InterDisciplines

Journal of History and Sociology

Volume 7 - Issue 1

Race, Gender, and Questions of Belonging

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Cover picture by Ian Kington: *The King's Medal for Native Chiefs*
Coverdesign: deteringdesign GmbH Bielefeld/Thomas Abel
Image courtesy of Dix Noonan Webb Ltd.
www.inter-disciplines.org
www.uni-bielefeld.de/bghs
ISSN 2191-6721
This publication was made possible by financial support from the German Research Foundation—Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).

Contents

Questions of belonging

Some introductory remarks

Bettina Brockmeyer and Levke Harders

The cover of this issue's *InterDisciplines* displays two sides of a medal. On its front we see the profile of the British King George V wearing his insignia of power; on its back, two ships, a warship and behind it a smaller cargo vessel. Both ships sail under a blaring sun; the coastline in the background is hilly and sports two palm trees. This medal was made out of silver and hung from a necklace.[1] Designed in London in 1919, the decoration was conferred to »native chiefs« in the British colonies. The medal is therefore closely linked to questions of belonging: Which people—imagined as »native«—»deserved« it? Who was allowed to decorate himself—chiefs in the colonies and mandates were men—with a sign of British power, representing the kingdom and its empire, its military and commercial forces under the tropical sun? The King's Medal for Native Chiefs is a symbol of inclusion and exclusion at the same time. As a reward it made the colonial subjects »belong« to the empire. The iconography, however, is exclusive. »Africa« is depicted only by nature, while Great Britain is represented by a (powerful) person as well as by symbols of technological and economic strength.[2]

1 The King's Medal for Native Chiefs, picture by Ian Kington, Dix Noonan Webb, London, February 2015, image courtesy of Dix Noonan Webb Ltd.

2 George V acted as British king from 1910 to 1936. For the creation and purpose of the medal, see the file from the Colonial Office in London, National Archives London, MINT 20/651. For more information, see Brockmeyer's article in this issue.

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v7-i1-150 ISSN 2191-6721

Thinking about this medal, we find ourselves confronted by complex questions of belonging as well as questions of race, class, and gender. The categories that come into play via this symbol of power have had their own careers throughout history. In this issue, case studies from the nineteenth century to the present shed light on the historical trajectory of categories such as gender, class, tribe, nation, and religion. Our aim is to determine, firstly, the historical changeability of methods of inclusion and exclusion and, secondly, the historicity of the categories themselves. As an analytical tool we introduce and at the same time attempt to think beyond the concept of »belonging,« based on the work of Floya Anthias, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, Nira Yuval Davis, and other scholars.

Within the context of categories of difference, belonging, we argue, can function as a flexible »meta-category« for the analysis of social inequality. As a social construction, belonging defines and produces difference and—simultaneously—power. As »belonging combines categorization with social relating« (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2011, 203), it is not only a flexible research category, but it also admits agency. Unlike other categories, it is not necessarily rooted in the times it helps to explain; which does not mean, however, that it has not been used as a supposedly »natural« attribution throughout history. Pfaff-Czarnecka defines belonging as »an emotionally-charged social location. People belong together when they share values, relations and practices« (ibid., 201). If this emotional attachment is threatened it develops into politics of belonging, as Yuval-Davis (2011, 10) points out. These politics of belonging aim at »constructing belonging to a particular collectivity,« that is »all signifiers of borders and boundaries play central roles in discourses of the politics of belonging« (Yuval-Davis, Kannabiran, and Vieten 2007, 3). Politics of belonging include citizenship or other boundaries of political communities, but also the idea that »national« traditions—for example—are shaped by historiography.

Belonging is an important pattern of community and society and influences identity, family, migration, economic factors, and »emotional attachments as they are articulated in national, ethnic, cultural and religious affiliations« as well as in gender and class (ibid., 4). Hence

belonging must always be thought of as plural or multiple. This heterogeneity of belonging makes it hard to define. It also creates difficulties for its use as an analytical tool in the social sciences and the humanities, even though it is an important dimension of life. Nonetheless, we would like to further explore the category by transferring the theoretical and methodological concept of belonging to empirical research in history and sociology. Because this concept as we define it simultaneously includes the ways subjects relate to the world and the ways in which subjects are addressed, it can mediate between the micro level of agents and the macro level of society. Put more simply: belonging bears reference to both structure and agency.

The term belonging itself is part of a long-standing tradition of sociological as well as historical conceptions of society. It is tied to concepts like Ferdinand Tönnies' relation of *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society), Max Weber's *Vergemeinschaftung* and *Vergesellschaftung*, or Anthony Giddens' analysis of structure and agency (Welskopp 1997; Yuval-Davis 2011). Recent discussions of belonging draw on these theories but do not (yet) explicitly distinguish belonging from them. Moreover, belonging is quite close to what Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker have convincingly offered as »alternative analytical idioms« to the strained term »identity« (Cooper and Brubaker 2005, 66). Already in 1996, Stuart Hall asked »Who Needs Identity?« He and other scholars, however, came to the conclusion that for certain questions, the term still was of importance (Hall 1996, 1). Cooper and Brubaker share this view, but instead of using »identity« they offer idioms such as »identification and categorization,« »self-understanding,« and »commonality« (Cooper and Brubaker 2005, 70–77). By bringing the self, social relations, and structures together, they discuss similar components and processes, which we would like to describe as belonging. In sum, belonging is not a new concept and it remains an open question whether and how it can function as a useful category in (historical) research.

In order to study belonging, Yuval-Davis suggests considering either social location or emotional attachments or shared values (Yuval-Davis 2011, 12–18; see also Anthias 2013 and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2013).

Researchers using the category of belonging are able to look at social and economic locations of individuals, at emotional attachments as created through narratives, and at ethical and political values. At the same time, the empirical focus could be on the politics of belonging as processes of inclusion and exclusion. These politics can be analyzed as power relations or as symbolic power orders (Yuval-Davis 2011, 18–21), for example as expressed through a colonial award. Anthias (2013) argues in addition for an intersectional, translocational, and transnational approach to »broaden the scope of analysis of ›othering‹ processes illuminating both the differential placing of actors within and across national borders and the often contradictory and complex processes involved« (16). The intersectional approach enables us to comprehend the social construction of belonging—and not belonging—as a process shaped by gender, race, class, religion, nationality or migration, depending on the specific situation.

This issue aims to further our understanding of the shifting discourses and practices of inclusion and exclusion through the construction of belonging. By applying the concept of belonging to (historical) case studies, we would also like to inspire the theoretical discussion. As our examples show, belonging comes to the fore—and is transformed and (re)defined—in crises and conflicts, and at points of fracture and rupture. Moreover, this issue of *InterDisciplines* contributes to the methodological conception of belonging and politics of belonging by connecting it to biographical and micro-studies. The authors emphasize the dynamic and processual character of belonging, i.e. creating or »doing« belonging. To what extent did concepts of race, class, gender, religion, nation or ethnicity contribute to both the construction and processes of belonging from the early nineteenth century to the present? How did these social constructions intersect in the case of mobile or migrating subjects? How did individuals, state and local actors alike negotiate belonging? This empirical research strengthens the theoretical model of belonging inasmuch it analyzes the complex and often contradicting processes of exclusion and inclusion in specific local and temporal settings.

Bettina Brockmeyer's article on a colonial biography and **Stefan Manz's** investigation of several »German« settlements outline processes

of belonging in colonial and global settings. Their studies advance research on the German Empire, while broader studies on colonial lives outside the British Empire are still a lacuna. If metropole and colonies are understood as entangled spheres, questions about the transfer of ideas, objects, and especially subjects become all the more important and can help us understand varying forms of entanglement (Conrad and Eckert 2007, 22–23). Consequently, Brockmeyer follows the traces and belongings of an African biography during European colonization in order to introduce new and more plural voices into colonial history. She thereby offers a closer reading of the making and effects of colonialism, and of the entangled histories of Tanzania, Great Britain, and Germany. Manz's analyzes discourses of inclusion and exclusion in the diaspora as important aspects of German nation-building. His contribution focusses on contested belongings regarding politics, religion, class, and language in different communities around the world and their function for the German Empire.

Whereas race, class, or nationality primarily structured belonging in these colonial and global settings, **Karolina Barglowski** and **Levke Harders** focus on processes of belonging in the case of inner-European transmigrants. Barglowski explores the creation of ethno-nationalist belonging in the context of a long historical tradition of Polish migration to Germany. The narratives of contemporary migrants show clearly the importance of emotional attachments and not only structural hindrances or advantages as an aspect of (researching) belonging. Harders' article, on the (unsuccessful) strategies of a craftsman to belong in Northern Europe in the 1840s, considers state and local actors alike to understand the construction of alterity and belonging along the lines of class and gender as more relevant than emerging ideas of national citizenship. All case studies reflect in different ways on the concept belonging to assess whether it could function as a useful category not only for sociological but also for historical research.

To make proper use of the theoretical and methodological gains of belonging, additional empirical studies, especially in history, are needed. A conceptual history of the term belonging might also be valuable to

analyze its flexibility, which is probably engrained in its semantic denotation; not containing, but mediating between structure and the individual. Future research could also discuss belonging in the context of existing conceptions of both society and identity to more clearly define its potentials and limits. Could belonging bear some advantages compared to other concepts, not least because it carries less theoretical baggage (Anthias 2013, 7)? Is it less static than »classic« ideas of community and society, understood as purposeful and conscious processes? We think that belonging is an open concept, one which is changeable over time and which can include multiple belongings. And, finally, politics of belonging are not only »prone to effecting social exclusion, but also the opposite—widening borders, incorporating, defining new common grounds« (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2011, 203). Focusing on belonging also means keeping the possibility of change in mind, since belonging is constantly renegotiated.

This issue on »Race, Gender, and Questions of Belonging« benefited enormously from intensive discussions with many scholars. We would like to thank Vasuki Shanmuganathan and Stefan Manz, who made the panel of the same title at the 2015 annual meeting of the German Studies Association in Washington, DC a rewarding academic experience. We also extend thanks to Karolina Barglowski, who agreed to broaden our approach from a sociological perspective. Thanks too to Kathleen Canning and Lora Wildenthal for chairing and commenting the GSA session. Our colleagues in Bielefeld—namely Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, Thomas Welskopp, Martina Kessel, Jana Hoffmann, and Melanie Dejnega—provided helpful feedback, as did the anonymous peer reviewers. All of their comments and critical thoughts contributed to this issue and continue to influence our thinking about belonging. It was a pleasure to work with Thomas Abel and Melanie Eulitz as editors as well as with Laura Radosh as proofreader of *InterDisciplines*.

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Doing colonialism

Reading the banishment of a »native chief« in the Tanganyika territory[1]

Bettina Brockmeyer

Introduction

In April 1940, an incident took place in Iringa, the district's capital town in the southwestern region of the Tanganyika territory in today's Tanzania. In front of the center of the colonial administration, called the *Boma*, in a public and busy square, chief Sapi Mkwawa, the leading figure of the »native authority« in the British administration system,[2] lost his temper. Almost 80 years later, we cannot fully reconstruct the detailed course of events, however, according to the British administration, the chief severely misbehaved and threatened colonial rule. Reportedly, he told the British to leave his country, otherwise he would force them to do so. He mentioned the Germans and the possibility that they would (re)capture Dar es Salaam. He even cursed in the German language. The British interpreted

1 This short article has already been on a long journey. On this journey, I received very helpful comments and input from many people. I especially wish to thank Celia Isaak Mkwawa, Is-Haka Mkwawa, Frank Edward, Br. David Gantner, Martina Kessel, Levke Harders, Paul Ocobock, the Africa Working Group, Georgina Willms, and the peer reviewers. In naming all those people, I must also emphasize that the final product is completely my own responsibility. I will continue to develop the ideas contained here as part of a larger book project on colonial biographies. My trips to Tanzania and the work on this article would not have been possible without the grants I was awarded from the Gerda Henkel Foundation and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.

2 For »native authorities,« see Beidelman (2012, 21). For a recent problematization of the term »native,« see Mamdani (2012). For the term Boma, see Michels (2009, 165–66).

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v7-i1-151 ISSN 2191-6721

these articulations as an expression of alliance with the German enemy. The incident had consequences. Mkwawa was ordered to leave the district and move to the north of the Tanganyika territory. In May 1940, at the age of 60, he left his home, two wives, and ten of his smaller children.[3] What had taken place? What had motivated a member of a prominent family in the region to insult the British administration by mentioning the European enemy in war and questioning colonial rule?

The historical context is the »colonial situation« in Tanzania, as Georges Balandier has described the rule of a minority over a majority ([1952] 1970). It began in 1885 with German colonization and formally ended in 1961 with independence. After World War One, Tanganyika came under a League of Nations mandate, administered by the British. This meant that the British were obliged to report on their work in East Africa to the League of Nations. Historians have pointed out that the former German colonies were effectively »treated as colonies« again (Banton 2008, 15; see also Beidelman 2012, xi). However, new research places more emphasis on the League of Nations as »a force field« and differentiates between the »anything but uniform« British colonial policies (Pedersen 2015, 5, 137). British policies varied not only from mandate to mandate but also over time. In relation to Tanganyika, both the League and British politicians agreed that it should be considered a territory for which permanent European settlement would be impossible. The British therefore avoided settler-friendly politics. They introduced »indirect rule,« which basically meant that they installed »native chiefs« in the various districts (Pedersen 2015, 136–37).[4]

3 Tanzania National Archives (hereafter abbreviated to TNA), Acc. 24, Iringa, A2/19, Native Affairs, Ex-Chief Sapi and his Family, fol. 14. Sapi Mkwawa was born in 1879. I do not know the month and day of his birth.

4 Uncountable studies have already been written on the British Empire and on indirect rule, unlike German colonialism, which for a long time has been considered a short and unimportant period in history. For German colonialism and its long neglect in historiography, see Eckert and Wirz (2002, 373–74). For Germany as an empire, see Dickinson (2008).

The African history scholar John Iliffe wrote, in his groundbreaking book on the history of Tanganyika during colonialism, that the system of indirect rule was in crisis by the 1930s (1979, 357). A tired and languishing administration might explain Mkwawa's banishment, but this only offers an explanation in a very general sense and fails to give reasons for the transcolonial aspect of the event. However, I want to interpret the incident in front of the Boma and its aftermath not just as a symptom of a collapsing system, but rather as an integral part of an ongoing process of »doing colonialism.« I understand doing colonialism in the same way that Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman have defined »doing gender« in their canonical text »as a routine accomplishment embedded in everyday interaction« (1987, 125). This article, of course, covers just a small part of »everyday interaction,« because it focuses on governing people and leaves out the majority of men and women on the ground.

In terms of methodology, I employ, first, a biographical approach and, second, I apply a theoretical framework for »belonging.« The biographical approach can speak to virulent questions in (post)colonial history, I would like to argue. The major objectives of colonial life writing are still to »provincialize Europe« (Chakrabarty 2001), to write decentered and shared histories (Conrad, Eckert, and Freitag 2007; Conrad and Randeria 2002), and to explore the »tensions of empire« (Cooper and Stoler 1997). Catherine Hall shows the possibilities of a decentered history by observing the itineraries of people between metropole and colony (2009). Natalie Zemon Davis demonstrates in *Trickster Travels: A Sixteenth-Century Muslim between Worlds* how even a life that left few archival traces can offer a way into a global history of the early modern era (2006). In different ways, these works open a »window« onto a certain time period and locality.[5] Thus, they represent new tendencies in life writing. Recent biographies no longer exclusively focus on prominent men but also on women, on transnational life courses, and some biographies try to decenter the person

5 For more about the »window« method as one of the different ways to conceive of biography, see Lässig (2008, 13).

they are writing about for example by focusing more on the context.[6] However, histories of extraordinary men and exceptional women of the colonial period are still prominent.[7] More widely, in European historiography depictions of colonizers far outweigh depictions of colonized men or women.[8] Taking the findings of postcolonial and subaltern studies into account, a history that focuses mainly on European sources, people, and experiences will, as informed as it may be, always remain one-sided. As a result, the biography of Sapi Mkwawa, who was an active leader in administrative positions and was promoted to a high rank under German and British colonialism, may deepen our understanding of the colonial period in Tanzania and, at the same time, offer insight into a life that was highly affected by colonialism.

The second and related methodological approach in this article is the application of the notion of belonging. In her definition of the term, Nira Yuval-Davis differentiates between: »social locations,« which are arranged around categories like race, class, and gender; »identifications and emotional attachments,« which explain or narrate identities; and »ethical and political values,« which might vary even within the same location and narrative (2011, 12–18). Furthermore, Yuval-Davis distinguishes belonging from the »politics of belonging,« which entails the creation of boundaries by those who have the power to do so (ibid., 18–

6 For an overview of the historiography of biography, see: Lässig (2008); Etzemüller (2012); Harders (2014).

7 As an example of the history of German East Africa in biographies, see about Lettow-Vorbeck: Schulte-Varendorff (2006); Michels (2008); about Carl Peters, see: Perras (2004); Kpao Sare (2006). For more information on the only woman who gained much attention for her exhaustive travel writing, see the work on Frieda von Bülow: Wildenthal (1998); Bechhaus-Gerst (2009).

8 For exceptions to this rule, see: Schechter (2012); Desley, Russell, and Woollacott (2010). For evidence of the growing interest in imperial or colonial lives, see: Lambert and Lester (2006); Habermas and Przyrembel (2013); Buchen and Rolf (2015). All these works mainly focus on imperial biographies, and one could replace the adjective imperial with »white.« For Africans in Europe, see: Oguntoye (1997); van der Heyden (2008).

19). She stresses that »belonging tends to be naturalized and to be part of everyday practices« and to come to the fore only when it is challenged or under threat (ibid., 10). Hence, a colonial scene, like the one I analyze in this article, is exactly the site where belonging and the politics of belonging are articulated. Therefore, I explore whether and in what ways belonging helps to shed light on the way colonialism functioned, and how belonging offers a way of looking at the making and effects of colonialism, the activity of doing colonialism.

To sum up, this article, first of all, contributes to newly realized modes of writing biography. It aims to offer a »window« onto a certain time and place, and it focuses on a non-»white,« overlooked (in comparison to those of his father's and son's) life course.[9] Second, it intends to offer a better understanding of the colonial situation by analyzing different forms of belonging. The sources I have analyzed are written documents from the colonial archives in London and Dar es Salaam, the archive of the Benedictine Mission in Bavaria, and interviews that I conducted in Iringa with members of the Mkwawa family.

A colonial biography

In the nineteenth century, the majority of people who lived in the Uhehe region were called *Wahehe*. The Wahehe were a »general political unit« (Mumford 1934, 203) of people with heterogeneous types of belonging (to groups, to families, and so on).[10] The family of *Mutwa* Munyigumba and his son Mkwawa had a hegemonic role among the Wahehe.[11] This

9 Sapi Mkwawa's grandson, Chief Abdul Adam Sapi, said in an interview that he and his grandfather shared the same fate of being sons of prominent fathers; interview with Abdul Adam Sapi, 21 Feb. 2014, Iringa; all interviews conducted by the author.

10 *Hehe* (*Wa* indicates a plural in Swahili) was a relatively new term in the nineteenth century, and has been interpreted by German and British colonizers as meaning tribe. See also Redmayne (1968) for more about the term Wahehe.

11 *Mutwa* is the Hehe word for male leader. The historian of the Mkwawa family, Fulgens Malangalila (1987), calls all male leaders in the Mkwawa

hegemony continued throughout the period of colonization. German as well as British colonizers positioned Mkwawa's male family members in social structures as leaders of the region.

The Mkwawa family has a famous history of resistance against German colonization. Mutwa Mkwawa was well known for his long-time opposition to the German colonial project. He fought against the occupation of the Iringa region until 1898, when he ultimately shot himself rather than surrendering. The Germans in Iringa, under the command of captain Tom Prince (1869–1914), took his skull and presumably sent it to Germany. For the British, the skull came to symbolize the cruelty of German colonialism; it is even mentioned in the Treaty of Versailles. [12]

Sapi Mkwawa was the firstborn son of Mutwa Mkwawa, and he was educated and trained, as was the case for all Mkwawa sons, as a warrior.[13] That means he was brought up with an attachment to the military. Born in 1879, he stayed with his father almost until the latter's suicide in 1898. When Sapi Mkwawa surrendered to the Germans, they took him and many of his father's wives, along with their children, in chains to the

family Mutwa. The German missionary Cassian Spiß wrote for the German word »*Häuptling*,« which meant leader or chief, in his Hehe dictionary: »*mutwa*, *mtemi*, *mlugu*, *chota*« (1900, 160). I use Mutwa to indicate the Wahehe position and chief to refer to an individual's position in the British administration.

