

Braudel and Foucault on structure and event

Towards a new approach to (neo)liberalism and capitalism¹

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Introduction: History in a new light

Fernand Braudel (1902–1985) and Michel Foucault (1926–1984), two renowned French historians who exerted enormous influence on studies of the history of capitalism and (neo)liberalism, were not in regular dialogue despite living more or less at the same time. Their texts do however contain a few references to one another that are essential for recognizing common points and links between their historical approaches and problematics. For one, Braudel’s historical sociology and Foucault’s genealogical history share a long-view perspective and both advanced critical thinking on the crisis of the discipline of history in human sciences. Braudel’s critiques of traditional history, which rely on heroic individuals and their successes and accounts in order to place surface-level events in a chronological time sequence, are the basis of his explorations into the history of modern economic civilization. In juxtaposition,

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inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche's genealogical critique of the history of origins, which regards human history as a progressive evolution, Foucault's critique of conventional history opens up a new horizon that enabled him to analyze his lifespan research triangle of »knowledge,« »power« and »subjectivation« starting from the times of the Roman and Greek civilizations through the *ancien régime* to the (neo)liberal age. As a result of their path-breaking and wide-ranging research into the history of human science, culture, and civilizations, Braudel and Foucault have become the most representative figures in the revolutionary turn of the discipline of history in the post-war period. Braudel sought to tread new pathways towards a transdisciplinary space in historical sociology by developing a long-term perspective based on new conceptions of time-scales, while Foucault's historical aim is associated with his critique of established notions of power and politics.

One of the common points of Braudel and Foucault is that their discussion and use of the structure and the event as analytical categories and methodological tools has played a constitutive role in the development of their revolutionary approaches to history, sociology, and politics. By extension, Braudel's and Foucault's historical views and methods establishing critical links between the structure and the event are the basis of their analyses as they venture into alternative interpretations of capitalism and (neo)liberalism. Braudel and Foucault recognize the history of capitalism and (neo)liberalism as centered around multiple societal power relations and long-term structures. Foucault puts emphasis on »the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality« (Foucault 1998a, 370), which also holds good for Braudel, who reaches the same conclusion about the non-finality of history through his structure-focused analysis.

Looking at the scarce mutual references of Braudel and Foucault, it is seen that both endorse the other's work and point to the links between their historical approaches and methods. These references give essential insights into their approaches to structures and events. In one, Braudel references Foucault, displaying the congruence or similarity of their conceptions of »civilization.« For Braudel, the history of a civilization

cannot be drawn around »turning points,« »events« and »heroes« (Braudel 1995, 26). Instead, long-term changes of the structural elements and limits of a civilization are related to its own past and other civilizations. The cultural, economic, religious or political exchanges between past and present—and between civilizations—can result in refusal or approval. Braudel considers Foucault's book *The History of Madness in the Classical Age* important because it illustrates how a subcutaneous structural element of the Western civilization has remained more or less unchanged into modernity despite changing attitudes towards the mad and the sane; »the triumph of reason« and »the public victory of rationalism and of classical science« (1995, 32).²

For Foucault, Braudel is significant in the new trajectory of the science of history. Foucault identifies four novelties in historical works of his time: new approaches to the periodization of history that do not focus only on critical events like political revolutions; new time-scales for the periodization of history, for which Braudel (2009) proposes »the short term,« which identifies the temporality of events, »the conjunctural« (cyclical time), and »the long term« (*longue durée*); transcending »[t]he old traditional opposition between the human sciences and history« (Foucault 1998b, 281); and finally the introduction of the varied »types of relationship and modes of connection« into historical analysis in such a way as to displace »the universal relation of causality« (1998b, 281) or, in Braudel's words, »game of ›causes‹ and ›effects‹« (Braudel 2009, 174). Foucault lends Braudel's name to the new project of historical analysis concerned with »the form of signs, traces, institutions, practices, works, and so on« (Foucault 1998b, 281).

2 Foucault's book on madness expounds on how the relation between reason and madness, the sane and the mad, in the West changed from the Middle Ages when the mad were regarded as »an emissary from God,« to the seventeenth century when the mad were regarded as »jetsam« to be imprisoned to keep them from threatening the »social order,« and finally to the nineteenth century when »they were treated more fairly, even kindly, because, they were recognized as ill« (Braudel 1995, 32).

Foucault credits these new developments, which are specifically focused on continuity, with helping to properly re-establish a connection between history and human sciences, but he is more concerned with discontinuities in history and »epistemological breaks« in human sciences. He characterizes the confluence of continuity and discontinuity as a »curious intersection« in the development of new ideas and approaches in the discipline of history (1998c, 298). Without specifying Braudel's name, Foucault refers to him as the watershed of this intersection (1998c, 298). If Foucault maintains a distinction between the two tracks of historical studies around the themes of continuity and discontinuity, he underscores that this does not mean that two opposite trajectories in historical analysis have emerged. Instead, »what has happened is that the notion of discontinuity has changed in status [...] It has now become one of the fundamental elements of historical analysis« (1998c, 299).³ Paul Rabinow's summary of Foucault's recognition of the Annales School is helpful as we proceed:

He [Foucault] drew on existing resources, putting them to new uses. From the great French tradition of the *Annales* school of historical analysis, he retained a tradition of the *Annales* school of historical

3 There is also another point showing that Braudel influenced Foucault. Foucault (1980, 149) credits Braudel with introducing the subject of space and geography into historical analysis, admitting that Braudel and the first generation of historians of the Annales School influenced his use of spatial or geographical metaphors. »Geography,« writes Foucault, »must indeed necessarily lie at the heart of my concerns« (Foucault 2007a, 182). In the first volume of *Civilization and Capitalism: 15th–18th Century: The Structures of Everyday* (1981), Braudel explores the foundations of civilization; he directs his attention to urban and country houses, their architecture and building materials as well as their interiors, and to towns and big cities. Braudel also opens up a broader dialogue with geography in his works, in particular, in *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1972), in which he links geography with politics. In regards to his analysis of power, Foucault seems to be more influenced by Braudel's political, economic and sociological insights into the spatial organization of civilization than his notion of the *longue durée* as the true time-scale that identifies the underlying structures of civilization.

