need of deconstructing. Given this, it is beside the point to look for Eurocentrism's birth certificate (where and when it was born): if we believe in Eurocentrism as a polymorphous entity in referring to which we have no possible form other than the plural, then the option in front of us is to leave the joys of genealogy aside and try to trace Eurocentrism(s)' numerous trajectories and stopovers on the most detailed maps of the world we could acquire.⁵ Eurocentrisms are, in this sense, fields of observation in need of liberation from the old mirrors, vantage points, points of interest, and binaries that they have always rather automatically been associated with.

4) To further populate the critique of Eurocentrisms with the actors involved necessitates a global mapping of academic practices, which lies beyond the scope of the present discussion. Suffice to say here that in the twenty-first century no conscientious scholar, regardless of academic upbringing and affiliations, works within the exclusive frame of Eurocentrism

4 Confirmed by Kanth (2005) and Hobson (2012), among others.

5 It remains, however, an uneasy fact that, while several entities discussed and examined in relation to the critique of Eurocentrism, from globalization(s) to racism(s), have come to be discussed only in the plural form, one of the rare references to Eurocentrisms as a plural noun other than in its dictionary form is a passing mention in an oft-quoted sentence by Samir Amin in his now-classic work *Eurocentrism* (1989, 214).

because, as just argued, Eurocentrism itself is assorted and engulfed in a larger apparatus of power. Without losing sight of what Eurocentrism is and how it has shaped our understanding of history, we must remain constantly aware that »the critique of Eurocentrism is«— and we would insist *has to*—remain a part of »a diffuse characteristic of all kinds of critiques of power in our day« (Dirlik 1999, 2). The result of such thinking is to avoid subscribing to the reductionist view that Eurocentrism is the source of all evils in the world and to the naïve hope that its downfall will lead to the dawn of a bright new era in global equality and peace.

More importantly, if we understand Eurocentrism to be conceivable only in the plural, the outcome would be that no two scholars are informed by one and the same Eurocentric paradigm, and because of this they would have to exchange ideas in order to get a sense of one another's definitions and frames of thought. Indeed, academic practitioners of history and sociology are residents of larger, conglomerate apparatuses of power of which Eurocentrism is only a part. Different groups of academics therefore have different distances, angles, and access points to Eurocentrism, the result of which is their various degrees of being influenced and shaped by Eurocentrism. Ultimately, it is redundant to mention that Eurocentricity goes beyond the question of phenotype. Non-Europeans have sometimes been keener to adopt the Eurocentric gaze than Europeans have, to the extent that, as Bashir's article so eloquently demonstrates, tokens of European modernity have entered into contracts with non-European meaning-making practices that function entirely differently in a locality such as a wealthy neighborhood in Lahore, giving birth to unprecedented Eurocentrisms (25). At the dawn of a new century, we should remain open to this interpretation as seemingly incompatible entities go hand in hand, introducing conglomeration, eclecticism, and porosity into our lives as thinkers, citizens, and actors. Furthermore, while thinking of Eurocentrism as simultaneously a conglomerate entity and an element in a larger apparatus of power relations, we should remain cognizant of the fact that the omnipresent, omnibus nature of Eurocentrism is »too serious to be left in the hands of elites to whom

Eurocentrism is an issue of identity in intra-elite struggles for power (Dirlik 1999, 3).«

In this issue

The present special issue is the result of a three-day interdisciplinary conference »Done with Eurocentrism?« held at the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology (BGHS), Bielefeld University, in summer 2016. The conference offered a platform for examining the trajectories departing from Eurocentrism, evaluating the sustainability of our strategies, diversifying our methodological toolboxes, facilitating theoretical border crossings, and turning our attention to knowledge produced in many languages and centers across the globe. Furthermore, and in response to the tendency in academia to develop non-Eurocentric research projects, the conference sought to highlight methodologically viable practices developed in different communities for re-mapping the world to account for a wider range of standards, needs, practices, values, and concerns. The papers included in the present issue touch upon these topics within various (trans)disciplinary contexts in the humanities and social sciences.