12 For the history of German colonialism in East Africa, see Pesek (2005). The history of the skull is still not completely clarified (Bucher 2016). For the history of the Wahehe, see especially the works of anthropologist Alison Redmayne (1964, 1968), who completed extensive research in the Iringa region in the 1960s and spoke to a lot of Mkwawa descendants.

13 Bonifaz Mkwawa, Sapi's brother, talked to the anthropologist Alison Redmayne about his childhood (see fn 12). I learned about this from Is-Haka Mkwawa on July 20, 2015, in Plymouth. The Catholic missionary Alfons Adams (1899, 27), who used to live in Tosamaganga, which is close to Iringa, at the time of Mutwa Mkwawa's persecution, wrote that all Wahehe children had to follow their fathers on war expeditions and carry their spears.

coast, where many of them died of illnesses as a result.[14] Sapi Mkwawa stayed on the coast and worked as a clerk for the German government. In 1905, the first year of the three-year Maji Maji War against German occupation, Governor Gustav Adolf von Götzen sent Sapi Mkwawa to Germany, in the custody of missionaries, in order to keep him away from Iringa. His caution reflected both the contemporary political situation, and German military and European geographical publications that described the Wahehe, and the Mkwawa family primarily, as the »tinderbox« of the colony.[15] These publications referred to the Wahehe as one of the colony's most dangerous »tribes« and thereby raised the prestige of the military forces that finally defeated them.

Sapi Mkwawa stayed in Bavaria until 1908. He lived at the colonial government's expense in St. Ottilien, and the government in Dar es Salaam also paid for all his travel costs. This was the arrangement reached by the abbot and Benedictine missionary, Norbert Weber, and the deputy governor, which was firstly put in place by the Catholic bishop of Dar es Salaam, Cassian Spiß.[16] Spiß was killed during the Maji Maji War. Weber, while stressing that he did not like the idea of bringing Africans to Europe, agreed to take the son of the famous Mutwa Mkwawa, who could be dangerous for the colony, to Bavaria. The abbot's opinion about keeping Africans out of Europe was part of the policy of non-assimilation that German colonizers preferred.[17] In 1905, after Spiß's

14 Different sources give information on these events: Letter from Sister Thekla in Dar es Salaam, *Heidenkind*, 9 Sept. 1898; Prince (1905, 164); and Archiv der Missionsbenediktiner St. Ottilien (in the following AStO), Peracta Tosa Maganga, 10 May 1898, Z.2.1.19.

15 Captain Nigmann to government in Dar es Salaam, 11 Nov. 1908, TNA, German Records, G 9/77, fol. 59. Nigmann was the leader of the military station in Iringa from 1903 to 1910 and published a much-cited work about the Wahehe (Nigmann 1908). For European geographic studies, see, for example, Thomson (1881, 229–38). For the Maji Maji War in German East Africa, see Giblin and Monson (2010).

16 Spiss to deputy Governor Haber, 28 July 1905, AStO, Z.1.04.

17 Weber to Rechenberg, Sept. 1908, AStO, Z.1.04; Lindner (2011, 309).

death, Catholic missionaries and German administrators shared the feeling that there was a threat of danger in Dar es Salaam. As such, Weber presumably approved of the policy of exile, and he himself took Sapi Mkwawa to St. Ottilien, the Benedictine's headquarters in Bavaria. Mkwawa's stay was supposed to be temporary. He was married when he was sent to Bavaria. The abbot and the governor discussed the wife and considered the possibilities for where she might stay. Weber then noted in his travel diary that she accompanied her husband to the port and that she was supposed to live with her sister until his return.[18] There is no evidence of what happened to her after this.

In short, missionaries and colonial administrators negotiated bringing Sapi Mkwawa out of his country. This was at first only an orally arranged transaction among German men over the life of a man from Uhehe, who they considered to be dangerous because of his strong attachments to his home region and family. Mkwawa's wife was excluded from any such transaction.[19] In terms of belonging, as a woman she was located outside colonial politics due to what was viewed as her socially marginal position.[20]

Weber sent Sapi Mkwawa back after two and a half years, saying in a letter to the governor in Dar es Salaam that Mkwawa was happy in Germany and highly interested in military matters. According to the abbot, he had asked to be allowed to remain for a longer time because he wanted to join the German army. Weber wrote that he had refused that

18 Norbert Weber, diary of 1905 (*Tagebuch*), 25 Nov. 1905, AStO, A.1.8.1; thanks to Fr. Tobias Moos, there is a transcript of the diary, which was written in old stenography. See also Governor Götzen to Weber, 22 Nov. 1905, AStO, Z 1.04.

19 Spiss to deputy Governor Haber, 28 July 1905, AStO, Z.1.04. Spiß suggested taking the wife along and housing her close to the monastery; however, in the letters that followed between Weber and Götzen, this was no longer considered.

20 For the argument that colonization was a predominantly male practice, see also Lawrance, Osborn, and Roberts (2006). This, of course, neither means that women were not colonizers nor that women were not a part of colonial practices (Wildenthal 2001).

wish and instead had always tried to keep Mkwawa away from big cities or military actions.[21] The letter shows Sapi Mkwawa's evidently still strong attachment to military practices. It can be assumed that military culture was part of his identification in terms of belonging.

There is little information about Sapi Mkwawa in Bavaria. He is absent from most of the records in St. Ottilien. The annalist of the monastery mentions him only once; at Christmas, 1905, he wrote that Mkwawa was one of the pupils and already felt at home.[22] At that time, the new pupil was 26, had just arrived after leaving his family in German East Africa, and found himself within a group of schoolboys. The practice of not mentioning Sapi Mkwawa further in the chronicles and school reports could have been a way of denying that he was entitled to belong there, especially because he was not one of the missionaries' conversion successes: according to his family, he was a Muslim.[23] The abbot's unwillingness to admit Africans to Europe, together with Mkwawa's sense of not belonging for reasons of religion, might be the reason for his exclusion from the missionary's archive.

After his return to East Africa in 1908, Mkwawa worked as an *Akida*, a leading administrator, for the German government on the coast and in the Dodoma area from 1912 onward.[24] After World War One, Mkwawa made his way home. The Italian monks of the Consolata missionary congregation, who took over the station close to Iringa after the German missionaries had to leave, mentioned Sapi Mkwawa in a letter to their

21 Weber to Rechenberg, Sept. 1908, AStO, Z.1.04.

22 Annalen, AStO, A.3.4.

23 Interview with Sapi Mkwawa's son, Msitapha Sapi, 21 Feb. 2014, Iringa. Ranger mentions Sapi Mkwawa using the name Saleh bin Mkwawa in 1919 and 1920. This highlights Mkwawa's own sense of belonging to Islam (Ranger 1975, 56–61). How and when Mkwawa became a Muslim is still an open question.

24 Beleg für die benediktinische Missionsaktivität vor und während des Ersten Weltkriegs, AStO, Z.2.4.05; Ranger (1975, 57).

predecessors in St. Ottilien in 1919.[25] They wrote that the local population chose Mkwawa as their leader. The letter reports that he lived at the Boma, which was still the center of the colonial administration. After almost 20 years of involuntary absence, he was back in his hometown and following in his father's footsteps as the leader of the local population.[26]

When the British officially implemented indirect rule, they installed Sapi Mkwawa as chief of the Iringa District. The British introduced indirect rule in their newly mandated territory to replace the former German system. According to their early descriptions, the system of the enemy in war was mainly based around Akidas who were—according to the British—very often alien to the area they administered. In 1922, the new European authorities in Tanganyika reported to the Council of the League of Nations:

> The continuation of the German system of employing Akidas, paid native officials, has been fairly successful in the administration of the coastal districts. Here the tribes lack tribal organization and the Akida is generally connected with the people by descent. In up-country districts where tribal cohesion is greater and where the Akida is often an alien, the policy has been to control the people through their own chieftains, replacing the Akida when possible by a headman of the people's choice. (Colonial Office 1922, 5)[27]

From this perspective, we can see that Sapi Mkwawa experienced both positions: he was Akida and then became chief. In his life course, he was a living example of the transformative process of colonial rule. One of

25 Mwanliti and Rugaruga to P. Severin et al., 12 June 1919, AStO, Z.1.02. Fr. Matthias Wetzel thankfully did the translation from Swahili to German. The information above that follows is taken from this letter.

26 Ranger (1975, 57) states that Sapi Mkwawa was given a subordinate position as »hut counter« in 1919. Brown and Hutt (1935, 43) mention Sapi Mkwawa's position as chief in 1920.

27 Ralph Austen (1967, 580) argued that this critique was only the conclusion of the first analysis of the German system; the British subsequently learned that the greater problem was missing manpower and a lack of control.

the leading figures in this process was Donald Charles Cameron (1872–1948). Cameron was governor of the Tanganyika territory from 1925 to 1931 after 17 years of colonial service in Nigeria. He brought his knowledge about indirect rule from Nigeria, where he became governor after his time in Tanganyika (Kirk-Greene 1991, 56; Cameron 1939; Hunter 2015, 20). Cameron presented the setting up of local government as follows: »We seek, then, the authority which according to tribal tradition and usage has in the past regulated the affairs of each unit of native society, which the people of the present generation are willing to recognize and obey« (1939, 97).[28] This statement exemplifies the process of »inventing traditions,« as Cameron shows how the British were looking for »practices« that »seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past« (Hobsbawm 1984, 1). The administrators needed a past to refer to in order to create stability through history. The Wahehe offered a history imagined as »tribal cohesion,« and Sapi Mkwawa was the first-born son of a prominent leader in the Wahehe's past. His belonging to a family made him the person the British were looking for. Hence, within both German colonialism and the British mandate, Mkwawa had an exceptional position because of the colonial politics of belonging.

A prominent figure within these politics was, as Anthony Kirk-Greene has emphasized, the district officer (DO). According to Kirk-Greene (2006, 13), the connection between the district officer and chief was pivotal, since »[t]he essence of indirect rule lay in the relationship between the DO [district officer] and the chief. The DO did not rule; the DO advised, the chief ruled, and the DO administered through the chief and his Native administration.«

In the British administrative organization, Sapi Mkwawa was chief for more than 20 years. To understand Mkwawa's role as chief it is helpful to consult a contemporary British publication. In 1935, Bruce Hutt, district

28 For Cameron's motivations in general terms, see Austen's (1967) article on questions of indirect rule and on leading British personalities in the Tanganyika territory.

officer of the Iringa District since 1932, and Gordon Brown, a leading British anthropologist, published *Anthropology in Action*. They wanted to offer an amalgamation of administration and science. In their book, they defined the role of the chief before colonization as »judge, maker and guardian of the law, the repository of wealth, dispenser of gifts, and leader in war« (Brown and Hutt 1935, 29). The most notable difference between this description and the position of the chief in the British administration was that the »native authority« was an integral part of the British system.

What did Mkwawa's work entail, and how did the district officer administer »through« him? Here I can give just a few examples. Reports from leading administrators of the Iringa District from 1930 to 1935 yield information about Sapi Mkwawa's work as chief. He travelled through the district and gave descriptions of the places that he visited, for example of the expected harvest. Furthermore, he installed sub-chiefs, who administered smaller unions within the district. According to the reports and other files, in this task he favored his own family when choosing men for administrative posts. Belonging was a large part of his own politics. In acting in this way, he was successful, in so far as most people seem to have accepted his personnel decisions, since the British administrators often failed to install their own and other's favorites in new posts.[29]

Another function of the chief was the collection of taxes. As with the installation of sub-chiefs, one can find evidence of the problems that arose with the British administrators. There is a letter where Sapi Mkwawa suggests a change to the tax system. He wanted to (re)install a flat tax for husbands with more than one wife. According to him, that would have been easier to collect. The British administrators rejected his proposal;

29 *Tanganyika*, Iringa monthly newspapers to Chief secretary (1930–1935), 11 June 1931, report about Mkwawa's travels, NA, FCO 141/177737; report about Mkwawa favoring his own family for sub-chief posts, 6 Jan. 1932, NA, FCO 141/177737. For Mkwawa's successful installation of family members who were widely accepted, see also, for example, Robinson to Provincial Commissioner, 20 Febr. 1940, TNA, Acc. 24, A2/32, Vol. I, fol. 61.

they did not see the need for a change.[30] This rejection is just one example of an unsuccessful attempt from the chief to gain influence on the administrative duties he had to carry out.

A striking example of how the British administration influenced politics on the ground was legislation. The chief signed regulations on the distribution of alcohol, among others, which was an oft-discussed topic during colonial rule.[31] Due to this, the British chose to implement unpopular rules »through« the chief. Acting as chief meant acting in between very different systems of belonging: British government, local people, and the chief's own family. With regard to Sapi Mkwawa, the position of chief was even more complex. According to Brown and Hutt, most people in Iringa disliked Mkwawa because he was a stranger to them; his long residence outside of Uhehe had »made his outlook too foreign for a tribal chief« (1935, 44). This did not correlate with the British aim to gain political stability through the continuity of tradition.

Sapi Mkwawa was awarded a silver King's Medal in 1936. The medal was a British reward for African chiefs (see the cover of this issue of the journal).[32] There is no hint in the files as to why Mkwawa received the medal, but it is reported that the British King George V bestowed it upon him on the occasion of his own birthday.[33] Thus, even if British administrators might not have especially supported the award, the medal had a performative meaning in terms of the British politics of belonging. While the archives reveal the troubles of everyday policy implementation,

30 *Tanganyika*, Iringa monthly newspapers to Chief Secretary (1930–1935), 4 Apr. 1934, NA, FCO 141/177737.

31 For example, native beer rules, 1940, TNA, Acc. 24, Iringa, A2/3, Native Affairs, fol. 45.

32 *Tanganyika Territory Gazette* XVII (36), Dar es Salaam, 23 June 1936. The King's Medal was inaugurated in 1919 by King George V; King's Medal for Native Chiefs (1919–1922), NA, MINT 20/651.

33 Native affairs, King's Medal for Native Chiefs and King's Certificate of Honours, TNA, Acc. 24, 42/34.

the medal symbolizes, perhaps precisely because of these everyday troubles, a successful collaboration between local and British governance.

To sum up, the position of chief during the British colonial period was fragile and contested.[34] It was characterized by competing local and familial systems of belonging, and was subject to the colonial politics of rule »through« the people. Reading one file from the archive very closely offers a more nuanced view of the conflict in question. Furthermore, the incident that took place in front of the Boma in 1940 shows how an individual subjected to colonization responded to the colonial politics of belonging with his own politics of belonging.

A colonial confrontation in 1940

There is no autobiographical description from Sapi Mkwawa about what happened in front of the Boma. There is an account of the scene in the archive in Dar es Salaam, but a more detailed version can be found in London. The British administrators had to write a report on any banishment or deportation (NA, CO 691/180). Reading »along the archival grain« the whole file in London offers a glimpse at the anxieties that Ranajit Guha so convincingly elaborated for British colonialists on the spot (1997).[35] They had to prove, testify to, or perform the justness of their decisions and seek the approval of otherwise potentially dangerous people on the ground. The file appears to follow the logic of an archive organized in chronological order, but it also happens to reflect the array of British professional hierarchies. At first, there are notes and letters from staff of the Colonial Office in London and from Governor Mark Young in Dar es Salaam. These are followed by a memorandum from Provincial Commissioner Cecil Mc Mahon, who did the final interview

34 There are, of course, more stories about the contested role of chiefs in the Tanganyika territory. See, for example, Lawrence Mbogoni's (2013, 42–56) research on Chief Makongoro (1894–1958) in the Musoma District.

35 I thank Richard Hoelzl for reminding me of Guha. Ann Laura Stoler claimed to analyze a colonial archive »along the archival grain« before reading against it (2002, 100). She then later offered a reading of Dutch colonial archives (Stoler 2009).

with the defendant and dismissed him. After this, we find a report from District Officer Innes Lowell Robinson, who made the decision on the dismissal, and finally there are several written statements from local (non-British) employees in Iringa. The report and statements are not dated; however, one statement refers to the incident as having happened »yesterday« (Patenani), so presumably the report and statements are from April 18.[36]

To come to the content, the »head messenger,« Tambatamba s/o Mubanga,[37] reported the following under oath to the British Assistant District Officer:

> At about 12 noon on the 17th April, I heard the bell ring and I found Chief Sapi standing at the door. He was very drunk. The District Officer told me to accompany Chief Sapi to his house in Iringa. I asked Chief Sapi to go with me. He refused and tears fell from his eyes. He said, »This is my country. I recognise no European whoever he may be. If the Germans take Dar es Salaam I will take Iringa.« (I understood this to mean that he would act as an ally of the Germans.)[38]

According to this statement, the chief was drunk and did not follow the advice he received to go home. Instead, he threatened the government and cried. The messenger went on to say that the chief spoke in Swahili, Hehe, the language of the Wahehe, and German.

Another clerk, Henry Paul, related what he had heard the chief say in Swahili, which was even more hostile toward the British: »*Ingekuwa kama Wadachi wamekamata Dar es Salaam nami ningejaribu kadiri niwesavyo kwa*

36 NA, CO 691/180/15.

37 S/o means »son of« and is included in some of the names. What is almost always noted is people's religion, which for Tambatamba was Christian, for Henry Paul Christian, and for Abdulrasul Patenani Islam. There is no information about the place of birth of the people that were interviewed, but they were probably all locals. For the different functions in administration and their meanings, see Lawrence, Osborn, and Roberts (2006).

38 NA CO 691/180/15.

Waingereza, ningejaribu kuwaua Waingereza walio hapa.«[39] This quotation articulates Mkwawa's threat that he would kill the British inhabitants of Iringa if the Germans took Dar es Salaam. A direct translation reveals a conditional threat in the subjunctive mood: »Had it been that Dar es Salaam had fallen under the Germans, I would have tried my best to eliminate the British found in this area.«[40] Henry Paul concluded his statement by saying that he was ashamed of the chief's behavior, but that the chief was very drunk. Another witness, Abdulrasul Patenani, put it on record that »He was very drunk. He answered me ›Verfluchthund‹ (filthy dog). *Hawa ni washenzi tu* (They are nothing but savages).«[41]

There are more statements in the archival file, taken under oath. Thus, according to several deponents, Sapi Mkwawa had threatened the British administration. However, most witnesses reported that he acted in a drunken state of mind, which could be understood as merely an excuse, especially since excessive consumption of alcohol was a much-debated issue in the colonial period, as I mentioned above. Just a few months earlier, Sapi Mkwawa had signed legal regulations for beer licenses.[42]

A detailed report was provided by District Officer Innes Lowell Robinson.[43] In his written perspective on the events of April 17, 1940, he emphasized that Sapi Mkwawa was »very intoxicated« and lurching about in front of the Boma. The chief

> at once became extremely abusive and said that he was not drunk and that if I wanted to quarrel with him he was ready to quarrel with

39 Ibid.

40 I thank Frank Edward for translating this sentence and Paul Kollman for making sure that I asked a native speaker for a more precise translation so that the subjunctive is transmitted properly.

41 NA CO 691 /180/15.

42 Native beer rules, 12.1.40, TNA, Acc. 24, Iringa, A2/3, Native Affairs, fol. 45.

43 Robinson was the 36-year-old son of a priest and had been educated at Cambridge. This was a common educational background for the leading administrators in Tanganyika (Kirk-Greene 1991, 308; 2006; Austen 1967).

> me. He then said that he was a Hehe and his father was Mkwawa, and that I knew what that meant and that he was not afraid of any European as the Hehe could fight.[44]

According to Robinson, Mkwawa had mentioned his father in order to highlight a genealogy of men who had the ability to »fight,« to which he belonged. Along with the recorded threat that he, Sapi Mkwawa, would kill the British in Iringa if the Germans reached the coast, Robinson provided the governor with serious reasons why he had to convict and sentence the chief. This decision was based on the »Deportation Ordinance« from 1921. According to the ordinance, it had to be proved under oath that the convict was »dangerous to peace and good order in any part of the Territory,« that he was »endeavouring to excite enmity between the people of the Territory and His Majesty« or, finally, that he was »intriguing against His Majesty's power and authority in the Territory.«[45]

The recorded testimonies were taken under oath; they report behavior that compromised »good order.« As this behavior is said to have taken place in front of the Boma, it could be assumed that Mkwawa was »endeavouring to excite enmity between« colonized and colonizers. As a result, Sapi Mkwawa and his family were exiled to Mwanza in the north of the mandate territory. He would never return; the British even refused a request for his corpse to be brought back after his death.[46] Today, his gravesite can be found in Kalenga, a small town close to Iringa.[47]

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44 NA, CO 691/180/15.