analysis [*siz*], he retained an emphasis on long-term and impersonal economic and social trends; from the equally distinctive French lineage of the history of science, he adopted an emphasis on concepts and epistemological rupture points. One could say, to simplify, that he sought to work at the nexus where the history of practices met the history of concepts. (Rabinow 1997, XI–XII)

Mitchell Dean (1994, 2), too, recognizes Foucault's works on »truth,« »power,« and »self,« which he describes as constituting »a Foucauldian triangle,« as a new gate to the terrain of historical sociology. In the following argument, Dean distinguishes Foucault's historical sociology, which is geared towards »problematizing intellectual practice,« from »the progressivist theory,« which assumes a teleological historical drift, and »critical theory,« which develops an emancipatory theory against modernist dominations in social and intellectual spheres. Foucault's problematization of historical sociology refers back to Nietzsche's »effective history«⁴ and attaches priority to »the dispersion of historical transformation, the rapid mutation of events, the multiplicity of temporalities, the differential forms of the timing and spacing of activities, and the possibility of invasion and even reversal of historical pathways« (1994, 4, emphasis added). As Dean rightly argues, Foucault's historical sociology built on the perspective of »critical and effective history« (1994, 12) taking as its point of departure the problematization of the present around the arrangements, configurations and organizations of knowledge/truth /rationality; power/domination/government; and subjectivity/self/ethics (that is, »the Foucauldian triangle«) and his approach is not totally

4 Or »wirkliche Historie« which stands in sharp contrast to »traditional history, in its dependence on metaphysics [...] [which] is given to a contemplation of distances and heights: the noblest periods, the highest forms, the most abstract ideas, the purest individualities [...] Effective history, on the other hand, shortens its vision to those things nearest to it—the body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies [...] It has no fear of looking down« (Foucault 1998a, 381). »The body—and everything that touches it: diet, climate and soil« (1998a, 375) constitute the historical objects and elements of effective history which is composed of events—natural and human.

inconsistent with that of Braudel, albeit varying contrasts do exist. Amongst them are Foucault's suggestion of »general history« against »total history« of the Annales School and, more importantly, his emphasis on the event against Braudel's discarding of the event as »a discrete atom« (1994, 38). Accordingly, what distinguishes Foucault's place in the sociological turn in history from that of Braudel and the Annales School is his recognition of the event as the method of historiography which he called »eventalization« (Foucault 2001c, 226), that is, »a construction of events« through which he was able to »breach self-evident continuity and teleological schemas« (Dean 1994, 41). All in all, a dialogue between Braudel and Foucault suggests that their historical methods and views, considered together, can serve well for analyzing the relations between structures, civilization, events, power, science, and discourse.

Rethinking structures and events in Braudel's historical sociology and the significance of Foucault for »eventful sociology«

The revolutionary turn in the use of history in sociological analysis instigated by Braudel ties in closely with his opposition to the conception of structure and event in a conventional historiography based essentially on a nineteenth-century Rankean narrative of events. Braudel's concern with the large-scale notions of structure, civilization, historical time, and the *longue durée* ties into his two primary aims. First, Braudel is concerned with overcoming the »general crisis in the human sciences« (Braudel 2009, 171). He aims to inspire a transformation in human sciences so as to replace the battle of the social sciences with the neighborhood of the social sciences. He argues that a new conception of time referring to a »precise idea of the multiplicity of temporalities and of the exceptional importance of the long term« (2009, 173) provides a foundation on which a possibility of a »common language in the social sciences« (2009, 202) can be built. A revolutionary change in the human sciences towards a transdisciplinary or unified and holistic social science in global terms can be constituted with a new long-term perspective. In this sense, the *longue durée* is not only a time-scale, measure or duration that explains deep structural foundations of civilization; as a perspective it is also the fundamental pillar of his objection against the idiographic epistemology

that sees events in their singularities and exceptionalities (Öziş 2010, 74) to the exclusion of the multifarious structural and historical relations and processes that engender them. Braudel is also diametrically opposed to any »single-factor explanation« (Braudel 1982, 402) that gives rise to nomothetic sciences which are ahistorical in character and presume general laws that govern individuals' conduct and mentality according to universal truths, as in neoclassical economics. »Sectorializing thought« advanced by idiographic sciences and »universalizing thought« by nomothetic sciences are the epistemological targets of Braudel's criticism from a perspective of the long term (Wallerstein 1995, 187–201). For Braudel, only historical analysis based on the long run can shackle the established epistemologies and create a new turn in human sciences. This turn, for Braudel, means establishing »a common program for the social sciences« on the basis of »the idea of multiple temporalities« (Braudel 2009, 189).

Second, Braudel's break with traditional historiography based on either nomothetic or idiographic epistemology is inextricably linked to his analysis of social reality. Social reality, for Braudel, is the composition and assembling of »the ceaseless constraints imposed by geography, by social hierarchy, by collective psychology and by economic need—all profound forces, barely recognized at first, especially by contemporaries, to whom they always seem perfectly natural; to be taken wholly for granted if they are thought about at all. These realities are what we now call »structures« (1995, 27–28). In other words, structure implies »an organization, a degree of coherence, rather fixed relations between realities and social masses« (2009, 178). These multiple realities or structures constitute a civilization, »which can persist through a series of economies or societies, barely susceptible to gradual change. A civilization can be approached, therefore, only in the long term« (1995, 35).