To start, and following Bauman's (1987, 110) criticism regarding Europe's project of modernity for »colonizing the future,« Eurocentrism is located at the heart of the material and social »modern« world. In the opening, independent contribution to the issue, **Shahzad Bashir** provides us with an illuminating tour into the persistent symbolism of Europe—either as »a place« or as a »set of ideas« (22)—and its embeddedness within the so-called periphery. He acknowledges Eurocentrism from two perspectives: first, as the practice of placing Europe in the world's center; and second, as a spatiotemporal practice used as a »measure« against which the rest of the world is judged. Eurocentrism, he asserts, is a ubiquitous practice that should be harnessed for the production of knowledge. While bringing up the question of the entanglements of history of Islam and Eurocentrism, Bashir gives a solid basis for understanding how to frame Eurocentrism and the history of what Orientalists referred to as »the Islamic civilization« by presenting two cases that marked the patterns for narrating the Islamic past in the nineteenth century.

The power of Eurocentric thinking has not only been materialized in territories and politics, but also constitutively reflected in knowledge production and its dissemination (Wallerstein 2001, 97–98). As already mentioned, Eurocentrism is not a question of history, but of privileging certain forms of historiography over others; nor is it a question of knowledge, but of denying certain groups of people access to platforms of disseminating knowledge, producing knowledge, and resisting certain forms of it. Under this premise, the two articles by **Mirjam Hähnle** and **Beate Löffler** portray, from different disciplines, how travel narratives and architectural history are addressed beyond Westernized circles of knowledge production. Hähnle's article discusses the epistemological dominance in knowledge production by analyzing Carsten Niebuhr's account of the Royal Danish Expedition to Arabia carried out in the eighteenth century. Drawing upon Michel de Certeau's concept of »heterologies,« the author analyzes the reciprocities and asymmetries present in Niebuhr's Eurocentric travel writing. She acknowledges such epistemological dominance by portraying strategies, narratives, and tactics applied in the Royal Danish Expedition's travelogues. Hähnle argues that knowledge production can be described as a »product of various forms of spatial appropriation« (45). In so doing, she discusses the importance of the different types of reproduction of Eurocentric dominations in European travel narratives. In the same spirit, Beate Löffler's article continues with the discussion around the dissemination and production of knowledge, reiterating the premise that Eurocentric approaches have privileged certain forms of historiography over others. As part of this debate, Löffler analyzes the roots of Japanese architectural knowledge within Western discourses. In her contribution, she uses discourses and narratives on Japanese architecture that emerged throughout the late nineteenth century in Europe and shows how Eurocentric perceptions continue to mark current architectural discourses about Japan. Touching upon concrete examples, Löffler explores architectural discourses sketched in newspaper articles and scholarly essays, among others, providing a detailed map of the ways knowledge about Japanese architecture is reproduced and represented in discursive constellations in the »West.«

Postcolonial studies arose in the late twentieth century as part of the criticism of Eurocentric thinking and Westernized historiography. Postcolonial thinkers such as Stuart Hall (1996), Hommi Bhabha (1994), and Robert Young (2016) reminded us to look at the dangers and problematics around the one-sided storytelling of Eurocentrism. Postcolonial scholars are aware of and have addressed the tensions and ambivalences between the understandings and productions of modernity across Eurocentrism and its »others.« In this vein, the contribution by **Julia Roth** reminds us how Eurocentric and colonial hierarchies still construct »universal stories« and »imperial landscapes« that define current social inequalities in the modern world (99). Her contribution intertwines radical intersectional theory and the concept of »critical Occidentalism« (Dietze 2010), bringing an innovative perspective to the study of the persistent geopolitics of knowledge around feminist approaches and Eurocentrism. Departing from a radical intersectional approach, Roth provides several examples of feminist approaches in order to address how »unequal geopolitics of knowledge« (98) are produced by feminist theorizing which in turn lead to the (re)production of epistemic inequalities. In her concluding remarks, she argues that epistemic sensitization and decentralization of the prevailing Eurocentric discourses and practices should build platforms of knowledge dissemination that reach beyond hegemonic Eurocentrism. In a similar manner, **Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar** and **Zubair Ahmad** address the persistence of Eurocentric postures by analyzing race and religion from the postcolonial perspective. Starting from the assumption that both categories should be considered as Eurocentric epistemic-political effects, the authors criticize the isolation of the categories of race and religion within the postcolonial studies approach by making visible the segregated discussions about race on the one hand and religion on the other. Their main argument is that this fragmented analytical *modus* ironically reproduces Eurocentric orders of knowledge. In their final remarks, Hernández Aguilar and Ahmad suggest that conceptual discussions about race and religion should contribute to the pursuit of historical junctures, as well as consider the role of Europe as an intrinsic practitioner for granting them new meanings.