45 Deportation Legislation, NA, CO 691/174/13. The legal text is attached to a letter from 19 Oct. 1939.

46 Ex-Chief Sapi and his Family, Apr. 1951, TNA, Acc. 24, Iringa, A2/19, Native Affairs, without page.

47 At the present stage, I cannot say whether Sapi Mkwawa was reburied; I have just seen a gravestone with his name written on it. Kalenga was the capital of the region the famous Mutwa Mkwawa led. For more information about the family, provided by a member of the family, see http://www.mkwawa.com/ (accessed June 12, 2016).

The banishment does seem to be an extraordinary outcome, as the British themselves had appointed Sapi Mkwawa chief and later honoured him for his work. This biographical sketch has already offered some possible explanations. To be chief meant fulfilling a contested and difficult role between the colonial administration and the needs and demands of the local people. That was especially the case within the system of indirect rule, which happened to be a very local mode of ruling based on the making of local traditions and of »tribes.«

John Iliffe, Ralph Austen, and Terence Ranger were some of the first historians to emphasize that the British »created« tribes. Iliffe wrote that »The British wrongly believed that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; Tanganiykans created tribes to function within the colonial framework« (Iliffe 1979, 318; see also Austen 1967; and Ranger 1982). In current work, the political scientist Mahmood Mamdani considers the deconstructive power of the creation of tribes. He states that »unlike direct rule, indirect rule aimed at the reproduction of difference as custom, not its eradication as barbarism. Before managing difference, colonial power set about defining it« (2012, 44). Only »natives« could possess land and work in the administration, which, according to Mamdani (2012, 47–51), excluded migrants, divided societies into small entities and, therefore, disempowered the colonized people. As a consequence, the important element of indirect rule in this context is its attributes of differentiating, categorizing, and making forms of belonging.

The British government installed local chiefs from 1926 onward. When British administrators replaced the German system with their own, they tended to choose Africans who had resisted the Germans (Iliffe 1979, 330). Sapi Mkwawa's genealogy was promising in this regard. Returning to the report from District Officer Innes Lowell Robinson, it probably was not necessary for Sapi Mkwawa to remind Robinson who his father was, as this was one of the reasons why the British had chosen him to be chief. Be that as it may, it might nevertheless have been necessary for there was frequent rotation in most of the leading British administrative posts, and Robinson was a new district officer at the time; he had been in Tanganyika

since 1926, but he had arrived to take up his office in Iringa just the year before (Kirk-Greene 1991, 308).

In a nervous state of war in 1940, Sapi Mkwawa allied himself with the European enemy, at a time when Germany was the most serious threat to the British homeland. At least the British administrators chose to understand his speech in this regard. Mkwawa's son and grandson told me that he was fluent in German, disliked the British, and used to participate in military exercises with German settlers.[48] In 1919 and 1920, Ranger described Mkwawa as a leading promoter of *Beni ngoma*, a military dance that included German military positions and European clothing (1975, 5–6, 56–61; see also Michels 2009, 224–226). Therefore, it is likely that Sapi Mkwawa perceived himself first and foremost in terms of his sense of belonging to family, Uhehe, and a military culture. The region of Uhehe was, in Sapi Mkwawa's account, Wahehe land. At the same time, he had a colonial biography that included journeys to Rome with the abbot and Bavaria, where he lived for more than two years. Afterward, he was Akida in several areas of German East Africa. Hence, he crossed a lot of national borders in Europe, as well as colonial administrations and district borders in East Africa.

Mkwawa could look back upon more than 40 years of different European colonial practices. The British had tried to reinforce a system of belonging that was based on their interpretation of history and their construction of »tribes.« They installed Sapi Mkwawa as chief because his father had opposed German colonization. When they realized that Mkwawa's position as chief was weak because of his allegedly foreign behaviour, they felt free to dismiss him. The backdrop of war offered them an opportunity. The British administrators agreed with the sub-chiefs' recommendation to install Mkwawa's son Adam Sapi in his place. Therefore, Mkwawa's behaviour did not change the British way of constructing power through the »native« leaders from ruling families.

48 Interview with Is-Haka Mkwawa, 20 July 2015, Plymouth.

Concluding remarks

Sapi Mkwawa's life course reveals the deep entanglement of the histories of Germany, Great Britain, and Tanzania. German and British models of colonialism alike presented themselves as works in progress that tended to preserve the status quo that was in place before their occupation of East Africa. The Wahehe under Mutwa Mkwawa ruled Uhehe. European geographers originally characterized the Wahehe as the strongest »tribe« in that region, and German military research later strengthened that reputation. Both colonizing powers, Germany and, later, Britain, bolstered their power by constructing »tribes.« Sapi Mkwawa, the son of a major rebel against German colonialism, was hired by the German government and sent to Bavaria in order to keep him away from Uhehe. Afterward, the British installed him as chief to rule Uhehe. Both decisions were the result of thinking in terms of specific frameworks related to »native society,« »tribe,« and class, specifically in this case, his being a man from the region's ruling family. As this case study therefore shows, »belonging« in the early twentieth century had different implications than a hundred years before (see Levke Harders' article in this issue), at least outside Europe. The category of »tribe« was one of the major social frameworks in terms of belonging, and »native« was an attribute that included the category of race.

From a colonizer's perspective, ruling was organized through differentiation and categorization. To call this kind of rule a politics of belonging is just one, and surely a debatable, way of interpreting it. In the case of Sapi Mkwawa, I would like to argue, it helps to avoid making a distinction between a colonizer's agency and a colonized response to an act in terms of collaboration or resistance. Instead, we can see two corresponding, albeit competing, politics of belonging in an asymmetrical power relation, that is to say in a colonial situation.

The politics of belonging provides a framework for colonization, and colonizers could, at any time, use belonging—a shifting category for producing difference—to demarcate the colony. However, the politics of belonging were not exclusively colonizing politics, and they could result in change as well. In his agitation in front of the Boma, Mkwawa was a

principal actor within the »tensions of empire.« As for the making of diasporas (see Stefan Manz in this issue), doing colonialism was a process, which included conflicts and fighting as an integral part. When Mkwawa objected to the call to go home, he referred to himself as a Wahehe and a famous warrior's son. Thus, he acted out of the power of the politics of belonging, even if it did not benefit him directly. The intertwining of the organization of power in both the individual context of Mkwawa and that of the British administration may be one of the reasons for the family's political viability and achievements. After Sapi Mkwawa's banishment in 1940, the British administrators, working alongside local representatives, did not disempower the family but chose Mkwawa's son Adam Sapi Mkwawa to be chief. Mkwawa's recorded response to the installation of his son is revealing: »I am glad that my son, Adam, is taking my place. It is the same as if I were the Chief.«[49] Today Adam Sapi Mkwawa is a well-known figure in Tanzanian history as he became a member of the first parliament after independence.

49 Memorandum, NA CO 691/180/15.

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»Germans like to quarrel«

Conflict and belonging in German diasporic communities around 1900

Stefan Manz

Introduction

Nation-building processes always go hand in hand with discourses of inclusion and exclusion. Germany after 1871 was no exception. Socialists, Catholics, and Jews all experienced some degree of marginalization, and pertinent public discourses were largely male dominated. Yet another platform to discuss issues of national belonging and »not-belonging« were German emigrants. In the course of the nineteenth century, the term *Auswanderer* (emigrants) was increasingly replaced by the term *Auslandsdeutsche* (Germans abroad), emphasizing persisting ties with the metropole despite residence abroad. Emigrant communities were now represented as outposts of a »Greater German Empire,« tying in neatly with global power aspirations. In economic terms, they could act as promoters or customers of German industry and trade. In cultural terms, they could disseminate a supposedly superior Germanic culture and elevate the cultures of their host societies. In political terms, they could be used to legitimize territorial claims, especially in east central Europe. Recent scholarship has developed the term »diaspora construction« to encapsulate the process of bringing emigrants into the fold of the nation through globally operating organizations, means of communication and transportation, and a flourishing ethnic press, which was itself integrated into global information flows (Penny and Rinke 2015; Manz 2014; Conrad 2006).

Kaiser Wilhelm II himself projected expansionary aspirations into his distant countrymen by speaking of the diaspora as the »Greater German

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v7-i1-152 ISSN 2191-6721

Empire« *(Größeres Deutsches Reich)*. In his speech marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the German Empire, he remarked:

> The German Empire has become a world power. Everywhere, in the farthest corners of the globe, dwell thousands of our countrymen. It is your part, gentlemen, to help me in the task of linking firmly this greater German Empire with the smaller home. (Klaussmann 1903, 132)[1]

By investigating conflicts in German migrant communities around 1900, this article raises doubts whether these ideologically inspired ascriptions of diasporic bondage and homogeneity were a universally applicable reflection of a more complex reality. »The« German abroad did not exist. What did exist were extremely heterogeneous groups or individuals of different geographical regions, political convictions, religious beliefs and social backgrounds, all moving into, and within, very different contact zones. Despite their heterogeneity, however, recent scholarship has made important inroads into integrating *Auslandsdeutsche* into a more comprehensive and polycentric understanding of historical national narratives. In negotiating their relationship with the metropole, these communities entered into both inward and outward facing dialogues to test the »boundaries of Germanness« (O'Donnell, Bridentahl, and Reagin 2005; Penny and Rinke 2015). The following article shares the polycentric notion, but approaches it from different theoretical and methodological angles. In conceptualizing *Auslandsdeutsche* around 1900 as a diaspora (Manz 2014), it follows recent theorizations which attempt to define what constitutes a diaspora. Robin Cohen's (2001, 26) criteria include »a strong ethnic group consciousness« and »a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement.« For Gabriel Sheffer (2003, 9–10), diasporas are primarily social-political formations, best defined by ethno-national parameters, that maintain »regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homelands and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries.«

1 All translations by the author unless otherwise noted.

With these criteria in mind, utterances by, and about, *Auslandsdeutsche* assume a new quality as a transnational discursive platform to negotiate *aspects* of diasporic belonging. They were particularly telling when the discourse turned sour. Methodologically, therefore, the following article argues that instances of conflict are a useful but hitherto underexplored tool to bring to the surface the *boundaries* of diasporic belonging. The article takes internal conflicts from German communities around the world as a springboard to analyze public contestations of belonging to the respective local German community on the one hand, and to the imagined »Greater German Empire« on the other hand. Primary sources abound with gossip, aggressive bickering, and official complaints to authorities. As one German solicitor in Shanghai remarked, possibly with a pinch of self-interest: »*Der Deutsche zankt sich gern*« (Germans like to quarrel).[2] Case studies from southern Brazil, Glasgow, Cairo, and Shanghai will investigate themes such as politics, religion, class, language, and culture. These particular case studies were chosen for their wide geographic and thematic spread. The focus on public discourse analysis means that authorship profiles of primary sources are confined to the educated middle-classes, producing texts such as letters to authorities, reports and newspaper articles. The discourses studied took place not only *within* communities, but also between them, as well as with the metropole, all in multi-directional ways. Questions of belonging were discussed around the world using strikingly similar arguments and terminology. The article thus feeds into what Jürgen Osterhammel (2009, 1292), in his study of nineteenth century globalization, calls an »asymmetric densification of references.«

Cairo: Inclusion and exclusion

Religious life serves well to introduce the issue of inclusion and exclusion. Frictions could arise from clashes of interest, which were increasingly fought along national lines within multi-ethnic »German« communities. As a backdrop, however, it is first necessary to highlight the crucial

2 *Das Echo*, 5 June 1902.

importance of Protestant churches abroad within the ideological framework of a »Greater German Empire.« Negotiations of religious conflict and symbolism lay at the heart of national identity formation after German unification in 1871. Elites in the Prussia-led Reich polemicized fiercely against »fatherland-less« Catholic ultra-montanism and universalism, which allegedly stood against the essence of the »true« German spirit. Heinrich von Treitschke and other historians represented Martin Luther as a national hero who had tried to liberate his fatherland from Roman domination. Whilst Catholicism was condemned for spiritualism and superstition, Protestantism stood for modernity and rationalism. The ethnically homogeneous nation state was seen as part and parcel of this modernity (Eley 2003; Walkenhorst 2007). Increased emigration in connection with global political aspirations after 1871 meant that this nexus was replicated abroad. More and more diaspora congregations decided to become formally attached to one of the German *Landeskirchen* (regional churches), most notably the Prussian Church. The number of congregations affiliated with the Prussian Church rose from 21 in 1861 to over 100 in 1904 and about 200 in 1914. The total number of congregations abroad attached to one of the German state churches stood at 307 in 1914. Their statutes had been approved by the respective state church, they entertained substantial transnational correspondence, received some financial support, and were sent pastors who had been ordained in Germany. Examples of attached congregations include Blumenau in Brazil with 7,500 members in the prewar years, Cairo with 2,200 members, Cape Town with 1,800, Glasgow with 500, and Shanghai with 57 (Manz 2014, 176–227, 277–303).

The sources for Cairo enable us to take a closer look at internal frictions that were hardly in line with projections of diasporic unity. The congregation was founded in 1873 and closely connected to the hospital of the local Kaiserswerth Deaconesses. The small plot in the central Ismail quarter had been given to the General Consul of the North German Confederation in 1869 by Vice King Ismail Pascha for erecting a Protestant church and school. In 1906, a bitter dispute surrounding the church building opened up wider issues of national and transnational

belonging. Pastor Kahle and the German consul, Dr. Gumprecht, wanted to sell the plot, benefit from high real estate prices, and move to newly built modern premises on the outskirts of the city. Others in the congregation wanted to remain in the center of town. The conflict was widely reported in the German press and generated substantial correspondence between the congregation, the Foreign Office, and the Protestant church council in Berlin. Resisting the move, a retired General von Ploetz felt he had been »publicly insulted« in a congregation meeting by a consular representative, subsequently accusing him of being a »man with a questionable sense of honor« and the pastor of »immoral official actions.« Von Ploetz was, in turn, officially sued for libel. The German Foreign Office received a number of libelous letters in relation to the pastor.[3]

An important point of contention was whether non-German members should have a say in the move. The congregation was traditionally mixed, with Swiss, Dutch, and other Protestants being eligible to vote and admitted to vestry board positions. French-language Swiss Protestants were also allowed to use the church for their services. When it emerged that the non-German contingent tended to resist the move, some Germans closed ranks along national lines. Four congregation members protested to the Foreign Office about foreign elements participating and having a say in congregation matters:

> The German church and school are preservers of German ways, culture, and influence, and it is a *Ehrenpflicht* [duty of honor] to look after them. […] Only if we do not become internationalized, only if we are a firmly enclosed structure which draws its strong reserves from *Volkstum* itself will we be able to effectively keep up Protestant belief abroad through the German nature and to defend the German church and school in the Orient as a central fortress of the German Protestant creed. This will then act as a bulwark for

3 Ploetz to Foreign Office, 21 Apr. 1906, and Consul to Foreign Office, 1 June 1906, AA-PA R901/39638/129; several libelous letters and Consulate Cairo to Foreign Office, 4 Apr. 1907, AA-PA R901/39639; Consul Gumprecht to Evangelischer Oberkirchenrat, 3 July 1908, AA-PA R901/39639/72.

> dispersed co-religionists from other nationalities. […] The vote for non-German members is an abuse. […] We have legitimate fears that sooner or later the German Protestant church will be flooded with foreign elements.[4]

When a majority vote decided to restrict any voting to *Reichsdeutsche* only, the German-speaking Swiss demanded compensation and wrote to Berne about the matter. A number of non-German members left the congregation in protest. The plot was ultimately sold for four million marks. In a different part of the city, a community center developed which was described as territorial demarcation by the *Kölnische Zeitung*, a newspaper close to the foreign office: »With admiration and pride we see new buildings […] looking like a whole city quarter consisting of school, church, vicarage, Kindergarten, and consulate.«[5] The newspaper also reveled in the fact that the church and school would now be just as representative as those of the French, and that the French press criticized this new German presence as being too ostentatious.[6] *Der Montag* found that the protest of the French and German-speaking Swiss members derived from an erroneous interpretation of the law that the Protestant church

4 AA-PA R901/39638/134–40, no date; »Deutsche Kirche und Schule sind Träger deutschen Wesens, deutscher Kultur und deutschen Einflusses. Es ist eine Ehrenpflicht, sie zu pflegen. […] Nur dann, wenn wir nicht internationalisiert sind, wenn wir ein fest geschlossenes Gefüge sind, das sich seine starken Reserven im deutschen Volkstum selbst holt, werden wir imstande sein, durch das deutsche Wesen den evangelischen Glauben wirksam im Auslande aufrecht zu halten und die deutsche Kirche und Schule im Orient als eine Hochburg deutschen evangelischen Glaubensbekenntnisses zu verteidigen, die dann einen Stützpunkt für die in der Zerstreuung lebenden Glaubensgenossen fremder Nationalitäten sein wird. […] Das Stimmrecht nichtdeutscher Mitglieder der Kirchengemeinde ist ein Abusus, der gegen die Tendenz und den Inhalt der Statuten verstößt. […] läßt sich in dem internationalen Egypten die Befürchtung nicht zurückweisen, dass doch über kurz oder lang die deutsch-evangelische Kirche mit fremdländischen Elementen überflutet wird.«

5 *Kölnische Zeitung*, 20 Mar. 1908; also 25 Apr. 1908.

6 Ibid., 26 Jan. 1907.

was not *reichsdeutsch*, but international.[7] Whatever the agenda behind each of these players, it becomes clear that national fault-lines were now part of the fabric of migrant communities, and that their negotiation was conducted within a transnational space which included Cairo, Germany, Switzerland, and France.

Southern Brazil: Politics and religion

Within Brazil, the southern federal states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina were the main magnets for nineteenth century German immigrants and hosted several hundred thousand by 1914. The town of Blumenau was founded in 1850 by a pharmacist from Braunschweig, Dr. Hermann Blumenau, and soon developed as an urban administrative center for the surrounding rural farm holdings. It also attracted artisans, small industrialists, merchants, and generally a bourgeois middle-class. This, in turn, led to a public infrastructure with German schools, associations, churches, newspapers, theater groups and choirs, as well as a hospital and a library (Schulze 2016; Frotscher Kramer 2008). Blumenau was not a self-contained, isolated town within an impenetrable jungle environment, but was involved in a global exchange of information, mirroring political cleavages in the metropole and elsewhere. One example was the conflict surrounding the local general practitioner, Dr. Hugo Gensch. Before coming to Blumenau in the 1880s, Gensch had practiced medicine in Frankfurt. Due to his social democratic affinities he had clashed with the authorities, spending a short time in prison. He also made a point of treating prostitutes for venereal diseases, which did not particularly please the authorities. Gensch left for Blumenau but did not leave his political convictions behind. He quickly joined the editorial board of the *Blumenauer Zeitung*, which was critical of the political course of the Kaiserreich. In contrast, the other local newspaper, the *Urwaldsbote*, was staunchly nationalist. In 1902, a press war between the two erupted. The *Urwaldsbote* accused Gensch of launching »disgraceful attacks against local *Deutschtum* and the German government.«[8] The *Blumenauer Zeitung*,

7 *Der Montag*, 11 Feb. 1907; similarly, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 27 Jan. 1907.

8 *Urwaldsbote*, 2 Feb. 1902.

in turn, defended Gensch as an »upright social democrat« and an »enemy of the monarchy and the self-governing regime of his fatherland,« which was »autocratic, despotic and intolerant.«[9]

This was countered by a smear campaign which became more and more personal. It was led by a local merchant and honorary German consul, Gustav Salinger. He wrote to the police authority in Frankfurt, which happily supplied details of Gensch's former life. Particulars about his imprisonment and his contact with prostitutes were disseminated in the community through the *Urwaldsbote*. The paper depicted Gensch as an »intriguer and drunkard who hangs around in obscure bars and preaches his wisdom to the lowest elements, drinking schnapps and beer.«[10] Bismarck's vision of the homogenous nation state had excluded social democrats as »vaterlandslose Gesellen« (fellows without a fatherland), not least because they had argued against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. In the same vein, the *Urwaldsbote* recommended to Dr. Gensch that he should »look for a new sphere of activity outside Blumenau.«[11] Criteria of belonging to the local migrant community as well as to the »Greater German Empire« were highly contested, both in the metropole and abroad.