Braudel characterizes civilization around multiple realities⁵ or structures. His methodological discussion of multiple temporalities enables him to

5 Braudel identifies occurrences in material life with the notions of »realities,« »facts,« or »everyday details« which together form the constants and chains of the long-term history of structures. In his words: »Material life, of course, presents itself to us in the anecdotal form of

divide the social structure of civilization into varied social structures. »Each social reality creates its times and its levels of time« (2009, 200). Accordingly, the short term is identified with the event that comes about in a short period of time and »doesn't last long, disappearing almost as soon as one sees its flame« (2009, 174). Braudel cautions social scientists, especially economists »who are imprisoned in a very short present« and »trapped in this time bind« (2009, 183), not to fall into the »claws of the event« (2009, 184) because of its »capricious« and »deceptive« (2009, 175) nature. He adds the »cyclical phase« (*conjoncture*), »the cycle« or »the intercycle,« as the other time category. The conjunctural time exposes the »curves« and »oscillations« (2009, 177) which represent more or less stable and regular economic relations and developments. It is a longer duration (ten to fifty years) which denotes »the various rates of medium-term change« (1984, 17) and shorter than the *longue durée* (three to four hundred years) which »is made up of a succession of repeated movements, with variations and revivals, periods of decline, adaptation or stagnation—what sociologists would describe as structuration, destruction and restructuring« (1984, 621). It should be noted that if Braudel accords primacy to the long term and the conjunctural time over the short term of the event he believes that they »coexist« and »cannot be separated« (1984, 85). Put this way, they »are bound together [...] The *longue durée*, cyclical phase (*conjoncture*), and events fit together easily« (2009, 19). As such, the long term being the fundamental perspective of historical analysis, the recognition of the coexistence and conjoining of these historical time categories with each other is essential for making sense of the interweaving of events and structures. Therefore, what is important for Braudel is a back-and-forth move »from the event to the structure, then from structures and models to the event« (2009, 201).

thousands and thousands of assorted facts. Can we call these events? No: to do so would be to inflate their importance, to grant them significance they never had« (Braudel 1981, 560). For Braudel, events are different from facts and the details of everyday life and have, in relation with structures, certain impacts on civilization.

Thus, it is fair to say that Braudel is not ignorant of the significance of the event and its temporality for understanding changes in structures. In this sense, Braudel does not stick to a structure-obsessed global history approach. A closer critical reading of Braudel suggests that he lays out a global historical sociological perspective surrounding the symbiotic relationship between events and structures. That being so, Braudel's discussions of the coexistence of the temporalities of events and structures inspired new strides in historical sociology in the 1980s, which recognized the event as the analytical, methodological and theoretical unit. This new event-focused historical sociology is described as »eventful sociology« by William H. Sewell (2005), known for his much-read and well-regarded works on the historical sociology of events. Sewell's critical analysis of classical historical sociology elicits its event-oriented theoretical aspects; however, as will be discussed, Foucault's works, which assume »eventalization« as a method, have been understudied for the promotion of »eventful sociology.« Foucault took a position against what he called »de-eventalization« in historical sociology, by which he meant historical works whose research object proves to be »the most unitary, necessary, inevitable, and (ultimately) extrahistorical mechanism or structure available« (Foucault 2001c, 228). In contradistinction to »de-eventalization,« Foucault called for »eventful sociology,« which he described as »eventalization.«

I am trying to work in the direction of what one might call »eventalization.« [...] What do I mean by this term? First of all, a breach of self-evidence. It means making visible a *singularity* at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all. To show that things »weren't as necessary as all that« [...] Second, eventalization means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary. In this sense, one is indeed effecting a sort of multiplication or pluralization of causes. (Foucault 2001c, 226–27)

Foucault's »critical and effective history« suggests that the true and critical historical sense and research is not engaged with »origins« but the »genesis« of the numerous »entangled events« (Foucault 1998a, 381). In accordance with the view of Braudel, who regards history as »the sum of all possible histories« (Braudel 2009, 182), Foucault's genealogical history »as the vertical projection of its position« (Foucault 1998a, 382) aims at »liberating a profusion of lost events« (1998a, 374). Therefore, genealogical history is engaged with the multiplicity and contingency of events and their co-genesis and interwovenness as well as their inclusion of multiple relations and structural elements. On this basis of genealogical history, a single event in historical analysis can achieve its true historical significance. This is the game of power relations, the event being »a scene where forces are risked and confront one another where they emerge triumphant, where they can also be confiscated« (1998a, 385).⁶

An entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity—as a theological movement or a natural process. »Effective« history, however, deals with events in terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations. An event, consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a domination that grows feeble, poisons itself, grows slack, the entry of a masked »other.« (Foucault 1998a, 380–81)⁷

6 For an illustration of reading history as a game of power relations, see Foucault's elaboration of *Oedipus the King* (Foucault 2001a).

7 Foucault makes this point clearer in his short piece »The Art of Telling the Truth.« In a dialogue with Kant, Foucault explicates that Kant's »What is Enlightenment?« was the turning point in philosophy because it introduced »the question of the present, the question of what is happening now [...] What is my present? What is the meaning of this present?« (Foucault 1988, 87, 89). With these questions on the »ontology of the present and ourselves« (1988, 95), a new interpretation of modernity in philosophy began for Foucault. It is events, neither the large-scale nor crucial events, but sub-events/undersized events which

This new conception of the event in genealogical history raises two criticisms in Foucault's oeuvre. One of them intersects with Braudel's transdisciplinary critical perspective against traditional historiography based on either idiographic or nomothetic epistemology. Braudel and Foucault place their historical perspective and methods in opposition to conventional narratives of events. Second, Foucault's genealogical history raises a political criticism, against the established systems of values and regimes of truth emerging from traditional historical analysis, that seeks to discover the origins of things. Foucault follows Nietzsche's critique of conventional history as the grid of truth production which contrives a way towards totalitarian politics gravitating around the single Truth with definite origins produced by metaphysics (Brown 2001). By means of the genealogical history, Foucault wants to open up a new horizon for politics, or better still, »the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth,« in other words, for breaking away from the conventional »political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth« (Foucault 2001b, 133). He believes that only a genealogical history can, in his words, »afford us a model for a historical analysis of what I would call the politics of truth« (2001a, 13). All in all, the politics of truth is essential for a radical turn in politics in theory and practice as well as for critical theory and epistemology in historical analysis so as to trigger »the insurrection of subjugated knowledges [...] that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations and disqualified

are hardly recognized at first, construct the present. As Kant takes up the French Revolution, it was not the Revolution itself but not-easily-observable events around the great event that proved to be the signs for the progress of the mankind. For Kant, only those events which are of the nature of *rememorativum* (the rememorative sign), *demonstrativum* (the demonstrative), and *prognosticum* (the prognostic sign) (1988, 91) bear the features of being the sign of progress. These are the criteria for an event or a series of entangled micro events and practices that have the capability to construct the present in a continuous manner. Taking inspiration from Kant, philosophy or »the history of the present« (1995, 31) is eventful for Foucault and as such recognizes the inter-temporality of events having the above-mentioned characteristics, which open a critical political approach to our presence at present.