Moving beyond race and religion, and based on the premise that Eurocentrism could be understood »more as a cultural expression than [a] cartographic one« (Wallerstein 2001, 97), the contribution by **Mirko Petersen** examines another central political actor that was at times pushed aside within the larger discussions about Eurocentrism: The United States. In his article, Petersen presents Argentina's involvement with Cold War international politics under the regime of Juan Domingo Perón as an in-between position enclosed by two global superpowers, i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union. His argument is based on the premise of global Cold War studies, which understands the Cold War period as a global political phenomenon. His discussion focuses on Argentina's geopolitical power within Latin America's Cold War scene, suggesting that Cold War studies should pay more attention to the role of peripheral relations developed within this timeframe, i.e., taking into account Latin-American scenarios, in order to rethink Eurocentric Cold War narratives. In so doing, Petersen reiterates the significance of viewing Eurocentrism not as a question of geography (borders of Europe as a continent), but of geographical discrimination and geopolitical benchmarking.

This last assumption leads us to the point that European does not necessarily mean Eurocentric, and that Eurocentrism goes beyond geographical borders. The final article in the volume, written by **Fabio Santos**, exemplifies similar arguments. Based on cross-border ethnographic research in the so-called »Outermost Regions« of the European Union, Santos illustrates his discussion with an in-depth analysis of life in the borderland between French Guiana and Brazil. Drawing upon the conceptual frame of »*geteilte Geschichten*« (shared and divided histories) developed by Randeria (1999), Santos examines a range of paradoxical examples of historical and current »post-colonial entanglements« with Eurocentrism by looking at the everyday cross-border life experiences in that borderland. He thus unveils the complexities of European geopolitical colonial claims and suggests a »re-mapping« of the discussions beyond Eurocentrism(s).

As discussed above, the polarizing power of Eurocentrism has led to multiple asymmetric acts of dominance over the »peripheries,« violations that have resulted from disparities rooted in a hybrid and eclectic history

of interconnectedness that challenge the very quintessence of Eurocentrism(s). Confusions, contradictions, and discontinuities, on the one hand, and fusions, conglomerations, and concurrences, on the other, have created an entangled, eclectic power entity that shapes our everyday lives in the modern world. The present volume aims at tracing new ways of critically engaging with this polarizing, plural entity (1) by appraising where in relation to Eurocentrism(s) we stand at this point in the twenty-first century and (2) by identifying the possible trajectories away from it in our ways of viewing the world and as we do research. As argued above, identifying and systematically challenging the Eurocentrism(s) inherent in centuries of hegemonic traditions, in individuals' outlooks toward »others,« in collective human encounters with the unknown or the uncharted, in silent and silenced assumptions about sources and applications of knowledge, in outpourings of pity toward the inferior other, in celebrating the European as better and best, in condemning the non-European as worse and worst, in research questions that assign the metropolitan (not even necessarily white and male) researcher an elevated, mature, supposedly objective position in contrast to the poorly focused, infantilized researched subjects, is at the heart of the discussions in this special issue.

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