This kind of contestation does not square up with the armchair fantasies produced in and for the metropole. Settlement areas abroad were represented as spaces where political differences would disappear. The diaspora situation would heal those political rifts that were constitutive of the Reich itself—and Brazil was seen as a particularly suitable space to make this happen. The *Handbuch des Deutschtums im Auslande* (Handbook for Germandom Abroad), for example, explained that »Blumenau has the same character as a medium-sized German town in the countryside. […]

9 *Blumenauer Zeitung*, 22 Feb. 1902.

10 Consul Salinger, Blumenau, to Imperial General Consul von Zimmerer, Florianopolis, 4 Apr. 1902, AA-PA R141741; »Ränkeschmied und Trunkenbold, der sich in den obscursten Kneipen herumtreibt und dort bei Schnaps und Bier den niedrigsten Elementen seine Weisheit predigt.«

11 *Urwaldsbote*, 2 Feb. 1902.

The whole atmosphere is one of peaceful comfort.«[12] Another text, by Robert Gernhard, a travel writer, maintained that those who arrived in Brazil as »fanatical Social Democrats« soon shed their »sectarianism« and ceased to be Social Democrats.[13] The episode surrounding Gensch is a poignant example of reality on the ground not matching, in political terms, such emigrationist fantasies. This picture is corroborated by wider studies on, for example, German anarchists in New York or socialists in Australia, who remained politically active after emigration (Goyens 2007; Bonnell 2013).

The tendency of theorizations to homogenize diasporas in terms of their social make-up has recently, and rightly, been critically reviewed. Focusing upon internal differences does not question the applicability of the concept to a given ethno-national group, but rather generates a more comprehensive and differentiated picture. Parreñas and Siu (2007, 7), for example, call for an appreciation of race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class as dividing markers within diasporic groups. In what follows, I argue that religion should also be considered within this context. By this I mean not only confessional splits (Catholic–Protestant), but also denominational differences within Protestantism itself. These call into question Wilhelmine constructions of Germans abroad as a unified block—but do not preclude the application of the diaspora concept. They also help to reflect on whether attempts by Reich institutions and organizations to link emigrants more closely to Germany were in fact successful. The Brazilian example shows that any answer must be qualified. A compilation from 1908 lists a total of ninety-five Protestant congregations, of which thirty-three were attached to the Prussian Church, nine to the *Lutherischer Gotteskasten*, twelve to the *Barmer Verein* (seven of them jointly with the Prussian Church) and thirteen to the North American Missouri Synod. Eighteen were not attached to any synod or organization outside Brazil (Bussmann 1908,

12 »Blumenau trägt den Charakter einer ländlichen deutschen Mittelstadt […] Es herrscht im Ganzen eine friedliche Gemütlichkeit.« (Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein 1904, 141–42)

13 Quoted in Conrad (2006, 275).

412–17). Just within the Protestant sector, we therefore have a five-fold split caused by different denominations or desired levels of independence. Catholicism and Judaism would, of course, make up the sixth and seventh religious splits.

The question of external attachment caused a split not just *between* but also *within* congregations. There was friction between those who had settled in Brazil long ago and were often naturalized (*Deutsch-Brasilianer*), and those who had arrived more recently (*Reichsdeutsche*). The former were concerned about their congregations' autonomy and also about their standing within the Luso-Brazilian host society, which tended to associate German institutions with aggressive Reich nationalism (Dreher 1978, 94; Luebke 1999, 110–22). One church official from Münster, D. Zöllner, after a lengthy visitation to Brazilian congregations in 1910, found it »fatal when theologians, teachers or young merchants who have just arrived from Germany immediately act as the saviors of Germanness, proclaiming pan-German ideas in their extreme form.« For example they would say about community matters »it is about time you came under proper Prussian command« and on congregational matters, »The Prussian Church Council should have a say here and interfere in a way that your senses would leave you.« Zöllner mentioned the case of former pastor turned school director and prolific public speaker Herr Meyer in Porto Alegre, »who is guided by the ideal of Pan-Germanism in its sharpest form« and who approached church representatives with utterances such as: »I would rather march after the sounds of a Prussian regimental band than after those of your Pan's pipe.« *Deutsch-Brasilianer* often felt repelled by this tone, regarded Reich-supported institutions with suspicion and »feared the Prussian spiked helmet.«[14]

14 Travel inspection report, Generalsuperintendent D. Zöllner (Münster), Evangelische Gemeinden in Brasilien, 1910, EZA 5/2174. »Für besonders fatal halte ich es, wenn eben von Deutschland gekommene Theologen oder Lehrer oder auch jüngere Kaufleute nun sofort in der Weise als Retter des Deutschtums auftreten wollen, dass sie alldeutsche Ideen in extremer Fassung proklamieren. […] Wenn nun der Reichsdeutsche ihm bei jeder Gelegenheit sagt, ›Ihr solltet einmal unter ein richtiges preussisches Kommando kommen, das thäte euch not, oder auf die kirchlichen

Brazil was contested territory when it came to religious authority, and this was always linked to questions of national attachment. The North American Lutheran Missouri Synod entertained active missionary activity and had 13 affiliated congregations in Brazil, mostly in the Rio Grande do Sul province. For visiting Prussian church officials such as Pastor Martin Braunschweig, this posed a threat to the »spiritual cohesion between colony and *Heimat*.« If Berlin did not provide more support, he wrote, »an acute Americanization of most of the Riograndensian *Deutschtum* is, in my opinion, unavoidable.«[15] For Consul Karl Walter, attachment to the Prussian Church was crucial to strengthen »the German-Protestant congregations against the intrusion of the Lutherans of the North American Missouri-Synod with its hostile propaganda directed against Germanness.«[16] The threat was therefore perceived to be a two-fold one: firstly of assimilation into the culturally »inferior« Luso-Brazilian society (*Verbrasilianerung*), and secondly, of Americanization through the Missouri Synod. Apart from the Missouri Synod, the Lutheran *Gotteskasten* posed a further threat to desired Protestant and ethno-national unity. Its pastors had received missionary (rather than academic) training

Verhältnisse angewandt: Ja hier müsste einmal der preussische evangelische Oberkirchenrat zu sagen haben, der sollte wohl dazwischen fahren, dass euch Hören und Sehen verginge‹ und dergleichen, dann kann man sich die Wirkung auf die Deutsch-Brasilianer vorstellen. […] [Für Meyer] ist das Alldeutschtum in schärfster Prägung das Ideal geworden. […] ›Ich marschiere lieber nach den Klängen der preussischen Regimentsmusik als nach den Tönen Ihrer Hirtenflöte.‹ […] fürchtet man sich vor der preussischen ›Pickelhaube.‹«

15 Travel report Braunschweig, EZA 5/2173; »[…] des geistigen Zusammenhanges zwischen Kolonie und Heimat, der durch den Einbruch der Missourisynode ernstlich gefährdet ist. […] ist eine akute Amerikanisierung des größten Teiles des Riograndenser Deutschtums m. E. unvermeidlich.«

16 Consul Walter to Evangelischer Oberkirchenrat, 30 Oct. 1905, EZA 5/311/213–14; »[…] ist der Anschluss im Interesse der Stärkung der deutsch-evangelischen Gemeinden gegenüber dem Andringen der Lutheraner der nordamerikanischen Missouri-Synode mit ihrer dem Deutschtum feindseligen Propaganda befürwortet worden.«

and were more concerned with the worldwide support of Lutheranism than with national issues. This approach, in combination with intrusion into what was perceived to be Prussian church territory, led to conflicts (Besier 1994, 475–76; Dreher 1978, 161–66). Reports draw the picture of a battleground of denominations, especially the »fight« (*Kampf*) in St Catharina province. The *Gotteskasten* had »conquered« (*erobert*) Itoupava, »strengthened its position« (*sich festgesetzt*) in Indayal and »tried to seize« (*hinübergegriffen*) Hansa-Harmonia. The local pastor in Itoupava, Gabler, complained about the rival *Gotteskasten* pastor, Rösler, who »incites his people […], lies and slanders as he pleases.«[17] As visiting church official Martin Braunschweig observed, »in a national sense it cannot be deplored enough that Protestant Germanness has been split by the intrusion of the *Lutherische Gotteskasten*.«[18]

The Brazilian case study shows that attempts by the German Protestant churches to reach out to emigrants and bind them closer to the Reich could have counterproductive effects. The increased global grip did not necessarily lead to denominational, confessional and ethno-national unity but, on the contrary, carried intra-Protestant fault lines and frictions into communities abroad. The diaspora resembled the situation in Germany, and the crux lay in the merging of Protestantism and nationalism. These two entities were not separable elements within a spectrum but rather complemented each other. As Walser Smith remarks, political Protestantism within Germany »harbored the potential for radical nationalism,« and as such, »it neither unified nor homogenized but rather divided and aggravated tensions within the nation« (Walser Smith 1995, 236–38). This analytical framework can legitimately be taken beyond the borders of Imperial Germany.

17 Pastor Gabler (Itoupava) to Evangelischer Oberkirchenrat, 19 Mar. 1913, EZA 5/2048/195; »[…] dass er seine Leute beständig verhetzt. […] Er lügt und verleumdet munter darauf los.«

18 Travel report Braunschweig, EZA 5/2173/52–54; »In nationaler Beziehung kann es nicht genug beklagt werden, dass das evangelische Deutschtum dieses Staates vor elf Jahren durch das Eindringen des lutherischen Gotteskastens gespalten worden ist.«

Glasgow and class

In addition to politics and religion, the issue of class was another field of idealized diaspora construction: social differences dividing Germany itself would be neutralized in the diaspora. The latter was represented as a laboratory of an ideal nation state without inherent societal rifts. Glasgow is a representative example where associational life was, in actual fact, clearly separated by class. According to census figures, 1053 Germans lived in Britain's »Second City« in 1901. Trade and commerce was the most important occupational sector, both in terms of numbers and diasporic activity. Other occupations included teachers, musicians, brewers, restaurateurs, hairdressers, miners, butchers, and a range of craftsmen such as watchmakers and bottle makers. Whilst the *Deutscher Verein* catered to the bourgeois middle-classes, the *Deutscher Klub* was a meeting point for artisans, shopkeepers, and skilled workers (Manz 2003). The development of Protestant congregational life was a prism of class negotiation and conflict. During the 1880s, a former engineer turned pastor, Hanns Geyer, built up a congregation both for German transmigrants on their way to America, as well as the local migrant community. The United Free Church in Scotland praised the »continued and increasing success of his mission labors.«[19] His services were attended by up to 80 churchgoers. In 1884, he was also employed as a seamen's missionary for Glasgow by the newly founded General Committee for German Seamen and Emigrant Mission in Scotland.[20]

In the long run, however, Geyer failed to gather support from the wealthier middle classes, crucially the ethnic leaders. He mainly appealed to the working class segment, and class reservations can be detected behind negative comments. Pastor Wagner-Groben from Edinburgh reported to Berlin that he had heard »discouraging judgments from very respectable people« about Geyer's abilities and character, and merchant Carl H. Römmele came to the conclusion that Glasgow needed »a missionary or

19 United Presbyterian Missionary Record, 1 Oct. 1884, 515.

20 Hanns Geyer to Pastor Harms, 4 Aug. 1884, EZA 5/1824/30–31.

preacher for the poor, and one for the better classes.«[21] Indeed, in 1898 a second congregation was founded with a clear agenda of class differentiation. In the words of timber merchant and leading ethnic figurehead Johannes N. Kiep, this was »established at the initiative of the better German circles,«[22] and for some time it had the reputation of being a »church for the rich.«[23] Although over the years it managed to reach out to artisans and the working classes, positions of power remained firmly in the hands of the middle classes. In a sample year, 1908, only three of the 18 parish councilors were artisans. No artisan was ever represented in the executive council, which consisted of six men. Subscriptions were another indicator of class differentiation. In 1905 for example, the congregation had 463 members. Forty per cent of all annual contributions, or £90, came from just four individuals, and 60 per cent came from 14 individuals. All of them were merchants and/or businessmen.[24] The relationship with Hanns Geyer's congregation remained tense. As one visitation report put it, »quarrels arose which did not do honor to the German reputation abroad and which very much impeded upon the religious life amongst the Germans.«[25] Middle-class voices continued to refer to former engineer Hanns Geyer as a »locksmith.«

The new congregation depended financially on a small group of merchants, and the latter used their position to exercise power. This led to frictions

21 Pastor Wagner-Groben to Pastor Harms, 30 Jan. 1885, EZA 5/1824/32–33; Carl H. Römmele to Pastor Harms, 10 Mar. 1886, EZA 5/1824/37; »Einen Missionar oder Prediger […] für Arme und einen für besser Situirte.«

22 Johannes N. Kiep to Oberkirchenrat Berlin, 12 Nov. 1902, EZA 5/1823/89; »[…] von den hiesigen besseren deutschen Kreisen in's Leben gerufen.«

23 Annual Report German Protestant Congregation Glasgow 1901, EZA 5/1823/70; »Kirche der Reichen.«

24 Calculated from Congregational Annual Reports in EZA 5/1823.

25 Dr. Witz-Oberlin to Evangelischer Oberkirchenrat, EZA 5/1824/1–2; »Streitigkeiten entstanden, die dem deutschen Namen im Ausland nicht zur Ehre gereichten und das evangelische Leben unter den Deutschen arg gefährdet haben.«

with the pastors, who represented, together with the honorary consul, the second position within the migrant community which was sanctioned by the German Empire. They were ordained in Germany and sent by the Prussian Protestant Church Council, but nevertheless had to assert their position vis-à-vis the influential group of merchants. In 1902, for example, Pastor Reinhard Münchmeyer was approached from Dundee to hold regular services and help build up a congregation there. Consul Kiep intervened, threatened to withdraw his financial support, and ultimately managed to cut down Münchmeyer's engagement in Dundee. During the negotiations, he rejected a possible vote among congregation members with the following reasoning:

> Simple majority decisions do not generate sensible results. It does not suffice to simply count the votes, they also have to be weighed. You know I have lived here for 35 years and am perhaps the best person to judge the circumstances. […] The way in which Pastor Münchmeyer dealt with the situation sadly cannot be excused.[26]

Notwithstanding these frictions, the new congregation was represented as a node within the »Greater German Empire.« Importantly, this happened at both ends. For the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the church was a »constant reminder for the 1,500 Germans in Glasgow to stick firmly and faithfully to their *Deutschtum* and to each other amongst a foreign people.«[27] And the main congregation donor in Glasgow, Johannes N. Kiep, stressed that »the German church congregations are destined to play a larger role for faithful

26 Kiep to Harms, 20 Nov. 1902, TH 8662/353, 11; »…Bei einfachen Mehrheitsbeschlüssen kommt nichts heraus. Die Stimmen dürfen nicht einfach gezählt, sondern müssen auch gewogen werden. Sie wissen, ich lebe hier seit 35 Jahren und kann die Verhältnisse doch vielleicht am besten beurteilen. […] Die Art und Weise des Vorgehens des Herrn Pastor Münchmeyer ist leider nicht zu entschuldigen.«

27 *Kölnische Zeitung*, 25 June 1909; »Die künftige Kirche gilt den 1500 Deutschen in Glasgow als ein stetes Mahnzeichen, festzuhalten an ihrem Deutschtum […] und treu zu einander zu stehen unter dem fremden Volke.«

adherence to the fatherland and German ways amongst compatriots.«[28] Constructions of diasporic belonging were at work abroad just as they were within the Reich.

China: Language and schooling

German romanticists such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) had developed the idea that the prime marker of belonging to a *Volk* was a common language, rather than a geographically demarcated territory or legalistic nationality. Throughout the nineteenth century—and indeed until 1945—his ideas were politicized and underpinned demands that territories where German-speakers lived or settled were by definition German. The linguistic de-territorialization of national belonging was soon projected onto emigrants. Theirs was an unalterable belonging to a cultural community which was above all defined by language: whoever spoke German, was German. Language preservation as colonialist practice was therefore of crucial importance in order to perpetuate the (trans-)national community (Manz 2014, 227–60).

After a century of mass emigration, around 5,000 German schools abroad with 360,000 pupils existed on the eve of the First World War (Werner 1988, 33). Their organization differed widely. Some of them offered full-time education, others only some Saturday morning instruction. Most were only primary schools, but from the 1890s secondary education became more widely available. There was often a symbiosis with existing congregations, with pastors or priests taking a lead role in pedagogical and organizational management. Through its Department for German Schools Abroad (*Schulreferat*), the German Foreign Office greatly expanded its engagement for *Auslandsschulen* after unification in 1871, and then in an accelerated way during the period of High Imperialism from 1890 onward. By 1914, the Foreign Office supported around 900 schools abroad

28 *Gemeindebote—Monatsblatt der Deutschen Evangelischen Gemeinden Großbritanniens* XII/8, Apr. 1906, 59, 62; »[…] daß die deutschen Kirchgemeinenden berufen sind, für das Wohlbefinden, sowie für das treue Halten am Vaterlande und an deutscher Art unter ihren Landsleuten eine größere Rolle zu spielen, als in früheren Zeiten.«

with 56,000 pupils. Its *Schulreferat* was headed by Dr. Franz Schmidt who, in a straightforward Herderian sense but with the added category of race, contended that »it is in the language, in the way it has developed and in linguistic expressions, that the spirit of the *Volk* reveals itself, its racial nature and its historical character« (Schmidt 1903, 15). In colonialist fashion, schools abroad were now molded into »fortresses of Germandom« and »guardians of the nation« in foreign lands (Judson 2006).

One example was the German School in Shanghai. The school was founded in 1895 by pastor Hackmann, the local missionary of the General Evangelical-Protestant Missionary Society (*Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantischer Missionsverein*), and immediately interpreted by the metropolitan press as »a bulwark for the preservation and fostering of the German language and spirit in the Far East.«[29] It was first named *Bismarck Schule* in order to honor the 80th birthday of the former Reich Chancellor, but renamed into *Kaiser Wilhelm Schule* when it moved into new premises in 1911. The institution comprised a pre-school *Kindergarten*, a primary school, and a secondary five year *Realschule* (middle school). Annual support from the Reich rose from 3,000 Marks in the founding year to 7,500 Marks in 1913. Student numbers rose continuously from 22 to 112 during the same period.[30]

Two instances of internal conflict shed some light on diasporic self-perception. The first of these can be typologically linked to the earlier example of national exclusiveness in Cairo. In Shanghai, demarcation from the non-German environment was clearly defined. Only a maximum of twenty per cent of children from other nationalities were admitted in order to preserve the German character of the school. Chinese children or those from German-Chinese mixed marriages were categorically ex-

29 *Vossische Zeitung*, 23 Jan. 1896; »Ein Bollwerk zur Erhaltung und Förderung deutscher Sprache und Gesinnung im Fernen Osten.« Also see *National Zeitung*, 21 May 1895.

30 Imperial German General Consulate for China, Shanghai, to Foreign Office, 10 May 1900, BAB 901/38906; Annual Report Kaiser Wilhelm Schule 1913/14, courtesy German School Shanghai; *Ostasiatischer Lloyd*, 5 May 1905.

cluded. Pastor Ruhmer, school director in 1906–1907, found it important that »only pure white children have access to our institute, whilst all *Mischlingskinder* (mixed children), including those of German men and Chinese women are rejected.« This would preserve the »good, real German spirit« of the school.[31]

Pragmatic voices disagreed. The *Schlesische Zeitung* reported that the policy was under discussion because knowledge of the German language amongst the Chinese and mixed nationality children was beneficial for German trade.[32] The *Tägliche Rundschau* suggested a third way. It wholeheartedly agreed that the school should remain »white« as a »protective wall of our national cultural heritage.« It found the mixing (*Vermischung*) of German fathers and Chinese mothers displeasing, but nevertheless pondered that one should at least draw advantages from this reality and establish designated *Mischlingsschulen*. The fact that English schools had an open-door policy meant that these bilingual children were currently turned into pioneers of English, instead of German, trade.[33] Pragmatism, then, stood at the center of a fourth strand of argumentation. In his book on *Germany and China*, Hamburg merchant Julius Kähler argued that dissemination of the German language had only limited benefits for German engagement in China. Rather, he asserted, it would be far more beneficial if Germans felt the need to learn Chinese in order to conduct direct business. According to Kähler, one German with Chinese proficiency was worth more than 500 German-speaking Chinese (Kähler 1914, 93–94).