as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity» (2003, 7). The achievement of these two interrelated aims of Foucault's genealogical and archeological history or, in short, »critical and effective history« consists in a new sociological and political vision as outlined above.

On balance, Foucault's »critical and effective history« has strong potentialities to support »eventful sociology.« In a nutshell, »eventful sociology« has been recently promoted by Sewell's works (1996, 2005, 2008) as the new critical wave in historical sociology. Eventful sociology attaches great significance to the event »as a theoretical category« (Sewell 1996, 841) with an eye to opening up a new methodological way of conceiving the multiple temporalities of social life, which is seen as »eventful,« that is, »irreversible, contingent, uneven, discontinuous and transformational« (2008). This »eventful temporality« (2005, 100–102) thus considers Braudel's conception of the symbiotic relationship between events and structures by tipping the balance in favor of the event in order to identify how events transform structures which are now regarded as the outcomes of »human action« (2005, 111). In addition to its innovative methodological implications, eventful sociology is employed and promoted by Sewell (2008) to gain new insights into the cultural political economy analysis of the history of capitalism and the neoliberal configuration of capitalism at present. If one sees the history of capitalism from the standpoint of eventful sociology, it becomes clear that capitalism, being a social organization with an unprecedented institutional setting, has emerged from radical, contingent, entangled, and unpredictable events and human actions in a process similar to »creative destruction,« as Joseph Schumpeter (1950) would have it. This means that capitalism is an event of invention in human history and not an enduring certainty. Thus, eventful sociology politicizes the history of capitalism in the sense that its past, present, and future depend on radical contingent human actions and forces that would trigger radical challenges to and changes in established structures.

This eventful conception of the past and future of capitalism provides a firm ground for understanding the eventful character of neoliberal capitalism at present. After all, Sewell's (2008) discussion of structures and events ends with an attempt to analyze neoliberal capitalism from an eventful sociological perspective. Sewell (2008, 521–23) identifies the expansion of socially abstract capitalist relations into non-economic and non-capitalist spheres as the most characteristic of the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism in which financial logics and events are at the center, creating new ways of capitalist accumulation. In the final analysis, Sewell correctly distinguishes neoliberal capitalism's »hyper-eventful« (2008, 527), unpredictable, excessive short-term, crisis-ridden, manipulative, chaotic, and dynamic character in producing forceful effects penetrating the very capillaries of society, which, all things considered, enhances wide-ranging conflicts across society and the entire globe. Therefore, the birth and development of eventful sociology itself lies at the very heart of the neoliberal configuration of capitalism. At this juncture, turning back to the insightful analytical schemas proposed by Braudel and Foucault comes in handy. Braudel's analytical scheme deals with an economic system dominated and ruled by capitalism and that of Foucault is engaged in (neo)liberalism as the complex ensemble of modern technologies of the production of truth, power, and ethical regimes, which, considered together, will help us make further contributions to the eventful sociological analysis of neoliberal capitalism.

Towards an integrated analytics of structures and events in times of neoliberal capitalism

The historical and methodological approaches of Braudel and Foucault to structures and events present us with two distinct analytical schemas supporting an eventful sociological perspective that are illuminating and instructive for developing new understandings of the history of capitalism and neoliberalism as well as the current dynamics of the crisis of neoliberal capitalism. These are the tripartite schema proposed by Braudel, which envisions society as divided into three layers (»capitalism,« »the market economy,« »material life«) in a hierarchical order which is best pictured in the form of a »pyramid« (Braudel 1982, 91; Özveren 2005, 115) and

Foucault's »analytics of power« (Foucault 1978, 82, 90; 2003, 23) which focuses on micro-power relations and spaces, and his »analytics of government« (Lemke 2012, 25–40), which comprehends (neo)liberalism as governmental rationality and an assemblage of governmental technologies. The conception of modern society building on the idea of the coexistence of multiple economies and power/governmental relations means that economies include governmentalities and power relations on macro and micro levels, and vice versa. As such, these two analytics, in Braudel's own words, aspire to analyze society »in all the richness, complexity and heterogeneity of real life« (Braudel 1981, 25).

Braudel's analytics identifies three major economic realms with different temporalities: 1) capitalist economy is a contingent eventful and conjunctural sphere that more or less follows long-term strategic and lucrative business/commercial affairs. It is the homeland of revolutionary events, especially regarding industrial and financial innovations, conjunctural forceful events that influence the whole structure in a way that forces it to change radically and abruptly; 2) the market economy or the site of economic and social regularities in which opposite forces balance each other out; and 3) the material life, the realm of subsistence economy that flows away in the watercourse of the *longue durée*. Yet they are not distinguished only by different time frames. The scales and organization of economic transactions, agents, motives, actions and mentalities also play their roles in this partitioning of the societal system (1982, 22), which means that there is no single »social machinery« (1982, 166). Instead, Braudel envisions society as »a set of sets« (1982, 458).