The issue of language and schooling can thus be integrated into the far wider discourse on Germany's engagement with China around 1900. The

31 Annual Report German School Shanghai 1906/07, BAB 901/38908; Imperial German General Consulate for China, Shanghai, to Foreign Office, BAB 901/38906, 10 May 1900; *National Zeitung*, 25 Dec. 1903; »Nur rein weisse Kinder haben Zutritt zu unserem Institut, während alle Mischlingskinder, auch solche von Deutschen und Chinesinnen zurückgewiesen werden. […] der gute, echtdeutsche Geist.«

32 *Schlesische Zeitung*, 20 Mar. 1907.

33 *Tägliche Rundschau*, 9 Feb. 1906.

country's vast resources and economic potential generated a flood of publications on how to exploit this potential. Racism was an integral part of this discourse, especially when interwoven with fears of the »Yellow Danger« of a potentially re-emerging economy. These ideas spread throughout Europe during the 1890s. China was represented as the Other that was incompatible with Western European culture. Through its dynamism, it could potentially threaten the cultural and economic balance of the Occident. Racial mixing between »white« and »yellow« was seen as particularly fatal. This fear was made concrete for the German public in the wake of discussions to »import« Chinese *Kulis* (coolies) as agricultural workers into Eastern Prussia. The nationalist writer Stefan von Kotze, for example, expressed fears of a »physically and morally degenerated mixed Volk. [The Chinese] is as alien to us as a Martian, and if he mixes with us we will, as a race, inevitably draw the short straw.«[34]

Perception patterns of this kind prevented German schools in China from exploiting their local advantage and producing graduates who could easily move and mediate between the two cultures. This also came to the fore in the curriculum, which strictly followed that of a German *Realschule*. Foreign languages included English and French, but not Mandarin. The detailed subject contents and exam questions in the schools' annual reports are more or less devoid of Asian themes, except for occasional references in geography lessons. The history curriculum worked its way from Western Antiquity to »Prussian and German History from 1740–1871.«[35] The second generation diaspora was to remain »pure,« both in race and in spirit. Again, pragmatic voices realized that this was not in line with the requirements of an integrating world economy. The *Ostasiatischer Lloyd*, commenting on the school in Tsingtao, expressed dissatisfaction

34 Conrad (2006, 192); »[…] ein physisch und moralisch verkommenes Mischvolk […]. [Der Chinese ist] uns fremd wie ein Marsbewohner, und […] wenn er sich mit uns mischt, ziehen wir als Rasse den kürzeren«; see also ibid., 168–228. For Chinese racism, however, see Osterhammel (2009, 1226–28).

35 Annual Reports, German School Shanghai, 1911/12 and 1913/14, courtesy German School Shanghai.

with its approach. The business newspaper found it »desirable that our youth should be made familiar with the country and its population in a more thorough way than has hitherto been the case. They should learn to overcome the prejudices against the native population which are widespread almost everywhere, and they should systematically be prepared for exchange with the population. This will be of utmost use later on once our pupils enter professional life.«[36] The two opposing views were guided by the same question: How can the German Empire make the best economic use of its second generation diaspora? Pedagogues in the Foreign Office found that the way ahead was to replicate as much »Germanness« as possible abroad in order to create long-term spiritual and intellectual attachment to the metropole. The teachers selected for service abroad had to subscribe to this principle. Some merchant circles abroad, in contrast, expressed a more pragmatic approach which accepted hybridity not only as a fact of diasporic life, but also as an asset in conducting international business and found schools should adapt accordingly.

German institutions in Shanghai were not only discursively linked to the metropole, but also to other diasporic locations, both within China and elsewhere. These translocal contacts were not always harmonious, revealing cracks in the image of an allegedly unified diaspora. The scramble for metropolitan resources, especially between Shanghai and the larger protectorate school in Tsingtao, could be a trigger for frictions. The *Berliner Tageblatt* complained that Reich contributions to the school building in Tsingtao amounted to 250,000 marks, plus regular annual contributions of 65,000. This was in contrast to Shanghai, where the school operated with considerably smaller sums. The *Reichstag* was asked to be more careful in its distribution of resources.[37] Direct frictions between the two

36 *Ostasiatischer Lloyd*, 5 May 1905; »[…] erwünscht, dass die Jugend mit dem Lande und seiner Bevölkerung in gründlicherer Weise, als bisher, bekanntgemacht wird und die heute fast überall bestehenden Vorurteile gegen die einheimische Bevölkerung überwinden lernt und sich systematisch auf einen Verkehr mit ihr vorbereitet, der beim Eintritt der Schüler in das Erwerbsleben diesen später nur vom allergrößten Nutzen sein kann.«

37 *Berliner Tageblatt*, 25 Nov. 1907.

schools arose after Pastor Ruhmer (Shanghai) had visited Tsingtao and published his impressions in a missionary journal. With subtle criticism he described the millions which had gone into infrastructure and colonial buildings in the protectorate, including the school. His own school in Shanghai, in contrast, had to make do with fewer resources from Berlin and was a mostly financed by the local merchant community (Ruhmer 1907). The headmaster of the school in Tsingtao, Dr. Dönitz, wrote a confrontational reply that aimed to question the significance and quality of the Shanghai school, and Ruhmer's expertise in particular. Publication of Dönitz' text could only be prevented after Ruhmer's official correction.[38]

Ruptures also arose across continents. *Das Echo*, a newspaper expressing the views of *Auslandsdeutsche*, published an article by Maximilian Hopf from Buenos Aires. After reading about Shanghai, he questioned whether the German community there spent its money efficiently, and stated that the school in Buenos Aires received less money per child from Berlin.[39] Taken together with earlier evidence on other locations, the sources on China confirm that diasporic conflicts were played out not only within migrant communities, but also at the translocal and transnational levels. Easy ways of gathering information about other communities across the world in combination with relatively fast communication channels facilitated transnational diaspora negotiation. Definitions of belonging were de-spatialized.

Conclusion

The examples analyzed in this article were drawn from very different world regions and revolved around equally disparate political, religious, social, and linguistic issues. Their common denominator was their contentious nature, triggering telling negotiations of belonging. Internal differences and frictions were woven into the fabric of many German diaspora communities around 1900. They allow for critical engagement

38 Consulate Shanghai to Foreign Office, 25 Mar. 1908, BAB R901/38908; Correction, 7 July 1908, R901/38909.

39 *Das Echo*, 11 Sept. 1902.

with wider issues. First, they question contemporaneous interpretations of the Imperial diaspora as a unified and *Heimat*-oriented block. Metropolitan discourse leaders projected fantasies of national unity into their distant countrymen and -women. Local sources, however, have shown that those religious, cultural, political, and economic rifts which were constitutive of the metropole were, in fact, replicated abroad. They were all part of the discursive construction of an Imperial diaspora which fed into conceptions of a »Greater German Empire.« Just as nations can be understood as discursively constructed entities (Wodak et al. 1999) or »imagined communities« (Anderson 2006), so can diasporas. This leads to a second theoretical point about the nature of diasporas. The article argues that internal ruptures are constitutive elements of diaspora construction and should be considered in concomitant theorizations. Tölölyan (2010, 29) rightly asserts from a constructivist standpoint that »populations are *made* into nations and dispersions into diasporas.« Internal conflicts can shed some light on the process of »making« a diaspora in Imperial Germany. Scholars increasingly appreciate that heterogeneity and ruptures are inherent characteristics of any diaspora (just as they are of any nation). Ruptures do not preclude the application of the term but should, in fact, be adequately discussed within pertinent analyses (Parreñas and Siu 2007). Third, the case studies highlight the close connection between diaspora and nation building. For elites who were keen to define the essence of what it meant to belong to a *Volk*-based state, emigrant communities constituted laboratories of national belonging. They stood at a perceived frontline of belonging, triggering the question of who belonged, or did not belong, to the national and transnational community. A final point is the methodological observation that a focus on conflicts can be a useful tool to investigate wider issues of this kind. They generate utterances that pinpoint critical fault-lines between different groups, interests, and positions pertaining to transnational belonging around 1900.

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Migration pressures and opportunities

Challenges to belonging within the European Union's mobility regime[1]

Karolina Barglowski

Introduction

What for a long time appeared unimaginable became reality with the enlargement of the European Union, beginning in 2004, which united countries that had been separated from each other for decades by the Iron Curtain partitioning Europe into the »East« and the »West.« The expansion turned people into EU citizens whose mobility had been severely restricted in the past, but who had nevertheless experienced widespread migration, often in a partly clandestine manner. The opening of borders was thus accompanied by fears that certain countries would be overrun by the movement of people from the new to the old member states. Among those new acceding countries, Poland, due to its large population and high rates of emigration, has significantly impacted discourses on Europeanization, intra-European migration, and inequalities within the European Union in the post-accession period. People from Poland have taken advantage of their post-2004 freedom of mobility with an unexpected speed and scale, thereby fundamentally transforming the socio-demographic landscape in many European regions (Favell 2008). Most of them have migrated to the UK, which as one of the few old EU member states has not restricted the immigration of people from the new member states. Yet despite Germany's seven-year accession moratorium, and widely unnoticed by social sciences, a significant and increasing

1 I want to thank the editors of this issue, Bettina Brockmeyer and Levke Harders, and the two anonymous reviewers for their thorough and detailed comments on earlier versions of this article.

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v7-i1-153 ISSN 2191-6721

number has also immigrated to Germany (Fihel, Kaczmarczyk, and Stefańska 2012).

Scholars have been eager to find answers as to why so many people have emigrated from Poland. After all, it is a country with a growing economy and one that was comparatively spared the economic crisis that hit Europe around 2008. The coexistence of economic growth alongside high levels of emigration has demonstrated the shortcomings of purely economic arguments for patterns of migration, and has paved the way for more cultural views on such phenomena. In the case of Poland, we find that many people in the country grew up in social contexts where mobility had become a socially accepted means to combat a variety of circumstances in their local environments (Garapich 2011). This means that people have used mobility as an exit strategy to escape not only poverty, but also realities such as violent marriages or cloying family bonds, or simply to pursue an adventure. Due to restrictions on mobility before 2004, many people concealed their motives for migration, which fundamentally affected trajectories of settlement and migration.

What does this »new freedom« mean for people in Poland, given that they have always migrated, even if their ability to migrate was previously severely restricted? How do they orient themselves within such frameworks of mobility? In this article, I intend to show that migration, although cherished as an opportunity to equalize life chances within the European Union (see Amelina and Vasilache 2014), may at the same time put people under pressure to obey the »migration imperative« (Kesselring 2006). In its modernist underpinnings, the migration imperative corresponds to the need to pursue spatial mobility, which is linked to the individual's degree of social mobility and flexibility. Yet at the same time, imperatives for mobility also challenge people's sense of belonging, in the form of their affective and inalienable sense of self and of their place in the world (Baumeister and Leary 1995; Pfaff-Czarnecka 2011). Such a relational view on ideas of belonging implies that there are socio-spatial forms of membership; this reaches beyond the often static and essentializing notions of identifications/identities, assimilation, and incorporation, thus acknowledging the complexities of belonging. This view also stresses

the emotional and processual aspects of belonging with regard to how people form, for a certain period of time, affectively pleasant attachments within contexts and relationships that they themselves have sought out.

The focus here is placed on the challenges posed to people's sense of belonging within the EU's mobility regime. In common use, the »mobility regime« refers to the power and normativity of human movement across borders, which is regulated by global power structures and shaped by inequalities (Glick, Schiller, and Salazar 2013). Although belonging has become a common point of discussion in migration scholarship and beyond (Anthias 2016; Anthias, Yuval-Davis, and Cain 1992; Baumeister and Leary 1995; Pfaff-Czarnecka 2011; Yuval-Davis 2011), it has not been applied very often within the context of intra-European mobility. This is probably because intra-European mobility is often portrayed as a space with low cultural and legal barriers to mobility (Amelina 2016). Yet, this view underestimates the ruptures in the presumed stability of migrants' social relationships, identities/identifications, and attachments (for a similar argument, see Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2008).

In the following section, I describe the sample, the methods of data collection, and analysis. Afterwards, I point out the most important milestones for past and contemporary patterns of migration between Poland and Germany, which is important for understanding the extent and dynamics of contemporary migration. In particular, it allows us to make sense of why people in the new acceding countries make use of their freedom of mobility to a much higher degree than their counterparts in the old member countries. In the subsequent empirical chapters, I will show that ethnicity continues to play a major role in people's sense of belonging. In this article, I use an empirical definition of ethnicity from an interactional perspective that is not primarily interested in the ontology of what ethnicity is but rather with how people organize their experiences and practices around what they consider to be »ethnic.« The continual assertion that countries have distinct normative sets of cultural values makes migration more likely to rupture people's sense of »ethnic« belonging. Yet, it is important to note that these disturbances do not affect all people to the same extent. Whether people perceive migration

as a pressure or as a freedom, as well as whether they consider their migration to have lowered their social position, depends to a large extent on their access to class-based resources and their gender.

Methodology

For this research, I adopted a transnational perspective and employed a multi-sited research design.[2] A transnational perspective rejects the methodological nationalism of many social science studies, in which nation states are assumed to provide the normative and institutional frames within which individuals organize their lives. This does not mean that transnational research denies the relevance of the nation state. Rather it calls attention to the significance of socio-spatial categories and attributes (such as »national,« »local,« and »transnational«) with respect to individuals' social positions and social relations (Amelina and Faist 2012). It is thus imperative that socio-spatial categories not be taken for granted, but themselves be definite objects of study. For this purpose, I chose to employ an interpretive approach that includes data collection and analysis from two sites, Germany and Poland. In keeping with the subject-centered and social-constructivist theoretical and terminological foundations of this study, my methodology was based on approaches that question the existence of an objective reality. Instead, the social world is understood as emerging from the processes social actors go through to make sense of all the objects in the world that they encounter (on the process of meaning-making, see Blumer 1969).

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2 This study was conducted within the framework of CRC 882 »From Heterogeneities to Inequalities,« project C3 »Transnationality and the Unequal Distribution of Informal Social Protection« at Bielefeld University, Germany. The present study references a selection of results from this project. In addition, the research comprised part of my doctoral thesis. I am grateful to my supervisors, Professors Thomas Faist and Anna Amelina, for their guidance, expertise, and constant support throughout the often rocky journey of crafting and finishing a PhD thesis. I am also grateful for the invaluable research environment and the resources that the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology has generously provided.

The results presented in this study draw from interviews conducted with three different types of respondents (n = 35):

- Twenty were migrants from Poland who lived and/or worked in Germany.
- Ten were significant others who lived in Poland and with whom the respondents stayed in touch (the »matched sample«).
- Five lived in Poland and had no immediate experience of migration.

My research was also informed by observations conducted in the homes and workplaces of respondents, analysis of social networks, and expert interviews. The stories of individuals who migrated or who were influenced by the migration of others are placed at the core of this paper, however the insights gained from other types of data informed the analysis presented here.

The 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted in 2012 in medium-sized cities in Germany. In addition, ten interviews were conducted in Poland with significant others whose locations had been provided by the interviewees in Germany. The sample in Germany comprised an equal number of men and women who ranged from 23 to 67 years of age. Of the 20 interviewees, eight had Polish citizenship, eight had German–Polish dual citizenship, and four were naturalized German citizens; 11 were married, four were single, three were divorced, and two were in an ongoing relationship. Thirteen had at least one child; ten had a university degree, seven had completed vocational training, two were students at the time of the interview, and one had graduated from secondary school. Those with degrees had received them in both countries. Interviews with the respondents were conducted in Polish in 13 cases and in German in the other seven. At the outset, respondents were asked in which language they would prefer to be interviewed. In general, respondents who migrated as children chose to conduct the interview in German, whereas those who migrated as adults chose to conduct the interview in Polish, with the exception of Marta, who had migrated to Germany ten years earlier when in her mid-twenties, but chose to speak German in the interview. In accordance with matched-sampling procedures, the 20 respondents

were asked to provide contact information for their significant others. As a result, ten interviews were conducted in Poland (three female friends, two mothers, two sisters, one female cousin, one daughter, and one uncle).

All interviews were transcribed in full and analyzed with the objective of reconstructing the meanings social actors attached to their actions, specifically with regard to the boundaries they drew when making sense of their lives. Social-scientific hermeneutics proved to be a suitable methodology to achieve this (see also Amelina 2010). As a methodology, social-scientific hermeneutics proposes the use of a two-stage data analysis consisting of a combination of coding procedures and sequence analysis. Coding procedures allow researchers to familiarize themselves with the data and to structure the content of the material. Through coding, significant passages (sequences) are identified for sequence analysis. Sequence analysis is an in-depth procedure that analyzes sequences in small units, sometimes even word by word, and generates various meanings for these units of text, which are then either proved or rejected when applied to subsequent text. In the end, only meanings considered by consensus to be the most valid for the whole text are accepted (Amelina 2010).

Migration from Poland to Germany: In the past and today

The migration of people from Poland (or of Poles in times where there was no Polish sovereign state) to German territories stretches back to at least the nineteenth century (Zubrzycki 1953). Since Poland has, throughout its history, been partitioned and deterritorialized several times, it has encountered frequent and extensive streams of migration. People from Poland have immigrated to Germany under very different circumstances depending on their legal statuses and the point in time of their migration. Until the post-socialist transformation of the country, many people migrated as »ethnic Germans« (especially during the 1970s and 1980s), since this was one of the very few legal possibilities to leave Poland and migrate to Germany. For some, migration to Germany felt like returning home rather than immigrating. For others, it simply presented an opportunity to leave Poland; these people often experienced migration as an escape. Others immigrated as asylum seekers (particularly around the time

of martial law in Poland from 1981–1983). Moreover, during the socialist era there were not only legal barriers to migration, but also moral ones. Emigration contradicted the socialist propaganda of Poland, which presented the country as a »socialist paradise« (Garapich 2011). As a result of bilateral agreements in the 1990s between Poland and Germany for short-term employment in some sectors of the German labor market, in particular agriculture, many (male) Poles travelled to work in Germany for a period of months, while maintaining their center of life in Poland.

The enlargement of the EU in 2004 marks the most recent peak in emigration from Poland. Due to changes in legal regulations, in 2011, after the abolition of a seven-year accession moratorium, Germany allowed the free movement of workers from the new acceding countries, and forms of mobility between Germany and Poland changed as a result. Short-term work contracts in Germany, during which migrants maintained their bases in Poland, tended to turn into longer stays or permanent settlement, and undocumented residence was legalized. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Sweden, which were the only old member countries without barriers to accession, became major destination countries for Polish citizens. In particular, the United Kingdom, which had the largest labor market of the three countries, experienced an unprecedented inflow of workers from the new acceding countries, the majority of whom were from Poland. Germany—though this is not as widely recognized in the news and research articles that focus on the United Kingdom and Ireland—has received a sizable number of newcomers from the new acceding countries, most of whom are from Poland, and the numbers are increasing (Fihel, Kaczmarczyk, and Stefańska 2012).

There are now three generations of Polish immigrants to Germany, totaling an estimated 1.6 million people, which makes them the second largest immigrant population after people from Turkey (German Statistical Office 2014). However, we know little about them other than their economic and historical backgrounds. Polish migrants in Germany are portrayed in an often stereotypical and derogatory way as »units of labor« or an »army of leprechauns« (*Heinzelmännchen*) who come to Germany to do the »dirty« work, such as caregiving, cleaning, or working in construction,

and then return to Poland (Wagner et al. 2014, 55). Migrants from Poland have kept a low profile, as they are largely invisible in German (migration) discourse (Schmidtke 2004). Also, the traces of this large community of Polish migrants and their long history of immigration to Germany are not easy to identify. The hidden presence of Polish migrants in the local German landscape stands in stark contrast to the abundance of Polish shops and churches one finds in the other major destination countries, such as the United Kingdom. These are not as easy to spot in Germany as Turkish shops and places of worship. The reasons for their invisibility can again be attributed to their particular migration history. For most of the immigrants of the past, »ethnic Germans« and those who managed to »escape,« maintaining of a sense of belonging to Poland and adherence to Polish networks was neither easy nor necessarily what immigrants desired. During most periods in the past, Polish migrants to Germany came under very restricted legal conditions and often had to conceal their reasons for migration; this situation did not foster the creation of dense networks between Poles, who often formed only weak ties and regarded each other with mutual distrust and suspicion (Irek 2011). Also, uncertain possibilities of returning to their home country and very limited opportunities of travelling to and communicating with Poland meant Polish migrants of previous waves hardly engaged in such transnational activities. This situation has, however, changed profoundly since Poland entered the EU, enabling easy transnational communication and frequent border crossings.

Migration and challenges to belonging

It would seem logical that, in the case of Poland, freedom of migration has been a clearly positive political accomplishment. After all, it allows people to pursue plans that they had previously tried to conceal. Yet, as the following empirical accounts show, these opportunities also present challenges to belonging. That is because migration is closely bound to discourses on globalization, which frequently place high value on the liberated, cosmopolitan, and free-floating subject, and link migration to a »successful navigation of social life« (Faist 2013, 1640). In contrast, these same discourses associate lack of movement with »stasis, decline, and

disadvantage« (Faist 2013, 1640). The following empirical accounts reveal the challenges posed to people's sense of belonging due to the enduring power of ethno-nationalist boundaries over how people understand themselves and their place in the world. This concerns in particular those people who were raised within strong nation states, which still provide a primary framework within which people can navigate their daily lives (see also Skey 2010). Migration, therefore, may disrupt people's sense of belonging, in particular when they feel forced to migrate and to conform to discourses that link spatial and social mobility. At the same time, migration may disturb accepted knowledge, as one leaves a social order that feels meaningful, familiar, and predictable (Misztal 2001). I will show, exemplified in the case of Poland, that the option of pursuing migration, the losses resulting from resisting discourses of globalization, and the profits to be gained from conforming to the same, are all tightly bound to class and gender.

»Being a Pole in Germany«: Migration and ethnicity-related belonging

Belonging »tends to be naturalized and to be part of everyday practices« (Yuval-Davis 2011, 10), and thus the need to establish and fight for belonging emerges only when people feel their sense of and place in the world to be threatened (see Brockmeyer in this issue). Perceptions of »ethnicity« play a major role in how people anchor their taken-for-granted sense of belonging. While the categories of ethnicity and nation are often used interchangeably, for analytical reasons it is important to consider that ethnicity is a more relational and micro-level category that denotes a »socially shared perception of differences between categories of people« and thus is less bound to place (Eder et al. 2004, 3). In contrast, the term nation refers more to a territorial demarcation and concepts of citizenry. In the case of Poland and Germany, both terms are interwoven since, in contrast to the US and Canada, both nations base their »raison d'être« on the myth of ethnic homogeneity (Eder et al. 2004, 1). The case of Poland is particular, as the country circulates ambivalent narratives of ethnicity and nationalist attachments, which reflect strong, »peasant-rooted« (Garapich 2011, 6) attachments to territory. At the same time, they also mirror long-standing experiences of migration and »the fact that throughout

the last 200 years Polish state borders were shifting, disappearing, reappearing, and shifting back and forth again« (Garapich 2011, 6). Many Polish intellectuals worked from abroad and turned the themes of migration, exile, and loss of homeland into important symbols and subjects of both classical literature (by authors such as Adam Mickiewicz and Henryk Sienkiewicz) and modern writing and film (see for example Galasiński and Galasińska 2007). Migration in the case of Poland thus has ambivalent ties to narratives of ethnicity and nationalism.

This ambivalent relationship to migration also stems from the fact that throughout history, the imagining of stark differences in prosperity, »modernity,« and political stability between the »East« and the »West« were central parts of the European narrative. Max Weber provided an early account of Polish-German history framed in this way. In his times, there was no Polish sovereign nation, yet parts of Prussia were inhabited by people who tended to identify themselves, and were identified by others, as Poles. When Max Weber occupied himself with an inquiry into agriculture in the different regions of Prussia between 1892 and 1905, he also travelled through its Eastern parts. Weber described the territories inhabited by Poles, and the Poles themselves, as rural, backward, and less civilized—an image of Poland that, until recently, appears to have been deeply rooted in the Polish-German collective memory (Barglowski 2015; Schmidtke 2004). Polish migrants in Germany often adopt this oppositional binary, when they reflect on themselves as a »Pole in Germany« in contrast to when they reflect on themselves as a »Pole in Poland.«

Piotr, who migrated from Poland to Germany in the early 1980s, elaborates on the differences between Poland and Germany:

> Well, now [that] the borders within Europe are open, people are no longer faced with such categorical choices. It doesn't mean so much anymore. A lot of people from Poland—I think two million—are in Western Europe: in Ireland, England and they get along very well there. They see a bit [of] another civilization, especially those from small towns. I think in a sense it will help Poland to [open itself] to the world, [to get] to know [it]. People [will not be] so closed off in their xenophobia and [in the] belief that they are

> special, some kind of patriotic outcast (*wyżutki*) from poor societies, to rationalize (*żeby coś tam wmówić*) that they are chosen, because otherwise it would be hard to survive, and I recognize that. And yet, one becomes disconnected (*człowiek się odzwyczaja*) after 30 years, [which] is quite understandable. I studied Polish studies, and when I read something in Polish, [it was] always with a kind of patriotic bonus. It was close to me, and until the end of my life I will jump [for] joy when the Poles play soccer and score a goal. (Piotr, age 55, Germany)[3]

By his use of the phrase »categorical choices,« Piotr means that when he arrived in Germany in the 1980s, his migration was supposed to be permanent, since during the first few years after his immigration return visits were not allowed; Piotr and his wife had to hand over their Polish passports to the Polish government when they received their German passports. Nowadays, migration from Poland is considered to be much easier, since people can travel to Poland as often as they like and can return at any time; thus, migration »does not mean so much anymore.« From the perspective of the migrants, migration often meant leaving a closed country for an open one. Whereas prior to the transformation period (i.e., before 1989), the term »closed« referred to borders, to an isolated country that had no interaction with the world outside, today the notion of being closed refers to the conservatism and traditionalism of Poland, which the respondents feel is not changing fast enough to correspond to what they regard as the more liberal and less traditional habits of the West. Similar to Piotr, many respondents described the less urbanized regions of Poland as »patriotic« and not open to global changes. These accounts reflect homogenizing views of these regions, which supposedly do not engage in exchange with the outer world. Piotr argues that »poor societies,« by which he means those lacking cultural and economic capital, need patriotism to feel a special identity and to see themselves as »chosen« in order to deal with their deprived situation.

3 The parentheses after quotations from interviewees include the pseudonym and age of the interviewee. Additionally, they state the country where the interviewees live, which corresponds to where the interview was conducted.

International mobility, especially to the West, is thought to enable self-transformation and development through which people can overcome their patriotic insularity by »seeing a bit of another civilization.« In this sense, migration entails overcoming not only legal but also psychological borders.

Drawing ethnic boundaries between »co-ethnics«

For many people, moving to another country is accompanied by experiences of a fundamental shift in sets of cultural values. Testament to the power of the myth of ethnic homogeneity, people often frame their experiences of difference in ethnic terms, which is also often fueled by collective nostalgia and the remembered narratives of members of the diaspora (Gońda 2015). Migration often makes people feel dislocated, as if a part of themselves were missing. These challenges affect newly arrived migrants as much as those who have been abroad for longer periods of time. While for newly arrived migrants, the perception of a »difference« between themselves and their new environment is a common experience, as more time is spent in the country of immigration, ethnicity often becomes an issue of negotiation between family and friends in the country from which they have emigrated. In the initial phase of migration, people often feel themselves to be »different« within the new environment to which they immigrated but, over time, as indicated in Piotr's account above, it might become a boundary between themselves and their relatives and friends in the countries from which they came. Markus is a 28-year-old man who migrated with his family from a village in southern Poland to Cologne at the age of three. He sees very clear differences between himself and his family members in Poland, which he classifies in religious terms: »With those of the family who stayed behind, it's really like this: church every Sunday, nice and proper and, er, and whatnot […], and I believe it [his lifestyle; KB] wouldn't fit in with their world.« Although ethnicity here is used in a rather fixed way, as an interchangeable trait shared among people, ethnicity can also travel across countries. Those who are considered to have remained »Polish« after immigration are affected by »othering« carried out by members of the same »ethnic community« to which they supposedly belong. Markus also

expresses his astonishment about his cousin's life in Germany when he shares the following observation: »When I go to my cousin's Facebook page, I look at her list of friends: all of her friends are Polish women. I have no idea where on earth she finds them all.« Ethnicity, which here is used to designate Polishness, is thus not a connection between fixed groups, but is constructed through processes in which people define how they belong to one another by emphasizing commonalities in »ethnic« terms. What and who is regarded as Polish, and more generally the ethnic boundaries that are drawn, are closely linked to the way migrants' social relations and their senses of themselves are constituted.

As a result, for some, migration can lead to a feeling of liminality and cause lower degrees of well-being and a sense of alienation. Joanna, who migrated as a child with her parents in the 1980s, senses that her subjective identity does not correspond to the environment in which she lives. She feels herself to be Polish but cannot imagine herself living in Poland, where she assumes she will experience poorer living conditions:

> Well, I'm torn between Poland and Germany. […] I don't know what I would have achieved by now if we had stayed in Poland. In Poland, adult children, even when they are married, live with their parents because they can't afford to have an apartment of their own. […] I have a Polish heart; my temperament is Polish. Here in Germany, everything and everyone is so cold, everyone [acts] on their own and for themselves. […] But I don't know what I would be doing in Poland. […] My younger sister is completely German. It's obvious that Germany is her home. My older sister is mainly in contact with Poles, and she actually only speaks in Polish. She's a typical mother and housewife, and although she identifies as a Pole, she doesn't want to return to Poland because she knows her life is better here. And for me it's the same. (Joanna, age 35, Germany)

Joanna ties her subjectivity to Poland while living in Germany where she experiences a sense of »being torn.« These feelings are often driven by comparisons with close family members who are perceived to manifest different degrees of Polishness and Germanness. Joanna's quote is a good

illustration of general discourses that link ethno-nationalism to gender, constructing women as the central agents in ethnic and national reproduction (Anthias, Yuval-Davis, and Cain 1992). In Joanna's opinion, both her older and younger sisters' identifications are not problematic—they are either German or Polish. Yet, she rejects what for her are characteristics of Polish women when she describes her older sister as representing »Polish hardness and conservatism.« Usually these traits refer to clear social expectations regarding gendered lives and sexualities, expectations that are often attributed to the widespread presence of the Catholic Church in public discourse, as well as images of »Matka Polka« (meaning both Polish motherhood and mother Poland) and constructions of femininity related to nationhood (Pustułka 2016). Conversely, Joanna sees herself as having a »Polish heart« but evaluates her life chances in Germany to be better, which makes it impossible for her to consider living in Poland. She seems to envy her sisters' unquestioning feelings of belonging. Perceptions of both stratification and ethnicity are frequently evidenced by respondents who feel they need to navigate between two unsatisfactory spaces. The respondents believe that while Germany offers many more opportunities for making a good life, it is also considered to be »cold« and individualistic. A similar balancing act was found in our study of queer migrants' coming-out narratives. In these, respondents were afraid of the limited social mobility they would experience in Germany as a result of being stigmatized as a migrant, restricted to their »ethnic« identity; on the other hand, they also tried to not be excluded from family networks by emphasizing their ethnic belonging to the countries from which they had emigrated (Barglowski, Amelina, and Bilecen 2014). Yet these processes show that for some people, ethnicity is connected with »the authentic site of original belonging,« which may exacerbate the process of realizing coherence within the scope of a dislocated subjectivity, as well as being linked to stability and normalcy in the times and places in which they currently live (Gońda 2015, 75).

The pressure to migrate as a matter of class and gender

The negative side of the new freedom of mobility experienced after 2004 in Poland is that while it has broadened migration opportunities, it has at

the same time also created restrictions on belonging and pressures to migrate. Where mobility is increasingly linked to advantages, immobility is associated with disadvantages. These benefits are present in particular within modern approaches to mobility, which equate spatial mobility and social mobility and successful living (see Kesselring 2006). Depending on their gender and class, people have different opportunities to profit from mobility; at the same time, these categories also shape the impact of their immobility in terms of their perceived life chances and self-realization.

Generally, the post-2004 wave was different from previous waves of emigration in that the option of migration was presented to people who had not typically migrated before, such as highly-qualified people or those with well-paid and secure jobs. For instance, Andżelika, a psychotherapist, and her husband, a computer scientist, both had, as she says, satisfying jobs. She recalls the atmosphere in Poland in the wake of its accession to the EU in 2004 as follows: »And then we thought, all Poles thought, I mean that [when] a lot of our friends moved to England, Ireland, [it] was a boom, a social movement.« Like Andżelika, most individuals believed that they were witnessing a »social movement« and a »boom,« and they considered becoming a part of it. My research has shown that all the respondents in Poland have reflected on the option of migration. This is the case since migration has, on the one hand, increased its »attractiveness« through the policy of open borders and, as Piotr puts it above, migration is no longer tied to »categorical choices« as it was before. In addition, individuals in Poland have found that their networks have spread across Europe, and these widespread networks between people in Poland and Polish citizens abroad have created spaces of opportunity, providing a variety of resources to enable migration but also allowing the circulation of »success stories« (Nowicka 2014). This meso-level of migrant networks is crucial for understanding why migration tends to be a self-enforcing process (Faist 2000). The extent of emigration, and the resources and stories exchanged across networks, make other citizens contemplate the potential gains migration might offer them too. This provokes an important, though widely neglected, question: How do people navigate these imperatives for migration, in particular when they

take into account the ideologies embedded in the Polish-German transnational social space? Such a view requires acknowledging the centrality of immobility within imperatives of mobility and focusing on what it means »when people react to the mobility imperative of modern society by refusing movement« (Kesselring 2006, 269). The interviews conducted in Poland with people who have not (yet) migrated clearly elaborate the relationship between belonging and migration pressures. All interviewees considered migration to be an option, such as David: »Well, in general, many Poles emigrate, so I sometimes think about it too. But I always think that [those who] emigrate can't cope here in Poland. So I was ambitious and tried to organize my life here« (David, age 26, Poland). Similar to Andżelika, who stated above that around 2004 in Poland emigration felt like a social movement, David also refers here to how migration has become a common thing to do and that he also considers it to be an option. In another central narrative, David refers to the class-related differences among migrants, who have different levels of access to the option of migration. There are those who »can't cope here,« who are considered as needing to migrate, and others who can choose to stay or to leave, which reflects a hierarchy among Polish migrants in terms of their supposed reasons for migration (Erdmans 1992).

While ethno-nationalist boundaries, as has been shown earlier, are a central mode in which people construct their sense of belonging, it can hinder some people from migrating, as they anticipate losing a sense of belonging: »I was thinking about migration, and my sister [her cousin Andżelika] really tried to persuade me. But honestly, I'm a bit afraid, and I like Poland because they speak Polish here. […] And I'm afraid of being isolated from my family« (Basia, age 23, Poland). Basia explains that she is afraid of migrating, mainly because she fears separating from her family and dealing with a new language. The decision not to migrate appears to be significant for her, as she suspects that migration would improve her life chances and her cousin is trying to persuade her to migrate. Family commitments are one reason why people choose to »stay put.« Basia expresses a sense that migration may open opportunities to her and there seem to be some benefits, which both she and her cousin, who tries to

persuade her, anticipate she would gain. Mobility and immobility are enmeshed in a web of cultural norms, particularly those pertaining to gender, which stratify the options of staying or leaving (Mata-Codesal 2015). For instance, the mobility of some depends on the immobility of others. As I have shown elsewhere, female family members are often excluded from international mobility because of their anticipated care commitments to the elderly in their family, which, however, enables the mobility of other (female) family members (Barglowski 2015).

Also, decisions about migration, settlement, and return are themselves gendered, because they are bound up with gendered labor markets and social norms in both the countries of emigration and immigration. Emilia's pattern of migration is a very common one and aids our understanding of the gendered inequalities inherent in migration. Her husband commuted between Poland and Germany for several years before they settled in Germany in 2011. Before migrating, Emilia had a job as a middle manager in a large retail company, and she was satisfied with her job.

> I don't know if I will ever have as good a job here as I had in Poland. My husband said that he doesn't want to return to Poland because he doesn't see any future for himself there. It seems as if it's better for him here. I don't know if it's better for me, though. I can't say I'm 100 percent happy with how things are now. […] While my husband was working here [in Germany] and we were in Poland, there was no problem. His income here, converted into Polish currency, was quite good. Now that we're here, the situation is a bit different. We pay taxes and so on. (Emilia, age 35, Germany)

Emilias's story sheds light on some of the involuntary requirements of crossing borders, such as the expectation that households should be united under one roof, and therefore family members should eventually sacrifice their own systems of belonging. Emilia's story illustrates that men often neither feel like quitting their bivalent lifestyle—working in Germany and living in Poland, for decades a common migration pattern between Poland and Germany (Łukowski 2001)—nor settling in their country of origin. This reluctance can be understood as a more general pattern in which a man's status is based mainly on his position in the

labor market. Although gender roles are changing, many people still believe that the male breadwinner model is ideal for both men and women. These factors also shape migration decisions. The loss of status that often accompanies migration means that men often have more trouble adapting to the country of immigration than women do (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005). It is particularly working-class men who fear becoming »migrants,« in other words a stigmatized category in the country of immigration, which would lower their status more then would have been the case had they not migrated, which leaves them feeling trapped in a liminal space. Therefore, the decision to settle in Germany may not always be a straightforward one, but it is often a strategy for overcoming »bivalence« and reuniting families. Moreover, Emilia's wish to adhere to the norm of nuclear families living together, and her lower bargaining power, leads her to a worse economic and career-related position after migration, as before she was satisfied with her job in Poland. Now that she is living in Germany, where her husband works, she is unhappy because she believes that her living standards have declined. Also, she struggles with not understanding the school system, institutions, and the German language. Reflections on social mobility play an important part in how migrants perceive the outcome rate between losses incurred after migration, such as feelings of alienation and distance from family and friends, and its positive results, such as increased security and economic prosperity.

Conclusion

Migrants and non-migrants alike have social expectations and visions about what migration would mean for them, creating imagined spaces of opportunity and illuminating the constructions of and challenges to belonging that are experienced in emigration environments. The example of Polish migration to Germany was specifically chosen for its ability to reveal that belonging is an open category that includes daily and mostly unconscious practices (see also, Brockmeyer and Harders' introduction to this issue), which, through a range of events, can become disturbed and threatened (Brockmeyer, this issue). In this article I hope to have shown that for some people, enlarged spaces in which they can be

mobile are connected to pressures to migrate and the feeling that their belonging is threatened. This is particularly true in regions that have a culture of migration, such as those that have traditionally high levels of emigration, deep-rooted socio-cultural norms, and where mobility has been restricted in much of the past, such as is the case in Poland. Notably, in those environments from which people emigrate, immobility and mobility are again stratified as people of lower classes often also have a more limited ability to »choose optimal environments for themselves and their resources« (Weiss 2005, 714). In contrast, the resources of the upper-middle classes are more universally recognized which usually makes both staying and leaving advantageous for them, and renders their practices of immobility and mobility more optional in nature. In a distinct way, the process of opening borders that began in 2004 created a discursive universe that perpetuated preexisting imperatives for migration, which made people feel they had to take advantage of their new freedoms. Yet for many the opportunity meant accepting lower living standards abroad, such as the many women who sacrificed their own careers and live under conditions that feel to them like accepting alienation in favor of meeting the expectation that nuclear families should share a household. In these reflections, social mobility intersects with ethno-nationalist ideas of belonging, which showcase the balancing acts migrants have to perform to meet both of these expectations.

The empirical accounts presented in this paper relate to contemporary debates on the subject of belonging. Most importantly, they show that belonging reaches far beyond issues of discrimination, repression, or assimilation, the latter of which is mostly studied in relation to the adoption of the language and culture of the dominant ethnic group (»cultural assimilation«) or the acquisition of an adequate work place and social contacts (»structural assimilation«). But, as Roy F. Baumeister and Mark R. Leary (1995) argue, belonging is more than this, and represents the need for positive and pleasant social contact in chosen relationships with people who are not regarded as »other« and in social contexts that feel familiar. That is, the need for belonging is satisfied by a person's bond to people and places, and is marked by »stability, affective concern,

and continuation into the foreseeable future« (Baumeister and Leary 1995, 500). Belonging also reaches beyond studies of individual or collective identities, and even beyond the more processual notion of identifications, as it refers not only to »collective boundedness, but also to personal options of individualization and to the challenges while navigating between multiple constellations of collective boundedness« (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2011, 199). Such an argument methodologically and theoretically questions ontological notions of belonging in favor of empirical studies of the boundaries that are relevant to the ways in which people form desirable kinds of attachment (Pfaff-Czarnecka 2011, 199). Understood in this way, transnational sociality affects belonging in distinct ways and, as such, also social inequalities under the conditions of globalization. As much as desire for belonging includes the need to feel in place and experience a sense of membership, it is, at the same time, characterized by displacement, dislocation, and even exclusion.