Braudel characterizes material life as »infra-economy, the informal other half of economic activity, the world of self-sufficiency and barter of goods and services within a very small radius« (1981, 24). Material life bears resemblance to Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, »systems of durable, transposable dispositions, [and] structured structures« (Bourdieu 1990, 53). Material life mostly consists of rural life, still a daily reality for

almost half of the world's population.⁸ Material life, which has the nature of inertia within the time frame of the long term, mostly escapes the attention of economists and historians. Material life seems to be a domain of, what Foucault (2001d, 379–80) would call, »non-event.« It is because of this fact that Braudel characterizes material life as a »shadowy zone« (Braudel 1981, 23).

The market economy exists as one economic order within which regular and visible transactions and relations take place between numerous buyers and sellers who do not have any monopoly power over the market exchanges. It consists of »transparent visible realities« (1981, 23), which do not necessarily lead to speculative transactions, because economic agents depend on competitively-determined prices via functional demand-supply mechanisms outside the control of individual enterprises. Thus, entrepreneurs earn modest profits in both commercial and production activities, almost at the level of normal profits in standard economic parlance. But this does not mean that »a microcapitalism« (1979, 62) does not exist in the market economy.

Moving up the layers of the pyramid towards its zenith through the »microcapitalisms« of the market economy, we face real capitalism. It occupies the smallest area, which, however, is the space of commanding height of economy in social hierarchy where the endless accumulation of power and wealth takes place. Capitalism is a »zone of turbulence« (1981, 24) for Braudel, in which pecuniary and commercial speculative affairs take place chasing after »super-profits« (1982, 405). It is the place where the rules are constantly bent and predatory strategies for »super-profits« are carved out. Capitalism is not always market-friendly. Quite the reverse, by and large it has a negative relation with the market economy, so much so that it constitutes an »anti-market« (1982, 136, 230). That is, it proceeds with constant rule-breaking strategies against the market. It is the sphere of »[c]ertain groups of privileged actors engaged in circuits and

8 According to the United Nations report *World Urbanization Prospects* (2014, xxi), fifty four percent of the world population lives in urban areas. By 2050, that number is expected to rise to sixty six percent.

calculations that ordinary people [know] nothing of« (1981, 24). Here is the place where the accumulation of power based on hierarchical relations is achieved. Therefore, if the market economy for Braudel is »a world of transparency and regularity [...] open to free competition« (1982, 455), capitalism is a »sophisticated economy« that functions according to »calculations and speculation« (1982, 22) for lucrative and mostly speculative financial and commercial business affairs. As a »hyper-eventful« domain, capitalism is full of contingent and risk-laden events, which break out in the form of crises that force the structures of lower layers of the pyramid to change.

Braudel's tripartite schema of society, which is derived from his conception of social life around different time rhythms, has certain objections against the established views of economics on economic life. First, *contra* mainstream economists, social life cannot be analyzed based on an imaginary thinking that assumes society as exclusively composed of capitalism or the market economy to the exclusion of material life, which mostly considers capitalism and the market economy as one and the same thing. In line with this, Braudel, does not conceive capitalism as an all-pervasive economic and social system dominating the entire social order with its set of interests, considerations, ways of doing things, lines of reasoning, and economic and cultural life, which is one of the reasons for Braudel's contemplation of society as »a set of sets.« Braudel states that he is of the same mind as Immanuel Wallerstein and Rosa Luxemburg to the effect that capitalist and non-capitalist structures coexist (1984, 64–65). If capitalism is an invasive social system, it does not completely integrate with other social systems— material life and the market economy. Instead, it touches them obliquely. It prefers to be stay at the top of the social hierarchies. In his words: »The preserve of the few, capitalism is unthinkable without society's complicity [...] For in a certain manner, society as a whole must more or less consciously accept capitalism's values. But this does not always happen« (1979, 63–64).

Be that as it may, what distinguishes the present form of capitalism under the neoliberal configuration of society and economy from its past liberal counterparts is the constant, emphatic and mostly forceful

extension of capitalistic market relations, attitudes and mentalities into the non-capitalistic market and social domains as far as the depth of material life which Braudel defines as a »layer covering earth« (1981, 23). As an example, as the result of growing financial debt relations and concomitantly the increasing use of biotechnologies, genetically modified and hybrid seeds, the transformation of the long-term agricultural structures, mentalities, habits of thought and techniques has resulted in an increasing disciplinarization of nature and farmers, as a study on Braudel and Foucault correctly argues (Carolan 2005). The distinguishing feature of neoliberalism for Foucault is its modeling of political government and social/material life on marketing. »The problem of neoliberalism is rather how the overall exercise of political power can be modeled on the principles of a market economy« (Foucault 2008, 131). In other words, »[o]ne must govern for the market, rather than because of the market« (2008, 121) as classical liberalism had formerly assumed. As German neoliberalism (ordo-liberalism) promotes, neoliberalism is »a framework policy« (2008, 140) that aims to »intervene on society [...] in its fabric and depth [...] so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment« (2008, 145). Therefore, Foucault is more concerned with identifying the mechanisms of the dissemination of neoliberal governmental techniques, rationalities and norms throughout society than with making analytical distinctions between societal layers to detect their characteristics. However, what is missing in Foucault's rightful depiction of neoliberalism is its lack of awareness regarding the distinction between unpredictable, unregulated and unbounded (financial) capitalism and the structurally institutionalized competitive market economy as suggested by Braudel.⁹ Integrating these two analytics can provide a powerful tool that is useful for understanding the configurations and changing patterns of structures and events under crisis-ridden neoliberal financial capitalism.

9 Contemporary studies in governmentality and biopolitics are focused on neoliberal and financial capitalism, see Collier (2011), Dardot and Laval (2014), Fumagalli and Mezzadra (2010), Hardt and Negri (2012), Lazzarato (2009, 2014, 2015), McMahan (2015).

The analytics developed by Foucault can be understood in two contexts: power and government. Through »the analytics of power,« Foucault, in opposition to a theory of power that builds on universal juridical conceptions as representations of the politically centralized sovereign state, is engaged in analyzing power relations in wide-ranging domains of society and the apparatuses that (re)produce power relations in micro domains. In his words, »the issue is to determine what are, in their mechanisms, effects, their relations, the various power-apparatuses that operate at various levels of society, in such very different domains and with so many different extensions?« (2003, 13). In this sense, there is no single domain of power, quite the opposite, what is at issue is »the existence of regions of power. Society is an archipelago of different powers« (2007b, 156), an expression which is close to Braudel's »society as a set of sets.« Therefore, in Foucault's analytics of power we discern a shift in the object of analysis from *the* power to multiple power relations across society. By means of the analytics of power, Foucault (1995) explores disciplinary forms, apparatuses, and institutions such as schools, prison, hospital, factories, and barracks which do not necessarily operate in a repressive way over subjects but instead through certain mechanisms of individualization, normalization, permanent modifications, interventions, hierarchization, surveillance, regular testing, isolation and confinement to construct malleable bodies for predetermined targets in which enhancing productivity comes first.

As such, the institutions of disciplinary power are not only the institutions of state power but also spread into the social body through family, army, police, schools, factory, hospital and through diverse local administration of collective bodies. In this sense, disciplinary power operates in the social body, orchestrating a spatial distribution of individual bodies to specific places. According to the techniques and procedures of disciplinary power, the artificial or institutional organization of the sexual, emotional, productive, biological, pedagogical, military aspects of the life of individual bodies consist in »a strict spatial partitioning« (1995, 195). In this sense, »[d]iscipline organizes an analytical space« (1995, 143) in order »to create a useful space« (1995, 144). This

goes hand in hand with a »detailed partitioning of time« (1995, 150) in order to create »a better economy of time« (1995, 148). This means the detailed partitioning of time and space by disciplinary institutions and techniques through which the energy of individual bodies is used and governed effectively and optimally for achieving certain ends without giving way to any disobedient feelings and behaviors. It is »to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost« (1995, 218).

Here, two points are important in relation to Braudel's analytical schema of society. First, Foucault too envisages the disciplinary modality of power and power relations as operating in a pyramidal hierarchical order for which he uses the metaphor of the »Panopticon« (1995). Yet, the tip of the pyramid is not the realm that produces and commands power relations.¹⁰ Instead, an articulation between the layers of the pyramid is at issue, enabling the power relations to disseminate across societal system. Second, Foucault sees the disciplinary formation of society as the correlate of the capitalist structuring of society.¹¹ However, Foucault's conception of capitalism refers to industrial capitalism in which labor exploitation and productivity through disciplinary techniques are essential targets. On the other side, for Braudel, capitalism is not reducible to

10 »[T]his summit doesn't form the »source« or »principle« from which all power derives as though from a luminous focus (the image by which the monarchy represents itself). The summit and the lower elements of the hierarchy stand in a relationship of mutual support and conditioning, a mutual »hold« (Foucault 2007b, 159). Although capitalist and disciplinary formation of society proves to be a »pyramidal organization« that »gives it a head, it is the apparatus as whole that produces power« (1995, 177). But the tip of the pyramid comprised of the state and high finance has certain strategic governmental functions. It constitutes the boundaries and privileges by taking power relations under its permanent supervision (Lemke 2012, 31–32).

11 »The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting forces and bodies, in short, »political anatomy,« could be operated in the most diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions« (Foucault 1995, 221).

industrial capitalism; even so, capitalism has no real home, something Foucault would argue for neoliberalism.

What interests Foucault in regard to capitalism is not so much the determined aim and action of the bourgeoisie to get hold of power as its concerted acts towards transforming the political power techniques in governing individuals as part of the population. Thus the political object and governmental rationality of disciplinary power needs to be reshaped by liberalism after the mid-eighteenth century according to a new governmental rationality formed by the supposed natural mechanisms and the »milieu« of the market economy.¹² In liberal governmentality, whose major form of knowledge is political economy, time becomes bound up with a series of events in »the market milieu« (2008, 259). And, in theory, or better still, in the liberal governmental rationality, artificially constructed and partitioned spaces are replaced with wide-open milieu in which natural population movements take place. This new articulation and configuration of time as event-bounded temporality and space as »milieu« in classical liberalism opened up a new type of government in the mid-eighteenth century.

12 The issue here for Foucault is not to propose and defend a liberal theory of the market as in mainstream economics, assuming that the market is natural and does not require any institutional inventions to function spontaneously as a self-regulating mechanism. What Foucault shows is that the logic, rationality, and techniques of the liberal art of government rest on this very teleological and ahistorical vision of the market. Compared with Karl Polanyi's (2001, 147) thesis that the market is not natural, but a product of a concerted and planned action of the state, the issue becomes problematic. Foucault himself would not be against Polanyi's thesis and institutional theory of the *laissez-faire* market economy, which expounds the actually existing history of market society, because the context of the former's problematization of the market is rather different. Polanyi is engaged in illustrating the invalidity of the *laissez-faire* myth by explaining the history and nature of the market society. Foucault depicts how this myth turns out to be the actual logic and rationality of liberalism in governing the state, society, and individuals. For an original Foucauldian critique of Polanyi in the context of classical liberal and neoliberal governmentality see Dardot and Laval (2014, 42–46).

In addition, Foucault points to three diverse conceptions of milieu in the sovereign, disciplinary, and security modes of power. Accordingly, »sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the major problem of the seat of government, whereas discipline structures a space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements, and security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events« (2007a, 20). In Foucault's recognition of the milieu of a liberal government is a political *dispositif* that targets ensuring security by means of the free game of forces which are in constant circulation in the form of a free flow of events that neutralize and balance each other out. Hence, Foucault explores the milieu as an eventful governmental instrument in the liberal art of government. In liberal governmentality »reality is the correlate of the government« (2007a, 272), where reality refers to events, not to structures.