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Mobility and belonging

A printer in nineteenth-century Northern Europe

Levke Harders

Introduction

»It was only now that I felt […] the rather vigorous need […] to possess a fatherland, to become a citizen of a town« declared the typesetter Franz Huber in 1842 after long years as a journeyman.[1] Huber was probably tired of migration, which was often a time of not-belonging. Like many craftsmen, seasonal workers, and others he had covered long distances within Europe, mostly by foot. Mobility was triggered by structural factors, such as changes in »rural landholding, employment, demographics, and capital holdings« (Moch 1992, 13). While around 16 percent of Europeans had migrated before 1800, by the early nineteenth century one-fifth of the population had already left their home region, turning migration into a characteristic feature of European societies (Lucassen and Lucassen 2009, 370). These migrants were seasonal workers, servants, craftsmen, peddlers, traders, and vagrants, but also clergymen, soldiers or physicians who often travelled within a region as well as long distances. Even in the preindustrial society, mobility was a Europe-wide phenomenon in urban and rural areas (Oberpenning and Steidl 2001, 9). Hence the perception

1 Franz Huber to the king, Flensburg, 26 Oct. 1842, 3; »Jetzt erst fühlte ich […] recht lebhaft das Bedürfniß […] ein Vaterland zu besitzen, Bürger einer Stadt zu werden […].« All quoted documents on Franz Huber can be found in Schleswig-Holstein's state archives (Landesarchiv Schleswig-Holstein, LASH), Abt. 65.2, Nr. 189II, Indigenatsrecht. All translations by the author unless otherwise noted.

DOI: 10.4119/UNIBI/indi-v7-i1-154 ISSN 2191-6721

of migrants as strangers was a relevant social classification in early modern societies and remained so throughout the long nineteenth century.[2]

In early modern Europe, people were seen as foreign or alien if they spoke another language or had a different faith or an uncommon cultural background. For them, as for other social groups, from the sixteenth century onwards the issue of belonging to a community became increasingly important, because it was connected to questions of residency or citizenship, welfare rights, social networks, and the like. The emergence of territorial states with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 gave rise to »three (discrete or overlapping, depending on period, country or region) settlement systems, each linked to the wider status of ›citizen‹ in complex ways: Work-based, residence-based, or birth-based« (Innes, King, and Winter 2013, 9–10). Since all three were difficult to realize, settlement and belonging were organized through hybrid and adaptable systems that reacted to »national statute, local law, bilateral international agreements and accumulated practice« (ibid., 11). After the French Revolution and the foundation of nation-states, residence-based systems became dominant in Western Europe. This led to formal citizenship, defined as »groups entitled to particular rights, with the focus initially on particular types of property and economic activity,« while »[a]lternative membership categories remained important for longer than is generally recognized« (Fahrmeir 2007a, 2–3) such as rights acquired through long-term settlement. The idea of citizenship—based on either *ius sanguinis* or *ius soli*—does not take into account the fact that people migrate and, consequently, societies change (ibid., 7). Therefore, mobility was increasingly controlled in the first half of the nineteenth century, mainly to prevent desertion (from conscription) as well as to stem political and social unrest (Fahrmeir 2007b).

2 I would like to thank Bettina Brockmeyer, Martina Kessel, Gregor Ohlerich, Veronika Springmann, Ulrich Prehn, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments as well as Ann-Kristin Kolwes and Jasmin Weber for their research and transcription support. This article is part of a larger project, funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).

As many scholars have argued, the formation of nation-states throughout the nineteenth century was linked to both legal regulation of and political debates on alterity and mobility (e.g., Althammer 2014). The invention of citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Fahrmeir 2007a) and of new instruments such as the passport (Torpey 2000) enabled states to expand migration control. In 1851, these reforms culminated in the Gotha Convention with its »multilateral principles of removal or compensation« (Gestrich 2013, 264). Thus governmental policies and practices defined who was to be seen as a stranger, but migrants and locals also participated in this process. Because they lived and worked together, normative ideals often differed from daily experience (Raphael 2013, 148).

In this »mobile age« (Moch 1992, 158) the notion of the stranger as a relevant social category began to change. Since by this time neither ethnicity/race nor nationality were the central paradigms of inclusion and exclusion within Europe, belonging can be understood as a socially constructed category and thereby a central technique of othering. But how was belonging constructed in this era as a means of power? How were inclusion and exclusion practiced before either citizenship or nationality had become fully developed concepts? Who could or could not belong to a region and why? How did masculinity shape belonging? And who were the agents in these processes?

A closer look at one migrant and the region he lived in aims to answer some of these questions. While migration control was a dominant topic all over Europe, questions of belonging were probably particularly ambiguous in the German-Danish borderlands, where »nationalization« had just gained a foothold in elite discourses of the 1830s. I therefore discuss questions of migration and belonging based on a case study from this area, Schleswig-Holstein. I will firstly introduce some main developments regarding mobility and its regulation in this region, especially in Flensburg, where the Austro-Bavarian typesetter Franz Huber had settled. His life course and his rather remarkable belonging to this town's community are presented in the second section. Thirdly, based on a theoretical conceptualization of belonging, I will analyze the strategies used by the government, the local townspeople, and Huber himself to construct

(not-)belonging, factoring in its different facets—mainly class, gender, and profession. This biography illustrates the conclusion that belonging was not so much based on concepts of nationality or ethnicity, but defined in a more pluralistic manner, revealing discrepancies between the politics and discourse of the state, the interest of local communities, and the migrants' desire to belong.

Mobility in the German-Danish borderlands in the 1840s

The region we know today as Schleswig-Holstein is located north of Hamburg and the river Elbe. In early modern Europe, it was a territorially fragmented area under shifting reigns, but generally speaking, it was part of the Danish crown. During the eighteenth century, the territory became more coherent and stable as a region, but after the Napoleonic Wars Denmark lost Norway as well as other territories and the Danish state went bankrupt. The duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were governed by the Royal (or German) Chancery in Copenhagen with regional administrations.[3] With around 850,000 inhabitants in 1840 (Commission 1842, VI) it was a farming region that exhibited rather late industrialization processes, but had a flourishing maritime trade, especially in Flensburg and Altona (a Danish and later Prussian city that only became a borough of Hamburg in 1938). Even though Denmark had implemented agrarian and political reforms in the Age of Enlightenment, it failed to modernize the state and its administration in the early nineteenth century. The political debate on a constitution that began in the 1830s increasingly involved questions of national unity within Denmark and of Danish as official language for all parts of the country. Within the duchies, German was spoken predominantly in the southern areas (Holstein and Lauenburg), while Danish was more prevalent in the north (Schleswig), alongside North Friesian, Low German, South Jutish, and local dialects. Like the composite state Denmark, the duchies were multilingual (Havinga and Langer 2015). Using language pragmatically, many people spoke more than one idiom (Graw-Teebken 2008, 25–26) and the administration of

3 Though the duchies were both part of the Danish monarchy, Holstein was a member of the German Federation while Schleswig was not.

the duchies communicated mainly in German well into the nineteenth century.[4] As Steen Bo Frandsen points out, the »duchies were geographically in between, and this position was reflected in identities that were neither Danish nor German. […] Unambiguous nationalities and national identities in a modern sense simply did not exist« (Frandsen 2009, 5). Political conflicts came to a head during the revolution of 1848/49 and again in the war of 1863/64. In 1864, Denmark lost Schleswig-Holstein, which subsequently became a Prussian province in 1867 (Bohn 2006, 86–94).

But in the early 1840s, the moment Franz Huber, living in Flensburg, longed for a fatherland, the »national question« did not yet dominate the daily lives of most people, who shared a dynastic understanding of the state (Frandsen 2009, 11). At the time of his application, Flensburg had more than 15,000 residents and was the second-largest city in the duchies (Commission 1842, 11), growing steadily because of both new industries and incorporation of nearby municipalities. As a member of the Hanseatic League, it had a prosperous trade reaching from the Baltic Sea to as far as the Danish colonies in the West Indies. Its lively urban community consisted of merchants, seafarers, artisans, workers, etc. The economic revival of the city can be traced in various indicators, such as the beginning industrialization. In 1835, 1.6 per cent of Flensburg's inhabitants worked in rum distilleries, sugar refineries or tobacco and other industries (Albrecht 1993, 208). Foreign, mostly German-speaking, journeymen had been coming to the city in higher numbers as early as the 1820s and were welcomed as a useful supplement to the workforce (Vaagt 1983, 253). In 1845, almost half of Flensburg's adults had not been born in the city (Bande and Hvidtfeldt 1955, 167). Moreover, between 1830 and 1847 almost 1,700 men were—upon application—included in the township as burghers (many of them journeymen like Huber) (Vaagt 1983, 267). Migratory movements in this era included mainly newcomers from the surrounding areas and some from the Danish kingdom, from German-

4 For example, the archival sources used for this article were all written in High German.

speaking countries or elsewhere.[5] This setting is comparable to other regions in Western Europe (e.g., Lehnert and Vogel 2011; Oltmer 2016; Tabili 2011). Huber was only one of numerous migrants to seaports like Flensburg, but as a long-distance migrant he was exceptional.[6]

Regional mobility of men and women alike was already high in the eighteenth century and increased during the following century, causing a population growth in the duchies as well as in other German states (Brockstedt 1979, 71). Even before many rural poor people began to emigrate to North America in the following decades, people in Schleswig-Holstein were already quite mobile, migrating mostly to farming areas. Servants and farmhands usually changed their employers annually, while craftsmen like Huber targeted destinations and travelled to cities (Rößler 1995, 90–93). As in other European countries, the state and communities reacted to this increasing mobility by instituting different regulations and practices that aimed at residency status. In general, migrants in Schleswig-Holstein could gain a residence permit—the so-called *Heimatrecht*—after staying (working) successfully in one village or town for three years, but they were only eligible for welfare after 15 years of settlement, as stated in the poor laws of 1829 and 1841 (Sievers and Zimmermann 1994, 49, 116). In many Western European countries, the right of residence was a

5 In 1845, 51.4 per cent of Flensburg's residents were born in town, 29.3 per cent in Schleswig, 4.7 per cent in Holstein, 5.2 per cent in Denmark, 3.8 per cent in German states and 0.8 per cent in other foreign countries with 4.8 per cent unaccounted for (Bande and Hvidtfeldt 1955, 167).

6 Except for »foreign religious affiliations« (*fremde Religionsverwandte*) neither the published census nor other contemporary studies on the development of Schleswig-Holstein's populace mentioned foreigners or migrants, but explained the population growth in the main with »natural« causes such as higher birth rates (Commission 1842; Gudme 1833, 86–88). Only later, the (printed) census differentiated between native citizens and foreigners. In 1871, Flensburg had almost 22,000 residents, of whom nearly half were not born in the city, while 480 were not Prussian citizens (Kgl. Pr. Stat. Bureau 1874, 16–17). This data illustrates that local migration as well as rural-urban migration were (still) important during this era, and that long-distance migration to Schleswig-Holstein often originated in states that later became Prussian or German.

complex system of rights and duties characterizing the relation of each individual to the parish they lived in. It was therefore more an element of communal than of federal policies. *Heimatbescheinigungen* certifying the belonging to a specific municipality were of utmost importance for mobile workers to legitimize their access to poor relief.[7] Communities, too, were politically and financially concerned with the right of settlement and enforced strict welfare regimes, expelling poor foreigners or other people in need.

Whereas from the sixteenth century *Heimatrecht* had defined protection against persecution and entitlement to welfare benefits in a community (Zimmermann 1991, 77–83), naturalization mainly described the legal aspect of belonging to a state. Already in 1776, Denmark had passed a citizenship law stating that foreigners could be naturalized based on their landholdings or financial funds, if they worked as a university teacher or missionary, or if their skills were needed as manufacturers, traders, or master craftsmen (»Indigenatrecht« [1776] 1798). In her study on German immigrants in Copenhagen, Gesa Snell interprets this citizenship law as reacting to conflicts within the composite state by privileging native-born subjects. Second generation immigrants also counted as Danish (Snell 1999, 71). With the growing migratory movements, both the *Indigenatrecht* and the various municipal regulations on poor relief became increasingly difficult to manage, since many migrants did not fit into the existing categories. Denmark therefore enacted a new law on settlement of and welfare for foreigners (*Patent, betr. die Niederlassung und Versorgung von Ausländern*). In 1841, this decree specified existing regulations and defined more precisely communal welfare duties. Strangers/foreigners had to verify their ability to support themselves and their families in order to settle in Schleswig-Holstein (§ 2). Moreover, migrants had to prove that their native parish would accept their return (i.e. grant poor relief; § 4) and that they were not (any longer) liable to military service (§ 3). Foreigners could be evicted if they lacked the relevant documents or in

7 See, for example, the requests for certificates of settlement in LASH, Abt. 80, Nr. 2797, Auswärtige Verhältnisse im Armenwesen.

case of poverty (§ 8) (»Patent« 1842). The question of military service was of high concern for both emigration and immigration control in Europe (Fahrmeir 2007b). With this new decree, the administration of foreigners and governmental deliberation on individual cases had become structured by this law.

A southern migrant in Northern Europe

It was against this background that the Austro-Bavarian typesetter Franz Huber wrote to Christian VIII, king of Denmark. While he was a highly skilled craftsman with employment in Flensburg and had already lived more than five years up North, he faced deportation, partly due to a missing certificate of settlement. But Huber wanted to stay and tried to belong by applying for legal equality with Danish subjects. From the late eighteenth century to the 1860s, at least 400 people in the duchies, mostly men, petitioned for naturalization, and some of these biographies, with their attendant migrant problems of belonging, are reflected in Huber's situation. At the same time, this example is noteworthy because it generated dozens of administrative reports and various explanatory letters by the petitioner. Its more than 70 pages overall allow a glimpse into his own and the administrative decision-making processes, as well as into his supporters' strategies of creating belonging.

Together with the printer and publisher Asmus Kastrup, his employer, Huber testified that his life had been as follows: In the early 1810s, Huber's family had emigrated from the archbishopric of Salzburg (a state of the Holy Roman Empire)[8] to Bavaria where his (step-)father worked as a teacher in Höhenkirchen. From the age of 12 to the age of 16 or 17, when his (step-)father died, Franz Huber went to grammar school (*Gymnasium*) in Munich. He then started his four-year apprenticeship as a typesetter; hence he had both a humanistic and a crafts education. He

8 After secularization in 1803, different sovereigns reigned over the (former) archbishopric of Salzburg before the region became part of Bavaria in 1809/10, and later of Austria in 1816. Thus the Huber family migrated exactly during these shifting territorial and political rules, which could partly explain the ambiguity of their citizenship.

also registered with the army, only to find out that the Bavarian authorities defined him as an alien because his (step-)father had failed to become a Bavarian subject.[9] As a result of his missing birth certificate, he had thus become a »legally homeless person,« belonging nowhere.[10] As a journeyman, he travelled for more than a decade through Prussia, Saxony, and Switzerland, and later to Hamburg and Altona. Huber's adoption of the term »homeless« referred to the legal discourse of his time, i.e. to settlement regulations and access to poor relief. He obviously had lived north of the Elbe for quite some time without having encountered difficulty proving his identity.[11] In 1841, Kastrup met Huber in Hamburg and hired him for his printing business in Flensburg. When he arrived in the town, the local police noticed his missing papers and asked him to supply certificates within a fortnight.[12] As in Hamburg and Altona, Huber not only worked as a typesetter, but also wrote articles for the *Flensburger Zeitung, ein Blatt für Handel, Gewerbe und gemeinnützige Mittheilungen*, founded in 1840 by Kastrup. Moreover, he planned to marry.[13]

9 Police report, Flensburg, 23 Oct. 1842; Asmus Kastrup to the king, Flensburg, 26 Oct. 1842; Franz Huber to the king, 26 Oct. 1842. Concerning his conscription, Huber told different stories: He once reported that he had been exempted due to a lung disease (*Brustschwund*); excerpt from the police records, Flensburg, 29 Oct. 1841. A year later, he implied he had been granted permanent leave after six years of service; Franz Huber to the king, 26 Oct. 1842, 2. He presumably never served due to his health, but was drafted and then put on leave. Most documents repeat that his (step-)father had illegally entered Bavaria and not obtained citizenship, only one letter suggests that he had been naturalized (ibid., 3).

10 Franz Huber to the king, 10 Aug. 1843, 1 verso; »[…] rechtlich heimatloser Mensch«. Moreover, in most countries »a continued absence of more than ten years definitely meant loss of citizenship« (Fahrmeir 2007b, 181).

11 Statement (draft) of the Royal Chancery, Copenhagen [?], 07 [01?] Apr. 1843, 2.

12 Excerpt from the police records, Flensburg, 29 Oct. 1841. In 1841, a fortnight was an unrealistic period to obtain documents from abroad.

13 Franz Huber to the king, 26 Oct. 1842, 3. I have found no other information on Huber's bride-to-be. There might be a hint in the census of

As Huber could not or did not deliver legal files verifying his date of birth (in Salzburg) or his citizenship (in Austria or Bavaria), he and his employer wrote to the king. Emphasizing Huber's typesetting skills as well as his commitment to Flensburg's newspaper, Kastrup concluded that Huber had become an irreplaceable mainstay of his business.[14] Alongside this endorsement, Huber's request contained a statement by the local police[15] and a petition by four Flensburg citizens on behalf of Huber: Peter Nielsen, Christian Esmarch, J. W. H. Jochimsen, and H. P. Schmidt Jr. They all confirmed that they knew Huber to be a versatile, educated man whose talents were useful (for the community).[16] Huber called attention to various positive certificates of former employers and to this testimonial by the »most reputable local men« confirming his moral conduct.[17] Though this was not an uncommon procedure in cases of missing written credentials, Huber's support was noteworthy inasmuch as he (with Kastrup) was able to win over the financial, political, and social elite of the town.

1855 (AKVZ 2013) mentioning the widow Anna Maria Huber, born in 1817 in Flensburg, working as a laundress, with her son, Franz Heinr. Christ. Huber, born in 1846. In 1860, Franz Heinr. Christ. Huber lived with the carpenter Johann Georg Emmertz and his wife Anna Marie (born in 1818), so that Anna Maria Huber had probably remarried; taking into account the inaccuracy of recorded names or dates of birth in census data. This data could imply that Huber had married and a child in the 1840s, but then had died (before 1855).

14 Asmus Kastrup to the king, Flensburg, 26 Oct. 1842, 1.

15 Police report, Flensburg, 23 Oct. 1842.

16 Testimonial by Peter Nielsen, C[hristian] Esmarch, J. W. H. Jochimsen, and H. P. Schmidt Jr., Flensburg, 26 Oct. 1842.

17 Franz Huber to the king, 10 Aug. 1843, 2; »Mögen E[ure] Königliche Majestät die mir von meinen verschiedenen Lehrherren ausgestellten vortheilhaften Atteste, so wie das von vier der angesehensten hiesigen Männer mir ertheilte Zeugniß über meinen Lebenswandel […] berücksichtigen […].«

Receiving this rather extensive application for naturalization, the government of Schleswig-Holstein (nowadays part of the city of Schleswig) requested a report by the municipal authorities and a case study by the regional administration in Gottorf.[18] The government's summary of Huber's life included some skeptical opinions: Hamburg's police reported that although Huber was law-abiding, he was perceived as a swindler. They were also critical of his writerly ambitions,[19] similar to Flensburg's magistrate, which assessed his newspaper articles as (politically) questionable, though they found his poetry to represent a »certain education and lyrical talent.«[20] The mayor and council of Flensburg had to admit that Huber's behavior had not caused any complaints, but they still had reservations against his naturalization.[21] These suspicions are consistent with the administrative distrust against journalists and printers who were habitually seen as—undesirable—political agitators (see e.g., Cöppicus-Wex 2001).

In April 1843, the government rejected Huber's request, despite the positive statements from Flensburg, focusing instead on his missing birth certificate and doubtful residency (*Heimathbescheinigung*).[22] The adverse decision was based on the new law mentioned above on settlement of

18 Municipal: Mayor and Council of Flensburg to the Royal Government of Schleswig-Holstein, Flensburg, 13 Feb. 1843, as well as police report, Flensburg, 23 Oct. 1842. Flensburg's police had already contacted the police stations in Hamburg and Altona as well as in Salzburg and Ebersberg (Bavaria) for more information on Huber. Regional: Report by the Government of Schleswig-Holstein, Gottorf, 10 Mar. 1843.

19 Statement (draft) of the Royal Chancery, Copenhagen [?], 07 [01?] Apr. 1843, 2.

20 The administration wrote that Huber had not always spared public figures in his articles (ibid., 5.). On Huber's poetry see Mayor and Council of Flensburg to the Royal Government of Schleswig-Holstein, Flensburg, 13 Feb. 1843, 3.