Liberal governmentality, therefore, is the cradle of changing structure of bio-power that modifies the disciplinary logic of power by shifting the domain of power from institutionally and artificially created and organized spaces onto the broad domain of the market. In contrast to the disciplinary mode of power, liberal government does not deal with the event by creating tight and permanent surveillance over time and space. Instead, liberalism lets the events take their natural course as formulated by the physiocrats through the expression of *laissez-faire*, *laissez-passer*. The reasoning is that in the natural milieu of the market, events are to reach an equilibrium where they neutralize and balance each other out, which naturally produces measures against security problems inherent to capitalist market economies (Folkers 2014, 93–95). Accordingly, liberal governmentality gives importance to the natural circulation of things and the population in the market milieu and assumes a time scale during which the natural flows and fluctuations of events occur more or less regularly in a rather short term. In the final analysis, liberal governmentality conceives social realm as »an indefinite series of events« (Foucault 2007a, 20).

Liberal governmentality accords privilege to probabilities, uncertainties, and consequences of events over pre-determined priorities (*consequentialism*). This requires a calculative rationality such as the *Tableau Economique*, as

opposed to a police state, which takes preventive measures to obstruct bad or negative events in advance. Therefore, what is at issue in liberal governmentality can be characterized as »the government of economic events« (Folkers 2014), the management of crises, risks and dangers. This ensures a least-cost or frugal government because, as Giorgio Agamben puts it, »governing the causes is difficult and expensive.« Therefore, »it is more safe and useful to try to govern the effects [...] If government aims to the effects and not to the causes, it will be obliged to extend and multiply controls. Causes demand to be known, while effects can only be checked and controlled« (Agamben 2013, § 7). As such, the naturalness of events, which are the results of the natural movements of the population, and the market milieu prove to be the essential instruments of the liberal art of government. The market milieu is the most representative domain of the liberal conception of space—in contrast to the territorial conception of sovereignty and artificially constructed spaces of discipline—because it involves governing individuals through freedom. Last but not least, if the milieu of the liberal art of government has a natural character, it is still a »field of intervention« (Foucault 2007a, 21). The liberal state has certain mechanism and techniques to intervene in the natural milieu of the market economy and its events, formulated around the premise of »governmental naturalism« (2008, 61), exchange, and equality. It is Foucault's merit to have distinguished between the »governmental naturalism« of classical liberalism, which assumes a distance, not opposition, between the state and the market, and the constructivist nature of neoliberalism, which reduces the distance between the state and civil society (the market) by organizing social, political, and economic life around the premise of competition and entrepreneurial freedom, resulting in the »extension of market logic« (2008, 118) into non-economic spheres and relations.


In lieu of a conclusion

All in all, we are presented with two analytics by Braudel and Foucault, which, once considered together in the imaginary form of integrated analytics, are very helpful for providing guiding insights into approaching

neoliberal capitalism and its continuing crisis.¹³ Braudel's tripartite schema is useful for distinguishing the peculiarities of capitalism, the market economy, and material life, and recognizing the pluralities of society in respect to economic and cultural structures and organization. Foucault's analytics of power and government is useful for understanding the different modes of power regimes. Foucault's triangle of modes of ruling comprises »sovereign,« »disciplinary,« and »security« modes of power. Just as Braudel argues, there cannot be a linear historical drift from the subsistence economy of material life to the market economy and finally the capitalist economy; for Foucault »there is not [a] succession of law [sovereignty], then discipline, then security [(neo)liberalism]« (2007a, 10). »The general economy of power in our societies« (2007a, 10), in Foucault's phrase, comprises these three modes of ruling and corresponding economic structures at the same time. Sovereignty, discipline and security as the modern »governmental management« constitute a »triangle« of the power regime we live in.¹⁴

13 I argue that the present world economic and political order in advanced and developing capitalist countries is still in crisis ten years after the great global financial crisis in 2008. The reasons behind this are numerous, but most notable, as recently delineated in the works of Wolfgang Streeck (2014, 2016), are low rates of growth, rising inequality at the national and global level, the upsurge of public and household debt as a result of financialization and, consequently, the demise of democratic institutions that have governed capitalist economies over the post-war period, paving the way for technocratic and authoritarian modes of governing the economic and political order. Therefore, as Streeck argues, the continuing crisis of capitalism calls for rethinking sovereignty as part of the problem of the crisis of neoliberal government in the face of the crisis that goes beyond its economic scope in a way to destruct the political and social foundations of the post-war democratic capitalism without inspiring any imagination and expectation for a new democratic order.

14 Pierre Macherey (2015), reading Foucault's research into the analytics of power and disciplinary society in light of Marx's relevant chapters in *Capital* on labor as productive power, that is, »labor-power,« identifies three mechanisms in governing population: »Direction,« »supervision« and »mediation.« This bears a resemblance to Foucault's triangle of power regimes that together shape the present power order. Considered



together, direction or sovereignty is the »direct form of authority«; supervision as a lower-authority involves disciplinary techniques that enable power to circulate through multiplicities; mediation as the form of »the generalization of authority« constitutes a complex network of power regime among individuals, forging a path for subjectivation with a relative autonomy in the capitalistic market milieu within a security paradigm. Incidentally, Braudel (1984, 621) conceives of capitalism in a similar vein, arguing that mercantile, industrial, and finance capitalism do not represent the stages of a progressive and linear history of capitalism; rather together they form a capitalist order past and present in which unspecialized and flexible capitalist ways of gaining choose commerce, production, and finance in conjunction. Put together, mercantile, industrial, and finance capitalism correspond to specific power regimes in Foucault's scheme. Mercantile capitalism emerged at the beginning of the art of government in the age of Cameralism, police, and the state, in which sovereignty was reproblematised in line with the rising importance of government. Industrial capitalism added discipline and the liberal art of government to this previous form of a power regime. Finance capitalism, which is a historical form of capitalism *à la* Braudel, gives a new direction to liberal governmentality, today widely known as neoliberalism, in which »direction,« »supervision,« and »mediation« are combined selectively in a neoliberal power regime that relies on the paradigm of security or *securitization*. These different conceptualizations of capitalism and power suggest that they operate and co-exist in a complex web of interactions.

The above illustration provides helpful insights into Braudel's and Foucault's perspectives on structures and events in the context of capitalism and (neo)liberal government. First of all, as mentioned above, the temporalities of social life are central to Braudel's historical sociology. If we conceive of the issue of temporality in the context of Foucault's analytics of power and government, we recognize that each power regime has its own temporality or time horizon and rhythm. Whereas the power regime of sovereignty has a final point in time which spots the end of the sovereign state and another starting point for the new one, »an indefinite time« horizon underlies the state doctrine later perfected by the (neo)liberal art of government, in the sense that governments will always be present even if the states perhaps come to an end. Under the sway of a power regime ruled by a (neo)liberal government, if there is possibly an end to »the indefinite governmentality of the state« or »a revolutionary eschatology« full of revolutionary events, it could be carried out by civil society, not by the state (which would reopen onto another indefinite time horizon). This is the critical and revolutionary hope of Foucault for the next stage of civilization, in which he identifies the development of »counter-conducts« with »the right to revolution« against (neo)liberal governmentality. As for the temporality of disciplinary power, it justifies the disciplinarization of every single moment in time in the capitalist production of commodities and bodies. This also involves an infinitive time horizon in the sense that disciplinary power uses time to the utmost at the present. Disciplinary time also opens onto a final point in the indefinite time horizon where most profit is obtained. »The disciplinary methods reveal a linear time whose moments are integrated, one upon another, and which is orientated towards a terminal, stable point; in short, an »evolutive« time« (1995, 160).

Second, therefore, Braudel's theory of plural social-economic temporalities and Foucault's conception of the plurality of time changing power regimes help us to develop a more comprehensive analytical framework through which to understand the relation between economy and power in general and the relation between capitalism and neoliberalism in particular. In this context, both Foucault and Braudel, the economic

order of the market and its governmental reason differ from that of capitalism. This allows them to distinguish the peculiarities of capitalism, which is now under the financial domination of private corporations and the state. The drawing above is also useful for imagining how financial power and governmentality permeates the structures beneath it. The actors, the multiple governmental reasons and apparatuses (*dispositifs*) are placed in a hierarchical order. Material life is the home of the daily lives of the population at large and is under constant formation by the neoliberal (financial) governmentality and the security mechanisms of the market supported by the state finance. The market as a realm of governmental reason and an economic life increasingly comes under the dominance of neoliberal governmentality and cuts itself off from material life and material interest of the population at large. But Foucault and Braudel do not have an optimistic and supportive view of the market economy in the sense that if capitalism did not exist, the market would provide favorable conditions for material life. They only want to picture the entire structure of civilization realistically. Accordingly, economic civilization and power regimes exist in multiple forms and different structures of economy and power coexist. From this integrated analytics, we also see that an event like crisis at the top of the pyramid spreads to the lower levels through different actors, networks, multiple governmentalities, practices, and instruments. Thus the integration of Braudel's historical analytics, in which the importance of events seems to lose its significance, with that of Foucault is helpful for recognizing how an event like crisis can force structures to change, as we observe today.

As such, third, capitalism, now under the dominance of financial accumulation, mechanisms, and logics, permeates the underlying structures or the lower layers of societies. Although for Braudel capitalism has always coexisted with other structures and touches them obliquely and its integration, especially with material life, is very slow, in neoliberal capitalism the situation has changed completely and the transformation of the market economy and long-term structures of civilization has been very swift, and destructive for many societies. Although the scale and mechanisms of transformation of material and social life configured in

the long term differ in developed and underdeveloped countries, as Braudel shows, civilizations are always in a constant tension between acceptance and refusal. We see this in the increasing movements of people throughout the world in the form of immigration or otherwise, which is mostly the result of the deterioration or quick transformation of the long-term structures of social and material life inspired by »hyper-events« like crises and wars/conflicts.¹⁵

All in all, regarding the historical background of modern society, Braudel, as an economic historian, focuses on the history of capitalism whereas Foucault deals with the genealogical history of (neo)liberalism. Both developed new definitions and expanded the research area of capitalism and (neo)liberalism. Braudel foregrounds the speculative and rule-bending aspects of capitalism and focuses on the relation of power and finance, which does not necessarily comply with the interest of the production sphere of industrial capitalism and the market economy. It is because Braudel identifies the essential aspects of capitalism in terms of its organizational structure, time frame, motives, and gains, and its relation with the state and the market economy, that his analysis is very helpful, considering the detrimental and profound impacts of the 2008 global financial crisis on economies, states and societies that continue to unfold. On the other hand, Foucault's analytics and »history of governmentality« (Foucault 2007a, 247) and »biopolitics« (Foucault 2008)

15 As David Harvey (2005, 160–65) states, »financialization« is one of the mainstays of neoliberal capitalism as a tool of »accumulation by dispossession« alongside »privatization and commodification,« »the management and manipulation crises,« and »state redistributions.« Yet, as I have shown in the context of Braudel's discussion of capitalism, finance has always been part of the history of capitalism. In line with this, Elmar Altvater makes an historical observation about finance capital and argues that whenever finance dominated capitalism, global wars and conflicts increased due to its destructive competition for economic sources. Altvater (1993, 139–46) states that, as historical cases show, growing national debt, leading to national bankruptcy, is a political and social project against modernization which uses political, and no less important I would like to add, military violence.

are increasingly gaining enormous significance after the 2008 financial crisis. Foucault himself saw the crisis of liberalism in the 1960s and 1970s as a crisis of governmental rationality and techniques. The recent crisis is now being interpreted as a crisis of neoliberal government in the literature of governmentality and biopolitics. Therefore, it is high time to reconsider the crisis as a crisis of capitalism and liberal governmentality in neoliberalism. Foucault (2008, 70) argues that, as history evinces, there can be a time lag between these two types of crises, which means that they do not necessarily overlap in time. So far, there have been ample cases and events that show that we are going through a joined crisis of capitalism and neoliberal governmentality.

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