21 Ibid.; »Seine hiesige Aufführung hat zu keinen weiteren Beschwerden [außer über einige Kritiken oder Verse] Veranlaßung gegeben.«

22 Verdict (draft) of the Royal Chancery, Copenhagen [?], 11 Apr. 1843, 1.

foreigners.[23] Although the different administrative institutions cited this recent decree, they never questioned Huber's financial resources, so that the law did not fully apply to his situation. Besides, his exemption from conscription in Bavaria could have simplified his petition for settlement in Flensburg. The critical view of journalism seems to have been one obstacle, another were the missing papers.[24] His own explanation of why he was unable to hand in a birth certificate remained short and vague, even if he underlined that he could not be held responsible.[25] Huber petitioned again in August of the same year, stressing his economic stability—consistent with the new settlement law. It would be painful to leave Flensburg, wrote Huber, while naturalization would be all the more pleasant and important because he now was able to work at his trade and to make a living.[26] Since the archival files do not contain any more information, it is uncertain whether he had to leave Flensburg or whether he managed to stay and probably married.[27]

23 Statement (draft) of the Royal Chancery, Copenhagen [?], 07 [01?] Apr. 1843, 6–8. The regional government argued similarly: Report by the Government of Schleswig-Holstein, Gottorf, 10 Mar. 1843.

24 Articles: ibid., 3. I have as yet been unable to compare these suspicions with the content of articles he might have published. Missing papers: ibid., 6.

25 At the same time, the administrations in Bavaria and Salzburg might not have been very interested in confirming Huber's origin given that this verification would have made them responsible for poor relief or for the costs of his expulsion from Denmark.

26 Franz Huber to the king, Flensburg, 10 Aug. 1843, 3 (emphasis in the original); »Die Entfernung vom hiesigen Orte würde mir aber gerade jetzt um so schmerzlicher, und die Erlangung des Indigenates mir gerade jetzt um so erfreulicher und wichtiger sein, als mir bereits zur Treibung meines bürgerlichen Gewerbes hieselbst Aussicht und Gelegenheit dargeboten ist, und ich mir sonach durch einen festen Nahrungszweig meinen Lebensunterhalt auf die Dauer zu erwerben in Stand gesetzt bin.«

27 See footnote 13.

»Belonging« in the making

In Huber's as in other cases, different actors negotiated whether a stranger belonged or not—state institutions, local citizens, and the migrants themselves. The European deregulation of mobility began in the 1860s with new laws on the freedom of movement and the freedom of trade. At the same time, the understanding of citizenship was increasingly shaped by national, ethnocultural, and racist definitions, with the objective of creating a homogenous people, or—as Benedict Anderson has put it—an imagined community (Anderson 2006). This construction of territorial, social, and cultural boundaries is therefore closely linked to (not-)belonging. Belonging as a relational and constructed category is based on categories of difference (see also the introduction to this issue). As an analytical category, belonging helps to distinguish between concurrent processes of inclusion and exclusion since it is based on a set of historically and territorially specific values that operate as a power relation by means of social inequalities. Sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis defines belonging as »an emotional (or even ontological) attachment« that »tends to be naturalized« (Yuval-Davis 2011, 10). It is transformed into a politics of belonging when it becomes endangered. Politics of belonging aim at »constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies which are themselves being constructed […] in very specific boundaries,« for example fixing social and territorial limitations within ideas of citizenship (ibid.). Belonging as a dynamic process is constructed through three interrelated factors:

> The first facet concerns social locations; the second relates to people's identifications and emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings; and the third relates to ethical and political value systems with which people judge their own and others' belonging. (Ibid., 12)

These practices, as well as both belonging and politics of belonging, become visible in this case. It allows us to consider belonging from different perspectives: 1) the view of the Danish government in Copenhagen and of the regional administration in Gottorf; 2) the local community's perspective in Flensburg; and 3) the migrant's interpretation. Huber's as

well as the administrative and local narratives are instructive both in what they tell and in what they conceal.

To begin with, the administrative papers clearly show that the Danish government had no particular interest in turning a foreigner into a subject of the Danish crown. Looking not only at Huber's but at other petitions in the first half of the nineteenth century, no organized migration policy (yet) evolves out of these decision-making processes. Migrants' arguments, for example their feeling of belonging to the region, seemingly mattered as little as economic or social benefits for the community. The government neither considered the labor market and its likely need of a skilled workforce, nor did it entertain the idea of making concessions to the local residents (who wished for Huber to stay). In this regard, Denmark differed from states that tended toward utilitarian or functional decisions on immigration or expulsion (Oltmer 2016; Schubert 2016). As Huber's case discloses, the Danish policies were only partially appropriate for the administration of an increasingly mobile society. The government was not interested in the underlying cause of his application, quite the reverse: it classified Huber as an alien subject. He would have had to remain so under the law even if the administration had decided that he needed the naturalization in order to stay in employment. In addition to his missing birth certificate, Huber's public activities were most likely seen as a reason not to grant naturalization. Making someone belong—or, as in this case, not belong—emerges as an administrative procedure based on legal grounds and political suspicions rather than a question of nationality based on language, »ethnicity« or religion. In light of that, »national identity« was not the main political paradigm. Moreover, Copenhagen did not try to win over local elites by approving their demand or by a prospect of civic participation—in contradiction to the historiography of the nation-state, which has emphasized the importance of winning over the elites and middle-classes for the national project.

From a second perspective and in contrast to their government, the local people (or at least their spokespersons) had several convincing reasons to include Huber. In the letters by his fellow citizens and even in the local police reports, Huber emerges not as a foreigner, but as an integral

part of the community. The correspondence does not indicate whether he spoke Danish or whether he had a strong southern German accent, because language was as insignificant as his—most likely—Catholic faith, at least in the existing sources. Not one document remarks on Huber's religion, even though Salzburg, Austria and southern Bavaria were mostly Catholic whereas Denmark was predominantly Protestant.[28] In 1840, for example, Flensburg had a total of 48 non-Protestant inhabitants, of whom 27 were Catholic (Commission 1842, 210). Aspects that were mentioned included his craftsmanship, his activities for the local newspaper, and his educational background. His schooling in a *Gymnasium* made him part of the »middle class«; as a journeyman he would have found his place in the lower classes.[29] Nevertheless, he quickly established close connections to reputable townspeople. At this time, Flensburg had only two printers with five employees and apprentices (ibid., 79), so that Huber's profession was possibly a desired competence. His participation in Flensburg's community almost certainly allowed him a higher social position than most journeymen usually held. The petition by well-respected citizens shows Huber's inclusion in the local bourgeoisie, given that Nielsen and Schmidt were senate members, Jochimsen was a merchant, and Esmarch was a Councilor of Justice (*Justizrat*) and a physician, i.e. all of them belonged to Flensburg's elite. Huber's skills—and probably his

28 On the one hand, Huber perhaps avoided mentioning his faith because he feared it could hinder his naturalization. For the authorities, on the other hand, his Catholic belief could have been an implicit reason to refuse his application. But even when Huber was drafted, the military authorities did not fill in the column »Religious Denomination.« See: Certified copy by the Royal Bavarian district court in Ebersberg, undated (probably copied before 1842). Since the Protestants had already been forced to leave Salzburg in the 1730s, Huber's family was almost certainly Catholic.

29 In the time and region studied here, class began to replace status (*Stand*). While class was »based on economic criteria« status was shaped by »issues of prestige and esteem.« »However, as both were aspects of social stratification, it was frequently the case that the distinctions became blurred. Status considerations could reinforce class distinctions […] or could cut across them […]« (Morgan 2005, 173).

transnational experience—made him attractive for the economic and political dynamics of the rising bourgeoisie.

A closer look at Nielsen, Schmidt, and Jochimsen, who vouched for Huber, reveals an interesting detail: All of them were members—and at some point leaders—of a local association, called the *Bürgerverein* (in German) or *Borgerforeningen* (in Danish), a liberal, *schleswig-holsteinisch* and later Danish-leaning society (Bram et al. 2010).[30] In the same vein, Nielsen argued for a Danish-oriented economic policy during those years (Vaagt 1983, 287–91). It is important to notice that this »new regionalism—Schleswig-Holsteinism—[…] did not begin as a separatist movement« (Frandsen 2009, 15). Some years after Huber's letter to the king, Christian VIII of Denmark visited the club twice. In a multilingual region, disputed in a so-called battle of nationalities from the 1840s to the twentieth century, the residents of Flensburg upheld a local/regional identity and saw themselves variously as »Danish,« as »German,« or as both. Born in Salzburg, Austria and raised in Bavaria, Huber was not only included in this northern European community. More precisely, he was accepted by burghers who defined themselves (at least to a certain extent) as *schleswig-holsteinisch* and later as Danish.[31] Moreover, the *Flensburger Zeitung* was considered a conservative paper loyal to the Danish king. It was backed by the city's trade association (*Handelsverein*), i.e. by the

30 Jochimsen chaired this organization in 1838, Nielsen in 1844. In the 1850s, the association had about 400 members according to the website www.borgerforeningen-flensborg.de/om-foreningen (accessed June 8, 2016). Miroslav Hroch emphasizes the different social origins of the Danish and of the German patriotic movements in the Schleswig region in 1840s: While the former had a strong peasant element the latter emerged from a bourgeois milieu (Hroch 1985, 117–24). This cannot be said for the *Bürgerverein* / *Borgerforeningen*.

31 The sources do not contain information on Huber's access to this group though it is rather unusual for a migrant to be included in a local community as rapidly as Huber, who had just arrived in October 1841. I assume that Kastrup, whose family seems to have been »Danish,« had probably introduced Huber to the local elite. Huber's work for Flensburg's newspaper could have been another reason.

economic and cultural elite. At least one of Huber's supporters (Nielsen) had also supported Kastrup's petitions to the king to establish the newspaper (Cöppicus-Wex 2001, 137–39, 182–83).

Interestingly enough, none of these aspects were mentioned in the petition although they probably could have furthered Huber's application. Why did neither Huber nor the members of the *Bürgerverein* indicate their close ties to the Danish state? One explanation could be that all involved were certain that these facts were known (even to the king in Copenhagen). Another reason might be that a »national feeling« was irrelevant to belonging. Huber's belonging was constructed along the axes of social status, education, skills, political and public commitment, and gender (as I will argue below). By ignoring citizenship, language, or religion as features of alterity, Flensburg's community evaded the authorities' definition and thereby his exclusion as a stranger. The heterogeneous environment of a port city, where mobile people were a part of daily life, may have been another relevant factor. For (a group of) the townspeople, Huber was not a foreigner, but belonged to them, especially in the social and political meaning of a burgher. All these factors combined facilitated his belonging; his social and economic location (Yuval-Davis 2011, 12).

On the individual level, thirdly, belonging in this case was also shaped through Huber's narrative of being a local (ibid., 14). He wrote several long letters to the king, retelling his story in detail, but never referring to himself as an Austrian or Bavarian subject. He reported that the Bavarian administration had defined him as an alien, through which he had lost Bavaria as his homeland.[32] According to Huber's application, his perception of belonging was related neither to his place of birth nor to a state (nation, kingdom), but he had created a new sense of belonging in Flensburg. Like regular peddlers, who belonged to different places at the same time (Oberpenning 1996), Huber had multiple belongings. In his petition he focused on this specific belonging—»to become a citizen of a town«—explaining the path of his life and his loss of citizenship at great

32 Franz Huber to the king, Flensburg, 10 Aug., 1843, 2; »[…] unschuldigerweise meiner Heimat Baiern nun verlustig gegangen.«

length, because they had led to his desire »to possess a fatherland.«[33] He pleaded consideration of his miserable situation and closed his petition with a request that the king deign to include him among his faithful subjects.[34] He also emphasized his schooling and financial solidity, while he kept quiet about his journalism and writing.[35] The government proved uninterested in these facts, but then again, it did not expect tales of national belonging.

Gender, migration, and belonging

All three levels—state, local community, individual migrant—and narrative strategies have however one aspect in common: They all refer to ideas of masculinity, especially the difference between settled and mobile men. Gender research on the nineteenth century has shown how civil society was defined as masculine with a close connection of professional, political as well as sexual identities (e.g., Kessel 2003, 2–3). Not only were ideas of masculinity used to negotiate social positioning, but homosocial networks, like political associations, played an important role in gaining a status of belonging. At the same time, masculinity often did not need to even be mentioned, because it operated as a norm (Dudink and Hagemann 2004, 4). Although none of the documents directly reflects on the prevailing gender order, Huber's (mobile) life course was highly gendered. In general, only boys and men received a grammar school education or learned a trade (as typesetter) and practiced it during long years as a journeyman. Participation in local politics and culture, too, were based on gender-specific connotations. Moreover, migration was linked to particular images of masculinity. The idea of sedentary masculinity was interconnected with concepts of nation, citizenship, race, and class as Todd DePastino has discussed in his study on homelessness (DePastino

33 Franz Huber to the king, Flensburg, 26 Oct. 1842, 3.

34 Ibid.; »[…] unter die Zahl Ihrer getreuen Unterthanen auch mich aufzunehmen geruhen.«

35 Huber also published poems on the occasion of the fourth centenary of the invention of printing, but a contemporary reviewer criticized the poor quality of his poetry (Review 1844; anon.).

2003). The question of who belonged (to a state) or not was also governed according to concepts of heteronormativity (Canaday 2009).

Historical (as well as contemporary) debates on male migrants often concentrate on young, single, unemployed, and poor men as a presumed threat of law and order (e.g., Scheibelhofer 2011). But in fact, many male migrants either had specific skills, valuable goods, functioning networks, or some money. In her analysis of the social construction of masculinities, Raewyn Connell explains that social inequalities are not only constitutive for relations between men and women, but also for relations between men and men, as different masculinities are related to, or are an effect of, different social positionings (Connell 1995). In the nineteenth century, public agencies and migrant men themselves referred to shifting notions of masculinity inasmuch as migrant masculinity was conceived as a marginalized or precarious masculinity that differed from a hegemonic bourgeois masculinity. Both arguments—masculinity as a resource versus masculinity as a disadvantage or even danger—were topoi of this era's discourse with its distinction between »proper« and »inadequate« men. In 1838, for example, German policy makers discussed new rules for residence permits:

> It happens often enough that a respectable man, the head of a family, who had tried to legally supply himself and his family with income and food, is expelled like a suspicious vagrant because he is not able to acquire a residence permit […]. The fate of such a homeless man is lamentable and does not seem to be in accord with federal law.[36]

36 Proceedings of the German Federal Convention, 11th meeting, 15 June 1838, § 147, 364–66, Prussian Secret State Archives (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, GStA), I. HA Rep. 77, 226, Nr. 96, Heimatscheine; »Oft soll ein unbescholtener Mann, ein Familienvater, der sich und den Seinigen auf rechtlichem Wege Erwerb und Nahrung zu verschaffen suchte, gleich einem verdächtigen Landstreicher, über die Grenze gewiesen werden, weil es ihm nicht gelingt, einen Heimathschein anzuschaffen […]. Das Schicksal eines solchen Heimathlosen ist

In its opposition of the »respectable man« with the »suspicious vagrant,« the text (re-)produces (new) patterns of masculinity. The officials clarified that a mobile, but poor individual could still be a decent man. In Huber's case, the authorities painted an ambivalent picture of the migrant as a suspicious writer, a mobile journeyman who had brought himself into the position of supplicant. The officials reported that Huber had been documented sufficiently and acted inconspicuously in Hamburg. In Flensburg, he was entirely unknown and had to be reminded several times to present the missing papers. The denial of settlement, concluded the administration, was his own fault.[37] The repeated suggestion that Huber might be a swindler—combined with his journalism—made him appear rather dubious. In this way he symbolized a marginalized migrant masculinity.[38]

In contrast, Huber's own narration of his life course and of his social position in Flensburg made use of existing patterns of a bourgeois masculinity—as a strategy to reach his goal. He and his local supporters tried to portray the migrant as an honorable man who represented a hegemonic role model. Kastrup, for example, praised Huber's character and attitude, referring to his service for the public good, which had won him recognition by the locals.[39] Huber himself not only described his education and apprenticeship as a bourgeois profession, he also depicted his decade on the move as an opportunity to go out into the big, wide world as well as to serve the people.[40] He described himself as innocent

beklangenswerth und scheint mit den Bundesgesetzen nicht im Einklange zu stehen.«

37 Statement (draft) of the Royal Chancery, Copenhagen [?], 07 [01?] Apr. 1843.

38 See footnotes 19 and 20.

39 Asmus Kastrup to the king, Flensburg, 26 Oct. 1842; »[…] gemeinnützige Tätigkeiten.«

40 Franz Huber to the king, Flensburg, 26 Oct. 1842, 2; »[…] ein bürgerliches Geschäft zu erlernen und die Wanderschaft zu ergreifen. Dies stimmte auch völlig zu meinen Absichten[?] und […] dem lebhaften

and faithful.[41] Huber then referred to his standing within a civic industry (*bürgerliches Gewerbe*), that is to say to his livelihood. With these terms he referenced burghers' rights as a member of the township as a political organization, even though he probably never formally gained the *Bürgerrecht*.[42] Right before Huber closed his petition with his wish for settlement, he denoted his meeting with Kastrup as »a fortunate coincidence« and mentioned his acquaintance with a young woman with whom he fell in love.[43] Both his financial and professional solidity as well as his plans to marry corresponded with the ideal of a bourgeois masculinity. His cultural and economic capital influenced Huber's belonging as much as his migrant, but »honorable« masculinity.

Conclusion

In the first half of the nineteenth century, questions of belonging were increasingly negotiated along lines of mobility, causing varying dynamics. First, state and regional administrations established new patterns and practices of controlling migration as well as of (not) granting settlement. In this case, the government did not take Huber's economic and cultural assets into consideration. This macro level reflects ruling discourses, policies, and structures which were closely linked to questions of power. Second, belonging was as much an element of daily life as it was a

Trieb; [sic] Gottes schöne weite Welt […] kennen zu lernen und im praktischen Leben der Menschheit nützlich zu werden.«

41 See footnotes 26, 32, and 33.

42 Huber is not mentioned in Flensburg's registry of burghers during the years 1840 to 1846 (Kraack 1999). Foreigners applying for Bürgerrecht either had to present a certificate of residence of their home parish or had to deposit a bond to cover the eventual expenses of poor relief (Vaagt 1983, 266).

43 Franz Huber to the king, Flensburg, 26 Oct. 1842, 3; »Ein glücklicher Zufall ließ mich die Bekanntschaft des Buchdruckers A. S. Kastrup in Flensburg machen […]. […] ja zuletzt sogar eine Jungfrau in den Weg führte, die sich enschließen konnte, den Verliebten auf seinem einsamen Lebenswege zu begleiten.«

practice—for the local residents, so-called strangers belonged to the community. Huber's local inclusion worked through social status and gender, so that this micro-level, too, acted as a power structure. Third, being elements and agents of transcultural processes, migrants themselves developed strategies of belonging. This enabled Huber to belong on a local level, even if he was excluded on the state level. Through such constructions of belonging, some migrants were able to participate and to gain privileges.

This migrant biography allows some insights in the mechanisms of belonging and yet it in itself is not conclusive. More work needs to be done in migration history to study belonging and its various (historical) factors (social locations, attachment, discourses). Migration and transcultural life courses can demonstrate that social differences in this era were structured through conflicting politics and practices of belonging. Even though most European countries had begun to establish a regime of migration control, the transformation towards a system of a national citizenship was not yet enforced. Local communities (at least to a degree) still determined whether foreigners were allowed to stay. Social, political, and economic membership claims and rights differed on the state and local level. Despite the fact that Huber, the citizens of Flensburg, and the government had different reasons for and strategies of creating positions of belonging, none of them drew on the nation as a valid concept. At the same time, the invention of belonging by Flensburg's residents and Huber himself functioned along the axes of class, education/profession, and gender.

Like Huber, many migrants sought permission to stay in their new region of residence. Naturalization files reflect the constant intersection of socio-economic interests, labor market forces, the political context, opposing concepts of citizenship, and common perceptions of migration and migrant masculinities. This is especially evident in regions where economic networks, politics, language, and religion transcended state borders as in the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Practices and narrative strategies of both administrations and migrants reference ideas of belonging and of alterity as influential elements of social organization. The power of »making belong« was not only shaped by government

institutions or political discourses, but also by local communities and (migrant) individuals.

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